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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
@
A Angstroms
AC Alternating Current
ACE Acceptance Checkout Equipment
ACQSS Acquisition Sun Sensor
ACS Attitude Control System
ADP Acceptance Data Package
ALSA Astronaut Life Support Assembly
AM Airlock Module
APCS Attitude & Pointing Control System
ARC Ames Research Center
ASAP Auxiliary Storage and Playback -,
ATM Apollo Telescope Mount
ATMDC Apollo Telescope Mount Digital Computer
BTU British Thermal Units
CBRM Charger Battery Regulator Module
CCB Change Control Board
CCOH Combined Contaminants, Oxygen, Humidity
CCS Counnand Communication System '_
C&D Control and Display :
CEI Contract End Item
! CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment
CG Center of Gravity -_
CL Center line
i Cluster SWS plus CSM (used synonymously wlth "Orbital Assembly")
i CM Command Module
CMG Control Moment Gyro
CMGS/TACS Control Moment Gyros Subsystem/Thruster Attitude Control
Subsystem
C/O Checkout
COAS Crew Optical Alignment Sight
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
COFW Certificate of Flight Worthiness
COQ Certificate of Qualification i
cps cycles per second
CRS Cluster Requiremen_s Specification i
CSM Command Service Module
C&W Caution and Warning !
DA Deployment Assembly i
db Decibel i
dc Direct Current _.
DCS Digital Command System i
DCSU DigitalComputer Switching Unit I
DDA Drawing Departure Authorisation
DDAS Digital Data Address System 1
des. Degree
DTCS Digital Test Com.tnd System
DTMS Digital Test Measuring System
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0ECP Engineering Change Proposal
ECS Environmental Control System
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
EPCS Experiment Pointing Control Subsystem
EPS Electrical Power System
ERD Experiment Requirement Doc_,ment
ESE Electrical Support Equipment
ESS Experiment Support System
ETR Eastern Test Range
EVA Extravehicular Activity
°F Degrees Farenhelt
FAL Fixed Airlock Shroud
fc foot candles
FM Frequency Modulation
fps feet per second
FSS Fine Sun Sensor
ft. Feet
g Acceleration due to Earth's Gravity
GFE Government Furnished Equipment
Grms G Level, root mean square
GSE Ground Support Equipment
H20 Water
lie Helium
HSS Habitability Support System
Hz Hertz
ICD Interface Control Document
IOP In urbit Plane
IU Instrumentation Unit
IU/TACS Instrument Unit/Thruster Attitude Control Subsystem
IVA Intra-Vehlcular Activity
JSC Johnson Spacecraft Center
KHz Kilohertz
KSC Kennedy Spaceflight Center
LCC Launch Control Center
LCG Liquid Cooled Garment
LH2 Liquid Hydrogen
LO2 Liquid Oxygen _:
LRC Langley Research Center
LV Launch Vehicle _
LVDC Launch Vehicle Digltal Computer
MDA Multiple Docking Adapter
MGSE Maintenance _round Support Equlpme_t
MHz Megahertz
MRD Mission Requirements Document ._j
MS Margin of Safety
m/see. Millisecond
MSFC M&rshall Space Flight Centez
MSFN Manned Space Flight Network
MSOB Manned Spacecraft Operations Building
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N2 Nitrogen
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Adminis_ration
NHB NASA Handbook
NIC_ Nickel Cadmium
NM Nautical Miles
02 Oxygen
OA Orbital Assembly (SWS and CSM - Used synonymously with
"Cluster")
OWS Orbital Workshop
AP Differential Pressure
PCM Pulse Code Modulation
PCS Pointing Control System
PMC Post Manufacturing Checkout
POD Planning Operational Dose
psi pounds per square inch
psis pounds per square inch absolute
psld pounds per square inch differential
Q Heat
RCS Reaction Control System
RF Radio Frequency
, S-IB First Sta_e of Saturn I-B Launch Vehicle
S.-ll Saturn II
SAL Scientific Air Lock
SAS Solar Array System
SCN Specification Change Notice
SL Skylab Program
SM Service Module
SWS Saturn Workshop (PSIMDA/ATM/AM/OWS/IUIATM Deployment
Assembly)
AT Differential Temperature
TACS Thruster Attitude Control System
TCRD Test and Checkout Requirements Document
TCSCD Test and Checkout Specification and Criteria Document
UV Ultra Violet
VAB Vehicle Assembly Building (HI-Bay)
Vdc Volts direct current
VHF Very High Frequency
WMS Waste Ma,tagement System
WSS Water Subsystem
Z-LVfE) Z Axis in Local Vertical (Earth Resources Attitude Mode)
Z-LV(R) Z axis in Local Vertical (Rendezvous Attitude Mode)
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SECTION 3 - RELIABILITY PROGRAM
3.1 OBJECTIVE N_D METHODOLOGY - The principle objectives of the MDAC Orbital
Workshop (OWS) Reliability Frogramwere to provide assurance that:
o System designs contained maximum inherent reliability consistent
with Skylab (SL) progrsml requirements and constraints;
o The as-built hardware retained its inherent design reliability;
o The OWS provided a reliable interface w_th other SL modules and/or
equipment.
To attain these objectives a methodology was formulated premised on \
Apollo Applications Reliability and Quality Assurance Program Plan
(NASA Document NHB 5300.5), Formal Reliability Program Plan, Saturn
S-IVB System (MDAC Document SM-h6863A) and other MDAC prior
program experience. The subsequent formulation of this methodology
culminated in the Orbital Workshop Reliability Program Plan (MDAC
Document DAC 56701A) which was prepared for the NASA under Contract
NAS9-6555, Schedule II and submitted under MSFC-DRL-171, Line Item
No. GO3.
The MDAC Reliability Program for OWS provided guidance, disciplines,
and assessment appliei to all phases, from design through test and
delivery, to achieve a high cuality, reliable, and safe OWS. MDAC organized
the Skylab/Orbital Workshop (SL/OWS) P_'ogram in a manner that assured
that reliability, quality, and safety requirements were determined and . _.
satisfied throughout all phases of contract performance. The salient
feature of this program was an integrated engineering effort among
the technology disciplines of Effectiveness (Reliability, System Safety
_-i
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and Maintainabil_ty), Design, Crew Systems and Logistics Support.
The following paragraphs describe these interrelated functions and
activities that enhanced the successful achievement of the Skylab
mission. Figure 3.1-i displays the interrelationship of these functions.
t
3.2 RELIABILITY - The Reliability Program was designed to assure delivery
of a reliable system capable of successfully performing the planned
OWS mission. The basic approach was to concentrate attention on hardware
items critical to crew safety, mission success or launch operations.
Table 3.2-1 presents the Reliability Program functions for the three basic
development phases. Table 3.2-2 presents a list of criticality categories.
The following paragraphs briefly describe the various reliability
program Casks and associated items that comprised the OWS reliability
effort.
3.2.1 System ReliabilityAnaiysis - The basic analytical effort was the Fail-
ure Mode and Effect Analysis (F)_EA). The FMEA for all mission phases
used MSFC Drawing 10M30111A, Parts I and II, as a guideline except that
all analyses were done on a single failure effect rather than a multi-
failure effect basis. However, functions that were not critical single
failure _oints only because of redundancy were identified and included
in the documentation. Certain groundrules, as follows, applied to the
preparation of the FMEA:
o MSFC Document IN-P&VE-V-67-6 was used as a guideline for GSE
_:alysisJ One major exception was that. the _nalysis began at
rollout rather than at T-2_ hours.
o The analysis nor=all_ progressed to the replaceable component
level. However, if the occurrence of a component's failure mode
3-2
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TABLE 3.2-1
RELIABILITY PR_;RAM Fb-,CTIONS BY DEVELOPMENT PHASE
: _ent Phase Reliability _ogram Function_
Conceptual Design Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects
_utlysis (F_F._)
Reliability trade-off s_.udies ._
Internal Design Reviews (IDR 's)
!
_ Detail Design Updated ,_l_EA's, Criticelity Analyses
(CA's). establistment of Mission/Safety _
Critical items (M/SCI), and establish-
ment of Critical Components List (CCL) _
: and Retention Rationale.
° Workshop Design Review (WDR) :
Supplier reliability requirmnents
Drawing and specification approval
- Parts and materials usage control
Production, Test, and Test and assessment document, c_nponent
Operational Use acceptance status, and certificate of
i component acceptance
Test procedure approval, test monitoring,
and test report approval
Review of failure reports, failure
analyses and corrective action i
, _ Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) and
" ! drawing cLange approval _
" 3-b
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TABLE 3.2-2
CRITICALITY CATEGORIES
General SFP
Category Failure Description Category
1 Single failures of flight hardware which c_uld 1
rem_It in loss of human life or incapacitatln6
injury.
11t Failures of redundant or backup flight hardware -
which exposes a single failure point, the subsequent
failure of which would be categorized "i."
2 Single failures of flight hardware which could 2
result in loss of mission or inability to achieve
other primary mission objectives but would not
create conditions hazardous to the safety of the
astronauts.
2R Failures of redundant or backup flight hardware -
which exposes a single failure point, the subsequent
failure of which would be categorized "2."
: 2B Failure of flight equipment which could cause a 2B
launch reschedule.
A Failures of MDAC supplied GSE which interfaces with A
crew life support f_mctions or system functions
during countdown and launch which could create
hazardous conditions adverse to the safety of the
ground/flight crew or the vehicle.
B Failures of MDAC supplied GSE which interfaces with B
crew life support functions or system functions
during countdown and launch which could either
result in an inability to achieve primary mission
objectives or cause a launch reschedule.
5 All other functional failures.
NOTE: Criticality category is based on the effect of the observed failure
without knowledge o_ t_,le cause" The failure must be considered to
occur randomly. Categorization is based on a "worst case" analysis
of the failed configur_tion and also of any similarly constructed
configurations subject to the same mode. .--
3-5
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Jwould have created a crew safety hazard or lead to an orbital
mission abort and a contingency procedure was not available or
planned, the F_A was extended downward until those circuits/
parts which were the lowest level SFP's were identified.
o A schematic and logic block diagram accompanied the FMFA to
identify the subsystem components, their function, their depen-
dencies and their input-output requirements. Each function was
analyzed for the following failure modes and their impact on the
system.
A. Premature operation
B. Failure to operate at prescribed time
i C. Failure to cease operation at prescribed tine
D. Failure during operation
J
o Prelaunch operations were analyzed to identify those failures
of 0WS equipment not detectable on the ground which would have
resulted in a mission loss after launch. The possibility of
eliminating these conditions if identified was investigated.
A. Identification of Single Failure Points - A single failure point
(SFP) was defined as a single item of hardware whose failure
would have adversely affected crew safety or resulted in loss of
0WS mission or primary mission objectives. Structural members
¢
which performed no function other than to provide structural
integrity were excluded. Certain ground rules were established
for determining whether or not specific failure modes were to be
classified as SFP's, These were as follows: _!
t
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I i/ A failure mode was not an SFP i£ either of the followingconditions existed:
a. Redundancy was available where two or more independent
failures must occur before a critica/ effect results.
Redundancy was defined as two or more elements available
to provide the same function, either simultaneously
(active) or by selection through auto_ltic or manual
switching (standby) by ground command or astronaut
actions. When simple redundancy (only two elements
to perform a given function) existed where otherwise
the function would be a critical SFP, the FMEA contained
the effect of failure, both with and without the redun-
dancy.
b. A backup was available to accomplish the required func-
tion. A backup was defined as a contingency procedure
available for use which required unscheduled astronaut
actions (other than simple manual switchover) to render
the systegn to an acceptable condition for use. Use of
orbital spares was included.
i, 2/ Loss of any or all experiments data was no_ considered critical,
Loss of any other data was considered critical only if the data
was mandatory for continuing the Skylab mission.
Z
-i
S/ Leakage failures resulting in loss of OWS atmoephere overboard
were categorized as possible mission loss If the maximum
leakage rate caused a loss greater than five pounds per day
_ with all other leakage paths within limits. If the maximum
_ 3-7
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leakage rate vas sufficient to cause the Caution and Warning
System to be energized, the failure was categorized as a
crew hazard.
k/ A failure in the Solar Array System (SAS) must have reduced
: available electrical power more than 12-1/2 percent to have
been classified as an SFP.
5/ Loss of one refrigeration loop, loss of one heating and vent-
ilation duct and one electrical bus out were not considered
to result in loss of mission and thus any single failure
causing one of these conditions was not classified as critical.
i B. Identification of Launch Critical Components - A Launch Critical
' Component (LCC) was defined as a component not classified as an SFP,
but whose failure during launch pad operations would have resulted
in a launch reschedule. A launch reschedule was defined as a delay
of sufficient duration to require detanking of propellants and re-.
tanking to a new countdown sequence. LCC's met the following
criteria:
1/ Functions actually operating prior to launch.
2/ Detection capability existed. This information was stated
with detection method and measurement number if applicable.
3/ Only tl,ose failures which would have caused a launch reschedule
(detank and retank) were to be included. Launch delay items
were excluded.
C. Caution and Warning System Analysis - The Caution and Warning
[
:_ ;
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(C&W) Syste_ _s analyzed to identify those safety and hazard
monitoring system components which, if individually did not function
as required, i.e., positively indicating a failure in the operating
system being monitored, would have caused a crew hazard.
D. Critical Redundant/Backup Components - During the performance of
the F_, components which, if it were not for redundancy or avail-
ability of a backup means to perform their function, would have
been an 8FP were identified. Single redundancy only was considered.
If two or more unrelated failures were required before a critical
SFP was created, the component did not receive this classification.
- E. Contingency Analysis - Concurrent with the preparation of the FMEA
a contingency analynis was implemented. This analysis identified
those contingency actions available to the astronauts to implement
_ in the event hardware malfunctions occurred. This was essentially
a feedback operation, where the FMEA identified the need for a
contingency procedure and when the _rocedure gas created and the
facilities plann_._ for its performance, the failure mode in the F_
was downgraded to its ultimate effect on the system. In this manner,
: the final critical SFP list contained those failure modes which
represented a degree of risk because they were still contained in
the system.
F. Risk Acceptance Rationale - A statement Justifying acceptance of
the associated risk gas prepared for the following hardware after
_ application of the contingency analysis described above:
_, i/ SFP's with a criticality category of 1 or 2. The design goal
_ was to eliminate, if at all practicable, all Category 1 SFP's.
; 3-9
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; 2/ Launch Critical Components with a criticality category of 2B.
3/ GSE with a criticality category of A or B.
; !
4/ Caution and Warning System Components identified as described
in Paragraph C. above. There is no SFP criticality category
for these components because by definition they were not SFP's
for the total OW$ system. They were, however, SFP's ror the
C&W system itself. These components complied with Criticality
Category iS as defined in Annex A of MSFC Program Directive
; NPD 8020._, dated 16 July 1970.
G. Criticality Analysis - A Criticality Analysis was performed for all
criticality i, 2, and A SFP's and criticality B SFP's Affecting
primary mission objectives. This analysis used the factors con-
rained in MSFC Drawing 10M3OIIIA and IN-P&VE-67.6.
These factors were used to determine a Criticality Number (CN) for
each SFP. Criticality, in this connotation, was that portion of
: : the unreliability of an SFP associated with its failure mode which
L
could have resulted in crew hazard, mission loss or primary mission
objectives loss. The CN itself, represents the expected number of
failures attributed to the SFP in one million mission attempts. If
a given SFP could have resulted in more than one of these effects,
a separate CN was computed for each SFP for each resulting effect.
H. Criticality Ranking - Criticality ranking was done to provide a
: convenient comparison of SFP's for their respective contributions
• toward crew/mission/primary objective loss. In the comparison,
it was important to treat criticality numbers relatively rather
3-10
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than by actual quantitative values. The value of the rankin_ was
that it identified the areas where the most unreliability existed
as a guide to product improvement design efforts.
I. Government Furnished Property (GFP) and Experiment Data - The OWS
FMEA and criticality analysis considered C_vernment Furnished
Property, including OWS corollary experiments. The Contractor
included the analysis of GFF to the same depth and to the same
criteria and groundrules as Contractor furnished equipment providing
the necessary data was made available to the Contractor by NASA/MSFC.
J. Mission/Safety Critical Items (M/$CI) - The main objective of the
" analytical reliability task described in this section was to identify "
those items of hardware critical to the OWS mission and eliminate
them or minimize their impact through the design and contingency
1
action process. The associated risk for those remaining must be
accepted. To help provide Justification for this acceptance, a
M/SCI list was created such that these critical items could receive
special program disciplines during the design review, production,
test, assembly and checkout phases of the program. The following
groundrules applied:
]/ The M/SCI list contained all SFP's of Category i, 2, A or B.
The llst also included SFP's havin_ a criticality of 2B at
the discretion of technical management. Non-SFP's were also
included if they performed essential functions (though not .
critical), were advanced designs pushin_ the state-of-the-art,
could have caused some degree of crew discomfort, or were in
the more critical redundant systems. With this selectivity,
3-11
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these special program disciplines were imposed in a cost
effective man-,mr.
2/ The M/SCI was normally at the replaceable component level.
The level was higher or lower, however, if more convenient and
did not prevent the implementation of the necessary disciplines.
3/ Electrical cables and piping runs were excluded.
!,/ Structural itens having no function other than providing
structural integrity were excluded.
The M/SCI list was maintained internally by the Contractor as a
Design Requirements Drawing. Additions or deletions to the llst
were made by Reliability Engineering to continually reflect the
latest FMEA.
3.2.2 Design Support - Premised on the output of the system reliability ana-
lysis effort, Reliability Engineering provided support to the design
technologies in the generation of criteria and guidelines necessary to
the development of a safe and reliable OWS.
A. Orblt_l Malntainabillty/Malntenance Evaluation - The analytical
effort described in Paragraph 3.2.1 was used as a tool to determine
' what hardware items should have maintainability provisions as a
design criteria and what maintenance provisions should be available
to the astronaut to maximize their presence in order to attain a
successful and non-hazardous mission. The feasibility or providing
useful orbital maintenance was enhanced by the presence of the
Caution and Warning System.
3-12
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The maintainability/maintenance task was a Joint effort among
Reliability Engineering, Crew Systems, Logistics Support and the
Design Technologies. The effectiveness engineering s.,pport of
this effort included the following tasks:
i/ Identification of M/SCI's offering potential for improved
mission capability through orbital maintenance.
2/ Identification of critical failure modes correctable through
orbital maintenance.
3/ Assurance that maintainability as a design criteria was im-
plemented through the design review process and day-to-day
communication with designers.
These recommendations for orbital maintenance and the design fea-
tures provided to accommodate this orbital maintenance were used
to :
o Establish in-orbit spares requireaents.
o Establish the tools required for performing orbital maintenance.
o Assist in the preparation of crew contingency procedures which
utilized this orbital maintenance capability.
B. Parts and Materials Program - The Contractor implemented a parts
and materials program for the selection_ control, and application
review of parts and materials for itens used in the OWS. Selection
of electronic and electro-mechanical parts and materials for the
OWS was based on proven capability of each part and material for
q
its application. It was the Contractor's _oal to minimize and
3-13
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control the existing number of parts and material types through
the selection and subsequent design review process.
Where adequate specifications for parts and materials did not
exist, the Contractor prepared them. These specifications were
responsive to the requirements which resulted in a reliable system.
These requirements were imposed in the form of readily measurable
values which included:
o Dimensional requirements
o Performance requirements
o Quality assurance requirements (inspection and production
acceptance functional testing_
o Special screenin_ requirements which may include x-ray, seal
leek tests, burn-in cycling
!
o Manufacturing process restrictions or special controls
o Toxicity and/or fl_mmability requirements
o Protective packaging
The adequacy of existing parts and materials test data were rev-
iewed to assure that development and qualification testing was
performed under environmental conditions equal to or more severe
than anticipated in OWS applications. Test data were reviewed to
assure that performance requirements and failure criteria were
also applicable to those in planned OWS usage. Where adequate
data was not available, the Contractor designed and conducted
tests to provide the necessary data.
i 3-1h
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C. ,_artsUsage Control (Approved Parts List)
I/ MDAC Fabricated Items - An Approved Parts List (APL) was pre-
pared utilizing the data derived from prior programs, parts
i application studies and testing. This APL governed parts
application for _t0ACfabricated flight and GSE items. It
contained those parts specifications defined in paragraph B.
which required that MDAC fabricated items contain screened
electrical, electronic and electro-mechanical parts to insure
?
maximum use reliability.
2/ Supplier Procured Items - Supplier procured items (higher
than the part level) had the following parts usage controls
imposed.
a. On all flight items, the procurement documentation
required that each supplier submit a complete parts list,
including his procurement specifications, to MDAC for
review and approval. Chal_ges thereto were subject to prior
MDAC approval. The order of precedence was defined.
b. On all applicable supplier procured M/SCI's and selected
supplier procured non-M/SCI's (both above the par_ level),
a specification was imposed which contained requirements
for selection, environmental screening and testing, quality
assurance documentation and evaluation of the electrical, *
electronic and electromechanical parts to be used. This
requirement applied to lower tier suppliers dovn to the t
part level.
3-15
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D. Parts Derating Requirements
i/ MDAC Fabricated Items - Electrical, electronic and electro-
mechanical parts used i- MDAC fabricated flight hardware items
were derated in accordance with established guidelines as re-
quired to achieve the long life capability of the OWS system.
2/ Supplier Procured Items - Selected supplier procured items,
basically those containing electrical, electronic and electro-
mechanical parts, had derating requirements imposed in that
the derating criteria used by the supplier was subject to review
and approval by MDAC. Items included in this parts derating
effort included but was not limited to M/SCI's. The selection
was made on a cost-effective basis considering past parts
problems encountered in the Saturn/Apollo Program and the con-
trols necessary to prevent their recurrence.
E. Design Review Program - The Design Review Program for the OWS was
comprehensive and included several types of reviews depending upon
the level of presentation and point in the development cycle. The
program included informal reviews within the design technologies,
formal design reviews by a single review board and the basic
drawing _elease system which ensured review and approval by
appropriate technologies and agencies during drawing release. The
timing of design reviews and the drawing release system are depict-
ed in Figure 3.2.2-1. Informal design reviews were held at the drawing
board and the branch level to resolve component and subsystem
design probl_s so that alternate approaches could be evaluated.
Formal design reviews were conducted at the system level to ensure
that the system met design and performance requirements. The
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formal design reviews were of two types:
I/ Internal Design Review (IDR) - An IDR was a review of the
conceptual design following the NASA Preliminary Requirements
Review (PRR) and prior to a Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
with NASA. This review was held during preliminary design
development to ensure in house coordination between the tech-
nologies and the program offices (e.g., Design Office, Project,
Quality Assurance).
2/ Workshop Design Review (WDR) - A WDRwas a review of the final
design as depicted on engineering drawings. This type of
review was held following the PDR and preceding the Critical
Design Review (CDR) with NASA, and at a time when substantial
numbers of production drawings were available. The review
ensured coordination between the technologies at the detail
level and ensured that production designs met PDR updated
requirements. The design reviews were conducted by the Contrac-
tor on each OWS system. These reviews considered the design,
system requirements, engineering analyses, reliability, crew
safety, crew interfaces, systems interfaces, maintainability,
spares provisioning, materials and processes, test data,
producibility, and quality assurance provisions. During the
review, presentations were ma_e to a formally constituted :
!
Design Review Board whose membership possessed the technical
I capability and authority in the aforementioned review consid-
[ eration areas. Some of the major objectives of the Design
[ •
Review Board deliberations included elimination of SFP's, :
chax_ing failure categories, and minimizing the attendant risks :of M/SCI's. Documentation of the reviews included decisionb _ "_
-18
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and agreements, any action items, and assiRnments.
A large part of the supporting documentation for the review was
obtained from FMEA's, specification reviews and parts and materials
?rogram activities.
F. Design Specification Review - Reliability Engineering reviewed and
approved all M/SCI design specifications and drawings to assure
that they included necessary provisions for reliability, maintain-
ability and crew safety. This was in addition to a review by other
analytical agencies for consideration of predicted environments,
operating loads and safety margins (derating factors). The check
list for this revie_ covered:
o Proper reliability requirements specification callout
o Proper operating £nvirorments specified
o Output performance specified and compatible with the FMEA
o Adequate test requirements and test data documentation.
Revisions to these specifications and drawings in the form of
Engineering Orders (EO's) were also reviewed and approved to assure
maintenance of the rL_uired design integrity.
G. Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) Review - All ECP's were re_'iewed
to the maxL_um extent possible with the design definition existing
at the time of review. The following points were covered in this
review.
o Effect on criticality
3-19
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o Effect 3n single failure points
o Effect on systems safety
o Effect on redline parameters
After ECP approval, additional Reliability Engineering analysis
was accomplished to the point of design release to support the
design drawing and specification approval function.
H. Supplier Reliability Requirements - Procurement documentation for
M/SCI's required that the supplier plan and implement an engineer-
ing reliability discipline %'hich influenced the inhouse design
process in the same manner as if this work was done vithinMDAC.
The suppliers were required to selectively provide the following
data as evidence of their analytical engineering reliability
activity.
o A program plan containing such elements as organization,
task descriptions and schedules
o A Failure Modes Cause Analysis
o Failure Mode Probability
o Specific design measures taken to minimize the probability
of occurrence of these failure modes
o A Joint MDAC-supplier design review to critique the _uppliers
design drawings and specifications. Test data and provisions -
for orbital repair/replacement.
Certain M/SCI items did not require all of the elements described
3-20
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7above. Therefore, the requirements imposed on each M/SCI supplier
L
was tailored to meet the need for the item being supplied.
3.2.3 Production and Test Support - The primary reliability effort in support
; of production and test was aimed at assuring that the as-built hardware
attained and retained its inherent design reliability. In accomplish-
t
ing this goal, Reliability actively participatea in the functions
described in this section.
A. Review of Test Plans, Requirements, Procedures and Reports -
Rel_ability Engineering reviewed and approved all Mission/Safety
Critical Items (M/SCI) Specification Control Drawings (SCD), Test
: Control Drawings (TCD), Tesz Procedure Drawings (TPD), MDAC and
Subcontractor Test Plans, Production Acceptance Test Requirements
Drawings (PATRD), Production Acceptance Test Procedures (PATP),
test reports, and changes thereto.
t
The SCD, TCD, and P_TRD were drawings originated by the cognizant
Design Technologies to specify verification of design requirements
by testing. The TPD, APTP, and Subcontractor Test Plans, were
: drawings originated by agencies outside of DesiKn Engineering,
which reflected the procedures used to meet the requirements of
the engineering drawings.
Reliability participated in the definition, formulation and
approval of these drawings for the purpose of assuring that the
design and conduct of the test established t) susceptibility to -%
critical failure modes.
B. Electronic Module Screening - Reliabillty, early in the OWS Program
Y
3-21
51974020219-059
conducted an investigation to determine if, based on previous
program experience, environmental screening of electronic
modules would be beneficial and cost effective and if
so what selection criteria should be used. The results of this
investigation were affirmative and led to the development of
Product Acceptance Test Requirements drawing Vehicle Circuit
Modules Screeni_ (IB79368).
The affirmative recommendation for inclusion of post manufactur-
ing controlled screening tests on selected electrical/electronic
modules was based on the following rationale:
1. An investigation of SIVB Electrical Hardware Supplementary
Failure Analyses disclosed approximately 10 percent of module
functional anomalies occurred after the module post-encapsul-
ation Production Acceptance Test (PAT). This test customarily
does not include environmental tests.
2. Reliability of the module would be increased by reducing the
portion of the overall module failure rate attributed to
fabrication-induced anomalies.
3. Extended operational requirements of the Orbital Workshop
(OWS) necessitated every effort be made to eliminate infant
mortalility prior to module operation.
_. Other studies showed additional corrective action, other
than upgrading workmanship and inspection techniques was
needed.
Each module was considered independently to determine what post- i
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manufacturing screening tests the module would be subjected to,
e.g., thermal-cycling, operstion turn-in, low-level vibration.
etc. Determining factors in this decision were:
: i. Complexity of the mod,,ie.
2. Type of piece parts contained in the module and the type of
)
internal structure, i.e., P.C. boards, l.C.'s etc.
1 7-
3. Function of module in the OWS.
• The basic investigation consisted of research of SIVB Supple-
mentary Failure Analysis (SFA) files. Of the 173 electrical SFA's
T
in the file, 18 functional anomalies met all of the following
conditions:
i. Failures occurred after the module final PAT, i.e., in the
system, on the stage. .
2. Use of a screened piece part would not have precluded the
failures occurring.
3. The anomaly would have been detected by a controlled screen-
ing test of the module.
h. Past corrective actions were primarily related to the areas
of manufacturing and inspection.
Thus, the research disclosed approximately i0 percent of those
electrical SFA's reviewed were performed on modules that contained
• either design or fabrication anomalies that would have been
i
detected by controlled screenin_ tests. Those anomalies consisted
3-23
1974020219-061
of:
i. Missed or inadequate welds.
2. Poor solder Joints.
3. Handling damage to a piece part during the next assembly
fabrication.
h. Wrong value piece part installed.
5. Piece part misinstalled (i.e., wrong polarity of capacitor).
6. Installation damage to a piece part during next assembly
fabrication that was compounded by encapsulation stresses.
7. Marginal design.
Since reliability of a module is determined by the failure rates
of the internal piece parts, design plus deratinf_ practices, and
fabrication induced anomalies it was concluded that the relia-
bility of the module would be increased in all t!rF_ areas if con-
trolled screening tests were performed on the module. The most
significant improvement was in the area of fabricatlon-induced
anomalies. The second most significant improvement was in the
design and derating area.
The research also showed that since more complex modules are most !
susceptible to fabrlcation-lnduced anomalies and certain piece
parts are more susceptible to fabrication-induced damage, all
c
i modules should not have screening tests. Also, the modules sel-
ected need not have all screen tests performed on them. This was 1
I
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dependent on complexity and the internal piece parts.
C. Loose Particle Detection Test (LPDT) - A loose particle detection
test (LPDT) was imposed on selected electrical/electronic compon-
ents used on OWS. This test was imposed at the component PAT
level with the purpose of increasing overall system reliability.
Components subjected to the test were relays and certain se_i-
conductors. Basis for the selection was past failure history
from the SIVB program on similar components and engineering
Judgement. The test consisted of acoustically monitoring the
component while it is being vibrated sinusoidally at 20 Hz and 2g's.
The program was considered highly successful. No particle related
failures occurred in any of the screened components after install-
atlon into a next hi_her assembly.
D. Hardware Acceptability - Early in the OWS Program, it became
apparent that hardware acceptability and verification would require
special attention. This was due primarily to two main reasons,
both of which were premised on cost effectiveness. One was that
hardware that had been qualified on previous NASA programs would
be utilized where ever possible. The second was that for the most
part when testing was accomplished it would not attempt to qualify
the hardware for the full duration SL mission.
This concept, while reducing development and qualification testing,
did not however reduce the requirements to verify and validate
the acceptability of all flight critical hardware. In attempting
; to define these requirements it was deemed necessary to establish
[ two major categories for hardware qualification; test and/or
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assessment. This led naturally to the need for a sln_le reference
source which became known as the Test and Assessment Doc_urent
(TAD).
The Test and Assessment Document (TAD) was a formal compilation
of Contractor Customer a4_reed to requirements for equipment accep-
tability. The TAD contained, for each applicable item, design and
mission requirements in terms of exposed environments and stresses
with the associated levels for each specific application. The TAD
also included the verification method (test and/or assessment)
which was to be _ployed to satisfy equipment acceptability in
meetin_ the requirements. Where test was the verification method,
the TAD iterated the specific test line item to be used to satisfy
each requirement. Where assessment was the verification method
; the TAD provided rigorous rationale, contained therein or by ref-
erence to other accepted documentation, in terms of analyses, prior
use in similar applications, and/or test documentation from other
sources to show the equipment met each requirement.
Certification that the hardware had indeed met the requirement
defined in the TAD became the function of the Certificate of
i Component Acceptance (CCA). Throughout the development phase the
i CCA was published monthly as a status report referred to as the
i Component Acceptance Status (CAS). Upon completion of testing
, and/or assessment of a given item the CCA was submitted to NASA/
MSFC for signature approval that that particular item was indeed ....
qualified and acceptable for the OWS.
The CCA was a multi-section document consisting of confiKuratlon
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history, test history, failure history and the certificate itself.
The configuration history defined changes from the baseline reviewed
during TAD negotiations. The test history, if applicable, defined
the test line items being conducted, their status, the configuration
under test, and the difference between the test and flight config-
uration. The failure history described the nature of all failures
and their subsequent resolution and/or corrective action. The
certificate section identified the mandatory flight configuration,
the methods of qualification (test and/or assessment), applicable
procedures and specifications including other pertinent documen-
tation which supported TAD requirements. The certificate also
provided for MDAC Design and Reliability Engineering signature
aFproval in addition to NASA/MSFC Design and R-Qual.
E. Non-Conformance Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action Control -
A maximum effort was maintained throughout the OWS design, develop-
ment, and production phases to provide management visibility and
control of all non-conformances, failure analysis, and corrective
actions. This section discusses the general system and techniques
employed to this end.
Quality Assurance was responsible for the detection and reporting
of non-conforming mate2ial. Upon detection, all nonconforming
material was promptly removed from the system and impounded for
disposition and completion of the non-conformance report. _-
NOTE: The system provided control through Failure and EeJection
Report Supplements (FRR Supplements), and Test Problem
Reports (TPR's) where immediate removal of nonconforming
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material was neither desirat,le t,or T.ractical. Such
circummtances often arose during _ualification Testinm
and Checkout.
Oualtty _surance utilized three basic: documents to report nolo-
conformances, i.e., Insvection Item gheet (llg), Failure Report
(FR) m.d the Discrepancy Report (DR}. Thp IIS was used to re_ort
temnorary nonconformances and to disnosition items which had ex-
ceeded their a_e/life limits. The IIS was initiated to authorize
removal and replacement of nonconforming, removaL'le details/
assemblies, or to authorize trmlblpshootin_, durir_ acceptance
testing, systems/sub._ystem test or checkout. Where a problem
could be eliminated by allowable ad,t,3stm_nt, th_ ]IS was used.
The FR was used to report functional nonconformances occurln_ during
cualification test, acceptance test and/or normal operation. The
DR was used to revort nonconformsnces such as dimensional discrep-
ancies, improper processin_ and physical discrepancies (non-Func-
tional).
As defined, both the IIS and DR imply for the most Dart minor
discreDancy categories. As such, these items were routinely
dispositioned throurh the Material _eview t'oard (_gB). 'Phe non-
conformances which fell into the FR category _resented a far _reater
potential of overall program impact and were considered priority
one. Upon detection and initiation of an FR, Quality Assurance
notified Development Engineering (DE) of the problem. DE immed-
iately initiated a nreliminary analysis and investigation of the
reported problem. The chronology of thls investigation generally
3-28
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followed the following format. Determination of the failure mode.
and effect if the reported problem had occurred during launch count-
down and/or during flight. A record search for any previous
similar or like failures. It was policy to require as a minimum
an FRR Supplement for all failures whose effect could Jeopardize
personnel safety, Mission and or Vehicle launch. The preliminary
investigation by DE normally included hardware retest prior to
removal, supplemental tests (within operational spec) for additional
data points and analysis of all performance data.
The FRR Supplement was an engineering initiated document defining
failure history, failure effect, the preliminary investigative
data (previous and current) and a cause conclusion. The primary
purpose of the FRR Supplement was to provide a comprehensive data
base in determining Supplemental Failure Analysis (SFA) require-
ments. The FRR Supplement therefore presented the total operational
and performance history to program management, and Quality Assur-
ance for their concurrence with enKineering's SFA recommendation.
Where this documentation revealed the cause of failure, no SFA
wa_ recommended, where the data failed to indicate the problem
l
cause conclusivel_, an SFA was recommended.
Upon review and approval of the FRR Supplement recommendations
by program managemen_ the disposition of the failed hardware was
J
reflected on the FR. In either case the FRR Supplement was attach- i'
ed and became a permanent part of the FR. Where data indicated
the cause of the problem the FR was completed, indicating cause
and corrective action to prevent recurrence and was submitted to
the customer (USAF) for concurrence. When the problem required _
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further and detailed investigation to determine failure cause an
SFA was initiated. Of the 388 FRR Supplements on the OWS Program
109 resulted in SFA's.
The SFA as the name implies, was a supplement of the FR designed
to control the failed hardware during investigation of the problem,
and upon completion became a permanent part of the FR. The SFA
defined in detail the scope of the investigation, who and _here
performed and served as a data record during the investigation.
The SFA was carried out to the degree necessary to define cause
of failure. Development Engineering at that point described their !
cause rationale and recommended any necessary corrective action.
o Upon completing the SFA documentation, the data was presented for
review _nd concurrence of the SFA Review Board. Final closure of
i
the SFA was withheld by the Board until proof that nec, _ ary
ccrrective action had in fact been implemented. With closure of 7
the SFA all documentation was attachea and summarized on the FR
which was submitted for Customer approval.
The foregoing discussion has been limited for the most part to
hardware handling internal to _DAC-W. At least two other classes
of nonconforming hardware should be mentioned chat which was
Government Furnished (GFP) and Supplier Furnished Material (SFM). _
GFP nonconformances were repo_ted and documented upon the FR or
DR system. The cognizant government agency was then immediately
notified and arrangements were made to return the subject hardware
to that agency for investigation disposition. FR/DR was plac_d
i in suspense pending completion of the government directed
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investigation and corrective action documentation. Upon rezeipt
of such information the FR/PR was completed and closed.
When M/)AC elected to return nonconforming SFM to the manufacturer
(this was often th£ case where failure occurred during acceptance
testing) for analysis and corrective action it was accomplished
via the MDAC "Supplier Rework and _ecurrence Prevention Record"
(SRRPR). This system worked much a'_ the handling of GFP, where an
FR/DR was initially written and h__u open pending receipt from
the supplier of the SRRPR defining the cause and corrective action
determined by the supplier. Following bDAC review and concurrence
of the data submitted, the FR/DR was completed reflecting the
SRRPR information and forwarded for customer clos1"re approval.
The "_p" Problem Report" (TPR) was used during OWS final assembly
and checkout. The TPR was identical in format and intent tc the
previously discussed FRR Supplement. Differing only in that its
utilization was confined to post manufacturing vehicle checkout.
It should be noted that integrated through t the MDAC nonconformance
system were provisions to input the IDEP Alert System. Each app-
licable OWS nonconformance occurrence was evaluated (both SFA and
FRR Supplements required such notation) determining whether an
alert should be requested. All nonconformances which were app-
licable to the alert system, resulted in requests for such alerts.
3.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECG)a_ATDATIONS - The Orbital Worksho_ Program present-
ec many challenging reliabillt_ problems which were the result of
mission and operational requirements and constraints unique to the
Skylab Pr.,gram. Some of these were the "one-of-a-kind" concept, the
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"off-the-shelf" concept, the mission duration and the fact that this
was the first operational space station.
Mission duration had probably the most significant influence on relia-
bility. This parameter alone was the subject of many system engineering
trade studies. Typical of these problems were loss of consumables due
to leakage, level _nd types of redundancy, maintainability versus re-
dundancy, manual versus automatic operation, ground versus on-board
control, etc.
Leakage by itself was a maJo problem and eventually led to an eng-
ineering management decision to braze or weld all fittings whereever
feasible. Where brazing or welding was not feasible special redun-
dantly sealed and torque free Joints were developed. The effective-
ness of this approach was demonstrated by the Thruster At?it_de Con-
trol (TAC) and Refrigeration Systems in that no measurable leakage w_s
detected.
Levels _nd types of redundancy also presented a problem in that for
missions of this length the probability of multiple failures was sig-
nificantly increased. Yet on the other hand multiple redundancy in-
creased system complexity, required detection and selection capability
and complicated system checkout, all of which tended to oppose relia-
bility. The basic sc .ion to this problem was two independent syster,s
either of which wa_ capable of performing the function for tb_ mission
i duration. Typical of this solution were the Refrigeration Sy3tem
which containe _ two completely independent loops and the electrical :
bussiz,g conce hich provided for two independent busses from the Atl/
i
OWS interface to all critical functions. Another example is the TACS i .
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system which incorporated series parallel thruster control valves in
a quad-redundant configuration. Each parallel leg Jn the quad was
controlled by a separate electrical bus. The series ar,anzement in
each quad protected a_alnst leakage, inadvertant operation and/or
failure of a single valve to close.
Maintainability was utilized in lieu of and/or in addition to redundancy
where the overall effectiveness of the system dictated. Prime examples
of this concept were the Waste Management Compartment (NMC) and Wardroom
(NR) water dump probes. Since loss of cabin atmosphere was a program
concern it was decided to limit the number of Habitation ._,-ea(HA}
penetrations thus reducing the number of potential leak points. However,
the NMC and NR water dump probes which exited the HA into Warte Tank
(I_P)offered a potential for cloggin_ especial]y due to icing. To over-
come this potential problem spare probes were stowed on-board and the
SL crews were trained in the maintenance task of removing and replacing
these probes. In fact during SL-3, the NMC probe did clo_ up and
Astronaut A1 Bean accomplished the task of removinf and replacinf it,
thus restoring the system to a fully operational status. Subsequent
to performing this task, A1 Bean reported that the Job had been easy to
accomplish and that he wished he had done it sooner instead of wastin_
the time they had in attemptin_ to free the clo_.
In stmlnary,the effectiveness of tZese concepts were evidenced by the
success of the SL mission. In retrospect and in light of actual on-
b
orbit operational experience there probably are thin_s that would have
been and should be done differently for future programs. One of these ._
obviously has to be an increase in maintainability p_ovisions for future "
manned space systems as evidenced by the ability of the SL crew to
maintain and repair the systems under the most adverse of conditions.
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' SECTION h- SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM
4.1 GENERAL - The Contractor recognized the requirement to make a total
commitment to pro_'ide experience, disciplines, and motivation to design
and maintain through handling and operations, the highest possible
level of safety.
The Orbital Workshop (OWS) System Safety Program (SSP) covered three
basic areas: Design, Ground Operations, and Flight Operations. This
overall proEram was implemented by the System Safety Program Plan
(DAC-56759) per M_FC DRL-171, Line Item H02, December 1969, and supple-
mented by a combination of activities such as: those of an on-goir_
nature within MDAC, those defined by various other Program Plans
and/or Specifications, and speciel activities not included in these
two primary categories.
MDAC on-goir_ safety activities consist of those defined in the MDAC
Employe Safety Manual (MS.057-AC) as well as other activities which
implement the requirements of standard NDAC policies and procedures.
Additional activities were defined by the OWS Crew System Integration
Plan and various NASA and/or government directives/specifications,
e.g., the KSC Ra;_e Safety Plan. A number of special activities not
defined in the above were also performed, two of significance were the
Contractor review and evaluation of the OWS, using: (i) the 266 space
flight hazards contained in NASA/JSC Space Flight Hazards Catalog,
and (2) the Skylab System Safety Checklists.
The MDAC OWS System Safety organizational responsibilities were basic-
ally in four areas.
A. All program personnel were responsible for seeing that safety
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governed their OWS efforts in all design and operational areas.
In addition, three coordination and surveillance organizations
assisted as noted below in paragraph B, C and D.
B. As a derivitive of the Saturn/Apollo Program management it was
desired that a single interface be maintained with the customer
in the interest areas relative to safety. To this end the Pro-
duct Assurance organization was desi&_ated to fulfill this role
and provided the overview to Industrial Safety, System Safety
Engineering, and the Quality surveillance and control over OWS
ground operations, such as manufacturing, handling and trans-
portation.
C. Effectiveness Engineering, as part of development engineering,
was primarily involved in design activities of flight hardware
including a considerable expenditure of effort for the design
of grcund support equipment.
D. Employe Safety had responsibility for ensuring that MI)AC Indus-
trial Safety Standards and Federal, State and local safety reg-
ulations and ordnances werc complied _ "
The above three activities operated as inter-dependent activities
with substantial amount of coordination. Representatives from all
t_ree of the organizations _ere often times in attendance at appro-
priate OWS meetings to discuss safety related items.
r
) 2
The key elements in implementation of the overall System Safety
i Program are shown in Table 4.1-1. Each will be covered with respect :1
to their use in subsequent paragraphs.
+
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KEY ELEMENTS OF THE OWS SYSTEM, SAFETY PROGRAM
o Failure mode effects analysis (FMEA)
o System logic analysis (SLA) _,
o Contingency analysis (CA)
o Hazard identification, assessment and resolution
o Design review
o Design change review
o Hazardous materials control
o Flammable materials control
o Contamination control
o Mission safety critical items (MSCI] control
o Hardware integrity reviews _'
o Review of operations with potential for damage to eouipment or injury
to personnel (Manufacturing, Handling &Transportation, Test, Pre-Flight)
o Test procedure revisws (Manufacturing, Acceptance, Pre-Flight)
o Operational procedure reviews (Handling & Transpc.rtation, Test, Pre-
Flight, Flight)
o Man-machine interface verifications
o Nonconformance reviews
o Safety and s,_fety related audits (Internal, Government)
o Accident/incident investigation, reportin_ and corrective action
o Alert processing
o Training (skills, operational, motivational)
o Eubcontractor/supplier safety activities
o Special investigations and reviews (Spaceflight hazards catalog, System
safety checklists)
o Safety surveillance and monitoring
TABLE 4.i-i
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_.2 CREW SAFETY
4.2.1 Concept Phase - The crew safety program _s consituted in the
design phase with the incorporation of the manned mission aware-
ness which became part of the design activity from initial concepts
to final design. This design approach was directed toward the
: evolution of a design minimizing personnel hazards or mission loss T
conditions.
It became essential to affec'& the design as early as possible with
i
the manned interface and to identify requirements stemming from the
necessity to provide a habitable, safe atmosphere which would satisfy
the total mission requirements. The concept ad_pted consisted of
review of preliminary design and mission specifications by personnel
principally involved in system safety within the engineering organ-
ization. This review was systemati_ and devoted to the early identi-
fication of potential crew hazards or mission loss conditions to the
engineering activity for impact on design and testing. In addition
the results of other analyses were reviewed with respect to safety
such as the output of the reliability effort in assessing the effects
of single failure points in terms of ground personnel or crew hazard
potential.
_.2.2 Design Phas9 - Once the safe_y aspects were implemented in the design
: concepts this activity consisted of analysis of systems to module
level including supporting GSE to identify and evaluate hazardous
conditions existant during all phases of the mission. A cross)
matrix of elements was formed from the Gross Hazard Analysis leading
[ -,
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to loss of life, physical injury, physical impariment, or early
mission termination.
The conditions leading to the above which were considered were:
toxicity, flammability, particulate matter, loss of cabin atmosphere,
_! loss of vehicle attitude control.
E
The results of this activity were presented via a gro._shazards
analysis, and status update through Quarterly System Safety Progress
Reports, MSFC-DRL-171A, Line Item H04, and communicated within the
design department through internal media, as well as formally in the
several levels of design review procedures.
In certain specific situations a System Logic Ana_vsis was performed
to set down the details of the failure mechanism, and to identify less
obvious modes and effects.
As the design progressed and identifiable hazards were reduced, the
• potential developed to utilize crew contingency procedures as a
method of reducing the effects of failures. To this end procedures
were organized toward the definition of crew and/or ground command
contingency action capability, and on the identification _ eval-
uation of procedures to modify the criticality of a Single Failure
Point (SFP) without eliminating the SFP itself. Inasmuch as the
development of the crew procedures were within another Jurisdiction, _'
this effort was modified to an evaluation activity aimed at deter-
mining the effectiveness of crew/ground contingency procedures to-
ward the elimination or downgrading of a SFP.
_.2.2.1 Key Studies and Controls
4
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A. Hazardous Materials Control - This subsection describes the
controls and assessment methods for material design usage in
the OWS for the purpose of minimizing or eliminating potential
and flight crew toxic hazards due to metallic and organic chem-
ical contaminants in the breathing atmosphere.
i/ Design Controls - Material uses that did not meet the
acceptability guidelines were reported to NASA/MSFC along
with the appropriate rationale to substantiate the material
usage or the need for an alternate material. MDAC initia-
ted reporting form P0327, Material/Component Usage, to
obtain approval from NASA/MSFC for the usage of these type]
materials. Each P0327 report was a supplement to MDAC
Report MDC G0126. The primary guideline documents were
the following for the control of metallic and non-metallic
i materials which offgassed carbon monoxide and/or other
organic chemcials.
a. Metals - Design Memorandum Number 0WS-46, Orbital ]
Workshop Usage/Crew Systems Requirements. This docu- "i
L.
ment established the policies, responsibilities, and
requirements for the control of metals, metallic
oxides, and alloys used within the 0WS.
b. Carbon Monoxide and Total Organics - The NASA control
document was 14SFC-SPEC-101A. The equivalent MDAC
document IB78110, Flam_ability, Offgassing, and Odor
Requirements, Materials was issued to provide the
engineering definition for contractual compliance_
U-6
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implementation, and control of MI)AC internal designs
_nd supplier designs.
Material Usage Computer Frogram, P0327, was used to
calculate the total offgassing rates for carbon monox-
ide and total organics for each usage of non-metallic
materials and the sum of all material offgassing
products.
?
2/ Manufacturing Control
a. General Cleanliness - The control requirements were L
established by CEI Specification, CP208OJIC, and by
the Contamination Control Plan, MDC G038_A. Contam-
ination control and cleanliness requirements related
to OWS hardware were applied throughout manufacturing,
test, and checkout of the OWS module.
b. Mercury Contamination - Mercury contamination control
requirements were in accordance with MSC Standard 120,
L
Breathing Systems, Requirenent to Test for Mercury
L
Contamination. This requirement w_s implemented by
the MDAC documenl,, Orbital Workshop Mercury Control
Plan.
?
3/ In-Flight Controls
a. Normal Operations
i. Atmospheric Contaminant Removal - The controls
to prevent the buildup of gaseous and particulate
?
_-7 (
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contaminants were a function of several ECS com-
ponents. The major components included.
o Carbon canisters in AMand WMC.
o Molecular sieves.
o Condensing heat exchangers.
2. Contaminant Monitoring Capacility - The inflight
._ monitoring capability for airborne contaminants
consisted of :
o Carbon dioxide sensors at inlet to mole-
cular sieves,
o Carbon dioxide analyses with the mass
spectrometer.
o Carbon monoxide periodic determination with
manual Drager tube_,
o Experiment TO03, Inflight Aerosol Analysis,
/
for periodic sampling of atmosphere for
particulate matter samples for return to
earth.
b. SL-2 High Temperatm'e Contingency - MDAC conducted
several studies, both analytical and test, to assess
the potential OWS high temperature contamination pro-
blems resulting from the launch loss of the meteroid
shield. In the area of contamination, these studies
had significant effects on decision making relative to
the SL-2 mission. The new requirements most directl)
influenced included:
h-8
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/i. OWS atmosphere pump down procedures to remove
toxic contaminants.
2. New capability for crew to monitor MDA, AM and
OWS atmospheres for carbon monoxide and toluene
disocyanate prior to entry.
B. Flam_able Material Control - This subsection describes the con-
trols and assessment methods for nonmetallic materials design
usage in the OWS for the basic purpose of fire prevention.
Flsumable materials were used only in the absence of a suitable
nonflammable material.
i/ Material Selection Control - The controlling document for
selecting materials was MSFC-SPEC-IOIA. MDAC document
IB78110, Flammability, Offgassing, and Odor Requirements,
Materials was prepared to provide the engineering defini- •
tion for contractual compliance, impleme: _ation, and con-
trol of MDAC infernal designs and supplier designs. MDAC
drawing IB86198, Flammability Batch/Lot Test Requirements,
was a list of materials that were tested prior to OWS usage.
The proposed usage of flammable materials vas reviewed,
documented, and reported on th_ P0327 usage form for NASA/
MSFC approval.
2/ Material Classification - Materials were classified as
Type I (nonfl_mmable), Type II (self-estinguishing), or
Type III (flammable). Type III materials were ranke_ _"
subcategories by functional application and sp_ti_
d '.stribution.
1,-9
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3/ Types II and III Usage Map - Eaca Type Ii or Type III
material or component was included as a part of the mater-
ials use map (MDAC drawing iB77015). The usace map depicted
the location of each it_ thus was an aid in determining
the distribution of materials t_mougbeut the habitable OWS
interior and their proximity to other flammable materials. i
This proximity information was used to segregate flammable
materials (Type Ill) on the subcategory basis thus emphas-
izing the probability of contributing to the propagation
of a fire. In summary, the _rouping of materials in this
manner providec the basi= for meaningful fire hazard assess-
ments.
4/ Stowage and Installation A_proaches - Multiple installation
and stowage approaches were utilized to ensure adequate
safety provisions for flammable material usages to minimize
;Jotential fire propagation. The following examples illus-
trate the design utilization of this approach with respect
to flammable material control.
L
a. Fixed Items
I. Charcoal filters were enclosed in metal canisters.
2. Water tank heaters enclosed in nonflammable
fluorocarbon rubber impregnated fiberglass.
3. Tank polyurethane insulation covered with fiber-
glass liner and aluminum foil.
_. Refrigerant control (Coolanol-15) by use of
@
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brazed tube Joints, o-ring sealed boss fittings,
and enclosure of activp components in a sealed i
vacuum vented container.
5. Wiring inzide OWS routed through closed metal
troughs contained fire barriers.
6. Light assembly lamps installed in a metal housing.
7. Power control consol_s compartmentalized.
8. Sealing of the habitable area foam insulation.
9. Ex_ensive circuit protection with circuit breakers.
i0. Encapsulated modules including switches and circuit
breakers. :
II. All anodized metal interior finishes of multiple
colors wherever possible to preclude us_ of paint
and satisfy color compztibility requirements.
12. Elimination of 02 in steel piping in deI'erence to
N2 for the pressurizing medium for water tank. :_
13. Extensive protection for maintenance of touch
temperature requirements in galley and water
'v
systc_s.
b. Stowed Items - Flanmability protectiou for stowed items ._
was provided by the use of metal stowage cabinets
and nonfla_nable glass fabric bags.
h-ll
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5/ Inflight Responses to Or_A_al Fires - A MDAC study was
conducted (MDC G2190-P) to provide data for the training
of the Skylab crews in responding to orbital f_res. The
information and recommendations aocum_nted by this studs
had a major impact on Skylab requirements in the following
elfeas.
a. Crew ground training procedures.
! Late addition of the water fire extinguishing system.
c. Crew inflight response and procedures for the con_ro]
of orbital fires.
C. Microbial Contamination Control
l/ Baseline Design Requir_nents - The 0WS desiMn requirements
for microbial control, as defined by CE_ CP2OSOJIC, gen-
erally i,_olved the application of earth open environment
principles to a closed nanned system. The following ex-
amples represent the major microbial growth =ontrol prin-
ciples that were applied.
a. Water systems were treated with a biocide (iodine).
b. Hydrated food supplies were refrigerated.
c. Personal hygiene procedures were to maintain a normal
body flor:_.
d. Crew housekeeping and waste handling proeedureo were
to prevent the buildup of organic matter md liquid
' water.
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e. The Skylab enviror_ental control system was to provide
the primary capability for controlling airborne bac-
teria in the carbon canisters, molecular sieves, and
the condensing heat exchangers.
2/ Design Support - _e Sk_lab Program Office on I_ August
1970 established the Skylab Intercenter Mic:oblal Control
Working Group (SY_4CWG)to conduct a detailed study of the
Skylab cluster microbial control problems and reccmnend
design and procedural changes. The major SIMCNG support
at, s included:
= Microbial sampling of OWS interior surfaces prior to
shipment to KSC.
b. Microbial sampling by JSC of OWS, AM and MDA interior
surfaces at KSC prior to SL-I launch.
c, infllght microbia" samrt_ng of crew skin and OWS
surfa_'esduring all missions with return of samples
to earth for analyses.
_. Bioclde wipe development by MDAC for _nfllght disin-
fection of Skylab surfaces with high potential for
microbial gro-_cb. The flight bloclde wipes consisted
of pre-wt,t pear heat sealed under reduced pressure in
conol_ _000. The water system contained 120 ml !
water and the equivalent of 5000 Pl_ of available
iodine, as betodine, on a cottom guaze pad of Webril
R-2201.
b-13 !
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e. Pressure suit assembly drying station requirements
for microbial growth control during stowage.
f. Flight plan requirements were established with respect
to general housekeeping procedures, trash handling
(noraaland contingency), spare replacement schedules,
biocide wipe usage, periodic crew inspection and
clean-up of high potenticl microbial growth areas,
etc.
4.2.2.2 Special Safety Studies
A. Experiment M509 Structural Impact Study - A special safety study
was conducted to investigate the effects of an experiment M509
£
(Astronaut Maneuvering Unit) runaway condition on equipment _
within the forward compartment of the OWS. The study was pos-
tulated on an impact load of 9h ft/lbs (127.5 Joules) of kinetic
energy from the experiment. The results from the investigation
provided a listing of approximately 30 items within the 0WS 7
which might suffer _amage from an M509 impa_t. Data was also
provided to indicate the probable effects of this damage on
system performance as we_l as the likelihood of damage occurrence.
B. SAL Structural Integrity Review Study - In response to a request
from MSFC, a study group was formed to investigate a possible
malfunction situation in which it would not be _ossible to re-
move at. experiment from the Scientific .Airlock due to a failure
to close the SAL outer door, thus the experiment would have to
re_ain att=ched to the SAL and constitute part of the overall
i CWS structure. System Safety participated in this study
i
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and identified several potential hazards and recom.ended design
changes as well as contingency procedures. The study approach
was to review data from each of the SAL experiment suppliers and
determine the capability of the equipment to withstand extended
exposure to both a space vacuum as well as any problems which
might develop within the OWS itself in terms of -rew impact
against the experiment.
C. Experiment Structural Support Fixture - A special investigation
was conducted to review structural integrity considerations in
the event of an astronaut impact against the T027 experiment
while it was attached to the SAL. An analysis was performed
which indicated that a 250 pound (1112 Newtons) load against
the end of the 5 foot (1.5 meters) __xperiment attached to the
SAL might exceed the ultimate load capability of the tank wall.
The findings of the study demonstrated that the existing design
_onstituted a definite hazard for crew safety in that a crew
impact could result in damage to the wall and possible depressur-
ization of the OWS. Consequently, System Safety recommended
the design of a structural support fixture to anchor the exper-
imen_ to the floor of the 0'4S. The design ch¢_ge was accepted
and resulted in the fabrication of a portable experiment support
fixture which could be installed and removed at the discretion
of the crew during on-orbit operat._ons.
D. Coolanol 15 Study - Coolanol !5 was used as the coolant in the )
OWS Refrigeration system. A safety study was conducted to
determine the acceptability of the coolant in terms of its
potential flammsbJlity and toxicity characteristics. In
b-15
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addition, the study investigated the likelihood of leakage
occurring in the OWS. The study results indicated that the
coolant was flammable and _hat it was also toxic at certain con-
centration levels. As a result of this study, special MSFC
funding was made available to conduct an Oral Sensitivity test
us_x:g 15 MDAC subjects to determine if a leak in the water
chiller, which would permit coolant to get into the drinking
water, could be detected by the crew. The study results were
affirmative. In addition, as a result of this study findings,
B-nuts in the refrigeration system plumbing were replaced by
brazed fittings and the refrigeration pumps were enclosed in
an evacu_.ted container. Both of these design changes were
intended to decrease the likelihood of coolanol leaking into
the interior of the OWS.
E. Mercury Study - An investigation was performed to explore the
safety considerations associated with the fluorescent lights
which provide6 general illumination for the OWS. These lights
utilize a small amount of mercury vapor and the focus of the
study wBm _0 explore the likelihood of mercury leakage and the
effect _ the _ew from the mercury released into the 0WS
atmosphere. In addition to an overall assessment of the _de-
quacy of the existing design, recommendations were made to
provide mercury vapor detection devices for the crew, period-
ically to energize the spare lights to check for leakage, and to
exercise extreme care and caution in handling and transportation
of the fluorescent devices. As _n outgrowth of the study, M_AC
generated an OWS Mercury Control Plan to identify the requirements
h-16
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and criteria necessary to assure that the OWS and GFP experi-
ments are protected from 4nd free of mercury contamination.
The control plan identified each of the items of equipment
which required the mercury checks and also described the detail-
ed procedural steps required to ensure that the hardware was
free from mercury contamination.
F. System Safety Checklists - MSFC _ir,cted that MDAC perform spec-
is/ safety studies utilizing customer supplied Skylab System
Safety Checklists for both Ground Support Equipment _GSE) (SA-
003-001-2H, dated July 1971) and Flight System Design (SA-003-
002-2}{, dated November 1971). These checklists were extremely
comprehensive and served as a for,ing fur ction to ensure that,
if possible, hazards had been eliminated and t_st the appropriate
safety features in the equipme._t design were utilized. In the
event of nonc-,,'.,_'ance__tems, it was necessary to list ratiovale
for failure co -:omply with the safety item. Sixty-one items of •
GSE and sixteen flight _'stmns were analyzed through these
safety checklists.
G. Sneak Circuit Analysis - An analysis of conducting pahhs that ""
could cause an unwanted function when power was applied to the
space vehicle to achieve a desired function was accomplished on
the OWS Program. The Sneak Circuit Analysis was accomplished
at MSFC. Effectiveness Engineering analyzed any sneak circuit
paths that were uncovered criticality impact on crew safety '-
or mis,.ion. The sneak circuits were analyzed for both activa-
tion of unwanted functlons and wanted functions. No sneak cir-
cuits were uncovered that would have resulted in danger to the ;
h-17
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crew or have had a mission impact.
H. Space Flight Hazards Catalog Review - A detailed review of the
266 hazards identified in the NASA/MSC Space Flight Hazards
Catalog was conducted. The objectives of this voluntary review
were to identify and document the means by which the OWS design,
procedures, or operations provided for detecting, controlling,
or circumventing the hazards. There were no cases where a listed
t
hazard had been unrecognized or overlooked and there were no
hardware changes found to be necessary as a result of the review;
however, the review was considered beneficial and productive.
In several instances, the OWS status relative to certain hazards
was not immediately apparent and required further study, analysis,
and/or test before the item could be positively categorized
as resolved. This investigative effort brought about a greater
awareness and recognition of those hazards and, in turn, an
increased confidence that they had been adequately circumvented
or controlled for the OWS application.
h.2.3 Test and Operations Phase - All test and operational procedures,
excluding routine shop handling and transportation procedures, were
reviewed for safety considerations. Included were Handling and Check-
out Procedures (H&CO), Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP), Develop-
ment Test Procedures, Qualification Test Procedures, Production
Acceptance Test Procedures (PAT), and nonroutine shop Handling and
Transportation Procedures.
Test and operational procedure documents were submitted to Effect-
i i iveness Engineering for review prior to final publication. It was
_-18
1974020219-089
the responsibility for the safety group to review the document to
ensure that any hazardous activities w_re identified on a special
page in the document which was devoted to safety considerations.
In addition, it was necessary to review all of the procedural steps
to ensure that any potential safety problems were preceeded by
"Caution" or "Warning" statements. A "Caution" statement was used
to flag out a potential accident which could result in damage to
equipment. A "Warning" notice was used to indicate that the proced-
ural steps had the potential to cause an injury to personnel. These
recommended changes were subsequently transmitted by written memoranda
to the originator and the OWS Safety Committee. The OWS Safety
Committee reviewed all procedures containing "Operations with poten-
tial for damage to equipment or injury to personnel."
Approximately 800 procedures or changes thereto were reviewed for
safety considerations with the great majority found /_0111yacceptable.
In a few cases, significant changes were found necessary to elimin-
ate or minimize potential adverse safety "affects and were implemented.
b.2.3.1 Review of Operations with Potential for Damage to Equipment or injury
to Personnel - These formal, documented reviews were accomplished in
accordance with the requirement._ _ MDAC Control Procedure "Operations
with Potential for Damage to Equillrent or Injury to Personnel."
They were accomplished by the special committee created by MDAC
and covered all manufacturing, handling, transportation, test and
pre-flight operations identified by the committee as having the
potential for damage or injury.
Each review involved a detailed study of the methods and purposes of
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the operation, the as-built configuration of facilities and equip-
mer_ involved, including the OWS system, analysis of the design of
affected tooling, facilities and equipment, analysls of applicable
procedures, and review of personnel training and certification
requirements and implementation.
i
Risks involved in each operation were assessed and necessary cor-
rective action implemented. In selected cases, simulated opera-
tions were performed. A complete listing of these reviews (92) is
shown in Table 4.2.3.1-1.
In general, there were no major problems and/or corrective actions
found as a result of these reviews. A large number of minor changes
and corrective actions as well as safety additions to equipment in-
volved were implemented. During subsequent performance of these
operations there were no incidents involving either equipment damage
or personnel injury.
In addition to the formal reviews described above, a relatively
large number of informal rev_=ws were conducted by the System Safety !
Manager's Office. These documented reviews were based on the same
considerations as those above; however, they were not accomplished
in strict accordant, with the noted MOAC procedures. A listing of
major reviews of this type (30) is contained in Table 4.2.3.1-2.
4.2.3.2 The MDAC aucit program included both internal and customer audits,
and was implemented at all levels and within all organizations. All
' of the internal safety related audits accomplished (62) were reported
in detail in Quarterly OWS System Safety Reports and are listed in
Table k.2.3.2-i. All corrective actions identified as "necessary"
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REVIEW Om OPERATIONS WITH POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE
TO EQUIPMENT OR INJURY TO PERSONNEL
o Tank Cylinder External PaintingT
o Tank Interior Foil Liner Installation
; o Side Access Door Installation and Removal
i o Stage Handling Operations Related to Tower 8 Leak Checks
o Crew Quarters Floor Installation (Vehicle Horizontal).
o Water Bottle and Water Bottle Support Structure Installation
(Vehicle Horizontal)
o Fo1_ard and Aft Skirt Foil Installation and Thermal Barrier Painting
o DTA Erection in Building 30
o Weight and Balance
o DTA Pressure Test in Building 30
, o Tank Cylinder Foil Installation
o Operations Related to DTA Shipment
o DTA Access and Handling Equipment and Plans in Building 30
"_ o OWS Tank Cleaning
o DTA Removal from Building 30
o DTA Operations at Michoud
o DTA Operations at MSC
o Revised Horizontal Work Platform OWS Interior
o DTA Erection in Building 30 (Reassessment for OWS)
o Operations Related to DTA Shipment (Reassessment for OWS)
o Access Controls and Procedures
o Contamination Controls and Procedures
o Personnel Safety Controls and Procedures
o Erection and Joining in Tower 2
o Interior Access in Tower 2
o AM/OWS Interface and SAS Mounting Bolt D1"illing Operations
o Meteoroid Shield Installation
o Roll Cleaning (Prior to Erection in Tower 2)
o Meteoroid Shield Ordnance Operations
o Meteoroid Shield Deployment Test
o In-Place Brazing Operations (External)
, .o
o In-Place X-Ray of Brazed Joints
o Erection in Tower 6
o Crew Quarters Wall Installation
TABLE 4.2,3. i-i
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o Interior Access Stand Installation and Operations
o TACS Bottle Installation
o Tooling Hois,_ Installation and Operation
o Documentary Photo Activities in the Habitation Area
o In-Place Brazing Operations (Internal)
o Observation Window Installation
o Tooling Conveyor Installation and Operation
o Water Bottle Installation (Vehicle Vertical)
o Film Vault Installation
o T020 Installation (Foot Controlled _neuvering Unit)
_ o M074 Installation (Specimen Mass Measurement)
o MI31 Installation (Human Vestibular Function)
o SI_ Installation (Particle Collection)
o _._72 Installation (Body Mass Measurement)
o GSE ?olly System Installation and Operation
o GSE Upper Interior Access Kit Installation and Operation
o GSE Hoist Kit Installation
o Meteoroid Shield Counterbalance System Installation and Operation
o Meteoroid Shield Ordnance Installation
o Trash Disposal Airlock Installation
o Refrigeration System Pumping Assembly Installation
o Meteoroid Shield Deployment Test (Manual)
o Meteoroid Shield Deployment Te'_t (Ordnance) !
o Habitation Area and Waste Tank Leak Checks
o TACS System Leak Checks
o C_ound Pressurization System Leak Checks
o VCL Pneumatic Control Leak Checks
o Water System Leak Checks
o Meteoroid Shield Ordnance Bantling
o Handling and Installation of Experiments:
ESS S020 S073 MI71
TOO2 T027 M092 S183
, ._> 8063 M093 S195 !
T_I3 N_71 M133 M509 .._:
8019 M073 MI51
o Refrigeration System Test Procedures
TABLE h.2.3.i-i (Continued)
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o OWS Transport, Tower 6 to Tower 2
o Final Preparations for Shipment
o OWS Removal from Tower 2 and Transport Loading
o Weight and Balance
k
o TACS System Proof Test at Seal Beach
o HFMU Handling and Shipping Operations
o Handling Equipment Operations Inside the Spacecraft (Reasses_ment
for 0WS Backup)
o SAS Loading on Guppy
o OWS Backup Handling and Shipping Operations
7'
TABLE 4.2.3.1-1 (Continued)
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SPECIAL SAFETY REVIEWS
o Removal of OWS from Tower 6
o OWS Habitation Area Personnel Occupancy Limits
o Methane Venting through the MITI (Metabolic Activity Experiment)
Vacuum Vent Lint
o 0WS Susceptibility to Damage During M509 (Astronaut Maneuvering
Equipment) On-Orbit Operations
c Fluorescent Work Lights
o Forward Interior Work Shands
o Experiment GZE Design Concepts
o Waste Processor Module Fit Check
o Suit Drying Station -:
o OWS Radioactive Materials
o Hearing Protection During M509 Checkout Operations
o Inadvertent Use of Zinc Chromate
o OWS Backup Common Bulkhead Rework
o VCL Emergency Egress
o VCL Emergency Lighting
o VCL Power Outage Procedure
o VCL Use of Portable Gage Regulator Assemblies
o F_t Check - Waste Processor Morale
o Production Test Plan - TACS System Proof Tests at Seal Beach
o OWS Pressure Integrity
o Coolanol Taste Odor Test
o Structural Integrity Review of the Scientific Airlock/Experiment
Interface
o Energy Generating Sources near Potential Coolanol Leak Points
o Experiment S183 Ultraviolet Panorama use of Tritium Paint
o Portable High l_+en_ity Light
o Program Manager's Review OWS Transp_:t Tower 6 to Tower 2
o Program Manager's Review - OWS Removal from Tower 2
o Lower Body Negative Pressure Device (LBNPD) Operations
o Handling Equipment Operations and Procedures Developed on OWS-I
(Reassessment for OWS Backup)
o OWS Backup Aft Interstage Shipment .. i
J
_ TABLE 4.2.3.1-2
_ k-::k
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SAFkTY AND SAFETY RELATED AUDITS
o Not-For-Production-Use (NFPU) System
o Inspection Guage Production
o Inspection Preplanning.
o Testing
o Surveillance Inspection
o Repetitive Nonconformance Control
o Process Control
o Processing Operations/Planning Call-(_ts
o Heat Treating
o Shipping Inspection
o Intercomponent Work OrCers (ICWO's)
o Skylab Workshop (SWS) Program - Florida Test Center (FTC)
o Controlled Material/Bulk Material Stockroom
o Control of Mercury
- o KSC Orbital Workshop/Airlock Modul_ Programs
o Nondestructive Testing
o Shipping Inspection
o Acceptance Testing
o Application of Standard Fasteners
o Reliability Critical Items (RCI)
o - Recurrence Control
o Surveillance Inspection
o Training and Certification
o Process Control - Cleaning
o Control of Detailed Process Material (DPM:s)
o Sampling Plans
CUSTOMEP
i
o OWS Quality, Reliability and System Safety Survey
o Annual Systems Safety Survey of OWS Operations
o Pre-Delivery Turnover Review
o Review of Nonconforming Supply and Corrective Action System
o Quality System Survey
o H_rdware Integrity Review
TABLE 4.2.3.2-I
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by these audits were accomplished. TL_e Customer audits, with minor
exceptions, found the system and/or operations unu_r _,uditcompletely
satisfactory.
4.2.3.3 Accident/Incident Investigation Reporting and Corrective A_-tion - The
contractor's Accident/Incident Investigation Reporting and Corrective
Action activities were in accordance with requirements of the O,_S
System Safety Program Plan, as implemented by MDAC Standard Prac+_ce
SP 1.004-ACN.
There were only seven reportable in_.f_?ats involving damage; two of
a serious nature, one of a significant _ature, two mipor, and two
near misses. These incidents, all r.ported in Quarterlv OWS Syut_n
Safety Program Reports, are s_marized.
A. Meteor¢id Shield - During initial portion of Skylab I flight,
the OWS Meteoroid E;hield failed causlng the loss of one $AS,
high OWS internal temperatures, and conbiderab!e perturbation
to fllght operations. Failure was contributed to des_gr, defic-
iency by a formal NASA Re, ew Board investigation &nd by parallel i
investigations conducted by the contractor.
B, Dar&ge to GSE - Significant damage was _ncur-e4 by GSE Model
DSV7-31h (Vacuum Pumping Unit) during tran._orta_ion _t _AC.
Incident was the result of improper fork lift operation and
resulted in approp__,te changes to procedures and instructions
regar,iing such operation.
t
C. L_mage to GSE - Two items of unused GSE incurred minor damage
_, during _rans_ortat_-:._at MDAC. The damage was the result of
h-26
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IF
" improper tie-down during truck transl_rtation and resulted
:. in changes to instructions and procedures related to tie-down. "x
J
D. Damage to Forward Dome - Very minor damage to the OWS forward
_- dome occurred during removal of a bonded support bracket when
: technician failed to follow appropriate procedures. All affect-
; ed technicians were reinstructed regarding such operations.
/
_ E. Gouges in Tank Structure - Several gouges were found in waste
tank dome structure during routine inspection, l'ilocause was c
identified. All technicians performing work in this area were
, were reinstructed with regard to need for care and surface :
protection.
; F. Crane Overload - This near miss incident was potentially the "
i
L"
most serious handling occurrsnce during the entire program and
was the result of improper use and overload of a mobile crane
? during shipping preparations of the Dynamic Test Vehicle. Had
overload been greater or the dynamics of the two crane operations
been d_fferent, significant damage to the DTA would have resulted.
This incident resulted in major changes to procedures involving o
: the use of all cranes.
-)
:_ G. Winch Failure - This near miss incident involved failure of a :
hand operated reduction gear drive facility winch equipped with/
a ratchet type safety lock. Malfunction of the safety lock ?i,
combined with failure of the drive handle freed the winch and ,..
_L
allowed a large catwalk access assembly to f_ll free. Fortun-
_ ately, no contact resulted. All reduction g._r drive winches
: in crltical applications were replaced with _elf-locking worm
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gear drive winches and technicians relnstructed regarding
: equipment maintenance.
The program experienced thirteen lost time injuries, all reported
in Quarterly OWS System Safety Program Reports, Ten of these inJut-
: ies were of a minor nature, e.g., employe tripped on stairway, em..
ploye strained back lifting routine load, etc.
i
One injury of a very serious nature resulted when an employe fell
:i
from a catwalk into the crotch area of the OWS Development Fixture
Forward Interstage. The exact cause of this fall was never deter-
mined. However, protective handrails were modified to eliminate any
possibility of recurrence.
Two fairly significant injuries occurred: One when an employe fell
approximately six feet when a faulty work platform broke, and the
other when an employe was struck on the legs by a mockup item which
tipped over for reasons never determined.
One near miss injury occurred when astronaut Bruce McCandless fell
shortly after particlpatlcn as a test subject in tests of the MI31
rotating litter chair. No connection between the fall and the chair
test was established and the small ground access ladder involved in
the fall was redesigned, In addition, procedures related to occur- i
rence involving injury or potential injury to astronauts were revised 'i
to require immediate examination by a physician regardless of sever-
ity or outward appearances.
h. 3 TRAINING
4.3.1 Skills Training - Throughout the life of the program, MDAC's on-
_-28
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going programs for both training and certification related to pro-
duction skills continued. Basic training and certification of an
on-going nature included soldering, torque and tubing, paste adhesives,
; and many others. Additional training, related to OWS peculiar skills,
was incorporated in the overall program. These additions provided
for training and certification of OWS Manufacturing and Quality
Assur.ance personnel in such skills as tube induction brazing, refrig-
; eration system insulation, wire harness fire proofing, and others.
: The relative absence of problems in the skills area provided confi-
dence that the program implemented was adequate.
4.3.2 Operational Training - Special training of an operational nature
was provided in several areas: safety, access control, contamin-
ation prevention, and system familiarization. Approximately 1400
personnel completed the safety, access control, and contamination
prevention training. Over 300 personnel completed basic OWS famil-
iarization/orientation training, including 80 MDAC FTC personnel and
127 NASA, NASA Contractor, and Air Force personnel. Most of these
5
personnel also completed basic OWS systems training and one or more
specialized courses in OWS subsystems.
4.3.3 Employe Motivation/Awareness - The Skylab Orbital Workshop Motiva-
tion/Awareness (M/A) Program was established in July 1970, as an
activity to motivate bo_h MDAC and supplier employes to produce
: defect-free hardware for the safety of the crew and the success of
the Skylab mission. Primary emphasis was directed toward maintain ....
i i_ the highest standards of workmanship and avoidance of human
errors in the manufacture, test and handling of mlssion/safety cri-
:, _ tical hardware. The program was a_gressively pursued an_ is being
_-29
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" actively sustained until the customer accepts and takes delivery of
i the OWS Backup Spacecraft in April 1974.
The scope of MDACM/A program embraced all of the key elements of _
the NASA Aerospace Awareness Program as subsequently delineated in
NPD 1700.3A and as recommended by the Office of Manned Space Flight.
It was formally implemented per authority contained in MDAC Standard
= Practice IO.O07-ACL, and directed by the OWS Program Manager for
• System Safety and Product Assurance.
To ensure that MDAC employes and critical suppliers were fully aware
of the significance of the OW$ program as well as the importance of
their OWS efforts to mission success, and extended series of presen- _
tations were conducted. The presentations consisted of the following:
A. Top management program overview.
g.
g. Two films: Quality Craftmanship (NASA film)
The Essential Factor (MDAC film)
C. Detailed briefing inside OWS full scale mockup.
D. Facility tour of OWS manufacturing area, payload shroud "
i assembly area and space chamber simulator.
_ E. Handout material (crew photos, NASA Skylab brochure, detals), i
By the time the OWS manufacturing phase had been completed, approx-
imately 1300 personnel from in-house and selected suppliers had
r; attended these presentations.
)Tn September 1970, a Skylab OWS conference was conducted _y MDAC at _o
1 '" k_30
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JHuntington Beach so that the collective managements of MDAC and
suppliers of critical OWS hardware could Jointly review their mutual
obligations to the man-i,, space. Primary emphasis was devoted to
the criticality of each invited supplier's hardware to crew safety
and mission success. Invitations were extended to the Chief Execu-
tive and Project Director of twenty-six companies who verc under
contract to provide components for use in the OWS. The Vice-Presi-
dent-General Manager, Program Director and other members of the MDAC
Skylab OWS management team addressed the supplier representatives
" and stressed the urgent requirement for on-time delivery of defect-
free hardware. The supplier's executives were also enjoined to
establish their own awareness programs and pass on the information
to their people.
In order to maintain the momentum established by the Skylab presen-
tations and supplier's conference, maximum use was made of the NASA
and MDAC motivational material as it became available. Approximately
560 MDAC West Coast and MDAC/KSC personnel attended showings of the
NASA film "Invitation to Overconfidence" and an additional 150 saw
i the film "Anatomy of an Accident." NASA and MDAC Manned Flight
Awareness posters were conspicuously displayed in all OWS work areas
continuously throughout the life of the program. New posters were
displayed and/or rotated every two - tba.eeweeks and maintained
current with the changing phases of the program. Th_ principal
themes that were emphasized included quality craftmanship, safety,
care in handling, cleanliness, contamination control and human error "_
_i avoidance. Another impressive display was a MDAC built 1/40-scale
]
model of the Skylab Cluster in-orblt. This scale model was
f
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effectively used as the focal point of a larger show case exhibit
which contained assorted space memorabilia, crew photos and other
program information.
In September 1972, an Open House was held at Huntington Beach for >
all employes and their families. It featured the OWS Hi-Fi Mockup,
Payload Shroud, several Skylab models, cutaways, pictorial displays.
.
• Several thousand persons toured the OWS work areas and the event
,_ was an outstanding success. Another one-time successful promotional
event was the visit of the NASA Craftmanship Van in February 1973.
During its stay at Huntington Beach, an estimated 4000 employes
visited the exhibit.
• A new error cause identification and removal system called Special
Performance and Craftmanship Effort (SPACE) was formally initiated
in February 1973, by C. R. Able, MDAC Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer. This aspect of the motivation program, with top management
emphasis, quickly took hold as a viable and effective program. As
a side benefit, SPACE proved to be a definite stimulus to the Em- _:
k
ploye Suggestion program. .
).
Recognition activities were maintained at a highly satisfactory level ;
throughout all phases of the OWS program. Approximately 150 VIP
citations were approved and awarded annually to program top perfor-
mers. In addition two MDAC employes were selected as NASA Manned
Flight Awareness Honorees for each of the Skylab launches and
attended all associated activities at KSC as guest of NASA.
i
Special ceremonies were held at Huntington Beach to recognize the
outstanding accomplishaents of the Skylab I and Skylab II crews.
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On each occasion the flight crews visited hundreds of emplg_es in
their work stations and 75 of the most deserving OWS team members
were invited to witness the spect_l presentation to the crew in the
:
executive conference room. Subsequently, a color reproduction of
the autographed Skylab photograph and flag, presented to the com-
pany by the crew, was in turn presented to the select group of OWS
team members.
In addition to the foregoing motivational activities, a considerable
. amount of program literature and miscellaneous motivational material, "
received from NASA and generated in-house, was transmitted and cir-
t
culated routl _ely to all MDAC departments and to critical suppliers. ,,
Material so distributed included Skylab booklets, _A brochures,
"'- i
_: pocket inserts, crew photos, decals, bumper stickers, lapel buttonsj
) and Awareness Newsletters. _.
_.4 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS - In retrospect, the Skylab OWS System
Safety Program is considered to have attained its objectives by
c
; providing for the welfare of the crew and the eventual success of the
\
_ Skylab mission. Specific areas where either new techniques were
' developed or the state-of-the-art was challenged are highlighted
below with respect to their effectiveness as well as some do's and
don'ts for future manned space programs.
A. Hazardous Materials C_ntrol - Methods were acceptable since crew
toxicity symptoms due to airborne chemical contaminants were "
not reported for any Skylab mission. The initial 0WS chemical ""J
contaminant load was greatly reduced due to the high temperature :L
To
bakeout and the multiple venting of the OW8 atmosphere prior to ,_
t
'_, h-33 '
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t SL-2 entry. This overheat conti_?ency was a positive factor in
minimizing the offgassing of carbon monoxide and total organics
from the non-metallic materials for the life of the Skylah.
,t
B. Flammable Material Control - This program was highly successful
and resulted in maximum development and usage of many new non-
flammable non-metallic materials; e.g., fluorocarbon rubber, _
impregnated fiberglass materials of different types, cardboard,
e_c •
,_ i.
Skylah design objective was to select the best non-flammable
t material for the intended purpose. When s non-flammable mater-
ial could not be found, the recommended material was documented
and coordinated with the customer for concurrance. Rationale
was supplied to support this technical Judgement. Part of the
: rationale included showing the placement Of the material on the
_ non-flammability map (MDAC drawing IB77015) for assessment of
potential flame propagation. Some materials, to meet flanma-
bility requirements, may compromise flight crew comfort and there- _
fore necessitated early coordination with the crew.
C. Microbial Contamination Control - Microbial sampling of OWS
surfaces prior to shipment to KSC dsmonstrated that the manu-
facturing cleanliness standards were very satisfactory in main-
taining a normal microbial flora population xn the OWS.
J
4
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SECTION 5 - TESTING PROGRAM
: 5.0 INTRODUCTION - This section defines the scope of the Orbital Workshop
_ test program performed by MDAC-W. This reflects the baseline scope
of effort associated with the "Dry" launched Workshop concept and
also identifies that effort common to either the "Wet" or "Dry"
"_ stage configurations.
_ The prime objective of the test program was to ensure that the
hardware and equipment furnished by MDAC-W fulfilled the objectives
stipulated in the NASA Mission Requirements Document I-MRD-0OIA and
the requirements of the OWS Contract End Item Detail Specification
CP2080JIC. The following testing was performed:
- • Component and subsystem testing
a. Development
b. Qualification
c. Production acceptance
• Structural testing
• Special and module testing
• Spacecraft system testing (post-manufacturing checkout)
" • Integrated vehicle testing
• Mission support testing
The following rationale was used by MDAC-W in the formulation of the
Orbital Workshop Test Plan: ,.
• Orbital Workshop considered one-of-a-kind experimental vehicle.
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@ :,_JAC-Wperformed development and qualification tests on selected
equipment and hardware to the extent necessary to provide or
._upport the technical Justification for usage. Testing was
accomplished on specific flight hardware or equipment categorized
as follows :
Vehicle Mounted Equipment and Hardware
• Category 1 - Equipment whose failure could adversely affect
crew safety.
i- • Category 2 - Equipment whose failure could result in not
achieving a primary mission objective but would
not adversely affect crew safety°
• Hardware and equipment evaluated at the Workshop system level
during vehicle or cluster checkout was considered ready for
• flight where successful fulfillment of the design and mission
objectives and requirements were achieved. Where analytical
models could be developed and evaluated for parti_-ular items of
hardware and equipment, those items would not be subjected to
I
component or subsystem level tests prior to vehicle installation.
_ • 0ff-the-shelf hardware or equipment was not requalified to the
Orbital Workshop levels where analysis was performed to Justify
their usage on the vehicle.
_ 5-2
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?
" • Hardware or equipment qualified on the Saturn IVB environmental
_ leve-s was not retested to the Saturn V vehicle levels, if
assessment showed that previous test levels were satisfactory
• The test program was based on fulfilling the total Skylab
mission llfe objectives; however, in interest of cost effective-
ness full mission performance was verified by a combination of
both testing and assessment, except where aualysls showed a
i_ necessity for long llfe or full mission duration testing. The
rationale for selecting testing and/or assessment to verify
elements of mission performance was documented in the Test and
Assessment Document (Reference MSFC-DRL-171A, Line Item GO9).
• Checkout and integrated testing followed a logical progression
to preclude i._validating tests or activities already accomplished,
and to facilitate fault isolation without intecference from
other systems. Integrated system testing was performed at the
highest level of assembly possible to ensure that all equipment,
systems, and support equipment functioned properly in relation
to the total mission.
@ Verification of GSE design requirements was accomplished by
Production Acceptance Testing. No separate development or
qualification testing of GSE was accomplished.
/_ 5-3
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_ • Test Program Objectives - Implementation of this Orbital Workshop
Test Plan fulfilled the following objectives:
• Performed all tests necessary to verify flight readiness of the
Orbital Workshop hardware and equipment.
• Demonstrated that the Orbital Workshop hardware/equipment ful-
filled the requirements of the Contract End Item Specification
CP2080JIC.
• Test Categories - The categories of tests described in this report
are defined as: Development, Qualification, Production Acceptance,
,!
Special, and Spacecraft Checkout and Integration Tests. A brief
description of each type is presented.
• Development Tests - Hardware utilized during these test prc-
k grams was either protolype or pre-producticn configurations
depending on the particular phase of design evaluation at the
i time of program initiation. Development testing was performed
to optimize hardware configuration and identify potential areas
of marginal design or performance. These tests also served to
determin_ and evaluate design feasibility, functional parameters
and environmental limitations. Development Tests also demon-
strated fulfillment of design objectives and requirements and
identified areas where design improvements would be required
prior to finalization of the production configuration.
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@ Qualification Tests - Qualification Tests were performed on pro-
duction hardware to demonstrate that the design and production
methods resulted in a product which fulfilled the design require-
ments established for usage.
@ Production Acceptance Tests - Production Acceptance Tests were
perfolaed on alS deliverable items of equipment to ensuL_e that \
: production methods and quality control i,roduced an article w_ich i
satisfied the design intent.
@ Special Tests - The special test program consisted of those tests,
usually conducted at government facilities and/or subcontractor
facilities, and required MDAC-W hardware, software and techni-al
supporting personnel during the performance of specific phases of
each program.
@ Spacecraft Checkout and Integration Tests - This activity included
post-manufacturing checkout accomplished at Huntington Beach and
system verification at the KSC. The integrated cluster systems
testing was also performed at the KSC.
5.1 TEST REQUIREMENTS
°: 5.1.1 General Requirements and Guidelines _
X
o The primary objective of the coaponent and subsystem te_t program
was to ensure that the hardware configuration sele_._ted for flight
usage fulfilled the design requirements. '"_
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• The dete_nation to perform development or qualification tests on
selected items of equipment _,d hardware was based on the com-
plexity and criticality of the specific item of interest. Design
verification .of certain items was made following development test-
ing only. The rationale used in establishing the depth and degree
• of testing was to ensure total verifi.ation of design at minimal
program expenditure and schedule impact. The judgment to eliminate
• development testing and proceed directly into q__alification was
made by assessing the _mplexity and similarity of that item to
existing design and adaptation for Workshop usage.
, • Where certain items of equipment and hardware were not subjected
to development or qualification testing, verification of design
was made during experiment integration, spacecraft checkout _n4
integrated system testing. Items verified in this manner included
those that required higher levels of assembly to properly evaluatei
f
their performance.
• IIardware or equipment identified as requiring dynamic testing were
subjected to the vibration and shock levels stipulated in the
Orbital Workshop dynamic criteria document - DAC 56620-C (OWS
mounted equipment). Any item of hardware and/or equipment selected
for OWS usage based on similarity to existing Saturn IVB Configura-
I:: tion was reassessed to determine whether additional testing was
required.
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• Hardware and equipment provided was designed to fulfill the require-
ment of 8-months of orbital life (Reference CEI Specification
CP208OJIC). Continuous operation environmental testing was
_ generally de_.onstrated only for the initial 28-day habitation
period; however, full or compressed mission duration life cycle
testing was conducted when, the test assessment indicated further
testing was required.
T
• Flammability testing at the components and subsystem levels were
ccaducted. Material evaluation tests were performed in accordance
_ith the requirements deiined in CEI CP2080JIC. Some of these
tests were performed in the MSFC facilities.
• The general policy for conducting Electromagnetic Compatibility
(EMC) tests was to evaluate hardware and equipment at the highest
level of assembly wherever possible. EMC testing conformed to the
:equirements delineated in MIL-I-6181 and MDAC Specification
No. 7883817-501.
5.i.2 Documentation and Control Requirements of Component and Subsystem
Testing
, @ Component Test Control Authority (CTCA) - The general testing
• requirement for any MDAC-W or supplier tested item was denoted on
Forms 850-7 (CTCA) which were used as the control document during
each specific test progrsm. A CTCA was prepared for each item of
hardware and equipment. '_-
4
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• Test Control Drawing (TCD) - A TCD was prepared for each of the
items subjected to compo:Aent or subsystem testing at MDAC-W. The
_" TCD w_ the engineering requirements document used as the basis
_ _ for the prepar_ion of a Test Procedure Drawing (TPD), when
_ required.
4
• Test Procedure Drawing (TPD) - The TPD, when required, w_ pre- : :
pared by either the testing laboratory or design section. It
outlined the detailed procedure for performance of the test and
w_ prepared in accord_ce with the authorizing TCD.
J
• Specification Control Drawing (SCD) - An MDAC-W Specific_ion
Control Drawing w_ prepared for each item supplied by suppliers
on deliverable items of equipment and hardware. -Section h of the
SCD defined those test requirements to be verified by the supplier
to support desi_ usage including Development, Qualification and
_ Production Acceptance testing. For each test, a test procedure
document w_ required to be submitted to NDAC-W for approval
prior to start of testing. MDAC-W Engineering and Quality ControlJ
"i monitored the testing at the suppliers facility to verify all test :
_quirements were met.
"_ • Qualification Test Controls - The qualification tests were con- _ q
ducted by MDAC-W Development Engineering with optional surveill- i _
_ce by NASA or its representative in accord_ce with the _ ,
z'ollowing: ,_
2
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The TCD was prepared for each of the items to be subjected to
testing. The TCD was the engineering requirements document
defining each test condition and environment per CTCA form and
used as the basis for preparing a TPD, as required. In certain
cases, it was necessary to make redline changes during the test
activity. These changes were reflected in a subsequent TCD
revision. All redline changes were approved by a representative
of the Contractor Design Technology and coordinated with an
authorized NASA RM0 Representative.
NOTE: When supplier tests were conducted, the procurement
specification completely defined the engineering test
requirements and provided for all anticipated environ-
ments to which the component may be exposed during the
life of the component.
@ Test Failure/Anomaly Reporting - When a failure occurred during
development testing, the resolution was the responsibility of
MDAC-W Development Engineering.
;
During the Qualification Test Program, should a component/module
fall to perform in accordance with test requirements of the TCD
or TPD_ the contractor would immediately instigate an investigation
or diagnostic test to determine the cause of the anomaly. If it _
was determined by the contractor that a true failure existed,
i.e., the component/module would not meet the test requirements ..
when subjected to proper test conditions, the NASA RMO was verbally
notified within one working day of the contractor's determination
of failure. A Failure Report (FR) was generated by MDAC-W ,._
5-9
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Quality Assurance as requested by MDAC-W Development Engineering.
: Test anomalies other than failures were documented in the Test
Log Book. Adjustments or equipment replacement was permitted
during an operation only if they were part of the normal use
cycle.
@ Test Status - Test status of all component/module tests was pro-
vided to NASA on a monthly basis. The status was presented in
the form of MDAC-W work plans. These plans were the in-house
working plans utilized by the MDAC-W for program management s_d
assessment of performance.
• Change Control - The test specimen quantity, configuration, and
testing environments for each component and subsystem test adhered
to the requirements defined in the appropriate CTCA form. MDAC-W
changes occurring during the Development Test Program as to con-
figuration, additions or deletions to test environments or speci-
men quantity were denoted in revision CTCA forms and submitted to
the NASA Resident Management Office as information. Changes to
Qualif: cation Test CTCA forms and the addition or deletion of
Development and Qualification Test line items were authorized by
mutual approval of a revised CTCA under cover of a Test Plan Change
Form. If MDAC-W notified NASA that the revision was a major change
in scope, a change order was issued directing the change. Test
Plan changes resulting from Class I OWS flight hardware changes
were submitted to NASA by the ECP submitting the hardware change
(reference paragraph 6.2.2.2 for Class I change definition).
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• Certificatioz of Component Acceptance - Certificates of Component
Qualificaticn were prepared for all items in criticality cate-
gories i and 2 prior to Pre-Flight Readiness Review.
• Data Submittal Requirements - Data submittal to the Contracting
.Agency during the MDAC-W period of performance was in accordance
with the Data Requirements List MSFC-DRL-171 (DRL).
5.1.3 Documentation and Control Requirements - Spacecraft Systems and
Integrated Vehicle Testing
• Documentation - In order to ensure a complete and adequate check- _
_ out was performed, a series of support documentation was provided.
Documentation was as follows:
; • Checkout Control Plan - The 1B79321 Checkout Control Plan, an
\
" internal _S_AC-W Engineering document, provided advanced checkout
: planning for both Huntington 2each (HB) and Kennedy Space Center
(KSC).
The final release of this document was an "A" Revision, dated
h August 1970. Subsequent planning was incorporated in Test
Outline Drawings (TOD's) and the IB83429 Test and Checkout
Requirements, Specifications and Criteria Document (TCRSC).
• Test and Checkout Plan (TCOP) - The TCOP was a matrix listing
which correlated the HB test requirements contained in the TCRSC,
the TOD's and the Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP's). Each
requirement identified in the TCRSC Document as applicable for
HB checkout was listed in the TCOP. A matrix was completed
5-11
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which indicated the TOD's and TCP's that satisfied the require-
ments during HB checkout. Only the TOD and TCP numbers and
titles were identified. Detailed paragraph identification was
not included. A TCCP was also prepared at the KSC tc verify all
TCRSC requirements were met.
@ Test and Checkout Requirements, Specifications and Criteria
Document (TCRSC) - A TCRSC Document was prepared in accordance
with Line Item J08 of Data Requirements List (DRL) - 171A. This
document specified OWS test requirements for both Huntington
Beach and KSC checkout. The test requirements were divided
into sections for each OWS system and subsystem.
The test requirements necessary to verify system and subsystem
operations were listed along with associated acceptance criteria
for both Huntingtcn Beach and KSC. If a test requirement was
not applicable at one of the test locations (HB or KSC), this
was also indicated. These requirements included the necessary
information to suppcrt OWS checkout in the HB Vehicle Checkout
Laboratory (VCL) CWS checkout and prelaunch checkout operations
at the KSC. The TCRSC required the NASA approval.
@ Area Control Drawing (ACD) - ACD's were prepared and utilized
to authorize, document and plan the conduct of the OWS and GSE ! •
testing in the VCL. All Test and Checkout Procedures and
Handling and Checkout Procedures required to v,r_fy, handle '_
and transport the Spacecraft and GSE were included. General
I !test policy, objectives, safety requfrements and test sequence
5-12
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were also included. Authorization for usage of ACD's was by
Manufacturing Planning Assembly Outlines (AO's). ACD's were
!
submitted to the Resident NASA Management for approval prior
to utilization.
: • Test Outline Drawings (TOD's) - TOD's were prepared in accord-
: ance with Line Item J2h of DRL-171A.
A TOD was prepared for each TCP that was accomplished during
HB checkout. The TOD's were updated until the release of the
corresponding TCP after which time no additional releases were
required. These documents included the checkout flow stud
operations for each procedure to a depth necessary to specify
the basic operations for each procedure to a depth necessary
to specify the basic operations to be performed. Test pre-
requisites, facility support, ground support equipment (GSE)
support, and other significant support information were
included. Detail checkout operations (e.g., connect, dis-
connect) and GSE interface operations were included. The
information contained in the TOD's provided the information
; from which the detailed TCP was prepared. In the case of ;
autcmatic tests, the T0D contained sufficient detail informa-
tion required to generate the automatic portion of the TCP.
The principal engineering design discipline responsible for
: each _c,t was responsible for coordination of inputs from all
other disciplines, the collation of the inputs, and the prep-
station of the respective T0D and TCP. Each design discipline
5-z3
1974020219-118
tensured that its individual requirements for each test was
recognized by the responsible discipline and incorporated into
/
the test sequence TOD's were submitted to the NASA for review.°
_ TOD's were prepared and utilized at the KSC in the same manner
as noted.
; • Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP's) - The TCP's were prepared
in accordance with Line Item J01 in DRL-171A.
!
: These procedures identified the step-by-step checkout to be
performed during the HB operations.
The TCP's were used to perform the tests and provide the buyout
documentation for acceptance of the OWS. TCP's were prepared
and utilized at the KSC in the same manner as noted.
: • GSE End Item Test Plan (EITP) - The GSE EITP was contractually
required by Line Item JOb of DRL-171A.
The GSE EITP contained a column listing of each item of GSE
used to support OWS checkout and handling operations at HB.
Included in the listing were the GSE model number and title
_ along with identification of the procedure used to verify proper
operation of the model.
@ Test Management - The MDAC-W Development Engineering Vehicle 1
Checkout Laboratory (VCL) functional organization, was responsi-
ble for managing and performing Spacecraft checkout operations
at Huntington Beach (HB). This organization was responsible
for:
1974020219-119
?@ Verifying _onfiguration before starting OWS checkout.
_ @ Assuming and retaining custody of the OWS from initiation
• of checkout operations until turnover for shipment.
@ Spacecraft modifications required to meet mission peculiar
requi r e_ent s.
i
@ Planning, organizing, directing, and controlling assigned
checkout tasks.
• Updating, modifying, maintaining, and testing test and
support equipment, and assuring necessary calibration was
accompli shed.
• Ensuring safety of personnel and hardware. !
• Maintaining an effective training level of checkout
_ representatives.
• Planning and controlling checkout area cost and budget •
requirement s. i
• Maintaining liaison with the NASA Resident Management as
designated in program requirements.
• Generating and retaining objective evidence in the fc_'mof
'r
test records to verify or establish that the test require-
ments were met.
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The MDC G2427, Huntington Beach Vehicle Checkout Laboratory _
Operating Plan, identified: (i) applicable management{
directives associated with directing the VCL operations,
(2) supporting MDAC-W elements who provided personnel, skills
and services, (3) custody turnover requirements from manu-
facturing to the VCL, (4) applicable Test Plans/Specifications,
-  (5)work scheduling requirements, (6) test team structure,
I •
{ (7) test conduct, (8) hardware configuration control, and
_ i (9) test problem reporting system, etc. This plan was a more
comprehensive document than was normally required for a _ost-
t
: manufacturing checkout because of the man_- interfaces between
/ the various NASA centers and experiment developers.
Speciai Operating Instructions (SOI'_) were released to define
! operating procedures for use by all personnel assigned to the
VCL° SOI's were written to interpret and implement the in-
tent of MDAC-W Management Directives or to provide operating
instructions where existing directives did not apply.
_ Safety aspects of the VCL operations were specified in the
_ following:
• The IB88179, B Revision, OWS Safety and Retreat Operating
\
Instructions, AS-VCL, specified redline monitor instructions
and retreat procedures to be followed in the event emergency
action was required during OWS operations.
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@ The MDC GC937, 0WS Safety Brochure of the Vehicle Checkout
Laboratory, Huntington Beach, dated November 1971, speci-
fied the safety rules and procedures to be observed by all
personnel engaged in checkout of the OWS in the VCL.
i
In order to ensure timely release of Test and Checkout Pro-
%
cedures (TCP's), verify all test requirements were included, 7
!
and to improve TCP coordination with the NASA, an OWS Review
and Pevision Plan was implemented. Initial release of TCP's
was scheduled no later than test minus four (4) weeks. TCP's
!
implemented the requirements of Test 0utline Drawings (TOD's),
satisfied test requirements previously approved by the NASA,
and were thoroughly reviewed by affected technologies. Test
time minus three weeks a review meeting was held with repre-
sentatives from affected technologies and the NASA. NASA i
approval letter was prepared and transmitted to MDAC-W
approving TCP contingent on incorporation of initial reviewmeeting agreements. Review comments were incorpor ted into
TCP by firm letter change release. A final review meeting i
was held at test minus one (i) week. Procedure changes re-
J
suiting from final review meeting were incorporated into all
test team copies by Procedure Change Instructions (PCI's).
Inspection and man/machine interface stamps (Snoopy)
MAN. (_
IZACHII J[_ were applied to TCP Inspection Master.
VERiFiCATION_ CaiW_nz_
The Snoopy was a symbol used to indicate that a crew systems '"
engineer had a requirement to perform a functional test to
!
properly evaluate whether the action met the loads and hand-
• ; ling capabilities of a flight crewman. Inspection master =
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• procedure vellum was then approved by the NASA and MDAC-W
personnel. Real t_me procedure changes were also incorporated
by the PCI method. •
Overall responsibility for the Saturn Wo:,Kshop Skylab (SWS)
program at the KSC was the NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
Spacecraft Operations (SO). Skylab Preflight Operations ?
Procedures (POP's) were established to define Contractor
• 1
Interface Guidelines for SWS Spacecraft Opera:ions at t4e KSC. _
5.1.k Documentation and Control Requirements - Mission Support Testing
_ @ Action Requests generated to solve Mission problems generally
flowed from Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Operations Manage-
ment Room (H)I_) to Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC);
however, requests were sometimes phoned directly to the MDAC-W
Mission Support (MS) Room Captain (RC). Each action was assigned
a unique Action Item Number.
Action Requests requiring use of the OWS Backup or Component and
System Hardware to resolve a Mission problem resulted in prepara-
tion of a Mission Support Test Request (MSTR) by the RC A
responsible,engineer was assigned. The engineer was responsible
:, for preparation of the MSTR Test Plan, coordinating test require- _"
ments, within MDAC-W and with MSFC, participatin_ in the test when
required, providing the solution to the Mission problem, and com- _
pleting the action item form. Action Requests and associated
MSTR's are presented in Figure 5.1-5. The MSTR, with Test Plan
included, was submitted to the VCL Progrsm Manager snd the NASA
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Senior Vehicle Systems Checkout Representative for approval prior
to c::_aencing any hA'."dware activities. The MSTR was then submitted
to the affected technology Task Leader. The Task Leader imple-
mented the requirements of the MSTR on a Test Preparation qheet
(TPS) and ran the test. All other agencies supported preparation
?
of the TPS and performance of the test as required. At the com-
pletion of the test, the Task Leader was responsible for subm'.tting )
the results of the test to the responsible engineer/Room Captain ?
and preparing a final report. ;:
The documentation utilized during Mission Support special tests
vere :
• Mission Support Area Control Drawing. MSACD's provided the
means to authorize, direct, control and document special tests
requested by a MSTR.
J
• Test Preparation Sheets - TPS's were generated by the Ergineering
Task Leader to implement the requirements of the MSTR. TPS's
' included but were not limited to the following:
• Pre-test setups
@ Recording requirements i'7
• Test instructions
• Temporary configuration chanqes
• Authorization for removals/disconnections _-
• Inspection buy out for app3icable details associated with _
returning the Spacccraft back to original configuration, and _
retest of invalid ,ed subsystems.
_ • Identifying Manufacturing Planning r_uirements
5-19
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• Non-Conformances - Non-Conformances were documented in accordance
with Quality Assurance Standard Practices.
O Documentation - Mission Support Test do-"uments were maintained by
Quality Control during Mission Support (MS). At the completion
of MS, all special test documentation was transferred to Quality
Data Records File.
L
5-20
i
1974020219-125
5.2 COMPONEhT AND SUBSYST_4 TESTING
This section enumerates the development and qualification tests
performed on the component and subsystems. Provided is a listing
showing the quantity and types of tests with the corresponding i
report number that contains all of the test data. A brief is
provided that describes the general purpose of the tests. For
detailed test description and discussions on significant anomalies,
reference is made to the Tests Section within each subsystem in
Section 2.2 of this report.
5.2.1 Development and qualification Testing - For purpose of clarity, the
development and qualification testing which was performed is grouped
in accordance with respective functional OWShardware breakdown struc-
ture. Tests which were not compatible with this grouping because of
scope and method of accomplishment are defined as special tests in
Paragraph 5.4 of this report. Major fUnctional groupings are listed
below:
o Crew Accommodations
o Habitability Support Systems
o Electrical Systems
o Illumination System
o Communication System
o Data Acquisition System
o Thermal Control Systems
o _,ruster Attitude Control System _ 4
o Corollary Experiment Accommodations
5.2.1.1 Crew Accommodations - This portion of the test program verified the
integrity _£ the crew quarters, astronaut aids, crew safety provisions
and the orbital maintenance _rovisions.
5-21
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|Testing of items in this category were initiated early in the OWS
program and many completed prior to the conversion from the "wet"
to "dry" concept. Twelve of these tests remaine_ applicable to the
"dry" version. !
J
o Crew Quarters - Tests applicable to this area encompassed the !
I
floor, ceiling, compartmentization, viewing window and col_r j
scheme. Listed below are Test Line Items used to develop and
qualify the crew quarters.
Line Report
Title Item T_e Start Completion Number
Floor Panel CA-I Dev 08/Ih/6( 10/06/67 TM-II5
Floor & Wall (h.2 Grid) CA-2 Dev 10/16/67 02/15/68 TM-123
Wall & Floor Grid Splice CA-3 Dev 12/18/67 12/27/67 TM-12h
Thermal Curtain & Ceiling CA-h Dev 12/15/67 12/31/68 MP-5169h
Green Alodine Coating CA-5 Dev 03/15/68 10/28/69 DAC-62115
Coating A1 Foil MD-19 CA-6 Dev 08/0h/67 12/05/67 DAC-62116
Color Anodic Films CA-7 Dev 02/26/68 12/16/68 MP 51,386
Viewing Window & Instal CA-18 Dev 11/16/70 08/20/71 G3865
Viewing Window & Instal CA-19 Qual 08/18/71 12/07/71 G3761
View Window Int Shield CA-27 Dev 09/27/71 0h/07/72 G3372
o Astronaut Aids - Items _ested in this category involved both fixed
and portable aids including handrails, tether attachments and foot
restraints. The tests noted below cover the development of these
items.
Insulated Plug Assembly CA-8 Dev 08/Ih/68 05/02/69 TM-131RI
Portable Foot Restraints CA-9 Dev 09/03/68 07/11/69 TM-190
Portable Hand Hold CA-10 Dev 06/17/68 06/21/68 TM-188
: Tether Attach Pin CA-II Dev 06/24/68 06/25/68 TM-184
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o Crew Safety Provisions - Testing in support of crew safety
provisions consisted of development cad qualification of the fire
protection and meteoroid shield deployment systems. Test Line
Items CA-5. CA-6 and CA-7 noted under crew quarters. _=-.eloped
the fire retardant coating utilized. In addition, testing was
accomplished on the foam insulation applied to the co,,,on bulkhead
dome under Line Item CA-21 _
Line Report
Title Item Type Start Completion Number :
Foam Insulation CA-21 Dew 06/11/70 09/22/70 TM-138
Listed below are those Test Line Items that developed and qualified
the deployment of the meteoroid shield.
Meteoroid Shield Rel Sys CA-12 qual 04/21/71 05/19/71 R689012
Exp Tube/CDF & EBW CDF CA-13 Dev 06/23/69 07/25/69 R6573A
Exp Tube CA-lh Dew 01/17/68 09/12/69 R666h :_
Exp Tube CA-15 Qual 02/19/71 0h/29/71 R6870A
mExpand Tube & Strap Assy CA-28 Dew 07/12/71 09/04/71 Gh022
Exp Tube/Strap Assy CA-30 Qual 03/08/72 04/14172 R70h2A
Exp Tube/Strap Full Scale CA-31 Qual 01/11/72 02/I0/72 RTOh3 :
<
Meteoroid Shield Post Inst CA-32 Dew 12/13/71 01/31/72 G3373
Meteoroid Shield Deploy
Latch CA-3h Dew 02/17/72 07/19/72 G337h
;
o Orbital Maintenance Provisions - Since most orbital maintenance
t
logistics spares were stored in stors_e containers, it was necessary
to demonstrate that this equipment could withstand launch and boost
\.
dynamic load environments. The Test Line Item noted below was
i
utilized for this purpose.
Spnre Equipment Stow CA-16 Qual 09/20/71 05/13/72 Chll2
Container Vol. I, ..
II &IIl
WTested at supplier.
_-23
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75.2.1.2 Habitability Support System - The habitability system consisted of2
mmk7 major subsystems requiring extensive development and qualifi-
cation testing prior to flight of the OWS. In addition to these
test line items, Neutral Buoyancy and Zero-Gravity testing, identified
in Paragraph 5.h as Line Items ST-I and ST-2, were conducted at MSFC.
Some design verification was accomplished on the spacecraft with
crew participation during post-manufacturing checkout.
t
z
For the prupose of this report, the Habitability Support System was
_ composed of the following subsystems: Crew Restraints, Waste Manage-
merit, Water, Personal Hygiene, Food _anagement and Refrigeration,
Trash Disposal and Vacuum provisions.
o Crew Restraints - Crew restraints ve_e evaluated and developed by
Test Line Item HS-l. These included Food Management Compartment,
Pressure Suit Foot, Portable and Fixed Foot, Sleep and Equipment
Restraints. In addition to the one "G" tests at Huntington Beach,
these restraints were testcd in neutral buoyancy at MS}_ facilities.
Sleep restraint stowage testing was initiated under Line Item HS-69
and subsequently stopped due to material change and testing
• accomplished at MSFC. Below are Test Line items involved.
Line Report
Title Item T_e Start Completion Number
Crew Restraints HS-I Dev 11/03/69 07/27/71 R6901 _
Sleep Restr Assy HS-69 Dev 02/02/72 02/03/72 N/A
{
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!o Waste Management Subsystem - The subsystem provided the hardware
necessary for safe. effective and hygienic collection, processing.
stowage and return or disposal of all waste products for the three
/
Skylab missions. Below are listed the development and qualification
test line items applicable to this subsystem including some supplier
©
tests.
Line Report
Title Item Type Start Completion Number
Ws_te Management Subsys HS-2 Qua/ 07/15/71 11/21/72 Gh176
"Zero-G Fecal Collector HS-3 Dev 11/01/69 Oh/lh/70 TM-192
"Waste Collector & Proc HS-h Dev 12/07/70 06/28/72 TM-198
"Urine Processor & Stor HS-5 Dev 11/03/69 03/05/70 TM-199
Apollo Blower HC-27 Qual 02/16/70 07/20/70 R6690A
*Apono System Hs-28 quaZ 07/08/70 o8/17/7o TM-195
*Waste Management Odor Ccnt HS-3h Dev 06/30/71 11/19/71 TM-203
mUCMSS - Prelim Spec Tests HS-39 Dev 07/28/70 10/06/70 TM-193
Urine Freezer HS-hl Qual 11/O8/71 03/28/72 R7038
Urine Sample Return Stor
Container HS-42 qual 04/28/72 07/13/72 G3973
"UCMSS - Two-Bs_ Urine HS-51 Dev 10/27/70 11/13/70 TM-196
f
: "Urine Centr Sep Assy H8-55 Dev 06/21/71 01/28/'(2 TM-20h
ICentr Sep fPlexiglass) HS-60 Dev 07/20/71 09/21/71 TM-206
Two Ba6 Urine Tracer
"Verification HS-61 Dev 11/29/71 02/25/71 TM-205
Centr Sep Collect Subsys. HS-62 Dev 09/18/71 08/16/72 0h132
Urine _eezer/Tr_7 Frost HS-6h Dev 06/09/71 06/15/71 R6888
Urine Freezer (Urine &
Blood HS-85 Qual 06/29/72 10/05/72 GhlS0
Urlne/Blood Sample Return
Storage ContaLner HS-86 Qual 10/16/72 10/27/72 Gh152
Urine Subsystem-Redeslgned H8-89 Dev 10/25/72 12/15/72 Gh198
Urine Subsystem-Redeslgned H8-90 Qual 12/08/72 0h/09/73 GhI99 '"":
Urine Bag Asay HS-91 Qual 01/17/73 02/12/73 3h196
; iT, st aucomplished at Supplier.
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rNOTE: Expendable storage and dispensing equipment which
included collection bag supply module, bag dispenser,
utility water dispenser, and storage containers were
evaluated during the qualification test of Waste
Management Subsystem, Line Item HS-2.
o Water Management Subsystem - Two separate installations of the
Water Subsystem were made in the OWS - One for personal hygiene
-\
i and one for food management. These provided capability for storage,
;_ supply, conditioning, dispensing for food and beverage preparatlcn,
drinking and body cleansing during all missions. Test Line Item
HS-7 qualified the water management subsystem. Line Item HS-94
• was the qualification test initiated on a redesigned water heater
with CAL-ROD type element for use in the OWS Backup spacecraft.
Listed below are the tests performed to develop and qualify this
major subsystem, i
Line Report
Title Item TYpe Start Completion Number
Water Subsystem HS-7 Qua/ ii/02/71 06/1517_ G_194
Water Storage Assembly HS-8 Dew 09/16/70 11/10/72 G4175 VOL
_- I & II
Food Reconst Disp Unit HS-IO Dew 03/02/70 07/07/71 R6915
Drink Water Dispenser HS-II Dev 02/10/7008/16/71 R6938
*Water Heater HS-12 Dev 09/29/71 06/0h/71 G39h5
Microbiological ERp HS-lh Dev 12/01/70 05/2h/72 Gh156
Per Hyg Water Disp HS-16 Dev 07/22/70 09/16/70 _4760
*Water Storage Cont Bel HS-32 Dev 12/17/70 03/12/71 03611
Heater Controller HS-46 Dew 03/29/71 06/11/71 R6875
Urine Sep Flush Disp Assy HS-56 Dew 09/27/71 01/31/72 R6989A
\ I Water Deionization Assy HS-59 Dev 12/08/7107/12172 C_181
s
J Water Heater HS-9_ Qual 08/02/73 11/27/73 R7228
_ *Tested at Supplier.
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o Personal Hygiene Subsystem - There were two types of personal
hygiene equipment utilized during th_ Skylab/Orbltal Workshop
missions. These were either individual or common personal hygiene
equipment. Qualification was accomplished under Test Line Item
( HS-17 at the subsystem level. In addition, neutral buoyancy and
zero gravity tests were accomplished at MSFC.
The washcloth squeezer was developed under Line Item HS-48 but
qualified luring the water subsystem test, HS-7.
Below are the tests conducted on this subsystem..
Line Report ;
Title Item Type Start Completion Number
Per Hygiene Subsystem HS-17 Qual 09/10/71 01/19/72 R6993
Cleansing Solution Test HS-33 Dev 02/23/70 04/03/70 R6703#
Wash Cloth Squeezer Assy HS-h8 Dev 04/05/71 05/23/72 R7062
Biocide Wipes HS-7h Qua& 06/12/72 Oh/2h/73 R7067
o Food Management and Refrigeration Subsystems - These subsystems _
provide the equipment and supplies required for the storage,
preparation, consumption and preservation of food and disposal
of food wastes and wrappers. The urine freezer tested as Line Items
HS-hl and H8-85 is noted under the Waste Management Subsystem;
however, it is functioned by the Refrigeration Subsystem. Below
are noted the development and qualification testing of the elements
of these subsystems. ?
) ;F
.t
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• Line Report
Title Item Type Start Completion Number
Refrig Subsystem HS-19 Qua/ 92/05/71 01/12/73 04180
Radiator & Plume Shield HS-31 Dev 05/25/71 04120/72 R7060
Pump Logic Control HS-35 qual 11/17/71 03/20/72 R6967 '
: Radiator Bypass Valve
: Controller HS-36 Qua/ 03/21/72 07/13/72 C_004
"Pr Rel Valve, RTC HS-66 Dev 08/11/71 09/ih/71 Sterer
,_ DTR-29450-SA
-t
: Bypass Control Monitor HS-76 qual 05/03/73 06/06/72 RT073A
: Radiator & Plume Shield HS-77 Dev 03/11/72 01/23/73 04234
: _Potable Water Chiller HS-78 Dev 02/28/72 05/09/72 Gh087
: Coolant Pump Inverter HS-88 qua/ 01/02/73 02/08/73 C,h193
L O Trash Disposal Subsystem - This subsystem included the collection
and disposal equipment necessary to remove trash and garbage from
f
the LH2 tank of the workshop and expel it into the L0X tank area.!
This was accomplished by means of an airlock located in the common
, bulkhead. Testing was performed on the bags utilized to contain
liquids and solids expelled through the alrlock (HS-67) as well as
the screens, baffles, gage and the trash airlock itself. Below are
listed the test line items utilized in verifying the design integrity
of this subsystem.
Line Report
_ Title Item, Type Stsrt Completion Number
Trash Disp Airlock HS-2h Dev 09/28/70 11/08/71 03364
'i Trash Bags HS-6? Dev 07115171 05/19/72 C,_09_
t
Waste Tank Screen HS-73 Dev 10/15/71 01/14/72 R70h0 '..-.
Pressure Gage, Trash "
Dispose/ Airlock HS-?5 Dev 12/20/71 02/09/72 03377
Waste Tank-Screen Baffle HS-81 Dev 03/03/72 03/31/72 R7039
_ °Tested at Supplier. _
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o Vacuum Provisions - These provisions were provided in the Workshop
to provide vacuum discharge and shutoff capability for various
_ items of equipment and experiment support. 1-inch and i/2-inch }
} bali valves were utilized in the Waste Management Compartment to :
accommodate the urine and processor dump systems, waste management
and wardroom water systems and the waste management dump system.
These valves were also utilized for shutoff capability to the
Lower Body Negative Press_re (LBNP) experiment, and vent refrigeration _-
coolant leakage into the waste tank. Testing of the components and
subsystems were accomplished by the following line items. •
Line Report
Title Item Type Start Coml_let!on Number
Vac Outlet Valves HS-25 D-v 08/29/68 03/19/70 R6358
Vacuum Outlet System HS-26 Qual 10/18/71 05/20/72 G4117 '
1/2 Inch Vacuum Vlv HS-65 Qual 01117172 Oh126/T2 R7065
Condensate Dump Syst HS-80 Dev 06/30/72 08/15/72 G4203
Heater Probe/AM Cond
Dump System HS-87 Qual 10119/72 01126/73 G_20k
Htr Probe Back-up BS-92 Dev 01/i_/73 01/31/73 G_205
5.2.1.3 Electrical Systems - The systems associated with the Workshop electrical
power generation, distribution and control are contained in this section.
There are three major divisional breakdowns involved: Launch Support
! Electrical System; Electrical Distribution and Contrcl; and the Solar •
J
Array System.
_ o Launch Support Electrical System - This operated only during launch
_ and ascent phases of the OW8 mission and remained passive subsequent i
to orbital insertion and Instrument Unit (IU) power down. Hardware -_
utilized was previously qualified for the S-IVB _tage; however, the
system _as verified during cluster testing at KSC.
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o Electrical Power Distribution and Control - Electrical energy is
'-' provided by the Solar Array System _SAS) with power conditioning :
accomplished by equipment installed in the Airlock Module (AM).
Single voltage DC power is then regulated and transferred into the
Workshop electrical power distribution and control system where
final distribution to end items of equipment is made. :
. The following tests were conducted to ensure design suitability jp
and verification of the electrical system which supplies _ower to
each of the Orbital Workshop components.
• Line Report
Title Item T_e Start Completion Number !
LH2 Wicking & Ign ES-I Dev 07/12/67 07/29/67 R6088 :;
, Cryo Mat Eval ES-2 Dev 11/06/67 03/11/69 R6134
Zero G Conn ES-3 Dev 02/06/69 07/50/71 R65hSA _ !,
Zero G Conn ES-h Qual 05/06170 02/03/72 R6970A
_ Forward Dome '_est ES-5 Dev Oh/Ol/70 05/28/70 G2071
Cont & Displ Panel ES-6 Dev 03/19/70 06/09/70 R6696A
' Cont & Displ Panel ES-7 Qual 10/11/71 06/15/72 Gh023 :,
OWS Relay Modules ES-II Qual 05/03/71 10/29/71 R69h3 ,
! 30 Amp G.P. Relay ES-13 Qual o6/I0/71 07/o8/71 R6877 '_/
WMC C & D Panel ES-lh Qual 10/21/71 12/16/71 R6939
Module, Isol. Diode ES-15 Qual 05/09/72 06/09/72 RTO53A
Series Reg Module ES-16 Qual 05115/72 06/06/72 RT05h i
o Solar Array System (SAS) - The Solar Array was the primary source of _'
electrical power for the Orbital Workshop. The test program conducted !
/
to develop the SA_ and finally qualify it for flight consisted of _:
development testing and qualification testing of array panel assemblies,
array deployment mechanisms, and passive vent module. This testing was !
followed by a qualification test of the entire SAS wing assembly to
verify that mechanical integrity of the array structure and equipment
would withstand the launch and ascent dynamics of vibration, shock and
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acoustics. The assembly was subjected to the launch dynamics in
the stowed position and verified the deployment performance from
initiation of the ordnance actuated beam/fairing release mechanisms to
full extension of the SAS wing section. Counterbalances during ex-
tension were utilized to negate one "G" loads. The following is a
list of all SAS testing.
Line Report
Title Item TYpe Start Completion Number
eSolar Cell Panel SA-I Qual 07/12/71 01/26/72 Gh039
OOne-Third Wlng Assy SA-2 Dev 07/01/70 03/21/72 Gh078
SAS Pwr Unit &Conn SA-3 Qual 11/22/71 01/07/72 G3999
mSolar Array S_stem SA-h Qual 03/31/72 07/11/72 Gh032
CDF Manif Install SA-5 Qua/ 10/23/r0 11/16/70 R6788A
Solar Cell Panel SA-13 Dev 08/14/70 09/22/70 SASh-3082
Wing Rel Mech Tube SA-I4 Dev 0h/23/70 02/19/71 R6835
Wing Rel Mech Exp Tube SA-15 Dev 07/12/71 08/30/71 Gh0h9
"Hinge Assy Beam SA-16 Dev 10/07/70 0h/28/72 Gh050
SAS Beam Rel, Exp Tube SA-17 Dev 01/08/71 05/14/71 R689h
OActuator/Damper SA-18 Dev 10/12/70 03/25/71 TM-7
"Actuator/Damper SA-19 Qual 02/18/72 07/18/72 GhOh7
mAct/Damper W/Brkn Spring SA-20 Dev 06/02/71 06/15/71 GhO00
Mag Rel Vent.Module SA-21 Dev 12/18/71 02/18/72 R7041
mSAS Vent Module SA-22 Dev 01/03/72 05/30/72 Gh0h6
•SAS Vent Module SA-23 Qual 04/19/72 05/31/72 G3950
eCinch Bar/Seal SA-26 Qua/ 07/05/72 07/20/72 G3932
5.2.1.h llumination System - The OWS illumination system which provides in- i
terns/ lighting units for crew quarters, work areas, emergency use and !
eTested at supplier.
5-31
1974020219-136
: experimental support operations utilizes a common lighting unit which
was subjected to a component qualification test designed to demonstrate
that the design objectives were fulfilled; however, a possible low input
voltage operating mode was defined which could prevent light operation
'
or cause possible damage to light. To overcome this problem, a design ; ?
change was implemented to add a capacitor circuit and a case extension '!
to house it. The redesigned lighting unit was qualified by Line Item
IS-7. In addition to the component tests listed below, total system
J
verification was accomplished during vehicle post-manufacturing checkout.
Line Report ;
I
Title Item Type Start Completion Number _ :
Gen Illum Light IS-i Qual 05/07/71 12/17/71 R692h
Gen Ilium Light IS-7 Qual 06/19/72 09/26/72 Gk155
5.2.1.5 Co,,,unication System - This section is concerned with elements assoc-
iated with crew communications. The telecommunication system and •
inter-communication systems are both a part of the Airlock Module and
were designed and tested as part of that effort. The interface of the
two systems is by means of inter-comzmnication (intercom) boxes
supplied as GFP and installed in the Workshop area. Verification
testing of the intercom was accomplished during post-manufacturing
checkout defined in Paragraph 5.5.
The Caution and Warning (C&W) system is provided for alerting crew to
/
out-of-tolerance and emergency conditions by visual and/or audible _)
i :
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s'ignals. This system was verified during ,mcecraft and integrated
systems testing and since the alarms apd displays are par_ of the
• control and display panel, these were _erified during test Line Items :
ES-6 and ES-7.
The following test line item was conducted to verify the str.ctural
mounted components of the communication system.
Line Report
Title Item T_pe Start Completion Number
Structural Mid Cons Comp CS-3 Qua/ 06/14/71 05/24/72 G3996 ,_
5.2.1.6 Data Acquisition System - This system included transducers, excitation
and signal conditioning, multiplexing, and on-board data displays. Data ':
wag acquired during the launch and ascent phase from various Workshop
L
system operations as well as the caution and warning system. This data
was transferred to the Alrlock Module (AM) telemetry system ¢r to the
Workshop contro:, and display panel. Electrical _ower for the data
acquisition system was supplied directly from the AM and wa_ electrically
_ independent of the Workshop electrical power distribution and control
system. The data acquisition system was made up of launch support data,
; Orbital Workshop (0WS) data, on-board data display end HSS data systems.
o Launch Support Data System - Monitored the launch, ascent and early
orbit system parameters vital to the success of that phase of the
mission. All components of this system, except the multiplexer, were
previously qualified and flown on the S-IVB stage. The multiplexers '
were utilized during the Gemini progPam but additionally tested as .--_,
Line Item DA-I to meet the Workshop launch and ascent dynamics Jevels.
:
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The forward signal conditionin_ panel was tested in four phases
as Line Item DA-3. The first two phases included lightly loaded
: and fully loaded panels to various environments. The last t%o
phases of this test were initiated to increase temperature ranges
and to eval ate the redesigned 5Vdc excitation module.
Line Report
Title Item Type Start Completion Number
-
tumultSign Cond-Gen DA-I Dev Unknown 07-07/69 EMR-2175-02
! Fwd Sign Con4 Panel DA-3 Dev 08/19/70 02/08/71 R6763
08/19/71 12/13/71 R6".63
o Orbital Workshop (OWS) Data System - Monitored functions of the various
Workshop systems which are important to crew safety, comfort and
mission success. The following line items verified the capability
of this system to meet mission requirements.
Line Report
Title Item T_e Start Completion Number
Fuse, Cart, Slk Mini DA-h Dew 01/06/70 01/09/70 R6658
Data Acquisition Comp DA-5 Dew 10/07/70 12/30/70 R6775B
IAbsolute Press Transducer DA-8 Qua/ 01/25/72 10/10/72 Gh075
mDiff Press Transducer DA-9 Qua/ 01/19/72 08/02/72 C_002
Data Acq Modules DA-10 Qual 05/17/72 06/30/72 CA005
"Tested at supplier.
i
L
!
, o On-Board Data Display System - This system was used to provide the
flight crew with the information needed to indicate particular sub-
system operational status and to provide visual indication of con- _.
i ditions sensed by the warning and emergency systems. These displays
.'_
g :
L
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are presented on the control and display panels which were tested
: as Line Items F_.-6and E_-7. (See Para. 5.2.1.3). All other
elements of the system were qualified for flight use by previous
>
usage or by qualification in some other system.
o HSS Data System - Utilization of log books, etc. for data precluded
the requirement for testing the items of this system.
: 5.2.1.7 Thermal Control System - This system consisted of three major elements:
Pressurization and Pressure Control, Thermal Control, and the Ventilation
Control Systems.
o Pressurization and Pressure Control - This system provided for
pressure control of the habitation area (LH2 tank) and waste tank
(LO2 tank) during ground holds, boost flight, tank venting during
orbital insertion, and orbital pressurization.
:_ The habitation area vent and relief control equipment was S-IVB hard-
ware modified to OWSrequirements and were verified by Test Plan
:' Line Items EC-13, EC-22, EC-38 and EC-I._. The waste tank prelaunch
pressurization was verified by PAT and post-manufacturing checkout.
: The vent and relief control of this tank consisted of pneumatically
actuated caps over each of the two vent ducts which penetrates waste
tank and aft skirt. These caps were released after spacecraft
separation and remained off throughout the mis,_on. This hardware
was verified by Test Plan Line Item EC-32. It wa_ also necessary to
reverify waste tank pressurization line (stainless steel tubing and ....
three bellows flex sections ) to the higher dynamic environments of
the OWS. This was accomplished by Line Item EC-_0. Orbital pressuri-
zation provisions included the access hatch check valve which was
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qualified by Line Item EC-39, the functional _nd structural integrity
which was verified by EC-2, and the airlock interface bellows seals
which were verified by Line Item EC-3. After completion of EC-2
, and EC-3, it was found necessary to subject the entry hatch to
r
further testing to clear an anomaly. (One rod and bearing on a latch
actuator rod for hatch closure came loose from the end, apparently
due to vibration test which occurred during Line Item E_-2.) This
was accomplished on Line Item EC-4_. Line Item EC-46 was performed
to accomplish functional leakage tests in order to qualify the hatch
for possible EVA use. Line Item EC-_ was conducted to qualify the
sealing device used to seal the habitation area vent line after
astronaut entry.
The Te._t Line Items accomplished for this system are listed below.
Line Report
: Title Item T_e Start Completio n Number
OWS Access Hatch EC-2 Qual 07/12/71 11/17/71 G3363
Bellows Seal Airlock EC-3 QJal 07/20/71 11/17/71 G3363
LH2 Tank Seal Device EC-_ Qua/ 0_/21/70 12/11/70 R6823
Solenold Vent Valve EC-13 Qua/ 07/lb/71 10/13/71 R6932
Fuel Tank Vent Duct Assy
Ext. EC-15 Qua/ 01/07171 03110/71 R6855
Hab Area Vent & Relief
Latching Vent & Relief
Valve E0-22 Qua/ o212o171 o9/3o/71 R6878
Short Duct Waste Tank NPV
System EC-32 Qua/ 10/08/71 10/29/71 R6973B
'_ Ha_ Area Vent Flex Line EC-38 Qua/ 01/22/72 02/03/72 R6998A
Check Valve, Access Hatch EC-39 Qua/ 02/16/72 03/15/72 G3375
Pipe Assy-Waste Tank Press EC-_0 Qua/ 02/07/72 02/16/72 R6999
Hatch Rod End Bearing Vib i
Test EC-4_ Qual 03/15/72 03/17/72 G3376
Entry Hatch-Repeat Cycle EC-_6 Qua/ 06/15/72 06/27/72 G3379 !
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o Thermal Contcol - Thermal control of the Workshop was achieved by
two methods - external passive thermal control and interns/ passive
and active thermal control provisions.
The external passive thermal control provisions consisted of surface
coating applied to meteoroid shield interior and exterior surfaces,
meteoroid shield boots and extension surfaces and forward dome
insulation. These coatings were verified by coupon testing in the
materials laboratory both at MSFC and at MDAC and wherever possible
i coatings which were previously qualified for use on other space programs
such as cat-a-lac h63-i-500, were utilized. Line Item EC-5 was a
7
development test to verify thermal shield extension structural
integrity when exposed to both high and low level sonic integrated
loads, •
The internal passive thermal control consisted cf internal surface
coating and heat pipes. The.Be coatings were selected to achieve
both aesthetic qualities desired as well as provide the necessary
emlttance levels and were evaluated both by MSFC and MDAC-W for flame-
! _roofing and emissivity qualities. This test activity is identified
in Paragraph 5.2.1.1, Crew Accommodations. The interior heat pipes k
are utilized to transfer heat from warm side of vehicle to the cold
side to prevent condensate to form within OW$. Test Line Item EC-41
was utilized to verify structural integrity when subjected to launch
i_ and boost dynamic criteria.
r_
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The active thermal control provisions include a radiant heater
which was qualified by Line Item EC-6. The convection heaters in
each of the TCS ducts were qualified by Line Item EC-7. The temper-
ature control assembly design was supported by development test
EC-11 and then qualified by test EC-12.
Ground thermal control was required to maintain the temperature
between _0°F (278°K) and 80°F (300°K) for maintaining stowed food
and film from the time they were loaded in the OWS to launch. Two
heat exchangers in series, located in the entertainment console,
were used to maintain this temperature. Development Test Line Item
EC-26 was cond,cted by the supplier (AIResearch) and qualification
testing by Line Item EC-27, was completed at MDAC.
Listed below are the test line items used to verify the capability
of the thermal control system.
Line Report
Title Item T/pc Start Completion Number
Thermal Shield Ext EC-5 Dev 07/03/69 10/29/69 TM-137
Tank Radi6nt Heater EC-6 Dev 11/10/70 11/12/71 R6786
Duct Heater Assembly EC-7 Dev 09/29/69 06/0_/71 R6601
Thermal Control Assembly EC-II Dev 06/2_/T0 01/15/71 R67_0
Thermal Control Assembly EC-12 Qual 12/15/71 06/29/72 R6968
WGround Thermal Cond Syst EC-26 Dev 0_/30/71 09/18/71 TM-207 i
Ground Thermal Cond Syst EC-27 Qual 09/21/71 02/29/72 R7035A !
Heat Pipe Installation EC-_I Qual 11/02/71 02/11/72 87037
!-
_ #Tested at supplier.
5-$8
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; o Ventilation Control System - The ventilation control system is com-
prised of a mixing chamber, where reconstituted air from the AM
heat exchanger and contaaination control equipment is mixed with air
to be rectrculated, and a 3-duct system which runs frcQ mixing chamber
to a plenum volume formed by a common bulkhead and ceiling. Each duct
had a cluster assembly of four GFE fans, which provided the required
flow rates and the air moved from the plenum into habitation areas
through adjustable diffusers in the ceiling. The waste management
area and food management areas were ventilated independently from the
Workshop proper. These areas had identical systems which are comprised
of a fan, filter, charcoal bed and sound suppression assembly. The
fan cluster was verified by a Line I_em EC-8. Line Item EC-9 was
utilized to verify air distribution and EC-10 verified room fan filter
assembly.
The atmosphere supply duct carried revitalized air from the AM/
Environmental Control System (EC8) to the TCS filter mixing chamber.
This duct was designed and qualified by MDAC-ED.
i
The atmosphere mixing chamber was a relatively simple design of a
sheet metal structure and was qualified by analysis. Further
evaluation was conducted during the systems tests described in sub-
sequent paragraphs.
The recirculation ducts carried airflow from the mixing chsmber to
the fan cluster through the crew's quarters and convective heaters
and into the plenum area above the ceiling. These ducts were qualified
by analysis and part of Line Item EC-8.
i, 5-39
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The fan cluster assembly consists of pre-installed porous wall
baffled resonant chamber, inlet and outlet muffler, and four GFE
recirculation fans. Testing for this cluster was accomplished on
Test Line Items EC-8, EC-33 and EC-36 as well as tests conducted at
MSFC.
The recirculation duct diffUsers and ceiling diffusers design verifi-
cation was accomplished by analysis and Test Line Item EC-9.
The waste and food management ventilation system consisted of ceiling
diffusers, filter odor removal canisters, recirculation fans and
resonant mufflers. Testing for these items were accomplished by Line
Items EC-IO, EC-34 and EC-37.
Three portable fans allowed the astronauts extra ventilation velocity
at selected locations within the OWS. Tests of these units were con-
ducted by Line Items EC-30 and EC-42.
The following list constitutes the testing accomplished in support of
the thermal control system. Further functional verification was
obtained during post manufacturing checkout.
Line Report
Title Item Type Start Completion Number
Fan Cluster Test EC-8 Dev 01/20/69 90/23/70 R6705
Air Distrib Ceiling EC-9 Dev 11/03/69 11/13/69 TM-I39
Rm Fan Filter Test EC-IO Dev 06/29/70 11/30/70 R6753
Fan, Portable EC-30 Dev 08/06/71 o8/27/71 R6911
Fan Cluster Assembly EC-33 Dev 10/11/71 10/21/71 R7022
Room Fan Filter EC-3h Dev 0h/26/71 09/17/71 GhlT7 ,-
_. Fan, Cluster Vib EC-36 Qual 05/Ih/71 05/28/71 C_IOI
Fan, WMC Vibration EC-37 Qual Oh/eh/71 0h/30/71 R6885 i
"' Portable Fan - Vibration EC-h2 Dev 12/21/71 03/21/72 RTO3h
' 5-_0
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5.2.1.8 Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS) - The TACS was a blow down
: type system using ambient temperature nitrogen gas and was used for
_ cluster stabilization prior to Control Moment Gyro (CMG) spin up as
well as correction of spacecraft attitude as required. Development
testing of the system was accomplished during Line Item TC-I and
i additional test accomplished by the supplier on TC-12 to evaluate
! the effects of adverse tolerances, etc., on the valves. Qualification
of the pressure switch was accomplished in Test Line Item TC-lh while
; satisfactory qualification of the temperature probe and switch was
verified by TC-13.
This system is made up of four major functional subsystems; propellant
: storage and distribution, propellant distribution control, thruster
_ modules, and thruster control.
o Propellant Storage and Distribution - Titanium cold gas storage
spheres were mounted to the thrust structure cone. These modified
- S-IVB spheres used a bi-metal Joint as a transition section between
the spheres and stainless steel manifold supply tubing. Development
testing of this bi-metal Joint was done during Line Item TC-10
while qualification of the sphere was accomplished through Test
Line Item TC-9.
?
o Propellant Distribution Control - The TACS system, being of the
i "blow-down" concept, had no regulation system; therefore, the
plumbing and manifolding configuration was evaluated during post-
manufacturing checkout.
?
o Thruster Modules - Initial development of the valves were accom-{
_ plished by the supplier but the TACS system, including the modules
(four valves) were developed and qualified during testing of
5.1_1
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Line Items TC-I and TC-2 respectively.
o Thruster Control - Control was achieved with these quad redundant
valves, the control switching assembly, TACS timer module and the
; TACS valve signal delay module. The total system was qualified
by Test Line Item TC-2.
The Control Switching Assembly - Thls electronic switching device
was used to supply command signals to the TACS and the critical
items were qualified during the testing of Line Item ES-II (see
{ Paragraph 5.2.1.3).
The TACS timer module was a solid state switching device qualified
_' by Test Line Item TC-8
The TACS valve signal delay module composed of four (h) i0 amp
general purpose relays and two (2) independent electronic times
was qualified by Test line Item TC-II.
Tests noted below summarize the test line items utilized in develop-
ing and qualifying the thruster attitude control system.
Line Report
Title Item Type Start Com_] etion Number
/ _ Thruster Module Assy TC-I Dev 0h/ll/70 12/03/71 R6868 :
Thruster Module Assy TC-2 Qual 09/13/71 11/06/72 Gh206
V0L I-VI
TACS Timer Module TC-8 Qua]. 10/16/71 ii/2k/71 R69k6
_ TACS Pressure Sphere TC-9 Qua/ 06/07/71 08/06/71 G2119
Bi-Metal Joint TACS Syst TC-10 Dev 03/01/71 05/05/71 G2113
TACS Timer Delay Module TC-II Qua/ 0h/12/72 05/17/72 R6971 ,.
t
e
? ,
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Line Report
Title Item Type Start Completion Number
TACS Temp Probe & Press
Switch TC-13 QueLl 08/30/72 11/08/72 Gh208
TACS Pressure Switch TC-Ih Dev 12/08/72 12/20/72 Gh209
Supplemental TACS Ball
Valve TC-16 Dev 07/03/73 07/19/73 R7219
(
NOTE: Line Item TC-16 was accomplished after launch of the Skylab
to develop a backup or supplementary TACS system. Hardware
: would be flown up on SL-3 if required. (This system was not
needed so did not get implemented, but test results indicated
its feasibility.))
5.2.1.9 Corollar_ Experiment Accommodation_ - The experiment accommodations
consisted of both electrical and mechanical provisions.
o Electrical Provisions - Regulated, direct current electrical power
for the corollary experiments was supplied through the Workshop
power distribution panel with switching function provided by the
panel circuit u_eakers. Typical Workshop wiring harness connections
to the power distribution panel terminated in receptacles for the
special electrical connectors designed for engagement or dis-
engagement by the pressure suited crew. These receptacles were
located to provide convenient plug-in power capabilities for the
corollary experiments, TV camera, portable fans, etc. The equipment
:L supplying these provisions was tested and described in Paragraph
5.2.1.3 of this document.
o Mechanical Provisions - These provide mounting, pneumatic, fluid
and vacuum provisions for the experiments. The functional and
structural integrity was accomplished by line items noted below.
: Experiment/accommodatlon interfaces were verified by post manufactur-
ing checkout.
: 5-_3
=
1974020219-148
i\
Line Report
Title Item T_e Start Completion Number i
Scientific Airlock CX-I Dev 07/10/70 10/08/71 GklI5
PGA Air Flow Mod Syst CX-5 Dev 07130/71 09126/72 Gk178
). Film Vault Humidity CX-7 Dev 05/10/71 06/18/71 R690k '
Film Vault Mat Compat CX-8 Dev 7/01/71 09/23/71 R6930A
SAL/Experiment s Desiccant i_
Unit CX-9 Dev 05/2h172 12/12/72 Gh179 -
Film Vault Mat Compat CX-II Dev 03/31/72 05/26/72 R7051
: NOTE: The accommodations for the lower body negative pressure
__ (LBNF) system consisted of tubing which connected the
; experiment support section to the LBNP valve located in the :;
• Waste Management Compartment vacuum panel. This tubing did
not require qualification testing but vas subjected to PAT, "
proof and leak tests during checkout.
:
• :s -_
1
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._ 5.2.2 P_oduction Acceptance Tests (PAT)
Production acceptance testing of contractor fabricated or assemblied
: items was performed in compliance with the production test require-
ments defined by Development Engineering in the applicable MDAC-W
drawing. PAT of supplier items were defined by engineer in the
' procurement drawing. (Specification Control Drawing, Source Control
Drawing or MDAC Standard Drawing. )
These requirements for PAT were determined by the design requirements
and mission application. A study was conducted in 1970 at MDAC-W
by the CWS Systems Engineering organization on Production Acceptance
Testing (PAT) with induced r rironments. A significant number of OWS
components, modules and assemblies were identified as being potential
candidates for environmental PAT. The environments found to be most _
effective for this purpose were random vlbration, low level sinusoidal
" vibration for loose partical detection and thermal cyc'ing, i
Most relays were subjected to loose partical detection (LPD) vibration
tests during PAT and their next assembly modules (approximately 225)
0 0 0 0
were thermal cycled between -85 F (208.2 K) and +160 F (3k_.3 K) for
approximately five (5) cycles. In addition, high reliability (HiRei)
components were given operational burn-in tests to gain confidence in
their acceptability to the Workshop environments.
All of these environmental requirements were defined _n the engineering
drawing and r_flected in the subsequent Production Acceptance Procedure
as indicated above.
Of signifiance, the entire solar wings (2) were given a vibration PAT
prior to installation on the OWS.
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5.3 STRUCTURES TESTING
OWS structures consisted of the Following major components:
o Forward and Aft Skirts
o Tankage (Habitation and Waste Tank)
o Aft Interst age
%.
Each of the above structural components were qualified s_,parately
during the Mainline Saturn Program. In addition to loading each of
the above items to ultimate design loads, items were tested to failure.
It was originally planned to utilize this data for design verification
;_ of the OWS structure. However, because of the many modifications and
weight increase to 78,000 ibs (34,373 kg), MSFC authorized by Change Orders 116
t
and lh7, a vibro-acoustic and static structural test program. This
package also authorized the assembly of an Orbital Workshop DynamicJ
: Test Article (OWS/DTA). These tests were performed in the vibration
and acoustic test facility at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Texas,
from January through May 1971.
The results of the acoustic tests were published in Volume I of Report No.
MDC G2h45, dated October 1971, and results of the low frequency vibration /
tests were reported in Volume II of this report. For this program, MSFC
was responsible for overall test direction and MDAC-W provided technical
support to MSFC. The DTA was constructed from existing fwd and aft
i skirts used in the Saturn V high force test program and existing Lox i
and LH2 tankage from S-IVB-100h, Facilities Checkout Vehicle. These _
major assemblies were assembled, reworked and modified to provide
structural and mass simulation. The DTA included flight configuration
i
crew quarters, ceiling, walls and access panel. Equipment racks,
panels, and bracketing, as veil as water contain6r ring and stowage ! _,
: I lockers, were configured in such a manner as to provide the stiffness, 'i
strength, and geometry of flight configuration. The mass of plumbing
5-_6 •
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and wiring was integrated and added to associated equipment mass sub-
stitutes excep_ fc" large ducts or wiring runs whose stiffness, and/or
mass would have affected modal characteristics. All components i stalled
on brackets, panels, basic structure and isolators were mass _imulated.
; The acoustic tests were performed at _WS acoustic qualification test
levels and structural integrity of all flight type s_ructure was verified
: to meet the flight dynamic environment. Several anomalous conditions
were noted, bolts loosening or backing off, however, they were peculiar
/ only to the DTA configuration.
The low frequency vibration tests utilized the DTA configurate _ as it
_,asfor the acoustic test. These tests simulated the maximum transient
response expected to be experienced by the OWS during launch, engine
cutoff and btage separation. Vibration response and strain were measured
and recorded during test. Integrity of all flight type
structure was verified to meet the flight dynamic environment.
Change Order 147 authorize_ the static test program performed at _FC.
MSFC was responsible for conductin_ and directing th_ tests and MDAC provided
technical support to MSFC. Volume I of Report No. MDC G2785, dated
August 1972, published the results of the combined loadi,g test6
where Volume II covered the ultimate pressure test. For these tests,
the OWS Static Test Article (STA) was the same structure as previously
designated DTA, but was updated to represent the increased weight of the
78,000-1b (3_,373 kg) OWS_
I
[
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The combined loading tests simulated ground wind and maximum o(_flight
loading test conditions, and tests were performed 21 October 1971 the, k
23 November 1971. All test loads were based on latest vehicle weight
and structural design criteria. Moment loads were applied using
hydra.,lic Jacks acting normal to vehicle centerline. Axial loads were
applied using hydraulic Jacks. The dead weight of the loading head
and lead weights were placed inside of the STA. Specimen sustained all
loads satisfactorily.
The ultimate pressure test to 32.5 psig (2.25 x 105 N/m_ was per-
formed at _9_ on May, 1972. The purpose of this test was to
demonstrate the structural integrity of the habitation area
cylinder penetrations, common bulkhead trash airlock penetration
i
and to demonstrate that there were no detrimental yielding or
other damage to the basic OWS structure under limit loads. No
pressure _._sswas observed during the test and no yielding or
other damage to the OWS tank penetrations were observed after
test completion. The basic test objectives were met. However,
a failure occurred in the meteoroid shield butterfly hinge on the
window side of the main tunnel. Also, post test inspection re-
vealed that three of the meteoroid shield hinges sustained
heavy damage due to circumferential growth of tankage during
pressurization. This failure resulted in a redesign of the
shield butterfly. The redesign was reverlfied by special test
: ST-28 discussed in Section 5.h
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5.h SPECIAL DESIGN SUPPORT AND VERIFICATION TESTS
There were tests that were considered "special': in nature and were
identified. Some required special facilities such as large volume water
- tank, aircraft to produce zero-g affect and sunlight at altitude. Others
were tests to evaluate unique problems. The following is a description
of each special test line item performed:
o ST-l, Neutral Buoyan_c2_Test_s " - These tests were performed from
2 July 1971 through 29 November 1971. The purpose of this effort
i
was to evaluate habitability support and crew accommodation hardware
equipment. The hardware was supplied by MDAC-W and was non-operational
! but did reflect the latest __xternal configuration to insure proper
astronaut interfaces. These tests were directed and conducted by
MSFC at Huntsville, Alabama. The following hardware was evaluated:
a. Waste Management Compartment Equipment
b. Food Management Compartment Equipment
c. Sleep Compartment Equipment
d. Forward LH2 Dome Equipment
e. Experiment Interfaces
f. Astronaut Aids and Restraints
g. Trssh Disposal Airlock
o ST-2Z_Gr__av_Ity_Test "_PrgEram.- The primary cbJective o£ this test
program was to perform operational evaluation of 0WS equipment during
limited duration zero-gravity exposure achieved during KC-135 aircraft
flights. MDAC-W participation included design and fabrication of
mockups simulating sections of the OWS and the test program. This _ ?
program started 22 June 1970 and was concluded 2 August 1971. The
following equipment was flown and evaluated:
a. Waste Management Compartment Equipment
5-_9
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b. Food Management Compartment Equipment
c. Sleep Compartment Equipment
d. Forward LH2 Dome Fixture
e. Astronaut Aids and Restraints
o ST-Ts SAS Cell Sunlight Test - Test was performed to obtain
sample current voltage curves of representative samples of glassed
cells. Tests were run using a solar simulator at a constant
I
intensity over full operating temperature range and
then repeated in natural sunlight. The tests were run to obtain
current and voltage temperature co-efficients for typical SAS cells.
The tests Lere conducted 15 February 1971 through 14 January 1972
" and results reported in Report No. MCR-71-320.
o ST-8_ SAS Panel Sunlight Te, t - Sunlight testing of the SAS solar
panels was performed on two groups of representation panels to
d_termine the following electrica_ characteristics:
a. Determine the sunlight performance capability of two 30-module
power groups.
b. Mismatch losses of modules.
c. The air mass equals zero (AM0) current-voltage (I-V) characteristics
of modules.
d. The correlation factors to be used for extrapolating terrestrial
data to A_O sunlight conditions.
e. Mismatch losses of power groups.
f. The basic design compatibility of the power source with the power
i control group (PCG).
" Testing was performed outdoors in natural sunlight at a minimum
sunlight intensity of i00 mw/cm 2 and when data was analytically{
_ corrected, the true solar array performance could be predicted.
These tests were performed 26 July 1971 through 18 October 1971 and
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; test results were reported in Report No. MCR-71-320.
o ST-9, SAS Module Shadow Test - Solar cell module shadow testing was
performed on single cells and on module series/parallel strings using
a solar simulator for cell energization. The test program was
designed to study and evaluate cell failure mechanisms and module
string configurations undel" changing shadow conditions.
!
The test objectives of this test program were:
a. To obtain confidence in the four separate string concept for
the SAS P_nels under shadow conditions.
b. To understand the cell failure mechanism due to heat and
reverse voltage, and to find possible cures.
: c. To determine which cell arrangement is the best technical solution
for Z-Local Vertical shadows with the cell failure mechanisms
known and either accounted for or cured.
d. Establish the integrity of the interconnect and solder Joints.
This test included a simulated orbital sunlight exposure it,co_Junction
with a SAS power distribution unit (PDU) and a power conditioning
group (PCG). A_:oduleswere tested singularly, and in parallel, with
loads/angle conditions simulated for the Skylab orbit, including
the dark portion of the orbit. Tests were started i November 1971
and completed 17 November 1972. Results were published in TRW
Report 8AS _-3142.
o ST-II_ M_87 Stowage Container Telt - the M487 Stowage Container
was vibration tested to verify that the container and" • equipment
within the container would not present a crew or mission safety
hazard when subjected to the launch and boost vibration"environment.
The failure/rejection criteria for this test was a post-vibration
5-51
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examination to verify:
o Equipment and/or parts ejected from the locker coL-.partment.
o Loose particles. _
This _est was started i December 1972 and was completed 29 February
1973. Results were published in Report _DC G4089.
o ST-12, Flowmeter Transducer Life Test - ._his flowmeter transducer
was used in each of cabin atmosphere circulation ducts to measure
output of fan units. The transducer consists of a flow sensor and
associated electronics for the readout signal. This t_st was a "
. 5700-hour life test at worst case humidity and temperature condition
and was run 30 July 1971 through 3 March 1973. The results were
published in MDC Report G4192.
o ST-13p Pneumatic Meteoroid Shield Release - Test was initiated i
f
to explore the separation characteristics of five (5) different
configurations of pneumatic meteoroid shield release mechanisms.
These tests were conducted 26 August 1971 through 3 S,:ptember 1971.
Test results were published in Report No. R69261.
o ST-14_ Meteoroid. Shie_id Deployment Test - Three (3) meteoroid shield
deployment tests were conducted utilizing the STA at MSFC, Reference
Section 5.3. These tests were accomplished in conjunction with
tank pressure tests. Test program started 17 February 1972 and was
completed 14 March 1972. Results were published in Report MDC G3369.
o ST-15j SAS Passive Vent Valve Module - Acousticall_ Actuated - Actuation
of the Passive Vent Valve Modul. _ was accomplished by the acoustics
field created by the booster engines at time of lift-off to demonstrate
functional performance. Specimens were actuated at KSC by exposure _
to the Saturn 16 launch acoustics field. Preparations for the test
,i included functional operation in an acoustics chamber prior to the
i ESC exposure. In addition to the KSC exposure_ long term storage
5-52
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the mechanism latched and subsequent actuation in the acoustics
chamber was accomplished to simulate the latched time span between
roll-out and launch, an_ to verify lack of stiction. Testing was
accomplished 3 March 1973 through 15 July 1973 and results were
published in MDC Laburatory Report TM-208.
o ST-16_ Sprir_ Loaded Mechanism,___MMM_netic Latch - The Magnetic Latch
Mechanism Assembly for the SAS Passive Vent Valve Module consists
of the acoustic panel, magnet, armature, armature support arm,
and support arm actuatin8 spring. The means of releasing the armature
from the magnet is acoustics impinsment on the acoustics panel.
This test wab performed to establish a confidence level for the latch
mechamism. Testing consisted of repeated acoustics initiated
latch releases on each of several production (flight quality)
assemblies, and a pull force test after latched storage on others.
Two specimens were used for reverberant chamber vs. progressive
wave tube acoustic efficiency comparisons. This test was started
26 April 1972 and completed 15 July 1972. Results were published
in MDC Report No. G3993.
o ST-172 Coolanol 15/Water 0ral Sensitivit_ - Special test was performed
using human test subjects to obtain information concerning the crew's
capability for detecting Coolanol 15 in the potable water system.
The test was conducted 17 February 1972 through 21 February 1972.
Results were published in MDC Report G_227.
o ST-18, SAS Solar Cell Panel - Testing of specimens from different
production runs was accomplished in this test effort to evaluate
cell and solder Joint performance in extended thermal cycling. Of
particular interest is the ability to maintain electrical continuity
5-53
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during thermal stressing while in space vacuum. Electrical performance ]
checks as well as microscopic and X-ray examination of all solder I
Joints, were made periodically to establish solder Joint integrity Ii
: values. These tests were performed i March 1972 through 22 June 1972. j
i
Results were published in MDC Report G4039. _
o ST-19, RSS Component Evaluation - Testing was performed to assess {
the RSS thermal capacitor's sensitivity to inlet fluid temperautre _
I •
i'change (Specimen #i), to determine the combined performance of the :
' radiator thermal control pressure relief valve utilizing a simulated i "
1
radiator for valve crack and reseat and coolanol mixing characteristics I
: (Specimen #2), to determine the effects of cold fluid temperature on I
i •
radiator control valve (Specimen #3), and determine if talk-back i
i
_4 switch in bypass valve affects valve operation after cycling i
(Specimen #4). Thermal capacitors were subjected to thermal evaluation
testing as an individual unit (Specimen //5), and as an assembly (Specimen i
#6) to evaluate a new thermal capacitor design. Testiug was performed
/
12 February 1972 thru 28 June 1972. Results were published in MDC
Report G4135.
o ST-23, Film_ Eu_u_L_entr GFP-25 - This special test line item was performed
to qualify GFE film transport magazine that was stowed in film vault to
the OWS dynamic levels. This testing started 2 June 1973 and was
completed 13 June 1972. Results were published in MDC Report Gh091.
o ST__-2hLExpandable Tube/SAS Tension Stra__- This test was performed
' to assess the performance of the SAS beam fairing tie down ordnance
links when fUnctioned with expandable tubing having the minimum
yield value per specification. Of particular interest was the
possibility of loose tab generation when functioned under flight
_, loading conditions with minimum yield limit _ubing. This test was
performed ii May 1972 thru 13 May 1972. Test resu:ts were published in
E
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MDC Report Gh091.
o ST-27t Stowed Items Life Tests - A typical ring locker with contents
i
listed below, was stored in a secured area at ambient temperature,
_ pressure and humidity for 9 months. Examination was then performed
on the contents to determine any degradation.
f
P/_! iT_
IB83881-501 Hose Assy Water Supply
LT-80 Aluminized Tape
_ I38_72h-I Restraint General Purpose
: TLC 691-3/4 Tape Pressure Sensitive
'_ TLC - CJH Duct Tape (49050 tape)
, 11383847-1 Patch Repair Meteoroid Penetration
IB90481-I Patch Repair
Q-1266 Qua_-X seal
h_-1300 Batteries
:_ IB91431-I Transfer Hose Urine Sample
i387h77-525 Label Stowage
I392262-501 Roy Stowage Waste
I387307-I Holder Assy Towel and Wash Cloth Drying
IB91613-507 Fillers, Fiberboard
!B91013-505 Filler, Fiberboard
Test was started 6 June 1972 and completed 3 March 1973. Results
; were published in MDC Report Gh223.
o ST-28, Meteoroid Shield - Butterfly. Hinge Test- This test was
performed to cbtain information for redesign of the butterfly
hinge as a result of a failure which occurred on the STA at NASA/MSFC. :
Reference Section 5.3. Test was conducted on 7 May 1972 throu_._
27 May 1972. Results were published in MDC Report ,_3605. •
5-55
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o ST-29,_S.AS Solar Cell - Special testing of SAS Solar Cells was
performed to determine the cause of solder de-wetting and low
solder Joint strength in some of the production cells. Suspect
cells from production panels were examined for solder Joint failure ::f
modes. Special cells were manufactured with variation in material
thickness, and in processing times and atmospheres during the
metalization processes to a. _-ertainthe modes of potential failures.
These tests were ccnducted 7 April 1972 through 9 June 1972. Test
' results were published in Report SAS4-3187. r
: o ST-31, Urine Collection Subsystem - Redesigned - The purpose of
this test was to determine the feasibility of proposed urine
collection subsystem redesign. Test was started 25 September 1972
and was completed 17 October 1972. Results were published in :
MDC Report G4161.
o S_T-34, Mosite and Pol_urethane Foam Odor Generation - Odor generator
of mosite and polyurethane foam which is used as a packing material
in the storage lockers became a concern late in the program.
The purpose of this test was to obtain _u._litative off-gassing data
when subjected to OWS mission pressure profile. The test was conducted
29 October 1972 through 15 January 1973. Results were published
in MDC Report G_159.
o ST-3_ a Trash Airlock Functional. Compatibilit M - Test was performed _:
to verify functional compatibility of trash lock when subjected
to various contingency anomalous configurations of operational _
, duty cycles with trash bags and disposal bags. Testing was started ,.-J
ii March 1973 and completed 18 March 1973. Results were published
in MDC Report G4228.
o ST-38_ Meteorold Shield, Debonded Butterfl_ Hinge - Test was
conducted to investigate the debonded hinges found on OWS-I. The
56
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test consisted of tension pull tests on 4 specimens. Tests were
accomplished 20 December 1972 through 3 January i_73. Test results
were published in MDC Report G3616.
o ST-39, TACS Terne_ture Probe Leak Test - Testing of the TACS
Temperature Probe to verify the integrity of the internal seals
of the item was accomplished by this test line item. One specimen,
consisting of a new transducer installed in the TC-9 test bottle, /
was proof tested. One specimen, consisting of two new swaged magnesium
(
j'
) oxide filled tubes was leak tested. The third specimen consisting _
of the qdalification test probe machined to expose the swaged tubing
was leak tested individually for leakage through each swaged tube and
through the body head bushing. The tests were conducted 1 January 1973
through _ February 1973. Results were published in MDC Report G4120.
o _Tc__PJ_AA_S__Fair_n_Te t _9_P_cpTbi_._Lg_s - A specialtestof
the SAS Fairing, utilizing test hardware from Line Item SA-16
was performed to demonstrate the structural integrity of the SAS
forward fairing and beam fairing when subjected to ultimate loads c
for de-orbit condition. This test was conducted 18 Aprll 1973
t
t)_ough 19 April 1973. Results were published in Report TM-171.
(
o ST-41, Mete_rQid Shield LeadinR EdRe B_lloonin_ Test-Wind tunnel
test program was performed to investigate shield lifting, due to
airflow entering underneath, to determine bending loads on shield
C
and to determine loading as shield lifts. These tests were run
25 June 1973 through ii July 1973. Result_ are contained in
Report AI-73-43.
o ST-_h3,SAS Fairinz__Test'=. pe-grbitig_ad_s- Test was couducted
2
to verify thct SAS beam fairing would withstand de-orblt condition
c
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ultimate loads when applied in the deployed configuration. Existing
hard.re from Line Items SA-16 and ST-I_0 were utilized for this
test. The test was started 25 June 1973 and completed 7 July 1973.
Test results were contained in Report M-7315.
t
>
(
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J5.5 SPACECRAFT SYSTF3_STESTING
5.5.1 General - Post-manufacturing chcckout of the 0WS-1 was accomplished in
the Huntington Beach Vehicle Checkout Laboratory during the period
6 November 1971 through 16 August 1972. The objective of this activity
%_s to a) provide an OWS checked out and calibrated to an extent con-
sistent with the ambient I-G environment, and b) provide an OWS accept-
able for planned, integrated cluster system testing at the Kennedy Space
,i
Center. Checkout was performed utilizing flight hardware within the
" constraints of hardware availability. Detail best requirements, accept-
ance criteria and operational constraints were orovided in the 1B83h29,
: OWS-I Test and Checkout Requirements, Specifications and Criteria. An
- OWS-I Timeline is presented in Figure 5.5-1.
The Ground Support Equipment required to check out the OWS was functionally
verified prior to utilization for checkout of the spacecraft. The Automatic
Checkout System was activated to support checkout and was used to provide
continuous monitoring and automatic control of selected OWS systems.
Provisions required to maintain OWS cleanliness and provide int_,rnalaccess
control were included.
Checkout was initiated with the start of Continuity/Compatibility
testing and continued through completion of the All Systems Test, Electro.
magnetic Compatibility (R,IC), and residual subsystem retests. During
this checkout period, all subsystems_ Crew Compartment Fit and Function,
and the AST and _C tests were performed. Thousands of elapsed hours
/
of manufacturing work were accomplished in parallel.
J
The spacecraft was moved from Tower 6 to Tower 2 on 16 August 1972.
' The significant Tower 2 checkout activities included a mercury certlfi-
' cation of the habitation area and calibration of the meteoroid _hi_id
: strain gauges. Mercury certification checks were conducted t_ _emonstrate
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compliance with MSC Standard 120 and MDAC-W System Safety and Product
A_surance Plan 120_ dated 22 October 1971. In general, the mercury checks
im!_lemented were:
o habitation Area was certified free of contamination prior to pressuri-
zation.
o Huntington Beach gas supply, d_tribu_on s:_stems, associated GSE and
flight hoses were verified to be frpe of mercury prior to being
connected to Experiments.
o Certain Experiments were verified externally during Receiving Inspection
or prior to installation in the Wo_°kshop unless a mercury-free
certification was received as Dart of the data package.
o In-flight spares were checked prior to stowage in the OWS.
o A final overall Habitation _-ea check for mercury was performed after
a twenty-four hour lockup period.
M_Jor manufacturing activity in Tower 2 was focused on modification of the
meteoroid shield and clean-up activities associated with final inspection.
The spacecram_ was moved to Seal Beach for TACS proof testing on
31 August 1972, _,hile final preparations for aelivery continued at
Huntiugton Beach.
Problems enccanmered during checkout were documented on Test Problem
Reports (TPR's). Test problems that ceuld not be closed at Huntington Beach
because cf unavailability o_ hardware, rework not accomplished, testing
not completec, etc., were transferred to a Recap TPR (0W1-P-9999-X).
The Recap T.R's described the problems being transferred, i.e., Failure
Report, Discrepanoy ]_port, Inspection Item Sheet, original TPR number and
Removal number, an_ ' reason the oroblem was not rosolved at
huntihgton Beach.
_ A Retest Assembly Outline documented the open retest and/or test require- :
ments of incomplete Assembly Outlines (AO's), Discrepancy Re_orts (DR's),
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Failure Reports (FR's), Removals at the time of delivery, and the Recap
TPR's noted above that were transferred to the KSC.
All items associated with open work were noted in Section h.0 of the
MDC G3078B, OWS Pre-delive._y Turnover Review (PDTR) Repcrt, Huntington
Beach, except crew comments that di_ not involve herd%_Rre changes.
All test objectives were satisfied except those noted in the PDTR.
Complete spacecraft test results, anomalies, test problems and hardware
discrepancies were documented in b_)ACG3069, Orbital Workshop Checl;out-
Cehicle Checkout Laboratory Report, dated November 1972. The checkout
that was accomplished on the OWS-I by system is outlined in the summary
paragraphs below:
5.5.2 S_t_.ruc.t_ure_s__-Structures consists of the following major components:
o Forward and Aft Skirts
: o Habitation Tank
o Thrust Structure
o Meteoroid Shield
o Aft Interstage r
Verification of the OWS Structures was demonstrated by successfully
completing all subsystem testing.
The Ground Support Equipment assoriated with Structures were as follows:
o DSV7-302 Meteoroid Shield Handling Kit
• o DSVT-371 Meteoroid Shield Counterbalance Kit
o DSV7-316 Mechanical Test Accessory Kit
Fit and function tests of the above were completed satisfactorily.
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5.5.3 Environmental Control - The Environments/ Control System (ECS) consists
of the Ground Thermal Conditioning Subsystem (GTCS), the Ventilation
Control Subsystem (VCS) _nd the Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS). The
GTCS maintains the proper environmental conditions within the OWS while
it was on th_ launch pad. The TCS maintains the proper environmental
conditions during all orbital operations and the VCS provides the
proper ventilation during manned orbital operations.
Checkout for the ECS consisted of two (2) major tests:
o 1B8_783 GrouLt Thermal Conditioning, OWS Interior
o 1B83589 Thermal and Ventilation Control Subsystem
The 1B8_783 test performed a functional checkout of the GTCS to a) verify
ths hermetic integrity of the plumbing and components, b) validate the
operation of the on-board heat exchangers and fans, and c) confirm
restart and purge capability of the Model DSVT-33_, F_vironmental Control
System. The test was initiated on 3 March 1972, and was completed on
28 March 1972. No major vehicle hardware problems were encountered and
no retest was required. There were no open items against the GTCS.
The i_3589 test performed a functional checkout of the O_S TCS and the
VCS, including spares to:
o Verify _unctional performance of the TCS duct and radiant heaters,
TCS thermal control assembly, VCS duct and portable fans and the
fan filter assembly.
o Verify fit of the spare charcoa_ canisters, inlet filters, heaters
and fans. •
o Demonstrate adjustment capability of the VCS diffusers and
i dampers.
i o Verify manual and automatic control of the TCS.
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The test was initiated on 21 April and the final test w _ completed on
20 June 1972. There were three (3) significant hardware problems
encountered during the test vhich were:
o Duct #2 flowmeter reading was out-of-tolerance low which was
solved Irj a redesign of a section of duct to provide a more
uniform contour at the flowmeter inlet.
o Floor diffuser dampers were binding, preventing actuation,
which required rework of the damper to provide more clearance
from the diffuser sidewall.
o The heat exchanger relay drive module failed to turn on the heat
exchanger indicator light which required a redesign of the
module.
Retest of the modified hardware was successfully completed. There were
no open items against the Thermal Control and Veutilation Subsystems.
The ECS portion of the All Systems Test verified proper operation of the
GTCS fans and heat exchanger, the TCS duct heaters, TCS control logic,
and VCS fans. The ECS equipment functioned as required by the simulated
mission timeline. The only significant AST ECS problem was in the GTCS.
The pressure switch on the #2 fan-heat exchanger as_ 'y failed to hold
the electrical circuit energized. The pressure switch .'Lstested and
found to be within specification. A design change was made to add a tube
from the existing high pressure static pressure tap on the f_n-heat
exchanger assembly to the exit of the fan. The design change increased
the delta P sensed by the pressure svltch by adding velocity pressure to
the high pressure side of the switch. The new design was tested success-
fully. There were no open problems or items against the ECS resulting
:tom the All Systems Test.
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The Ground Support Equipment required by the ECS was Model DSV7-34_,
Environmental Control Distribution System and Model DSVT-33_, OWS
Interior Ground Thermal Conditioning System Kit. The -3_h was the
ground ventilation air distribution duct that was installed in the OWS
during VAB operations. The -3_ installation and flow balance test
was completed wJ h no problems encountered.
The -33_ ground thermal conditioning unit supplied the coolant to the
on-board heat exchanger and controlled the fan-heat exchanger unit. _
All fit checks were accomplished without encountering any problems,
and the unit functioned properly.
5.5._ Electrical /
5.5._.i Continuity/Compatibility - The IB6698_ Continuity/Compatibility Test
verified the integrity, of OWS electrical, wiring prior to application of
pc-_erand prior to GSE/OWS interface connections as follows:
o End-to-end continuity of spacecraft wii'ing, applicable line
and component load resista:.ce series active elements such as
circuit breakers, switches, relays, diodes and resistors, and
powered activation of relays via a portable power source.
o Ground isolation of spacecraft power and return buses, separate
return wires and relay coils.
o Bus-to-bus isolation, includin_ power bus to return bus
isolation of related buses, etc.
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All anomalies/problems were satisfactorily resolved and retested.
There were no anomalies or problems encountered during this test except
minor procedure problems. All resistance measurements were within
tolerances.
5.5.h.2 Power Distribution - The OWS Power Distribution Subsystem is comprised
of that hardvare which is involved in routing electrical power from the
AM/OWS interface to the various items contained within the Workshop.
The primary function of this subsystem is to provide the required circuit :
protection and switching capability necessary to meet manned space flight
requirements.
All Huntington Beach post-manufacturing checkout procedures associated "_
&
with establishing the integrity of this subsystem were completed. Checkout
for the Power Distribution consisted of the following:
o IB66984 Continuity/Compatibility
o IB77430 Umbilical/AM Interface Checks
•. o IB8357_ Power Setup,I/C Scan, Power Turnoff
o IB83585 Power Distribution Acceptance Test
o IB92665 Electrical Bus Isolation
o 1B86_24 Crew Compartment Fit and Function
o 1B93589 All Systems Test - Preparations and Securing
o IB83590 D_C - Preparations and Securing ._
o IB93588 All Systems Test - Prelaunch, Boost, and Preactivation
o 1B93591 All Systems Test - Activation, 0rbit_l Operations and
Deactivation . .
There were no anomalies encountered during these tests that created
any significant redesign. All checkout problems were resolved
: and all applicable test requirements were satisfied.
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There was no open work pending on this subsystem as related to delivering
a complete, functional subsystem to KSC. All subsystem hardware
(i.e., wiring, circuit breakers, switches, etc.) installed in the OWS _
was flight qualifie_ equipment. All Interim Use Material (IUM) was
removed and replaced with flight equipment p:'ior to beginning the All
Systems Test. In addition, all subsystem ha_-dware changes authorized
during VCL checkout were completed.
5.5._.3 Illumination - The OWS Illumination Subsystem is comprised of that hardware
which is involved in providing lighting to support crew activities within °
the Workshop. The primary function of this subsystem is to provide the
required illumination levels for planned mission functions and, in addition,
. provide sufficient lighting for crew activities under emergency conditions.
All Huntington Beach post-manufacturing checkout procedures associated
with establishing the integrity of this subsystem were completed. Checkout
for the Illumination Subsystem consisted of the following tests:
o IB83586 Illumination Subsystem Acceptance Test
o iB86h_6 Photography
o IB91066 TV
o IB86424 Crew Compartment Fit and Function J
o IB93589 All Systems Test-Preparations and Securing
o IB83590 EMC-Preparations and Securing
• o IB93591 All Systems Test-Activations, Orbital Operations and '
Deactivation _.
There were no anomalies encountered during these tests that created
any significant redesign. All checkout problems were resolved
t
and all applicable test requirements were sat_ _fied.
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The DSVT-I05, Internal Test Lighting Kit was verified during post-
manufacturi_ checkout. There were no major problems encountered
during the checkout of this item of Ground Support Equipment.
5.5.5 Instrumentation and Co_unications
5.5.5.1 Instrumentation Subsystem - The ONS Data Acquisition System provides real-
time and delayed-tlme monitoring of OWS Subsystem flight parameters, as
well as biomedical and scientific experiment data to ground tracking
stations of the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN). Designed
as an integral part of the Airlock Module Data System, it consists of high
and low level multiplexers, signal conditioning, transducers and umbilical
prelauneh instrumentation.
All Interim Use Material (IUM) was removed and replaced with flight hard-
ware prior to the All Systems Test (AST). Subsystem hardware
installed in the spacecraft was flight qualified equipment.
The checkout procedures listed below identify the various post-manufacturing
tests that were performed to establish the integrity of this subsystem:
o iB8358h Signal Conditioning Setup
o IB83574 Power Setup, IC Scan, Power Turnoff
o IB83576 DAS Calibration, 0WS
o IB83578 DAS, Acceptance Test Procedure
o IB93589 All Systems Test - Preparations and Securing :.
o IB93591 All Systems Test Activation, Orbital Operations and
Deactivation
@ IB93588 All Systems Test - Prelaunch, Boost and Preactivation •
o 11383590 D4C Setup and System Reverification
e IB86_2_ Crew Compartment Fit and Function Check
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Open work transferred to KSC related to a number of measurements that
could not be functionally verified end-to-end at Huntington Beach because
they were either not required to be installed (i.e., SAS, Meteoroid Shield,
etc.) or the Subsystem/Parameters were not required to be exercised
ftmctionally (i.e., Water System, digital clock, etc. ).
During spacecr,_ft testing of the Data Acquisition System, per Acceptance ;:
Test Procedure (ATP) IB83578, measurements randomly failed in responding
to a_'tomatically programmed Remote Automatic Calibration System (RACS)
commands to provide checkout verification levels. The problem was
extensively investigated in both software and hardware areas. All
; measurements responded to manually initiated I{ACS commands. During sub- :
sequent runs of the D/kS, no random failures of RACS responses occurred.
C
This was documented as a Phantom Test Problem Report. The RACS hardware
[
is installed for flight. However, the I{ACS is used for ground verifica-
tion only and its isolation prevents any affect on the flight performance _
of the measurements.
A Phantom is defined as any problem for which a positive solution or
explanation has not been reached b,_t is thought to be an acceptable condition
and risk. This includes intermittent problems which disappear or _ill
not repeat.
5.5.5.2 Communication and Television Subs'[stems - The 0WS Communication System is
designed as a functional part of the Orbital Assembly (OA) Audio System _
for the Skylab Program and _rovides:
: o Direct voice line between the OWS and STD_ via the Command Module (CM)
: S-band.
o Biomedical Data to STDN through the AM PCM telemetry system.
o Intercommumicatlon line between astronauts. --
o A%Idlo and visual displays of warning tones generated by the Caatlon and
Warning System.
o Control for the operation of the voice and data recording system
• in the Airlock Module (AM). i
5-70
k
1974020219-175
There vere no major problems encountered during checkout of the Communi-
cation subsystem and there was no open work transferred to the KSC.
The O_S Television Subsystem is an extension of the Orbital Assembly (OA)
television system and provides video coverage of crew activities, equipment
operation, and experiments. Transmission to STDN is made through the
Command Service Module (CSM) unified S-band.
The subsystem hardware was qualified equipment; however, an updated •
configuration was installed but not tested at Huntington Beach.
The TV Input Station was provided as GFP and was qualified by Martin-
Marietta Company (MMC), Denver, document MMC Environmental Test Report 3278.
The only open work transferred to the KSC was related to the testing rcquired
as a result of replacing the Televison Input Station (TVIS) with the _
latest configuration after All Systems Test. The XSC test requirements
were defined in the KSC Test and Checkout Requirements, Specifications
and Criteria Document. There were no major problems encountered during
testing of this system.
The checkout procedures listed identify the various post-manufacturing
tests that were performed to establish the integrity of the Instrumentation i
and Communication System:
o IB83587 Intercommunication Subsystem
o IB91066 TV System Acceptance Test Procedure
o IB83590 EMC Setup and S/stem Reverification •
o IB93589 All S_stems Test - Preparations and Securing '.
o IB93591 All Systems Test - Activation, Boost and Deactivation
o IB93588 Prelaunch, Boost and Preactivation
5.5.5.3 Caution and Warnin_ Sub__st____- The OW8 Caution and Warning Subsystem is a _
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part of the Cluster Caution and Warning System. It consists of redundant
monitor and repeater circuits to identify caution, warning and emergency
parameters. The parameters monitored throughout the cluster are _nnun-
ciated visually as well as by audio mea_s. The status of the OWS bus
voltages and fire surveillance within the compartments utilizing fire
sensors are primarily for monitoring performed within the OWS. Solar
flare activity which is monitored through the Mult.ipleDocking Adapter (MDA)
Solar Flare Panel is also annunciated within the OWS by an audio tone
_ annunciator.
Subsystem hardware installed in the spacecraft was qualified equil_nent.
The checkout procedures listed identify the various post-manufacturing
tests that we:-e performed to establish +he integrity of the subsystem:
o 11383588 Caution and Warning Subsystem Test
o 1B83590 _C Setup and Systems Reverification
o 11393589 All Systems Test - Preparations and Securing
o 1B93591 All Systems Test - Activation, Orbital Operations and
Deactivat ion
There were no problems encountered during testing of this subsystem that
created any significant design chauges and there wa_ no open work deferred
to the KSC.
5-'r2
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5.5.6 Waste Management - The Waste Management Subsystem components consists
of:
o Waste Processor
i o Blower Unit
o FecM./Urine Collector
o Vacuum Cleaner
o Urine Dump Station •
o Mirror
i o Trash Airlock
o Shower
• o Suit Drying Station
Checkout consisted of the following te_ts:
o iB8k78_ Waste Management _
o iB928kl Shower
,_ o IBSk735 Trash Airlock
o Suit Drying Station - All Systems Test, Delta C2F2 _
t
The one significant problem encountered during checkout was the sticky
operation and operational forces of the urine pressure plate. The
pressure plate was redesigned by replacing the clock spring with a tension
i
T
spring. The redesigned unit was reinstalled and verified in the spacecraft.
' The Processor Chamber #2 heatar plate temperature was also out-of-tolerance, i
Waiver Number OWS-2 was submitted to the Test and Checkout Requirements,
_ Specifications and Criteria (TCRSC) to waive the 105°F +..5°F(303.6 +_13.1K)
requirement and accept the maximum temperature of II3.1°F. (316.2K). This
condition was considered minor and did not require hardware changeout.
{ The significant crew operation problem remaining at the completion of
7
_, checkout was an odor in the fecal collector cabinet which was discovered ,'
"' during Delta C2F2 _
]9740202]9-]78
Review of other units (qualification test, development test and S_AT
collectors) resulted in detection of a similar odor. The odor appeared
to be coming from the acoustic insulation. The acoustic ins_tion was
subsequently replaced by Fairchild Hiller.
oSE Model DSVT-373, Waste Management Checkout Kit, was the only item
of Ground Support Equipment required for the Waste Management. It
functioned properly with no significant problems.
5.5.7 S_olarArra_Sub_st_- The Solar Array Subsystem (SAS) consisbs of two
!
(2) wing assemblies with the major components being forward fairing,
beam/fairin£, deployment mechanisms, electrical harnesses end instrumenta-
tion, and three (3) wing section assemblies per wing. The wing sections
are composed of ten (I0) panels with solar cells. There is a total of
147,8h0 cells for the OWS. The SAS was manufactured and tested by MDAC
subcontractor, TRW, Inc., in accordance with Specification Control Drawing
IB79083 for the System and IB78822 for the Solar Cell Panel.
The SAS was qualified for flight by a testing program which included
component as well as a system qualification test. The component testing :
was done on solar cells, solar panels, actuator/dampers, deployment mechanism,
and the vent module.
:_ System acceptance testing _:as accomplished on a wing assembly complete except ;
for the thermal baffle and environmental seals and the two forward bays which
had dummy masses simulating the wing sections. System testing included
_namic_, deployments, and structural testing under induced worse case '" _
environments. All tests were comDleted satisfactorily.
Acceptance testing of the 60 solar cell parels was accomplished using TRW
Procedtue SA-IhA-01. The acceptance criteria of 67.0 watts minimum per "
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module was exceeded on all panels. No major or unresolved problems are
known.
Acceptance Testing of the system was performed using the following TRW
procedures:
o SA-01A-06 Acceptance Vibration Testing
o SA-OIA-05 Ordnance Deployment Tests !
c SA-OIA_02 Wing Section De_loy_.ent Tests
o SA-OIA-'3 Beam/Fairing Deployment Tests
o SA-0h_,-02 Electrical Tests
o SA-OIA-OI Weigh and Final Acceptance
All tests were completed with no major problems or unresnlved discrepancies.
The types of problems that were encountered during th£ acceptanc_ testing
_,ndtheir resolutions were as f_llowJ:
o During post-vibration electrical checks of wing Serial Number (S/N) 2,
a shim between panel _ard-point and panel sub_trate contacted solar
cell causing an electrical short between the solar cell and the cinch
bar structure. The shim diameter was reduced at all locations to
provide clearance.
o During wing S/N 2, Pre-vibration Function,i Wing Section Deployment
Test, the power and instrumentation harness wires were pinches between
hardpoint bushings at two (2) locations on the wing section which • _
resu2ted in wire damage. This damage _rasrepaired and procedure precauuionary
notes were added and placards were ivqtalled on the leadinc _tabili_er beams to
remind personnel el the necessary precautions.
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o During post-vibration deplo,_nuent of wing section S/N 3 on wing S/N i,
the truss and dummy panel failed to deploy to a flat position. Th_
dimension between the second stabilizer beam to panel slide fittinu
and the hinge line between the first and second stabilizer beam sections
was too short. Shims were added in the stabilizer beam hinge area to
p?ovide the necessary dimension. The wing section was again deployed
and the panels deployed to an acceptable position.
The wings were prepared for delivers" , at completion of testing, in
accordance wlth _W Procedure SA-01M-OI and SA_01N-02. GSE Models DSV7-3C_,
Solar Array Hoisting nd Handiln_ Kit, DSV7-305, Solar Array Shipping and
S+_rage Dolly AssemL_.L', and DSV7-306, Solar Array Preservation Kit, were
[
used ir c! _9.rting ,ha handling of the SAS wings. Model "qv7-!_9, Solar
Array Component Test Set, was use_ in the electrical checkout of the wings
at TRW.
5.5._ Refii_grA_i99 - The Refrigeration Subsystem (RSS) provides for chilling
%nd fre, ing of urine, chilling of potable wat_ _, _d chilling and
_ =zln_ uf food during all OWS operational m_des including Pre!aunch
.)rbital Storage.
All elements of this subsystem were verified for thermal and functional
performance in bctn manual and automatic logic con_rolled modes of operation.
The subsystem was proved to be le-_k-tight. Checkout for the RSS consisted
of the following tests:
o 158696i Refrige, a_ion Sjstem Electrical Preparations •
o IB8h781 Refrigeration Subsystem Service
o !B8h750 Ref-Jgeration System Activation, Operating and Securing •
o IB84782 Refrigeration Subs..'zt,m
o 1B9_987 Refrigeration Cubzystem Service-Flight
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The major problems encountered during checkout operations were corrected
and are described below:
o Pum_._Start_Anpmal;¢.- _,.n"ing checkout icop switching verification,
primary pump #i did not start when commanded. The automatic icgic then
switched to primary pump #2 which started normally. This occurred
one time out of a minimum of 147 pump starts accomplished during
checkout, The flight invertors were adjusted to maximum current limit
following checkout. Running current for all eight pumps was measured
and data indicated all pumps to be consistent and satisfactory.
Laborator/ testing was conducted using a production invertor and a
prototype invertor in conjunction with various pumps _nd motors.
These test data indicated a torque capability from the mJtor of approxi-
: mately 15 in. oz. (10.6 N cm). Additional data indicated the drive train
looseness could allow the motor to start a pump having a static frictional
torque cf 18 in. oz. (12.7 N cm). Cyclin_ tests with a 18 in. oz. (12.7
N cm) pump showed tha5 if drive train looseness wgs unfavorable and a
start did not occur, a second turn-on always started. Additional testing
continued to verify that a second turn-on of a hi D , friction pump would
produce a start after a no-start turn-on. The nroblem was determined to
be one of marginal start capacity due to the current limiter in the inver-
ter. The in zerte_, was s_)sequently redesigned and retested to correct
this problem.
o Food Freezer Frpgt_Bui_dgp. - During AST operations, frost was observed
in several spots on the food freezer exterior. Addi+ional _S-19-I
testing confirmed the formation of local areas uf frost and ice;
howe,_r, no condensation occurred. The frost/i, e accumulation reached
a steady state condition during the first 48 hours of test. This condition
did not impair freezer door operation and all doors opened freely with
no _rost adhesion to the seal or door surfaces. This condition was
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subsequently aispositioncd at the kSC as un a.'._t.!,tablean<,m_L1y.
The Ground Support Equipment required by the Hefrigeration Subsystem
were Models DSVT-301, Ground Thermo-Conditioning System - RSS, DSV7-315.
Refrigeration System Service Unit, DSVT-314, Vacuum Pumping Unit, DSVT-316,
Mechanical Test Accessory Unit, and the DSV7-122, Refrigeration Test Set.
All units were verified with the exception of ._n out-of-to_erance flow-
meter frequency controller module on the -301. The frequency controller
was replaced and retested at the KSC.
5.5.9 Ordnance Subsystem - The Ordnance Subsystem Consists of t;,e ordnance
components and electronic circuitry required to function the fcllowing
s._stems :
o Meteoroid Shield Release
o Solar Array Bea_/Fairing Release
o Solar Array Wing Section Release
o S-II Retro-Rocket Ignition
o S-II/0WS Separation7
Because all ordnance components were installed ,.t KSC, checkeut at
Huntington Beach was limited to verification of electrical circuitry
only on the OWS.
Checkout for the Ordnance Subsystem consisted of the following two (2)
tests :
o 1B83580 EBW Subsystem, Meteoroid Shield and Solar Array
o IB85235 All Systems Test (AST _,
No significant problems were encountered during thls checkout, and there
were no _nresolved problems.
• • q
All ordnance luaiification tests were completed satisfactorily. Major
areas of qualification were accomplished under line items ST-I4 and SA-h.
; o Test ST-lh, "Full-scale Meteoroid Shield Deployment," was accomplished
: at MSFC on the Static Test Article. Repeated testing verified proper :
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performanc_ of the meteoroid shield release sTtstem, which had been
redesigned following VCL deplo}inent in May 1971, in w-ich deployment
t
was not total, and an expandable tube ruptured, releasinf7 gas and debris.
o Test SA-4, "Solar Array System,' was accomplished at TRW and included
deployment tests which qualified both the solar array beam-fairing
release and wing section release systems. All individual deplo/anents
were successful, the only ordnance system anomaly being the breakin_
off of small metal tabs along the fracture line of the tension straps
during firing. This problem %-asresolved with a dual tape-%Tap wh_ ch
had been satisfactorily tested in SAS Production Acceptance Tests.
These tests, which incorporated flight ordnance, showed that all broken
tabs were completely retained by the rape.
There were no outstanding ordnance qualification test problems.
5.5.10 P_neu_tiF_ S_u_b.s_/.s%e.m- - The Pneumatic Subsystem consists of the following
systems :
o T._u-usterAttitude Control System (TACS)
o Pneumatic Control System (PCS)
o Habitation Area (H.A.) 8ridWaste Tank (W.T.) Presst_eization,
Vent Pur_e Systems
o Vacuum Provisions.
Wardroom and W_5_e _e_oment Water Dump Sy=tems
o
o Urine Dump System
o Refrlgeratlon Pump Container Vent Line
o Metabolic Analyzer (M.A.) and Lower Body Negative Pressure
(LBNP) Vacuum System
Checkout for the Pneumatic Subsystem consisted of the following _ests: <
o *IB82256 Pressurization Systems and Vacuum Provisions
o IB90960 PCS, H.A. an,lW.T. Leak m_d Functional Tests
WIncludes DSVT-350, Vacuum Pump Demonstratio,. Test
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o IB90961 TACS Leak and Functional Tests
o IB83582 TACS Automatic Checkout
o IB85235 All Systems Test
o IB89875 TACS Proof and Leak Test, Seal Beach
The following significant problems were found during checkout:
o Metabolic Analyzer (M.A.) Sample Valve and Vacuum Outlet leakage
exceeded Interface Control Drawing (ICD) allowable 0.h liter/sec
at 10-5 tort, a high vacuum could not be established at the M.A., and
OWS skin interfaces. The M.A. was replaced _th a flight unit. The
OWS system, M.A,, and Model DSVT-350 VacuL,m Pump then performed
nominally.
o TACS Temperature Transducer, P/N IB79580-505 (C7262)and a leak at
the miter weld Joint. The transducer was removed and replaced. All
eight ta) TACS Temperature Transducers were modified to haze an
externally applied bonded sheath
o TACS emergency vent command circuitry caused upstream valve (LI) to
delay in closing. Circuitry was redesigned to eliminate the delay
and the system operation was then normal.
o During All Systems Test, the TACS pressure s,litch "Airlock Nodule
indication" did not come on during the first cycles of two (2) TACS
thrusters. The response was nominal on the subsequent 102 cycles.
Detailed troubleshooting, inspection, testing and analysis was performed.
The problem was dispositioned as c Phantom for the following reasons:
o The fault which caused the delayed _alkback problem did not re-occur.
o No evidence of a damaged component on the spacecraft or GSE was
found to indicate the cause of the delayed talkback.
o The TAC$ I-IV and I-I! thrusters were successfully tested for
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approximately 102 cycles subsequent to the malfunction.
•. Possible causes were delineated in Test Problem Report OWI-P-2052-O/C (P),
dated 23 August 1973.
o During the Spacecraft Mass Decay Leak Test, individual component
leakages were also measured. The Mass Decay Test met all leakage
requirements, however, it was noted that the hatch and check valve
individual leakages were less than their production test leakage
value3. Since all primary test objectives for the Mass Decay Test
were met, it was concluded that the individual component leak test
fixtures were leaking.
5.5.11 Crew System____s-b_)AC-W Crew Systems personnel performed mission crew tasks
in the subsystem tests to veriDj the crew interfaces. The checkout tests
performed in the Crew Systems area were:
o IB88207 Food Management
o IB96426 Crew Accommodations
o IB94641 Microbial Control Test Sample
o IB8642h Crew Compartment Fit and Function (C2F2)
o IB94312 Delta C2F2
Nc significant problems were encountered during checkout.
The testing of the portable foot restraints (triangle shoes) and the sleep
restraints were deferred to KSC because late configuration definition
prevented flight articles from being available at Huntington Beach.
The flight crew performed the C2F2 _est in two (2) sessions and a fina]
bench check of the Ring Stowage Containers on 30 August 1972. Fifteen
(15) flight crewmen participated during these tests. There were no
significant problems; hc_wever, _ number of Test Problem Report (TPR)
items were transferred to KSC for crew reverification because of insufficient
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schedule time at Huntington Beach. Thesewere identifled in
!
the Pre-delivery Turnover Report. Significant sections of the C2F2 Test
and Checkout Procedures that were not performed at Huntington Beach
because of hardware unavailability were:
o M487 Experiment Verification
o M172 Experiment Verification
o Rescue Drogue Verification
o Stowage Fit Checks - Sleep Compartment
o 29 Stowage locations in other compartments
Crew Systems required no unique GSE. The interface with Model DSV7-303,
Crew Quarters Verticsl Access Kit, and DSV7-311, HSS Equi_ent Handling )
Kit, was successfully demonstrated.
: 5.5.12 Stowage- The Stowage Subsystem provides provisions for containment/restraint
for loose equipment in the OWS during the launch/boost phase and zero-gravity.
Stowage provislons consist of containers, lockers, cabinets, film vault,
food freezer/chiller and miscellaneous restraint provisions.
Checkout for the Stowage Subsystem consisted of iB96h22, Stowage p.ocedure,
plus eighteen (18) additional procedure_ mostly experiments and water
subsystem hardware.
All stowage locations were fit checkt luring checkout except for approxi-
mately 28 locations which were completed at the KSC because of the hard-
ware not bein_ available. In addition, 96 locations were unstowed and the
hardware was returnee to the suppliers in accordance with contractual
direction. _eklty-five (25) Ring Contain,_rs were delivered to the KSC
outside the spacecraft. Fourteen (14) of the Ring Containers were fully
_ stowed and five (5) were partially stowed.
. ,j
- _ A precision inspection of the eleven ambient food containers disclosed that
i
t
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some of the inside dimensions were outside the ICD tolerances. A Dzawing
Department Authorization was submitted. During checkout, the installation
and removal of the GFP food racks were success_ully demonstrated in all
eleven contslners.
Pressure tests of the Mozlte packing material (a closed cell material)
indicated a change of volmne with pressure change. Since this volume
: change could affect support of equipment during boost aud/or in orbit,
a series of tests were conducted to evaluate OWS uses. The test consisted
of selecting critical installations of packing materials (Mosite, urethane,
and fiberboard) and subjecting it to launch-to-orbital pressure profiles.
Results of the tests were as follows:
o Launch pressure Support of equipment deemed satisfactory.
o Orbital Pressure Design changes were requried on M_87 stowage box to
make it easier for the crewman to extract instruments
supported by the foam.
Interface with DSV7-303, OWS Crew Quarter Vertical Access Kit, and
DSVT-__!I, Habitability Support System Equipment Handling Kit, was
successfully demonstrated.
5.5.13 Experiments Subsystem - The Experiments Subsystem consists of the hardware
accommodations needed 5o integrate the experiment equipment into the OWS.
These accommodations include structural attachments, electrical cabling,
.pressurization and vacuum plumbing provisions, and storage restraints.
The experiment/OWS interface accommodations were verified through a series
of subsystem tests and the All Systems Test. Additional man/machine ,
interface verifications were accomplished during Crew Compartment Fit and
Function (C2F2) testing. The subsystem testing for experiments covered
t
the period February through Au_ast 1972. The All Systems Test (AST) and
C2F2 testing were ccmpleted in August 1972.
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No significant problems regarding OWS experinent accommodations were
ercountered during OWS testing. The major problems encountered with
experiment hardware are as noted.
A total of lh subsystem tests encompassing 21 experiments were performed,
including six (6) retests because of replacement of experiment hardware
with new hardware after those tests were completed. On/y a small number
of test problems of any significance were encountered. These included:
o Out-of-tolerance electrical bonding interface for S063 and S183
o SI90B stowage provisions
o T027 photometer extension rod failure
o T027 Sample Array leak check failure
o Displays did not illuminate
o M171 Exhale Sample Valve was opened beyond its limiting stop
Since no anomalies occurred during the AST, the out-of-tolerance bonding
checks were acceptable and waivers from the Interface Cc rol Drawings
(ICD's) were requested. The SI90B stowage provisions were corrected by
adding a new storage container for these items. The T027 extension rod
was redesigned and successfully retested. The T027 Sample Array was
returned to the supplier °or evaluation and rework to c_rrect the interface
leakage problem. The T027 lights were r_placed by _he supplier. The
_xhale Sample Valve opening did not _'equirerecalibration. Recalibration J
was needed only for "high accuracy" testing.
Only one (i) significant problem occurred during the AST - a failure of
the MI71 Metabolic Analyzer. This was attributed to a failure of the
spirometer ball valve. This unit was returned to MSFC for rework and retest
and was subsequently made ready for flight. No significant problems occurl.ed
during C2F2 except T027 Photometer extension rod failure. The extensio_ rod
was returned to the experiment developer for rework The modified unit was
' _ returned to MDAC-W and retested.
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The significant checkout open items remaining were summarized in the PDTH.
Most of these items were open because the flight hardware was not avai]able
for checkout, or the hardware was scheduled for future modifications
before delivery to the KSC. The experiments that were returned to the
supplier(s) for rework were identified in MDC G_0'(8, Ih_TE.
After completion of the AST, the biomedical experiments MI71, N092,
M093, ESS, were removed from the OWS and replaced with new flight hardware.
A retest of the new hardware was successfully completed with no major
anomalies noted. Checkout for the Experiments consisted oF the Col]owin_.
tests :
o TOO 3 iti_JOJ_3 J Aerosol Analysis
o TOI3 IB84569 Crew/Vehicle Disturb_tncc
o HOTh I_81_567 Specimen Mass Measurement
o M172 ]B_4567 Body M:tss Measurement
o T027/ IB86432 Contamination Measurement/Gegenschein-Zodlacal Light
S073
o Slh,) 1BS(,h32 Particle Collection
o ';019 IB86J_28 UV Stellar }'hotography
o ['020 i_J6h]O UV/X-rRy Solar Photography
: o M509 IBSh565 Astronaut Maneuvering Equipmen*
o TO20 IB8_56_ Foot-Controlled Maneuvering Unit
o S063 iBSOhh2 UV Airglow Iiori_on Photography
o [40!)2 IBSh56_J Lower Body Negative Pressure
o M093 IBShE68 Vectocardlogram
o MI31 ][',8)_5{,t_Jl_..anVestibular Function .-
o Ml71 IB8J_568 '4etabollc Activity
o I.:SS IB_I4568 I;xperJment Sup_ort [;ystem
o M151 IB_61Jh6 Time and Motion Study
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o S183 IBd6hM_ UV £anortLma
o M133 IBSh566 Sleep Monitoring
o T002 IB91060 Manual Navigation Stghtir_gs
o SI90B IB91058 Earth Terrain Camera
5.5.111 Water - The OWS Water Subsystem provides for storage, ple:,:_rizatic,n,
distribution, purification, thermal centre J, com_itioi:ing, and , •spensini<
of water required for the total mission.
Checkout of the Water Subsystem was satisfactorily completed _er ll_I_h'f80,
Water procedure. Two significant problems were: encountered which were:
(1) The water tank dome:; on several tanks were deformed. The problem
was found to be related to the mechanical restraint method used for
handling. The domes were reformed ,,lth gas pressure. 'l'_e re[;tr, int
system was redesigned to utiliz,_ a vacuum system, (2) dispensed wa_er tempera-
tures from the chiller were Ib°F (8°K) higher than the speci£ication require-
ments of hS°F (281°K). Changes to Contract End item (CEi) and Food intcr£acc
Control Drawing (ICD) were processed. The TCI<SC drawing was cha_igcd a_id
approval obtained. The subsystem was prepared for shipment per ll_,!_Oh_O,OW[;
Mechanic_l System l:reparation for Shipment.
A Waser Subsystem/GSE service demonstration utilizing, the I)_;V7-_12, h,_;,';
Water Subsystem Sterilization Checkout kit (GSE), was performed i_er
iBSh779, Water Subsystem Service Demonstration, which included sterili-
zation and filling of two (2) water tanks, a portable tank, and prelaunch
%
conditioning of a deionization filth-. The only problem encountered was
the failure of a H20 level transducer on ohe tank. Thls failure was
attributed to its being used at a temperature which exceeded its design ....:
operational limits. The transducer was replaced and retested.
The DSVT-31h Vacuum Pumping Unlt was used to evacuate the water networks i
prior to filling the system with water and to evacuate the portable water _ank <
for leak testing. No problems were encountere_ to cause any design changes.
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5.6 INTEGRATED VEHICLE TESTING - KSC
5.6.1 General - There were three primary areas of operations at KSC:
o Operations & Checkout Buildin_ (O&C) - general office area and
Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE) rooms located on the third
floor.
o Vertical Assembly Building (VAB) - office area, receiving inspec-
tion, equipment storage, assembly and test site; MDAC OWS-I
occupied some of the low bay area, High Bay 2, 20A & B, 24B, 25B,
26B of Towers A & B.
o Launch Complex 39A - CWS-I Launch Site.
All pre-flight preparations and testing were conducted in accordance with
the MDC Florida Test Center, P_e-Flight Operations Procedures (POP).
All High Bay 2 facilities, GSE, electrical, mechanical, and fluid systems
: were verified and certified as functional, clean, and mercury free prior to
vehicle hookup.
[
The complete integrated schedule for all testing and prelaunch preparation
for OWS-I at KSC is presented in Figure 5.6.1-_.
All data for all tests have been _valuated. All tests were acceptable and
' !
all test objectives were achieved.
5.6.2 Vehicle Arri___val,_.Ins_gctip.n_.apd_Ve!tic_a_ 9_gmbly - The OWS-I arrived at
KSC on SeptemBer 22, 1972. A walkdown inspection of the 0WS-I was performed
to assess any damag_ which may have occurred during shipping and to ensure
the OWS-i was in • condition _o erect. The Aft Interstage was erected and
?
• assembled onto the vehicle stack; access kits w_re installed; and the OWS-I
was erected Septem0er 28, 1972, and _ aced on the vehicle stack. The IU was
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erected N_ember 1, 1972, and the Fixed Airlock Shroud (FAS), Airlock
Module (AM), and Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA) were added to the stack on
January 29, 19'f o. This completed the stack and the KSC activity shifted to
c
subsystem verification. The following is a list of procedures which were
used at KSC to prepare the OWS for subsystem verification:
C0-3000 OWS Erection
.I-3002 DSV-7-331, DSV-4B-368 Protective Cover Removal and
DSV-_-32_, DSV-_B-365 Desiccant Reconfiguration
_ K0-3003 _._SFacility Mate, Preparation for Habitation Tank Access
and DSV-7-303 Crew Qucrters Workshop Access Kit Installa-
tion end Removal
KO-300_ DSV-7-311 HSS Equipment Handling Kit Installation and
Removal
KO 3005 DSV-7-327 Aft Umbilical Carrier Installation, Initial
KO-3006 DSV-7-375 Forward Umbilical Carrier Installation, Initial
K0-3007 DSV-7-328 Vertical Forward Shirt Access Kit and DSV-7-307
Dome Protective Cover Installation and Removal
K0-3009 DSV-7-326 Interstage Access Kit Installation and Removal
_ The OWS-I wa, certified as mercury-free and any item taken into 0WS-I was
cortified to be mercury-free. Mercury contamination control at KSC was
_ specified in Memorandum Ahl-787-M_-M-OI2, dated November 29, 1972, and
signed by the Mercury Control Officer.
5.6.3 Sub syst em Verification
5.6.3.1 Structural System - There were no structural tests scheduled at KSC.
For Structural Testing, see Paragraph 2.2.1.
The ordnance effort at KSC was a_ninistered in the structural group and
the following procedure,, were employed:
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Io KS-1000 - OWS/DA/Payload Shroud (PS) Ordnance Receiving Inspe-_tion
and Storage. This test was performed every time ordna:ice was received.
Test objectives were to perform a receiving inspection on all ordnance
required for the OWS, DA, and Payload Shroud. There were no signifi-
cant Discrepancy Reports. All test objectives were achieved; all data
were reviewed and found to be acceptable.
o KS-1001 - OWS/DA/Shroud Ordnance Lot Verification Test. The test
began April 2, 1973, and was completed April 9, 1973. Test Objectives
were to demonstrate ordnance acceptability for flight by lot sampling
methods. All seven (7) tests were performed successfully on schedule
and all test requirements were achieved. The flight ordnance on the
Skylab I OWS/DA/Payload Shroud and S-193 Experiment Systems were
verified flight worthy.
NOTE: All ordnance which was flown on OWS-I was from the same
manufactured lot as the ordnance which _.s tested in the
Ordnance Lot Verification Test.
o KS-1002 - OWS/DA/Shroud Ordnance Installation. The test began
December 20, 1972, and was completed April 14, 1973. All c_.-dnance
detonators were installed by TCP KS-0007, CDDT/CD.
Objective of the test was to install ordnance in 8WS, specifically,
: LEA installation in the payload shroud, CDF assemblies, CDF manifolds,
and pressure cartridges installation in ATM/DA, CDF assemblies installa-
tion in OWS meteoroid shield, and 8-193 experiment ordnance installation.
All install_tions were successfully accomplished per the TCP requirements. I''"
•
There were 9 IDR's generated of which 6 were upgraded to DR status.
: The test was successfully completed and all objectives wer, m_. al)
test data were reviewed and found to be acceptable.
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75.6.3.2 Meteoroid Shield Systea
o K0-3018 - Meteoroid Shield (MS) Mechanical Deployment Test. The
te_t was begun October 3, 1972, and completed October 28, 1972.
Test Objectiveswere to install the ordnance-releasedfolded panel
and rig the meteoroid shield for flight, 7erify proper deployment of
meteoroid shield u._ing a mechanicelly released folded panel as a
: test substitute for the ordnance released panel used in flight, _nd :
verify proper operation of MS sensors which report deployment and
positioning.
The real-time data and post data evaluation showed the objectives
were accomplished as planned with the inclusion of the following
specificationswaivers:
o Waiver MDAC OWS-WR-02 allowed any three of the four link latches
to engage at deployment. Two of the four li_ latches did not
_ engage during the first deployment test One of the four latches
did not engage during the second deployment test which conforms to
waiver M_AC-0WS-'/R-02.These discrepancieswere documented on DR's
0WI-02-0112and -0118.
_ o TCN OW-012 changed the tolerance on the torsion rod strain gage _
output s.
Significant IDR' s/DR' s encountered are noted:
o Interferences occurred between the forward circumferential bulb
scale and the swing links. The bulb seals were replaced by flat
seals. These discrepancieswere documented on DR's 0WI-02-0039,
-0069, -0095, -0096, -0108, and -0_i0. '_
o The lower proximity switch magnet located on the right butterfly
hinge interferedwith the main tunnel cover during the first deploy- _i
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ment test. The interference was eliminated. This discrepancy
was documented on DR 0WI-02-0067.
o At two (2) panel Joints on the aft end of the meteoroid shield,
the shield was away from the spacecraft approximately one (i)
inch after the shield was rigged for flight. The splice plates
at these panel Joints were improperly installed. The attachment
holes in the splice plates were slotted to permit proper installa-
tion. This was documented on DR 0WI-02-0136.
o The hinge doublers bonded to tunnel str&ns were determined to have
slight areas of debond per TPS 0WI-02-0246. Tests were conducte_
; at Huntington Beach and the condition was found not to be detrimental
tr,the structaral integrity of the S/C. This discrepancy was
; documented on DR 0Wl-02-0289.
o The hex of the torsion bar at position five (5) aft section was
found to be twisted with a permanent set. This torsion bar was
replaced. This discrepancy was documented on DR 0WI-02-0066 and
!
was performed prior to initial deployment.
o The contact area of the meteoroid shield with the habitation tank
was determined to be 62% at zero _ P. The contact area was checked
" at 8 psid during the performance of KO-h001 and determined to be
_ 95%. This _s documented on DR 0WI-02-0180 and performed after
flight rigging.
o Minor discrepancies occurred or were: determined during the test.
These included out-of-tolerance parts, chipped paint, damaged gold
foil, improper installations, mis_!ignments, bent, scratched and
lost parts. These discrepancies are documented and resolved prior
4r
:. to launch on DR' s 0WI-02-0025, -0027, -0028, -0029, -0030. -0031,
-003h, -0035, -0037 thru -00hS, -00h7 thru -0055, -0066, -0068, -0070
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thru -0090, -0092 thru -0094, -0097 thru -0107, -0109, -0111, -0113,
-0117, -0119, -0126, -0129, -0132 thru -0134, and 03-0024.
_ In suwmry, all problems encountered during the test were resolved
Z
satisfactorily, all data were evaluated, and all requirements were met.
5.6.3.3 Thermal Control System - The active system was the Ground Thermal
Control System (GTCS) which was controlled and conducted by K0-5003,
0WS Habitation Tank Ground Thermal Conditioning System Functional and
Operational Test. The test was begun December 20, 1972, and completed
March 18, 1973. The purpose of the test was to - (a) leak check IGTC
0n-Board Heat Exchanger and associated plumbing; (b) verify On-Boald
fan operation and malfunction logic and indicators: (c) fill system
with water-glycol; (d) perform Habitation Tank heating, stabilization,
and cooling demonstrations with both primary and secondary systems, and
(e) purge Heat Exchanger and re-cycle with ground system.
Major problems encountered were - (a) umbilical quick-dlsconnects were
found to be susceptible to side loading and developed leaks. A line
support bracket was added to the aft umbilical carrier and no further
problem was experienced; and (b) GSE Model DSVT-33h was found to be
marginal in its ability to refill the flight system following pre-launch
purge. A seven-gallon supplemental reservoir (S14-140 bla_der) was
added and no further problem occurred.
; The GTCS "_s put into operation following hatch closure (AFril 8, 1973)
and operated to hold OWS internal temperature within specified limits
throughout rollout, countdown demonstration test, countdown and launch.
There were no significant discrepaucies. All test objectives were met,
and all data were reviewed and found to be acceptable.
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Passive System handling at KSC was confined to the following procedures:
o K0-3012 - OWS Surface Optical Measurements, The purpose of the test
was to determine if atmospheric contamination and handling degraded
the surface optical properties of various selected portions of the
OWS sufficiently to require cleaning. Solar absorutivlty and
emissivity measurements were taken on selected internal and external
surfaces, components and coupons with Gier-Dunkle infra-red and
solar reflectometers. There were no significant discrepancies.
All test objectives were achieved, and all data were reviewed and i
found to be acceptable.
o K0-3011 - OWS Forward Dome High Performance Insulation InstalAation
(HPI) and Purge. The purpose of this test was to install Habita-
tion Tank forward dome high performance insulation (HPI). IIPIseg-
ments were removed from shipping containers and carried into forward
skirt. Sections of the forward skirt access kits were removed and
J
HPI installed on forward dome. Lace HPI sections were laced together 7
and HPI protective cover was installed. There were no significant
discrepancies. All test objectives were met and all data were
reviewed and found to be acceptable.
1
i There were thirteen (13) waivers processed on the Thermal Control System •
and all were approved. These fell into meaningless categories, generally, _
¢
such as time of measurement or number of measurements or unavailability
of some measurements, etc.
5.6.3.h Thruster Attitude Control System -. This section addresses all pneumatic '_ _
_ testing in addition to the TACS.1 t
The following TACS/Pneumatic System procedures were performed at KSC .
in qualifying the various pneumatic systems and TACS:
j ,,, 5-9_
1974020219-200
o K0-5009 - Vacuum Provisions Checkout. This test was begun
!
December i, 1972, and was completed April 4, 1973. Test objec-
tives were to perform a leak check of the vacuum systems. These
included the urine dump, refrigeration pump container vent. waste
management water dump, LBNP experiment vent, metabolic analyzer
vent, wardroom water dump and water condensate dump subsystems
: llne. Each subsystem vacuum line was evacuated using a mass _
spectrometer and each Joint was sprayed with Helium to determine
external leakage at each Joint. The seat and stem leakage was
measured for each vacuum valve and the opening and closing break-
away torque was determined. There were no significant discrepancies.
The test was satisfactorily completed and the vacuum subsystem was
accepted for flight. No significant problems nor anomalies were
found during the test.
i
i o KO-4001 - Pneumatic Pressure and Tank Leak Checks. The test was i
J
begun December i, 1972, and completed January 3, 1973. Test
!
objectives were to perform a leak and functional test of the various _
pneumatic systems aboard the OWS. The test was satisfactorily
completed and the Pneumatic Pressurization and Tank Systems were
accepted for flight. _I specifications and criteria requirements
!
were met except for the following:
o Leakage a_ the LH2 feed blanking flange exceeded the requirement --
1 x 10 -3 sccs He allowed as against 1.25 x 10 -3 sccs He actually
meuure4. Waiver MDAC-OW,Q-WR-13, allo%_n_ the slightly out-of-
t tolerance leakage, was submitted and approved by NASA. _
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o Quantitative leak checks of the coupled quick disconnects (QD's)
' for the H/A pressurization system, waste tank uressurization
:" system, pneumatic control system, and SAS purge system could
not be satisfactorily accomplished because of accessiblity pro-
blems when the umbilical carrier was installed. Waiver
MDAC-OWS-WR-30, substituting a aualitative leak check of these
QD's, was submitted and approved by NASA
o Leak check of the Pneumatic Control System Monitor Port Ca_ was
accomplished by a 2h-hour pressure decay test instead of with
leak detector solution required by the specifications and
criteria document. This change was made to conserve schedule
_ time. Waiver MDAC-OWS-WR-52 was submitted and aDproved by NASA
for this change.
' There were no significant discrepancies.
o KO-4000 - Thruster Attitude Control Systems Checks. The test was
; begun January 12, 1973, and completed January 17, 1973. Test
objectives _ere to perform leak and functional checks of the
Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS) to verify system integrity
; and demonstrate the system meets the design intent. The test was
satisfactorily completed and the TACS was accepted for flight. All
specifications and criteria requirements were met except for the
following:
A leak at the IB79580-515 Temperature Transducer located on TACS
Bottle #9. The leakage requirement was i x 10-6 sccs Helium and
the actual leakage measured was 7.Ok x i0-5 sccs Helium. No
<
leakage was noted when using the mass spectroleter in the
sniffing mode. The leakage requirement was changed per KSC
request to no leakage allowed using the mass spectrometer in the
_ sniffing mode and the transducer was accepted for flight.
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o Fifty-six (56) brazed Joints out of approximately 400 brazed
, Joints were leak chc_ked using the mass spectrometer in the
sniffing mode instead of in the vacuum mcde as required by the
L
specifications and criteria document. Waiver MDAC-OWS-WR-36,
allowing leak check of these Joints in the sniffing mode instead
of the vacuum mode, was submitted and approved by NASA.
o Leak check of the TACS Q.D. was performed with Helium and the Uson
Leak Detector instead of with GN2 and bubble soap. Since the Felium
test was a more stringent test, Waiver MDAC-0WS-WR-19 was submitted
and approved by NASA.
5.6.3.5 Solar Array System - The Solar Array System (Wings #i and #2) was handled
at KSC by the following procedures.
• o KO-3001 - OWS/SAS Mechanical Mate and Ordnance Installation. The test
: was begun October 17, 1972, and completed March 18, 1973. Test objec-
tives were to (a) install ordnance for beam fairing release and solar
panels release systems, (b) per Jrm mechsnical pre-load on solar
; panels subsequent to ordnance installation in SAS wings, (c) install
Wing #I and Wing #2 on OWS-I, (d) leak check p_trge subsystem and
; establish a GN2 purge within the solar cell compartments, and (e) verify
proper operation of the vent modules. All test obJectiv-.s were met and
_ all test data were reviewed and found to be acceptable.
' During and subsequent to SAS wing installation, various minor changes
.r
! were made to the specification and criteria requirements for the SAS purge
system. These changes were made primarily to conserve schedule time and
were docu=ented in the following waivers which were submitted and approved '
by NASA.
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o MDAC-OWS-WR-0h - Waived load sensors 13 and lh cinch bar rigging adjustments
+0 Ibs
because they were set per TCP values which were in error - 440 -25
+0
(1957  09-I12N)should have been hSO -25 ibs (200.2 + 0,-II2N).
o MDAC-OWS-WR-06 - Waived the requirement to maintain 0.i _ .01 Dsi_
(1.02 x I0) _ 68.9 N/m2) in the SAS wings until the appropriate orifices
could be fabricated (12/13/72).
t
• o MDAC-OWS-DR-08 - Extended the date for installing the purge orifices
from 12/13/72 to 12/22/72.
o MDAC-0WS-WR-07 - Increased the allowable relative humidity for the
: SAS wings from 60% to 68%. This change was allowed during the
mechanical mate of the SAS to the OWS only.
; o MDAC-0WS-WR-I4 - Allowed a one-time deviation only of maximum SAS
S
f
purge off-time of 67 minutes instead of 60 minutes.
o MDAC-0WS-WR-15 - Allowed use of GN2 and bubble soap for leak test of
i the SAS purge system instead of helium and a mass spectrometer.
o KO-IC07A - SAS Dmrk I-V Test. Pre-ordnance installation was begun
October 17, 1972, and completed Octover 25, 1972. Post-ordnance
r installation was begun November i0, 1972, and completed November ii,
1972. Test objectives were to obtain dark current-voltage (I-V) data
on the solar array wings before installation on the OWS. There were
no significant discrepancies. All test objectives were achieved; all
_ test data were reviewed and found to be acceptable.
o KO-1006 - SAS/OWS Electrical Mate and Dark l-V Test. The test was
i begun November 20, 1972, and completed December 6, 1972. Test
,: objectives were to (a) verify the redundant elertrical paths from each
solar module to the solar array power _nit, (b) obtain dark current
i and voltage (l-V) data on the solar arraYwings after installation
i on the OWS, and (c) connect the electrical interfaces between the SA8
k
wings _nd the OWS. All test objectives were achieved; all test data
i _198
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were reviewed and found to be acceptable. No major problems were
noted. Only two minor problems were documented on DR's_ two pairs
of wires on test connectors were reversed. The DR's were disposi-
_ tioned to re-identify wires to _revent future test problems. The
noted DR's were: 0WI-03-0227 and -0234.
o KO-1008 - SAS/OWS Dark I-V Test. The test was begun March 26, 1973,
and completed April 4, 1973. Test objectives were to obtain dark
current-voltage (I-V) data on the solar array wings after AM
electrical mate. All test objectives were achieved; all test data
were reviewed and found to be acceptable. This test was performed to
obtain current and voltage data on the Solar Array Wings and verify
electrical mate of SAS temperature measurements after Dark I-V Test.
The procedure did not account for the temperature gradient across
the SAS wings in excess of 2°F (256._K). The data had to be evaluated using
individual module voltage vs. temperature curves. A waiver (MDAC-OWS-
WR-38) to the TCSRD was written to include the module curves as part
J
of the acceptance criteria. A failure in the DSV7-109 caused modules
iii and 139 on both wing_ to give faulty readings. The wing modules
were retested and found to be acceptable, using individual module
voltage vs. temperature curves.
5.6.3.6 Electrical Power Distribution System - The Electrical Power Distribution
System was re-verified at KSC after some modifications and all problems
were resolved satisfactorily. All test objectives were met.
/
• i
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The following procedures were performed in the pursuit of electrical system
verification:
o KO-100h - OWS/IV/SII Continuity and Compatibility Checks. This test was
begun November 20, 1972, and completed November 22, 1972. Test objectives !
• f
were to verify the pre-power compatibility of the OWS electrical interface
f
lines prior to application of power 8_id prior to mating with the AM, IU,
<
SII, and SAS. Also, establish the initial OWS switch and circuit breaker
configuration. There were fourteen (l_ IDR's generated during the per-
formance of th_s procedure. Thirteen (13) were closed by deviations which
_ revised tolerances, test meter polarity, meter range, dirty pins which
were cleaned or test cables used not wired pin-to-pin. DR OWI-03-0469
--'_ which was transferred from KO-1001,, IDR-013 documented a discrepancy on
one of the signal lines from tile S-IC to the IU. A higher-thsm-specified
resistance through the OI4S - 1.4 ohms rather than 1.0 ohms maximum was
found. During investigation, one of the interface connectors was dis-
[
connected at tile IU and upon reconnection, the out-of-specification reading
was c,lred. During flight mate, the suspect connector was found to be <
• contaminated. The contamination was removed by cleaning with alcohol. _
In summ&ry, all test objectives were met and all data were reviewed and
foundto be acceptable
o KO-1001 - OWSPower-Up Support. This test was begun November 22, 1972, "
and completed November 29, 1972. Test objectives were to power up and
power downOWS electricalbuses thatwere energizedand controlledthrough
t_e OWS/GSE umbilicals, in order to support OWS electrical tests prior to
the integrated(AM/MDA/OWS)phase of checkout. _ _
g
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The following OWS buses were energized:
4DI19 (talkback power)
RACS/RS (Refrigeration System)
Prelaunch Instrumentation
The power down portion of the procedure de-energized the noted buses.
Prior to each power application, isolation resistance measurements :vere
performed in order to verify that the power buses were safely above
ground. In £ummary, ell test objectives were met and all test data were
reviewed and found to be acceptable. Run i of the procedure revealed
that the ACE software for RACS HI ar.dRACS LO commands was reversed.
_%e ACE software was revised to correct the problem.
5.6.3.7 lllumination System - The verification of the lllumination System was
incorporated into KS-O0hS, SWS End-to-End Systems Test and E_<periment T_st
(see Paragraph 5.6.4).
5.6.3.8 Communication & Data Acquisition System - Verification of this system was
incorporated into KS-OOh5, SWS End-to-End System Test (s_e Paragraph 5.6.4).
The following significant problems were encountered and resolved
satisfactorily.
o Multiplexer Thermostat Installations, KR's 0WI-03-0477, OWl-O3-Oh76.
t During visual inspection, it was discovered that th? multiplexer
thermostats, P/N IB75338, were installed in reverse; i.e., the thermo-
stat sensing surface was installed away from the multiplexer surface.
A thermal analysis was performed to determine the thermal response of
the thermostats in the above configurption. The resul_s indicated
; only a one degree difference in the switching points of the thermo-
i
stats, with the therz stat sensing element installed next to the
multiplexer case.
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• Drawing Change Request Seria/ Enginee_'_ng Order (DCRSEO) IB77021-A41-1
per Engineering Ch_nge Proposal (ECP) W003-122, was issued to clarify
the installation drawing. The thermostat can be installed with either
side toward the multiplexer case. TPS 0WI-04-0479 was _enerated to
reflect the above change. No retest was required.
o Speaker Intercom Assembly Rmnoval, TPS 0WI-06-0054. All Speaker Inter-
com Assemblies (SIA's) were removed twice from the spacecraft for
design modifications. The first removal was to reduce the output level
of the call potentiometer which minimized the possibility of squeal in
the call mode. The second removal was the result of DR's related to
the indexing of the channel switches and the looseness of the CCU
_. rcceptacles. The SIA's were reinstalled and successfully retested per
KS-0045, Sequence 14.
o TV Input Station Removal, DR OWI-06-856. The TV Input Station located
at 40_ was found to have an improper DC offset. This unit was replaced
; with S/r!00001 and successfully retested per KS-O01_5_ Sequence 15.
5.6.3.9 Caution & Warning System - This system was verified durin_ KS-00hS, SWS
End-to-End System Test. (See Paragraph 5.6.4)
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5.6.3.10 E._eriment Accommodation System - Experiment testing w_s conducted both
off- and on-module. All test requirements were satisfied and four (4)
waivers were written to accept discrepant items.
The following procedures were used to conduct off-module experiment tests:
KE-7005 Medical Experiments Off-Module
KE-7006 Experiments Off-Module Preparations
KE-7007 S019/S183 Off-Module Functional
KE-7008 Off-Module Periodic Operations
The following procedures were used to conduct on-module experiment
< tests or were integrated tests supported in whole or in part with
% experiment hardware:
K0-19003 Receiving Inspection
KO-7000 Experiment Leak Checks
KO-70QI Experiment Installation and Removal
" K0-7002 Experiment Mechanical Tests
KO-700h On-Module Periodic Operations
KS-00G9 Simulated Flight
KS-0016 OWS Closeout
KS-00h5 End-to-End Test
FI_-7000 Experiment Stowage
The following paragraphs detail, by experiment, those tests performed
and indicates any anomalies observed and the subsequent resolutions.
o Thermal Control Coatings (D02h) - This is a passive experiment; only
a receiving inspection and fit check were performed.
./
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o Experiment Support System (ESS) - After receipt of the OWS at KSC; the
ESS was removed end/ returned to MSFC for rework. After reinstallation
in the OWS, no anomalies were detected.
o In-fllght Blood Collection System (IBCS) - No anomalies were observed
during IBCS testing.
o Specimen Mass Measurement Devices (MO7k) - On-Module testing was per-
formed with no anomalies. Calibration of the devices could not be
; performed on-module because of low frequency vibrations present within
the spa_craft. Calibration was suc_sst_JO" accomplished off-module.
>
o Lover Body Negative Pressure (M092) - _,£inorepairs were performed on
the waist seal, iris plate and delta p gauge by MSFC representatives.
-_ Leak and function tests were performed on the de_.ce. Waiver
_ r4DAC-OWS-WR-02was written to explain the out-of-_olerance readings of
: the leg volume measuring system.
o Vectorcardiogrsm (MO93) - One vectorcardiogrsm umbilical was returned
to MMC for rework and the electronics module in the ESS was reworked at
MSFC. No other anomalies were detected.
-
o Human Vestibular Function (M131) - No test anomalies were observed.
: o ,SleepM,:mitoring(M133) - After receipt of the OWS at KSC, II133was
returned to _C for rework of worn hardware and incorporation of design :
" modifications. After return of the hardware, the backshell of the power _
cable was discovered to be loose. The shell was tightened and the dis-
crepancy closed. Other test anomalies observed were associated with the
: M133 test set.
I
o Netabollc Analyzer (btlTl)- After receipt of the OWS at KSC, the bicycle i
ergometer and metabolic analyzer were returned to MSFC for rework. After i
!
¢
L
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_ reinstallation in the O;.:S,the ergometer performed unsatisfactorily and was
C
again returned to MSFC. After reinstallation in the OWS a
_ leak in the metabolic analyzer was discovered. The leak was isolated
and fixed. All subsequent tests were satisfactory. Two (2) waivers
(MDAC-OWS-WR-02 and HDAC-DWS-WR-II) were written to allow for a power-
off period in excess of that specified in the test requirements.
Waiver MDAC-0WS-WR-23 was written to explain an anomaly in the comparison
of metabolic analyzer telemetry outputs versus displays.
o Bo_7 Mass Measurement Device (M172) - On-Module testing was performed with
no anomalies. Calibration of the device could not be performed on-module
i
because of low frequency vibrations present within the spacecraft. Cali.-
bratlon was successfully accomplished off-module.
o Habiability/Crew Quarters (MhS7) - This equipment generated numerous
discrepancies due to cleanliness problems, label debonding and inadequate
drawer inserts. All discrepancies were reworked and ec_epted. The
• digital thermometer output did not meet the acceptance test requirement, i
However, it was determined that the requirement exceeded the hardware :
design specification and the unit was accepted.
o Astronaut Maneuvering Equipment (M509) - No test anomalies were observed.
" The propulsion support system bottles were discovered to contain twisted
valve stems. The bottles were reworked and retested by MMCpersonnel add
reinstalled in the OWS,
o UV Stellar Astronomy (S019) - A_ter receipt of the OWS at KSC and com-
pletion oi- tests, the film cannister and optical cannister were returned . . _r
to the University of Texas for flight calibration and film loading.
After reinstallation in the OWS, no anomalies were observed.
o X-Ra_7/UV Solar Photography (5020) - No tost anomalies were observed.
_-105
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!o UV Airglov I[orizon Photography (SOG3) - No test anomalies were observed. _
, o Micrometeorite Particle Collection (S1_9) - During testing, a loss of
motor drive/cassette support unit motor temperature occurred. The
!_ problem w-._ traced to a faulty socket on the photometer connector.
The socket was reworked and the unit performed satisfactorily. No other
test anomalies were observed.
o UV Panorama (S183) No test anomalies were obse_'_d. The pupil on the
unit was determined to have spots and scratche_. The unit was cleaned
and it was determined that the scratches would have, no effect on the
photographic data to be gathered by the experiment.
• Earth Terrain C_era (S190B) - No test anomalies were observed.
• _ o Trans-Uranic Cosmic Rays ($228) - This is a passive experiment; only a
receiving inspection and fit check were performed.
o Magnetospheric Particles Composition $230 - This is a passive experiment.
Only a receivin_ ins_ction and fit check were _rformed. No anomalies
were observed.
o _nual Navigation Sightings (T002) - No test anomalies were observed.
o In-Fli_ht Aerosol Analysis (T003) - No test anomalies were observed.
o Crew Vehicle Disturbances (TOI3) - The suit was removed and returned i
to Langley Research Center for rework. After return of the suit, '_
subsequent testing showed no discrepancies.
t
1
1.-
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o Contamination Measurement and Gegenschein/Zodiacal Light (T027/
S073) - Leak checks of the unit at both scientific airlocks
produced leakage in excess of the test requirements. The cannister
was removed from the OWS and i(_k testing was performed in the
laboratory. Leakage was reduced to an amount acceptable for flight.
A failure of the photomultiplier tube indicator resulted in replace-
ment of the indicator. Additionally, the photometer connector was
reworked (Reference Micrometeorite Particle Collection (S149)
paragraph, above).
o Sample Array (T027) - The unit was rejected due to pittin_ and
corrosion and returned to Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC) for
rework. The backup sample array unit was upgraded for flight ar,d
installed in the OWS. Leak tests o,_this unit were successful
and it was installed in the OWS. A functional failure on this unit
_ occurred during system testing and it was returned to MMC. The
: original unit was returned to the OWS and system tests were completed.
After rework of the backup unit and subsequent system tests, it was
determined that the backup unit was more flight worthy, the flight
optical samples were then installed in this unit, final off-module leak :
_ and fUnctional tests were successfully completed and the unit was final '
y stowed for flight.
o Van Allen Belt Dosimeter (VABD) - Irregular variations of certain tele- _:
meter indications were observed. Off-module tests showed these date
variations were characteristic of the unit and the unit was accepted. ""
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o Bacteria and Spores (ED31) - No functional testing was performed on
this experiment hard_are. Receiving inspection and fit check were
performed. Some missing tape was noted and dispositioned.
o In Vitro Immunology (ED32) - No functional testing was performed on
this experiment hardware. Receiving inspection and fit check were
: perfonaed and no discrepancies were observed.
o Motor Sensory Performance (ED_I) - Contamination was observed in the
cable. The unit was cleaned, functioned satisfactorily and accepted.
Web Formation (ED52) - No discrepancies were detected during functional
tests.
o Plant Growth/Phototropism (ED61/62) - No functional testing was performed
on this experiment hardware. Alignment/orientation information was
not present. This discrepancy was dispositioned and the unit was accepted.
• o Cytoplastic Streaming (ED63) - No functional tests were performed on
this experiment hardware.
o Capillary Study (ED72) - No functional tests were performed on this
experiment hardware. Some marks on protective coatings were noted and
dispositioned.
o Mass Heasurement (ED74) - Numerous discrepancies, including improper
o
identification tags, inadequate packing, delamination and bent pins were
• noted and dispositioned. No anomalies were detected during functional
tests.
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1974020219-214
o Neutron Analysis (ED76) - No functional tests were performed on this
experiment hardware. Two neutron detector slides were accidentally
exposed; however, this condition was dispositioned as acceptable.
The unit did not have the required radioactive material decals: :
; decals were applied.
o Liquid Motion in Zero-G (ED7B) - No functional tests were performed
on this experiment hardware. No discrepancies were observed.
All experiment testing objectives were &chieved; all test data were
reviewed and found to be accevtable.
5.6.3.11 Habitability Support System
o Waste Management System - Subsequent to OWS-I delivery to KSC, the
_S was redesigned to accommodate increased daily urine collection
requirements. The redesign and hardware fabrication were accomplished
_ at MDAC-W per ECP W659. Associated rework and installation at KSC
were accomplished per the following TPS's: 0WI-09-0139, 0WI-09-0151,
0WI-09-0181, OWI-09-0182, 0WI-09-0185, 0WI-09-0202, OWI-MDAC-0036 and
OWI-MDAC-O040.
2
TCP's K0-5005, KS-0045, KS-0010, KS-0009, and KS-O016 were rewritten
and conducted using the redesigned WMS hardware.
o K0-5005 - Waste Management System Verification and Checkout was
i_ begun January I0, 1973, and completed March 3, 1973. Test objectives
were to perform a power-off mechanical test of the Waste Management
Subsystem to ensure flight readiness, perform leak and functional
, .q
_ cheeks of the Waste Management System in the processingand launch
'I
: configuration, and perform a mechanical and functional checkout of
the trash airlock. All test objectives were achieved: all test data "_
_ were reviewed and found to be acceptable. _
J
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i Major problems encountered and solutions are summarized below,
o DR-0WI-09-0802 Excessive Closing Forces on Urine Drawe: #2
unacceptable to flight crew. Drawer was replaced with drawer from
OWS-2 and retest yie._ded acceptable forces,
: o DR-OWI-09-0852 Interference Between Chill Plate and Centrifugal
Separator in Urine Drawer #2 scratched chill plate and created
potential coolanol leak, Scratch depth was measured and analyzed
• and found not to create a leak hazard, Separator mounts onall three
drawers were backed-off to provide adequate clearance and preclude
: repetition of problems,
o Airflow and pressure drops in collection module during KS-0045
f
--_ test failed to satisfy TCRSCD requirements. This problem was
attributed to clogged filter in GSE fecal bag, Retest of Drawer #2
usin_ flight bag yielded acceptable results, Data analysis indicated
' no retest required on Drawers #i and #3 (reference Waiver Request
1
MDAC-OWS-WR-31 ).
, o DR-OFS-0046 Centrifugal Separator mount assemblies (P/N IB90271°.
: 501C) were found to have loose center cores resulting in index pin
J
misalignment, Failure analysis by NASA malfunction investigation
staff (MIS-039-73) concluded that debond condition was caused by
• "short shot" of center rubber material. Mounts were replaced with
Dew mounts_ however, a history of similar failures in the _est
program prompted develo_nent of a backup means by which the flight
crew may re-align index pins on debonded mounts. "
o Water Management System - To perform a functional check, sterilizationL
and servicing operation for the IiSSWater Subsystem_ and to prepare the
: system for orbital operation, K0-5007 Water Subsystem Servicing and
5-II0 !
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Functional Test was performed. The test was begun February 23, 1973,
and completed April i0, 1973. Test objectives were to perform a
functional check, sterilization, and servicing operation for all
the HSS water subsystems including portable tank, microbial control
equipment, and shower, and prepare the system for orbital operation.
Review of real-time data accumulated during this test indicated
that all test objectives were met. The pressurization manifold
transducer was successfully tested and the telemetry output verified.
The ten water tank level transducers were evaluated during water
loading. Reference data was obtained during bellows stroking to
correlate bellows position with transducer outputs and meaningful
results were obtained on 7 of I0 tanks. The specification requirement
for i00 + 2.4% was waived (MDAC OWS WR-33) since all transducers were
: intermittent, fluctuating between an on-scale reading and off-scale
high. During performance of this test, sixty-three IDR's were written
and of these IDR's, three were voided_ one was transferred to _ MDAC
Discrepan y Report (DR) (Flight Crew Equipment), two were transferred
to LUT 2 DR's, ten were 'transferred to DSVT-312 DR's and twenty-seven
were transferred to Spacecraft DR's. The most significant anomalies
are discussed below.
o Low Water Flowrate from Facility (Reference IDR 005) - Due to
restriction in the LUT 2 facility water filter bank, maximum flow
delivered was 0.4 GPM (.0259 liter/sec), should have been 0.5 to
1.5 (.0315 to .0945 liter/sec). Waiver Request (WR) MDAC-OWS-WR-26
all_¢ed completion of a test sequence with this low flowrate. The '" _
I facility filter banks were reserviced subsequently to correct
/ th_ problem.
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o Shower Suction System Indicated Leakage (Reference IDR Olh) - During
shower suction system leak checks, the Uson leak detector
indicated several apparent leaks. Waiver request MDAC-OWS-WR-28
allowed use of the mass spectrometer in the sniffing mode
instead of the Uson, and all leakages in this mode were
acceptable.
o Biocide Level Problems (Reference IDR's 009, 017, 020, 0h6) -
Problems resulted during preparation of water/biocide solution
in the GSE reservoir. Contributing factors were (a) incorrect
biocide concentration in supply container, (b) binding of the
injector assembly, (c) leaks in the injector needle, and (d) cali-
_-_ bration of the injection system. These problems were resolved
and correct biocide concentrations were achieved.
o B20 Gun Hose Leakage (Reference IDR's 022, 023, 02h) - After
steam sterilization of the wardroom network and water servic-
ing, leakage was noted at each of the three H20 gun hoses. The
hoses were replaced by TPS OWI-08-0h46 and successfully retested
by deviation K0-5007 No. 275. TCN 130 eliminated autoclave steam
sterilization of the guns to avoid subsequent damage. Guns were
maintained sterile using aseptic techniques.
o Portable Tank Biocide Level (Reference IDR 011) - Waiver request
MDAC 0WS-WR-27 was written to permit a biocide level of
3.8 ppm (S/B 6+1 ppm) for the portable tank test. This water
was loaded for demonstration test only and was subsequently
drained from the portable tank. _
o Water Tank Number 9 Low Volul,:e - Water tank 9 was not completely
filled during servicing. Waiver request MDAC OWS-WR-3_ allows .
up to 55 Ibs (2_.9_ Kg) of water to be off-loaded [was 25 Ibs
(11.33 max um].
5-i12
1974020219-218
o Miscellaneous Specification Changes - The following TCN's
were processed during this test:
o TCN-136 changed the cation filter water sample require-
ment to delete discolved gas specification.
!:
o TCN-139 changed the cation filter final b_ocide condi-
tioning requirement to 21 + i ppm (w_s 14 + i ppm).
o TCN's 107 and 141 deleted requirements to run wet tests
of the urine flush and contingency networks.
/
All test objectives were met_ all test data were reviewed
and found to be acceptable.
J
o Personal Hygiene System - No testing was accomplished at KSC on
this system. The only activity at KSC was the stowing in the
OWS. (See Paragraph 5.6.3.13.)
o Body Cleansing System (Shower) - The KSC activity consisted of
leak checking the shower, the inter-connect tuoing, and the pump.
f
The pump was functionally verified by operation and the whole
system was stowed aboard the OWS (see Paragraph 5.6.3.13). The
testing was completed and all results were satisfactory.
o Food M-,_agement System - No testing on _,.is system was accomplished
at KSC_ this system was stowed aboard the vehicle (see Paragraph
5.6.3.13).
o Sleep Support System - The light baffles for each sleep compartment
were retested at KSC to evaluate design changes made after the OWS i
vss shipped to KSC. The retest resulted in 8evera. more design
i cha_g_s to minimize light leaks. The final evaluation of the sleep
support system was acceptable.
J
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o Refrigeration System - The mechanical Refrigeration System (RS)
/
_ checkout spans the time from December 9, 1972, until Countdown
Demonstration Test (CDDT), May 2, 1973 (K0-5001). ;
o The RS electrical checkout _tarted November 27, 1972, and was
i
completed December 4, 1972 (K0-1000). Problems encountered
z_
!
/ and solutions are sunnnarized below:
t
o The Pressure Indicator Panel (PIP) was reassembled after :
cleaning and leak checked by bagging in lieu of a vacuum
chamber check (a chamber large enough was not available). :
The bagging technique could not be used on the quick
disconnects (QD's) which later became the source of leakage
and caused a connection delay with the pump enclosure.
These same QD's were susceptible to side loading and leaked i
r
(DR 0WI--02--I013). A support bracket was fabricated and the
QD's secured. No subsequent coolant leakage was reported
': after December 19, 1972, bracket_installation. Protective ,,
aides were also fabricated to prevent gage glass breakage and
calibration screw adjustments. QD handling procedures were ,-
developed to maintain lubrication in QD mating surfaces. _:
o Refrigeration System (RS) Checkout (KS-OOhS) started i:
February 12, 1972. Schedule delays were caused by the inad-
vertent use of "quarantined" Coolanol-15 heat transfer fluid
:_ (Batch QB4) in the RS Servicer (DSVT-315) A new supply of
/
: Coolanol-15 (Batch QB3) caused a new concern over the dark
/
yellow fluid color. The yellow cool_ol was filtered (1.25 ,.,
: microns), analyzed and counselled with the manufacturer and
determined to be acceptable. A decision wa_ made to use this
fluid. The GSE was serviced, and Coolanol-15 dewatered and
_
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_ degassed. A waiver (MDAC OWS-WR-25) was required to accept
/ the CSE particle sampling (one parti_}e approximately 190
?
microns). The decision to use the "yellow" Coolanol caused
a resequen,'_ng of the RS checkout procedure which now started
with chilldown and without the proper flight coolant level.
All RS "cold" tests incorporated an insulating cover and a
.013 ft 3/min (6.13 X lO-6m 3/Sec) Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2)
trickle purge for the pump enclosure which allowed for the
regenerator heater operation and the verification of chiller
low loop switci_ingusing dry ice in the food chiller only.
The completion of _S coolant loading was dela_ when the
IB93649-501 secondary loop Jumper hose outlet QD operator
did not retract. The fix was to disconr_ct the secondary
jumper hose while maintaining a slight positive pressure on
the pump enclosure secondary outlet QD [approximately i pslg
(1.08 x 105 N/m2)]on disconnect. The primary Jumper hose was
! used to off load the secondary coolant loop.
A waiver (MDAC OWS-WR-32) allowed for a refinement of the off
loading temperature variable, the net result of which allowed
the average coolant temperature in the primary loop to reach
9h.2°F (307.7K) and the secondary loop to reach 91.1°F
(305.9K) before completely extending the accumulator bellows.
GSE Model DSVT-301 supplied the proper water glycol flow rate
temperature and pressure to the RS; however, the Temperature
Control Units (TCU's) failed to refill the flight system after
_ the launch p_ge. Th_ first fix was to modify the GSE by adding
7
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two Slh-140 bladders to add seven gallons of additional
water glycol reservoir capacity to each TCU. Although the
bladders were ultimately successful in refilling the TCU
reservoir, the problem was found to be excessive glycol
leakage in the TCU's. The RS ground serviced water glycol
loop was over pressurized when incorrect operational steps
were taken to reduce the pressure (IDR i19). Subsequent data
review revealed that the GSF relief _a/ves limited the maximum
pressure to 310 psia (2.137 X 106N/m2) [maximum proof is 400
psia (2.757 X 106N/m2)]. Procedures, valve, switch positions,
and relief valve settings were change_ to prevent a further
-_ recurrence of overpressurization.
Umbilical QD's at find numbers (FN) A7679 and ATC8B started
leaking water glycol into the aft umbilical carrier (GSE
DR-DSVT-301 000h). The QD's were removed and inspected.
Normal seal wear was observed and the possibility of QD side
loading, causing le_:age, was confirmed. The fix was twofold:
a coolant line support bracket was fabricated (iB7277h-l) to
support QD's and help maintain axial alignment. The QD's with
new seals were replaced (after KS-O08). There was no sub-
sequent water _lycol leakage reported from these umbilical
OJ)'s. KS-OOls5 was completed February 25, 1972. All RS flight
and ground functional modes were verified except for water
glycol ground refill with the DSVT-301. ..q
|
i
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Since the RS umbilical QD's were not available for the
swing arm test (KS-0008) February 27, 1973, no ground
J
functions using conditioned water glycol were verified.
All GSE uplink functions were simulated. RS plus count
activities (loop enables/disables, plume shield Jettison/
reset) were verified functional.
i
Umbilical QD's were installed and leak tested in time for
the start of Space Vehicle OAT (KS-O009). All RS perfor- !
mance was acceptable during the test.
Current spikes were observed during post-test data review
on the +4DIII Remote Automatic Calibration System (RACS)
bus (DR 0WI-09-I099). Fault isolation revealed an electri-
cal noise sensitivity in the primary loop inverter. Current
spikes did not affect the pump flow output or other para-
meters. The RS primary loop inverter was replaced March 25,
1973, with a unit tested at Huntington Beach and verified
not to have a similar condition. Subsequent retest and •
observation of +4DIII current showed no further occurrence
of current spikes. Corrective action on the inverter which
was removed was to twist the clock line and its return to
the shift register, twist the 5 vdc supply and its return to
the shift register, and remove a capacitor across the clock
line. Removal of the capacitor reduced the clock pulse fall
time from 8 microseconds to 2 microseconds which minimized
5-i17
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the clock output line exposure time to noise. These actions
eliminated the current transients.
: The Automatic Terminal Sequence Program (ASEP iiii) which
: sequences off the Interior Ground Thermal Conditioning
System (IGTCS), RS and AM functions, was verified in the
simulated Flight Test (KS-0012). Performance of the RS was
acceptable.
RS responses to DCS commands and IU commands were verified
i
in the Software Integration Test, March 27, 1973, (ZS-O011).
RS pump enclosure tube support was found missing. Part
:.... was fabricated per 0WI-02-I013 and support was bonded in
place. The gold foil blanket was installed over regenera-
tive heat exchangers and the pump enclosure door installed
[
and enclosure purged with GN2 (K0-5009) on March 13, 1973.
, The RS was prepared for frozen food storage by TPS-OWI-09-029.
; Frozen food was stowed at 10:30 AM, April 8, 11173,and RS
:_ was operated cuntinuously with all system data recorded a
minimum of every half hour until launch.
?
J
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The radiator backface insulation and thermal curtain
were installed by KS-O016. Rollout (KS-O018, May 16,
1973) was uneventful except for facility transients
during power transfers. RS was successfully controlled
and monitored from Mobile Launcher panels 302-h21A2 and
302-420A2.
RS performance d,_ring CDDT and CD (KS-0007) was acceptable. _°
Water glycol purge and refill by DSVT-301 was successful
during CDDT. The ASEP iiii Terminal Sequencer Program
sequenced AM IGTCS and RS functions properly. A nominal
performance during countdown and launch was observed.
o KO-IO00 - Refrigeration System Electrical Checks. _le test
was begun November 27, 1972, and completed December h, 1972.
Test objectives were to verify that electrical components of
the RS were functional prior to the start of RS wet tests.
The following were conducted:
o Pump inverter and logic supply voltage checks _
o GSE input command checks
o Logic unit checks
#
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o Pump Sequencing
o Loop Transfers
o Logic Control
o OWS Display Indications
o Temperature Control Circuitl_ Checks for:
o Freezer Inlet Temperature
o Chiller Outlet Tezperature
o Regenerator Heater Controller
o Radiator Bypass Controller
o Heater voltage and thermostat checks
All test objectives were achieved: all test data were reviewed
__ and found to be acceptable. Leak checks on the RS were performed
; by K0-5009 and are recorded in Paragraph 5.6.3._.
5.6.3.12 Pressure Garment Conditioning System - No testln_ was accomplished
i
on this system. The suit drying station was installed in the
vehicle •
5.6.3.13 Stowage Syst_ - Crew equi_ent stowage was handled at KSC by Test
and Checkout Procedure (TCP) KO-301_. This test was begun
March 25, 1973, and completed April 2, 1973. Test objective of this
; test were (I) to provide instructions for handling and pre-packaging
L
! flight crew equil_nent in the cleanroom to support subsystem testing,
_ bench review, crew fit and function test, and flight stowage,
(2) to provide instructions for stowage of flight crew equipment
,,
in the OWS spacecra_ :'orCCFF and flight; and (3) to create an
installation record of etowed flight crew equi_nent in support
7
of launch operations. KO-301_ also provided CCFF procedures for
the rin_ containers. All tests were conducted satisfactorily.
_-120
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Six (6) procedure change requests (PCR's) were written due to
stcwage changes. Three (3) bench reviews were conducted with crew
participation and all components or representative samples were
reviewed. There were 1255 deviations written and 231 IDR's
generated during the total test run. None of these were any
major problem and all were closed or upgraded to DR's.
All test objectives of this sequence were satisfied and the
test was acceptable.
5.6.3.1h Ground Support Equipment (GSE) - the GSE utilized at KSC was, for
the most part, the same GSE used at Huntington Beach (A3) in the
Vehicle Checkout Laooratory (VCL) for stage checkout, except where
facility differences dictated a different test setup. A more
complete _ccount of the GSE exists in Paragraph 2.2.14.
Prior to performance of OWS interface checks, _ystem verificaticn
and space vehicle integrated testing, the following SWS ESE TCP's
were successfully completed to prove the integrity of the Ground
Electrical Power and Control Systems.
o KS-9000 - LC39 Electrical Support Equipment Cable Validation.
This test assembled all electrical equipment on the Mobile
Launcher ana Launch Control Center and performed electrical ring-
! out, meggering, and connection of GSE cables.
o KS-9O01 - ACE to VAB GSE Integration. Verified the capability
of ACE control room 2 to transmit comnands and receive data from
LC39 GSE and spacecraft umbilical systems. Each con_and and its ,.
associated indications were validated prior to use with the
space vehicle,
/
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)o KS-9002 - SWS GSE Emergency Power Test Verified _he capability:
to transfer to and from emerge,icy back-up power and confirmed
which equipment was on emergency power.
o I_-9018 - VAB GSE Power System Activation. Verified _O.1 local
controls in the Mobile Launch and provided a control procedure
for daily use when not operating under ACE Station control.
: o KS-9101 - EBW Pulse Sensor Functional. Verified the calibra-
tion of the EBW pulse sensors prior to spacecraft use.
o KO-9010 - DSV7-109 Solar Array Component Test Set Self-Test.
This test was utilized to set up and run a self-test of the
DSV7-109 Solar Array Test set prior to running each dark I-V
test. There were three issues of this self-test; all were
completed satisfactorily.
t
:L
o KO-9016 - GSE Relay Module Test. Functionally tested GSE relay
modules prior to installation in GSE racks. There were three
iaaues of this test and all were completed satisfactorily.
o KO-9017 - GSE Diode Module Test. Functionally tested GSE diode
modules prior to installation in GSE racks. )
o K0-9018 - DSVT-122 Refrigeration System (RS) Checkout Kit. This
test was utilized to set up and run a self-test of the DSVT-122
Refrigeration Test Set prior to accomplishing the spacecraft RS
tests.
• o K0-9019 - GSE Circuit Breaker Test. Functionally tested OSE
circuit breakers prior to installation in GSF racks. There
were three issues of this test; _ll were satisfactorily completed.
i
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o KO-O004 - SWS to IU Interface Test. Test objectives were to (i)
veri_ ° the OWS switch selector interfaces and the vibration and
=i acoustical channels; (2) ensure that ot_er systems operating during
this test did not transmit false commands to the SWS switch
selector MDA vent valve circuits; and (3) assure that the MDA vent
valves operating commands via the SWS switch selector did not
: transmit transients to other systems in parallel operation.
All of the channels were verified with the exception of Channels 108
and 109 which control the radiator shield Jettison command. These
connnandswere performed by deviation to KS-0008. Two (2) errors
.t
found in the switch selector counting ACE routine. The counter
counted multi-malfunctions when the switch sel,:ctor output was 2.4
vdc. The output voltage for a single channel was found to be a maximum
• of 2.7 volts instead of 2.4 vdc. The tolerance in the counting routine
was changed to not more than 2.7 vdc. This solved the problem of
receiving erroneous malfUnctio" .ounts and multi-malfunctions. This
procedure channel verified all ATM/AM/OWS vibration and acoustic
sensors through the IU FM telemetry system with no problems.
o KS-0008 - SWS Operations for Space Vehicle Swing Arm Overall Test.
Test objective was to verify the SWS/LV compatibility during countdown
_ and an abbreviated plus count (9 min., _0 sec. ) while in a minimum GSE/
ESE cabling configuration. The test was satisfactorily completed.
L o KS-0005 - IU/ATM/OWS TAC8 Test. Test objectives were to verify the
/
capability of the IU and ATM to provide the necessary signals to ._
the TACS to accomplish the required attitude control functions and to
verify the proper TACS response to these controls. The test was satis-
_ factorily completed.
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complete and the Skylab mission was ready for launch. These tests
were nearly trouble-free and any problems which occurred were quickly
resolved and satisfactorily handled. All test data were satisfactory
and all test objectives were achieved.
o KO-0003 - AM/MDA/OWS Electrical Interface Test. Test objectives were
to perform flight mate of the OWS to the AM and verify the operational
performance of the complete electrical and power distribution system.
Six (6) DR's were written which involved cable routing. The cable
routing was changed and the DR's were closed. The OWS Power
Distribution Control System was functionally verified and no hardware
problems were found.
o KO-0001 - AM/MDA/OWS Leak Test. Test objectives were to perform a
leak test of the various systems aboard the AM, MDA, and OWS, and
verify the integrity of the interfaces.
o KS-OOh5 - SWS End-to-End Systems Test and Experiment Test. Test
objectives were to: (i) Verify OWS control circuits from ESE/GSE;
(2) verify AM/OWS manual control of SWS systems: (3) verification of
the caution and warning system including the ATM interface_ (h) verifi-
cation of on-board HSS eouipment to the extent possible in a one "G"
environment; (5) verification of the on-board illumination system;
(6) verification of the experiments which could not be checked prior
to OWS/AM/MDA mate; (7) verification of all ordnance circuits: (8) :
verify operation of the communications and instrumentation s_stems_
(9) verify the combined operation of the EREP system: (i0) MSl2-confidence
level verification of the vacuum system: (ii) RNBM-end-to-end verification
of flight spare RNBM alert l (12) EREP-perform operational checkout of _
earth resources.
All tests were satisfactorily completed.
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o K0-9020 - DSVT-502 Mass Decay Leak Test Kit and Associated GFP
Validation. Performed an end-to-end verification of the DSV7-503
test set prior to installation for spacecraft checkout. Signifl-
cant proplems encountered were: Mobile Launcher Noise (DR GSE-7-
3_9-0014) - It was discovered during checkout operations, that
i
Mobile Launcher noise was present and was being introduced into
pressure transducer output lines. The transducers responded to
7
this noise and caused an out-of-specification condition and/or
noise in the measurement. The noise affected five OWS pressure :
measurements and approximately thirteen measurements within
- existing S-IVB pneumatic consoles. Consoles affected were: •
i DSVT-301-MT 3 and 4; DSVT-329-MT I, 2, 3, 4, 6, i0, and 14:
DSV7-322-MT 8 and 9; DSVT-334-MT 3 and 4; DSV7-343-MT I, 2, 3,
_, and 5.
_ Only three OWS pressure measurements resulted in out-of-speciflca-
f
tion conditions. (High RACS indicated 2.56 vdc and should be
4.00 + 0.40 vdc Low RACS indicated 0.7 vdc and should be 1.00 +
0.050 vdc). An interim fix which consisted of a capacitor in
the patch panel measurement test points was incorporated.
As a final fix, filter cables were fabricated per ECP W003-65C. _
The filter cables were installed and successfully tested per
J
KS-0009, Mission SIM Test,
5.6.h System Verification - The following test procedures represent all the
• d
_ integrated system testing which was accomplished at KSC. These tests are
listed chronologically and the general test philosophy was that apon ;_
successful c_mpletion of each of these tests, system verification was _,
?
/,
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o KS-0009 - SWS Operations and Space Vehicle Overall Test Mission
Simulation/Flight Readiness Test. Test objectives were to (i)
i verify IU/SWS interface compatibility in the flight mode; (2)
accomplish SL-I _.ountdown and countup functions in preparation for
SWS simulated flight; (3) demonstrate electromagnetic compatibility
J
between the individual SWS systems, and between SWS systems and
associated experiments during SL-2 countup and orbital operations;
(_) Perform docking drogue installation in MDA axial tunnel and
• closeout docking port hatch; (5) perform axial docking target install-
f
ation; (6) perform an open loop VHF ranging test to CSM on P_d 39B.
:- The test was satisfactorily completed.
o KS-O011 - SWS SIT Test. Test objectives were to verify the ATM/LV
interface in the guidance system after electrical mate, demonstrate
the compatibility of the space vehicle with the command network,
demonstrate the suitability of the operational handbooks for the
conduct of the mission, and verify operation of the backup command modes.
o KS-O012 - SWS Operations for Launch Vehicle Flight Readiness Test.
• Test objectives were to demonstrate compatibility of Saturn Workshop
with the launch vehicle by participating in three plus counts. Part 1
required nominal support from the SWS. Part 2 validated TACS switch-
.+
: over on IU guidance failure. Part 3 validated SWS functions upon
normal IU command.
_ o KS-O010A - Integrated Crew Compartment Fit and Functional Test The
i Crew Compartment Fit and Functional Test (CCFF) at KSC was performed _ _
to accomplish the verification of fit check and functional sequences
that were not satisfied during the first CCFF (IB86_24) at Huntington
Beach due to lack of hardware or non-acceptable equipment requiring
L
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• modification and subsequent review. The specific tasks performed by
the Flight Crews, under the direction of assigned Tes Conductors
vere:
o Verification of the accessibility and operational suitability
of the previously non-verified stowed and installed OWS module
? equil_ment provisions.
o Verification of applicable mechanical and certain electrical
functions of certain stowed and installed equi_ent, including
experiments at in-flight using locations within the OWS module.
o Verification of fit check and/or functional interface within the
_. OWS module of certain equi_nent launched in other vehicles and
designated for temporary or permanent OWSmodule occupancy.
_ o Verification of selected critical tool interfaces.
o Verification of selected in-flight maintenance tasks using
orbital spares.
o Demonstrate and verify functional performance of designated
Habitability Support System (HSS) operations as comprised by the
r
test environment (IG, i_.7 psia, etc.).
o KS-O016 - SWS Electrical and Mechanical Closeout. Test objectives
were to: (I) verify final stowage for flight; (2) verify the overall
internal OWS la_ch configuratJon; (3) configurate all OWS switch panels
and valves for flight; (_) closeout of the OWS dome and side hatches;
(5) Perform a leak check of the OWS side hatch, waste tank vent caps
and purge and monitor ports; (6) perform fit check of S009 detector
package; (7) M131 rotating litter chair, installation of chair to base;
(8) T020 interior pictures.
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o KS-O018 - SWS Operations for Space Vehicle Transfer to the Pad.
Test objectives were to provide the required AM/MDA/OWS suppor_
functions while transferring from the VAB Complex to the pad
_ complex (rollout).
5.6.5 Final System Test and La_ch - KS-0007, Countdown Demonstration Test •
(CDDT)/Recycle/Countdown (CD) test was begun April 26, 1973, and "_
completed May 2, 1973. It was the final system test nrocedure which i
demonstrated launch readiness and prepared the vehicle and the launcher
" for the actual launch operation. Test objectives were to perform the
sequence of operations and tests required to _repare SL-I for launch
and provide operational plans for launch recycle if required.
After the vehicle was transferred to launch _ad 39A, and all facility
and pad preparations and hook-ups were accomplished, the KS-0007, Wet
CDDT, was initiated. The CDDT consisted generally of closing out the
vehicle for flight - removal of access kits from the vehicle, final
installation of ordnance, pressurizing vehicle systems for flight, etc.
The CDDT was trouble-free and proceeded smoothly. All test obJectlves
were met, and all data were reviewed and found satisfactory.
• The only significant problem encountered during performance of CDDT was
,i
_i the habitation area dew point maximum temperature requirement of O°F _
_ (255.3K) per the specifications and criteria document could not be
maintained without schedule impact to the test. Waiver MDAC OWS-WR-5_,
_ allowing dew point excursions up to +k°F (257.5K) was submitted to and i:
:, approved by NASA.
"i
; i
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o KS-O007 (Countdown (CD) CD was initiatedfor launch May i0, ]973, •j
and flowed smoothly down to launch. The Skylab was launched on
May 14, 1973_ from Complex 39, Pad A. The spacecraft was boosted
1
_. into a 234 nautical mile (433 kilometer) orb by a Satarn V launch
i
' vehicle. Liftoff time was 1730:00.586 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).
J
i
i
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!5.1' MISSION SUPPORT TESTING
5.7.1 OWS Backup- The OWS Bazkup was utilized many times in its mission support
: role as a functional real-time test equipment entity. Procedures were
verified and system anomalies investigated to provide rapid and realistic
solutions. The Backup was utilized by a crewman to develop a procedure
to extract coolano] from the OWS Refrigeration System for servicing the
AM cooling system. In addition, hardwsre was removed from the OWS
: Backup for logistic resupply to the Skylab via the Command Service Module.
The Mission Support activities utilizing the OWS Backup are outlined in
. the paragraphs below:
_.7.i.i Water Heater Test (MSTR GO1)
o Problem/Anomaly - Tests indicated there was a possibility the water
heater life would not extend through SL-4 mission.
: o Action was to determine temperature and voltage/current characteristics
: of Wardroom and Waste Management Compartment water heaters.
o OWS Backap action was to remove the heaters from 0WS-BU, perform the
test in Engineering Laboratory and ship heaters to the KSC. Results
of the laboratory tests are presented in Paragraph 5.7.2. The heaters
: were flown as spares on SL-I.
5.7.1.2 Wardroom Window Cover Pressure Decay (MSTR 010)
o Purpose - Concern was expressed that pressure could be trapped between
wardroom _indow and cover.
o Action _-asto remove the window/cover assembly from the Backup and
check for pressure decay in the Spacecraft.
o Results - The window cover seal relieved at a relatively low pressure
and, therefore, did not present a problem,
5.7.1.3 SAS Wing Output Measurements (MSTR 011)
o Problem/Anomaly - Inadequate power supplied from SAS and indications
5-130 l
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were that the SAS did not deploy.
o Action _as to l) de'_ermlne deployment status of SAS Wing #2,
2) analyze available flight _ta_ and 3) simulate flight data on
t
0WS Backup.
o Conclusions - SAS Wing N2 position data indicated SAS Wing H2 on
OWS #i had be=_n separated from Sk)lab.
L
s=.7.1.h Duct Fans Operation by Ground Command (MSTR 017)
o Problem/Anomaly - Because of elevated OWS temperature, due to lack
_L
of power, it may have been necessary to operate duct fans during "_
unmanned periods.
o Action was to develop hardware and procedures and demonstrate
capability to operate duct fans. Cables were developed connecting
: from radiant heater to duct fans. Procedure and successful operation
were demonstrated.
o Result - A decision was made by NASA, not to fly up these cables.
5.7.1.5 Bus Crossover Investigation (M_TR C30)
o Problem/Anomaly - Buses 1 sad 2 low voltage caution and warning lights
came on even though bus voltages were normal. It was also noted that
the caution and warning low voltage sense breakers were open. ,_
o Action was to trace wire harness routing in Backup to
determine if crossover points existed which would allow a potential
short path.
o Conc_aslons/Results - Interbus short _s ruled out and troubleshooting
indicated circuit breaker position was probably the problem.
: During the crew d¢briefing, it was stated numerous breakers and
switches were inadvertently actuated urtil they became accustomed
to the cluster configuration and zero-G.
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5.7.1.6 Restraint Adapters (MSTR 038)
o Problem/Anomaly - Use of Waste Kanagement Compartment (l_4C)
foot restraints required removal of triangle shoes by flight crew.
o Action was to i) dev_lop a procedure so flight crew could install
• a newly designed triangle shoe adapter, 2) perform flt/function check
on adapter, 3) determine dimensional capability and determine fit/
_- function of triangle shoe and redesigned restraint on 0WS Backup.
o Conclusions/Results - Test of the redesigned restraint was successfuL.
JSC design was flown on SL-3.
:: 5.7.1.7 Wardroom Window Drying Procedure (MSTR 0_5)/
o Problem/Anomaly - Condensation and ice had formed on Wardroom Window.
Action was to i) determine on-orblt hardware available to crew which
would allow evacuation of Wardroom Window enclosure, and 2) determine
t
routing and fit check of hose attachments and fittings necessary to
connect vacuum source.
: o Results - Routing was established, and a new adapter was designed
and flown ap on SL-3, to allow SL-3 crewman to perform evacuation.
t
5.7.1.8 Refrigeration System Radiator Bypass Valve Lockup (MSTR 052)
: o Probl_n/Anomaly - Skylab Refrigeration System temperature was elevated.
Cause was believed to be partially open bypass valve resulting from
a potential contaminant.
(
o Action was to i) simulate radiator surface temperatRres and initial
RSS conditions, 2) activate loop enable/disable commands, 3) monitor
:_ bypass valve talkback indicators, and h) ascertain delta time to
prevent lookup in bypass position under no flow conditions.
o Conclusions/Results - Delta time between enable/disable commands
must exceed 2.6 seconds for proper bypass operation. This information
was utilized by hOSC and JSC to formulate new procedures.
t
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I3.7.1.9 Refrigeration System Ground Command Initiated Flushing Procedure (MSTR 05h)
o Problem/Anomaly - Skylab Refrigeration System temperature was elevated.
Cause was b_lleved to be partially open bypass valve.
o Action was to i) activate enable/disable commands to determine valve
lockup in bypass position, 2) determine when valve would respond
properly to temperature sensor inputs from radiator and thermal
; capacitor, 3) perform combined ground DCS command and manual circuit
breaker open/closing flushing procedure, _) perform flushing procedure
with pumps operating for both the primary and secondary loops, 5) demonstrate
= capability for ground dual loop operation, and 6) demonstrate crew
accessibility to RSS connections.
o Conclusions/Results i) delay time between enable/disable commands
must be greater than 5.6 seconds for consistent results _o prevent
lockup in bypass positlon, 2) a combined ground DCS and manual circuit
breaker opening/closing procedure was feasible, 3) circuit oreaker on
Panel 611 must be closed for valid TM indications, _) demonstrated
crew capability to access %nd remove RSS electrical connectors which
allow primary and secondary loops to function independently, 5) verified
that the OWS can be left in a configuration which would allow use of
both loops slmultaneously should the need arise even during unmanned
storage time.
5.7.1.10 Refrigeration System - Crew Operational Procedure Verification -
Radiator Bypass Controller (MSTR 055)
: o Problem/Anomaly - Skylab Refrigeration System temperature was elevated.
; Potential transient resulting from crew actions. ,.---
o Action was to verify that crew task of opening and closing bypass
, controller circui_ breaker would not cause transients that could alter
bypass valve positions and verify that radiator bypass valve flushing
procedure could be performed by the crew.
._ 5-133
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o Conclusions/Results - i) a feasible flushing procedure was established,
2) crew operations did not generate transients during bypass controller
opening, 3) optimum flushing procedures techniques require combined
crew and ground monitors, and _) opening the logic circuit breaker
for 10 seconds on Panel 611 returns the bypass monitor control module
to its proper state. _
5.7.1.11 Radiator Bypass Valve Flushing (M_TR 059)
/
o Problem/Anomaly - Possible contamination in bypass valve.
o Action was to develop and perform a procedure that could be utilized
during Skylab _nned operations.
o Conclusions/Results - i) the procedure was developed and successfully
-' accomplished, 2) time required to run simulation was 16 minutes _er
loop, and 3) verified TM indication is bypass when radiator bypass
controller circuit breaker was open.
5.7.1.12 Intercom Systma Feedback (MSTR 062)
o Problem/Anomaly - Feedback in Skylab Intercom System.
o Action was to determine methods and develop procedures to reduce
feedback effect by i) determining maximum and miniml,m volume
: settings, 2) determining groups of Speaker Intercom Assemblies
(SIA's) that may exhibit interactions resulting in feedback and
3) determine the results of reducing the total number of SIA's.
o Results - Optimum volume control settings were established which
eliminated feedback problem.
_i_ 5.7.1.13 Verify NASA MSFC Refrigeration System Flushing Procedure (MSTR 063)
o Problem/Anomaly - Possible contamination in bypass valve.
o Action was to perform and verify NASA MSFC procedure prior to
! submission to JSC.
o Res,_lts - The procedure operated the system satisfactorily.
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5.7.1.1_ Condensate Dump Fit Check (MSTR 067)
: o Problem/Anomaly - Requirement was established to develop an alternate
method of venting gas side of condensate dump tank.
o Action was to establish tools, prepare and verify a procedure to
verify hardware compatibility for a method of venting the gas side
of condensate tank through the SAL.
o Results - The procedure was verified but because of hardware con-
figuration, alternate means were recomended.
_ 5.7.1.15 Pump Package Cover Photographs (MSTR 070)
o Problem/Anomaly - Coolanol leak in airlf,ckmodule cooling system.
o Action was to develop crew training photographs which depicted the :
series of operations required of the SL-3 crew to _thdraw coolanol
from the OWS Refrigeration System.
/ o Results - The photographs were obtained and transmitted which depicted
; hardware appearanoe and relationships to surrounding equipment.
5.7.1.16 Refrigeration System Flushing Procedure (MSTR 071)
o Problem/Anomaly - Possible contamination in bypass valve.
o Action was to establish flight _etup initial conditions s_idperform
combined ground flight RSS flushing procedures.
o Results - The combined ground flight RSS flushing procedures were
acceptable.
5.7.1.17 Malfunction Noted During Performance of JSC/Flight RSS Flushing
Procedure (MS_'s 071, 071-1, -2)
o Problem/Anomaly - Oround monitors noted bypass valve position talkback
did not indicate radiator position during flushing proceduxe.
o Action was to determine probable cause by performing JSC/Flight RSS
Flushing Procedure utilizing different delay times and determine if
: circuit breaker flight operetional sequences or simultaneous closing
f
and opening of the circuit breakers could cause bypass valve lockup.
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o Results The bypass valve did not lock up in the bypass position for
times greater than one (I) second. Reversed circuit breaker operation
sequences, sequentially closed and reversed circuit breaker operational
sequences simultaneously, closed did not cause a lockup.
5.7.1.18 AirlockModule Coolanol Servicing (MSTR 072)
o Problem/Anomaly - Coolanol leak in Airlock Module cooling system.
o Action was to verify crew access capability and develop a procedure
for extracting coolanol from OWS Refrigeration System into OWS portable
water tank for transport to airlock module and injection into cooling
system.
• o Results - SL-3 hardware could be utilized to accomplish transfer of
: coolanol from OWS Refrigeration System to airlock module cooling system.
• 5.7.1.19 Trash Airlock (TAL) Turnbuckle Interlock (MSTR 081)
o Problem/Anomaly - Turnbuckle interlock between the inner door latch
": and the valve/outer door handle was damaged (bent) to the extent
that airlock operation was difficult but not impossible.
o Action was to detenaine whether MDAC-W recommended any maintenance
on the interlock.
o Conclusions - Maintenance of the TALwas not recommended. This
recommendation was the result of a procedure accomplished in the OWS
i
: Backup which indicated the bent turnbuckle rod was not the cause of the
difficulty to close lid and latch. The cause could have been
the result of latch torsion spring moving out of the slot when fully
unlatched and then Jamming during latching operation. It was recommended
that the crew inspect the spring position and if the spring was out of '
position_ to remove the spring as the latch can be operated without
the spring. If spring was not out of position, a troubleshooting
• procedure was provided.
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ri 5.7.1.20 Wardroom Table Top to Function as a Desh (MSTR 083)
o Purpose - Ascertain the design requirements to convert the Wardroom
+.able top to function as a desk top.
o Action was to remove 1B86h_8-1, Food Table Cover and four (4)
1B87579-1 Bungees from OWS Backup and perform engineering evaluation
to allow conversion of Wardroom table top to function as a desk top.
t
o Results - IB96_31-I, Adapter Restraint was designed and the test
part was hand carried to JSC for evaluation.
5.7.1.21 Dual-Loop Refrigeration Operaticns (MSTR 086)
o Purpose Demonstrate capability of performing dual-loop Refrigera-j
tion System (RS) operation.
°-- o Action was to verify the RS logic unit interface connector 436A_gWIPI
could be disconnected from the primarS" loop logic connector
h36A49AIJ5 without damaging the RS in order to perform dual-loop RS
operations.
o Conclusions - Both primary and secondary loops will work independently
of each other when RS logic unit interface connector h36A49WIPI
is disconnected from primary loop connector h36A49AIJ5 (Dual Loop
Operation).
Manned flushing and unmanned flushing procedures can be accomplished ,
for dual loop operation.
L
Application of +28 vdc (from pins on the interconnecting harness)
?
to any other pins on the interconnecting harness, or the grounding
of any of the pins, will not damage either the primary or secondary
loop logic units.
5.7.1.22 Fit Check Lower Leg Restraint and Adapter (MSTR 089 and 078)
; o Problem/Anomaly - Fit of lower leg restraint and adapters in the
/ Waste Management Compartment on door of Locker No. _29.
,_ 5-137
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o Action was to verify fit of leg restraint and adapters.
o Resultz - Parts performed adequately. Screw length discrepancies
were noted and corrected. Parts are considered ready for flight.
5.7.1.23 Adapter Assembly Fit Check (MSTR 093)
t
o Purpose - Verify the satisfactory fit check operation and integration
of 1B96363-1 adapter with the Quick Disconnect (QD) on Panel 500
and hose assembly. ,
, o Action was to perform fit check of adapter in 0WS Backup per Assembly
Outline (AO) IB96363-_N2D-B01 to support SL4 Airlock Module coolanol
i reservicing.
• i o Results - The adapter was successfully fit checked. No problems
_._ were encountered.
5.7.1.24 Waste Management Compartment Foot Restraint Fit Check (MSTR 096)/
i-
• o Problem/Anomaly - Fit of WMC foot restraint.
o Action was to perform fit check of WMC foot restraint in 0WS Backun.
J
o Results - Fit check of left foot restraint (IB86723-503) and !
adapter IB96414-502 in both positions (in front of w_ter module and
in front of collector) was successful. A tightening technique was •
developed in that if the set screws start from a flush position
(point end)--placed on foot restraint--and then set screws
tightened four (4) 180 ° turns of Allen wrench, a good attachment
: was obtained. The -504 and -506 right restraints were not
satisfactory. The -504 adapter after being tightened, popped off
and the -506 could not be properly installed. The right restraints
had a bend or curve in the sole plates. Discrepancy Reports (DR's) ''_
were prepared and _ispositioned to straighten the sole plates.
The set screws were moved to a lower position per IB96_12-503, '
Revision D. The straightened restraints and reworked adapter
were retested successfully. _
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5.7.1.25 Acoustical Feedback Elimination (MSTR 097)
o Purpose - Determine feasibility of utilizing a variable load to
: control acoustic feedback in the OWS Intercom System.
o Action - Activate Intercom System in the OWS Backup.
o Connect the variable load connected to CCU connector of SIA at PgoI.
o With variable load set to maximum and connected at P_OI, determine
volume setting required to produce feedback _rhen speaking into SIA
at P702 The test was then repeated while speaking into P540.
o Results - The SIA volume control developed for eliminating acoustical
feedback in the Skylab performed more than adequately in eliminating
• acoustical feedback.
_- 5.7.1.26 T027 Sunshield Interference (MSTR N/A) ;
o Problem/Anomaly - Plus (+) Z SAL was covered by the sunshield through
.J,
which T027 had to project.
o Action was to determine substitute methods of utilizing T027 from
; minus (-) Z SAL.
o Results - A plan w_s prepared to fit and function cables to utilize
T027 on minu_ Z S_L and route cabling to Panel 5hh or Panel 518. :_
5.7.1.27 Telemetry Anomaly During Pre-launch Tests at the KSC (MSTR N/A)
o Problem/Anomaly - Noise affecting TM during pre-launch tests at the KSC,
o Action was to determine a method to eliminate noise in Skylab data
system. Photograph various TM signals on the OWS Backup for comparison _
with _ignals observed on OWS-I.
o Results - A capacitor was added to each spacecraft low level multi-
plexer to suppress the noise (ECP W003-2_C).
5.7.1.28 SAS Wing Substitute (MSTR N/A)
o Problem/Anomaly - Insufficient spacecraft power because of missing
SAS Wing.
_ o Action was to develop interface equipment and a plan to provide for
5-139
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an on-orbit installation of a SAS wing°
o Results - The plan was prepared for implementation when required.
: 5.7.1.29 Installation of Dosimeters in Backup (MSTR 102)
o Problem/Anomaly - There was a noted discrepancy in the dosimeter
readings during SL-3 and SL-k missions.
o Action - Four (k) dosimeters were shipped from JSC to MDAC-W for
installation in the Backup spacecraf% Two (2) in the film vault"4 •
• for a two week exposure.
o Results - Thes_ dosimeters were returned to JSC for analysis. :
5.7.i.30 CMG Heater Adapter Cable Development (MSTR lOk)f
o Problem/Anomaly - Unstable operation of CMG's during mission-
One CMG inoperative and one intermittent instability.
o Action - Develop a cable to supply heat to the CMG in order to
stabilize gyro operation.
o Results - The M509 cable connector was disconnected and cable
harness cut on the Backup vehicle. Tool clearances verified that
procedure could be performed on the spacecraft.
5.7.1.31 Fit Check Urine Trays in Return Container (MSTR 105)
o Problem/Anomaly - During SL-_, the urine trays were not fitting
i into the return container satisfactorily.
o Action - A fit check was made in the Backup vehicle using various
i
i methods of stowing.
o Results - Several methods were tried using Teflon, removing com- i
partment dividers, etc. and result_ indicated task could be
accomplished in spacecraft satisfactorily.
l !
t
J
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" 5.7.2 Laborator_ - Laboratory test results provided valuable data in support
L
of each workshop habitation. The test hardware used for qualification
"t
" testing of waste management subsystem, Line Item HS-2, was utilized
';
prior to first habitation to determine operation characteristics without
power. In addition, the Refrigeration Subsystem Qualification Test
[ Hardware, Line Item RS-19, was utilized almost constantly during first
t
and second habitation period for the investigation of problems and
their solution as required.
The following is a listing of laboratory tests instigated in support t
of the OWS mission(s):
5.7.2.1 Freezer Temperature Decay Test (MSTR RS0001)
o Purpose - Develop a temperature curve with which to determine allowable
hold time (TCU Ground Cooling not available) as a function of s_orage
• freezer temperature.
o Action - Utilized HS-19-1 hardware in Space Laboratory to accomplish :_
testing and record measurements.
o Results - Satisfactorily accomplished prior to the launch of
_. SL-l.
5.7.2.2 Orbital Insertion Performance Data for Refrigeration System (MSTR RS0002)
! o Purpose - Obtain plots as required for data noted in t_tle to support
launch of SL-I.
" 5-1kl •
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o Action - Utilized HS-19-1 hardware in Space T_boratory to accomplish
i
! testing and record measurements.
o Results - Satisfactory for three possible launch times giving inter-
_ section points for the insertion-to-solar inertial case and the
• corresponding solar inertial orbital case. :
5.7.2.3 Window Metal Cover Pressure Tests (MSTR 009) ,.
o Purpose - Verify structural integrity of the Rosen Insert installation
T
in the Fluorogold Ping. _ j
, o Action - Three specimens of inserts were used to determine the pull-out
strength and the load/strain characteristics of the insert Instal_ation
t
at different load levels. Phase two was to simulate a cabin blowdown
condition in which the cavity between the window protective cover and the
glazing of window assembl, had reached the pressure of the habitation
compartment prior to blowdown.
o Results - Achieved prior to launch of SL-I and indicated no degradation
in the sealing capability of the cover assembly.
5.7.2.h SAS Beam Fairing Actuator/Damper Break-away Force (MSTR 002)
o Problem/Anomaly - SAS wing not fully deployed and possibility of A/D
being exposed to abnormally low temperatures making it nec-_ssary to break -,"
A/D loose before full deployment of SAS wing could be achieved.
o Action - Required several test runs on qualification test Hinge Assembly i
°: varying temperature on A/D to achieve deployment. "
o Results - When A/D was cooled to -IO0°F, (199.79°K) a force of llh Ibs.
ii (507 N) was applied at the _pex of the deployment frame and broke the
hinge loose. Failure occurred in the clevis fitting of the forward
fairing. The A/D did not fail nor extend, i _
5.7.2.5 SAS Beam Fairing Cold Actuator Damper Deployment Durations (MSTR 00._)
o Problem/A_omaly - SAS wing not fully deployed and possibility of
:, actuator/damper being _old, will increase deployment time. " "
5-i_2
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o Action - To de_ermine i) lowest temperature of the A/D at which the
beam fairing can deploy in one orbit, 2) time to fully extend at 0°F
(255.3°K) and 20°F (266.h5°K),
d
o Results - Indicated that -20°F (244.2h°K) was lowest tem-erature for
one orbit deployment and that deployment at O°F (255.3°K) took 4 min.
48 sacs (2o8 sac.) and at -20°F, (2h4.24°K) 3 min. 22 sacs. (202 sac.).
_ These results indicated a need for further tests and u_nderrefined
test procedures. (Reference MSTR 028)
5.7.2.6 Internal Insulation Outgassing (MSTR 004)
o Problem/Anomaly - Loss of meteoroid shield created an increase of the
spacecraft's internsLltemperature which could create a degradation of
the internal insulation.
o Action - To test L!specimens in a bell Jar at 5.5 psis oxygen atmosphere
using temperatures of 175°, 290°, 350" and 400°F, (352.56°, 416.44o,
\
449.77° , and 477.55°K) for ll-1/2 hours (4.14 x l04 sac). Specimens
_ were evaluated for structural, thermal and off-gassing qualities.
o Results - Specimens subjected to temperatures above 1TS°F (352.56°K)
became debonded. This was well above the temperatures within the OWS.
5.7.2.7 Waste Processor Test (MSTR 005)
o Problem/Anomal_ - With SAS undeployed, power limitations may require
_i processing of feces without use of the heaters in the waste processor.
o Action - Testing was accomplished at Fairchild Hiller and MDAC. The _
backup processor was used to run a 14-phase test urogram at _AC.
o Results - The processor can accomplish its function without power but •
_ processing time is longer dependent on specimen and mass. _
; 5.7.2.8 Iodine Container and Reagent Container (MSTR 006)
o Problem/Anomaly - Elevated temperatures within the OWS created by loss
of meteoroid shield caused concern as to temperatur,_ vs. pressures
:_ within the containers noted above.
: 5-1J'3
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o Action - Run an elevated temperature test on the iodine and _-r-_ent
containers (loaded to flight levels). Temperatures to be 160° - 180°F
(3_h.23o _ 35;_.22°K) appro;_imately. I
o Results - Iodine container wa_ exposed to tem_-r_t,tres from 99° - 180°F I
(310.3h° - 35h.22°K) with internal pressures of from 9 psi (620h6.0 N/m 2) I
to 156 psi (1.075 x 106 N/m 2' . The reagent container saw temperatures
from 99° (310.34°K) to 165.5°F (3hT.280K), m,d pressures from 15 psi
(i.03_ x 105 N/m2) to 36 psi (2.h8 x 105 N/m2). Water was expelled
from iodine container at 165.5° (347.28°K) and 1800F (35h.22°K). All
results on both containers were satisfactory.
5.7.2.9 Determine Bond Strength of 3D Tile at Elevated Temperature (MSTR 006.1)
o Problem/Anomlly - Continuation of MSfR _v, _ al._,,atedtemperature test
of internal insulation. Specimen was 3/9foam attached to aluminum plate
by Lefkoweld randwrapped in foil.
o Action ..Determine bead strength of the specimen at temperatures of
300°F (422.0°K) on aluminum skin side and aluminum foil side at 200°F
(366.hS°K) over a total 8-hour (2.88 x i0h sec) period of constant tempera-
tures followed by a pull test (at ambient temperature), of embedded
at hach fittings in the 3D foam.
o Results - Indicated cracks first appearing in Lefkoweld after 2 hours
h0 minutes (9.6 x 103 sec) of an intended 12-hour (h.32 x i0h sec) run.
Temperatures were at 19h.5°F (363.39°K) on foil side, and 292.5°F
(hly.83°K) on aluminum sheet side. Test was stopped after i0 hours
i0 minutes (3.66 x i0h see) when temperature on metal side was 300.5°F
_ (h22.27°K) and 201.8°F (_67.hS°K) on foil side. Lots of cracks in ad-
_ hesive. Debonding at plate and discoloring at bond llne noted. The
[
"L
embed%_4 fittings withstood design ultimate loads when subjected to
tension loads.
i 5-1h_
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5.7.2.10 Pressure Regulator Test for Pneumatic Heat Shield (MSTR 008)
o Problem/Anomaly - Loss of the meteoroid shield created overheat-
" ing problems on the interior of the spacecraft (OWS). It was
• necessary to establish a protecti_"_- sun shade that alleviated the
overheating conditions. In the design of the heat shield, it is
required to utilize pressure regulators.
o Action - A test on h regulators was made to verify regulation
could be maintained from 5 psia (3.447 x i0h N/m 2) to .5 psia
(3.hh7 x lO3 N/m2) with a vacuum as reference.
o Results - All regulators performed satisfactorily; data was with
5.0 psia (3.hh7 x i0h N/m 2) inlet conditions.
5.7.2.11 Hand Tool Rupture of SAS W ng Section Ordnance Straps (MSTR 012)
o Problem/Anomaly - SAS ring failed to deploy at the proper time,
therefore, alternate methods were surveyed to determine if the
astronauts could manually deploy the wing.
o Action - Could the ordnance straps be a binding element holding
' the wing in place, devise a method using all actual recommended
hardware and determine actual force required and technique.
o Results - Successfully ruptured one ordnance strap groove which
partially released the ordnance strap but not enough to deploy.
Successfully ruptured opposite groove which provided the complete
release. Actual forces applied to _2 inch (30.h8 cm) pry bar
handle were not measured, but "not _ery much."
5.7.2.12 Early Cinch Bar Release of SAS (MSTR O12.1)
o Problem/Anomaly - Failure of SAS to release on scheduled command
transmitted to SL-I.
o Action - Build an 8" x i0" x .020" (20.32 cm x 25.h cmx .0508 cm)
piece of 6061T6AL and attach to a piece of 3" (7.62 cm) square
tubing to simulate meteoroid shield skin. Release cinch bar
assembly simulating early release to determine cinch bar/shield :'
skin interaction.
5-I_5
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o Results - Release of assembly simul%ting the projecting adjustment
screw penetrated the .020"( .0508 cm) stock full length of the ex-
posed screw threal, and the stock sheared over a length of 1-i/h"
(3.175 cm) where the cinch bar edge attempted to penetrate the
stock. The penetrated screw required between 5 and iO ibs.
(22.24 and 44.h8 N) of force to remove from.the .020 (.0508 cm)
stock.
5.7.2.13 Meteoroid Shield Swing Bar Restraint to the Been Fairing Deployment
: (MSTR 012.2)
" o Problem/Anomaly - Indications were the SAS beam fairing was held
in its present position preventing deployment by interference -
restraint by a swing bar from the meteoroid shield.
o Action - Determine where the meteoroid shield swing bar and asso-
ciated bar can restrain the beam deployment.
o Result - l) the swing arm alone, because of its configuration,
does not offer any means of restraining beam fairing deployment,
2) with undistorted shield frame angle still attached, damage
could be done to the solar cells, but there would be no beam fair-
ing deployment restraint, 3) with distorted shield frame and/or
distorted cr torn shield panel skin, there are many ledges and
flanges which could be snagged, restraining beam fairing deployment.
5.7.2.14 Auxiliary T_mnel Aft Section Pressure Test (MSTR 014)
o Problem/Anomaly - Due to the loss of meteoroid shield, a possible
source of differential pressure lifting the end shield could be in
the auxiliary tunnel aft section.
o Action - A test was performed with a 2" (3.08 cm) diameter vacuum
line and later changed to a 3" (7.62 cm) diameter and test re-run.
o Results - Using the 2" (5.08 cm) vacuum line, a differential pres-
_ sure of 2.5 psi (1.732 x i0h _I/m2), with a flow rate of 297.335
cubic feet per minute (.ih029 m3/sec) was obtained. With the 3"
(7.62 cm) diameter line, a differential pressure of h.9 (3.378 x
l0h N/m 2) was obtained with a flow rate of 1,5ih cubic feet per
minute (.71435 m /sec).
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5,_.2.15 Meteoroid Shield Failure Anomaly Investigation (MSTR {)ll_It!)
o Problem/Anomaly - Reference MSTR Olh, _ee preceding investigation.
o Action - he-run boot test previously described _bo'¢e to determine
an accurate picture of a leak area vs. boot AP.
o Results - A curve of leak area vs. boot A|' wl_ transmitt,-d to MI;F("
via Mission Support Room.
/
5.'{.2.16 SAS Beam Fairing Deployment Test (MSTH OJ_)
o Problem/Anomaly - Establish method for astronaut to d_q)]_W ::A:"
beam fairing.
. o Action - Determine forces, energies, and reactions of tht. ;;A'; wi-g
assembly in crew deployment effort using _he qualification test
wing in zero-G fixturv. Approxim_t_/y 8 tests were conducted
under various conditions.
o Results - It was discovered that if debris were remov,:d from re-
straining the SAS wing, the outboard tip would immediately move
approximately hS" with no external force applied. Witi, the actu-
ator broken loose, it was entirely possible to deploy the SAS beam
fairing to a latch-up position by using a small amount of ext,:rnal
: force.
" 5.7.2.i'( Humidity Generator Test Plan (MSTR 016)
o Problem/Anoma] y - It was suspected the internal humidity inside
the Workshop was too low.
o Action - Pump a nozzle from the humidity generator into a vacuum
chamber and operate under su,tieipated workshop conditions.
o Result_ -'['he nozzle crested a fine mist that raised the humidity
of the test chamber according to eeleul_tions.
_.'(.2.|8 High Temperature Degradation and Outgassing of Tank Insulation (MS'rE 018)
o Problem/Anomaly - Interior of the OWS overheating due to lack of
meteoroid shield acting as s sun shade.
o Action - Using a 2' x 2" (C,0.98 cm ":5.08 ca) tank section in test
: line item CA-30, 0WS Insulation (2 specimens) install in va,.uum
chamber and determine the outgassing rate of carbonmonoxlde and
total hydrocarbon output throughout heat/vacuum en_,_ronn,ents.
: Vacuum chamber to have 100% oxygen. Outer skin surface temperature,
30OAF; (h22.0_K) inner surface 200°F (366.h5°K). Chamber pressure
: approximately 5 psi (3.hh7 x i0h N/m2). Gas samples to be taken
throughout a 72-hour period (2.592 x I0_ sec).
• 5-z_7
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0 Results - Test indicated there would be n,_ :;tru,.t,n-_lld,.gr;_,btti(_u,,I"it,,,
intern_.l tank insulation or emission of t.oxi(-gases t.(J,,,lyd,.Hr,.,._,:"
; daz,ger to the astronauts welfare.
5.'/.2.19 SAS Beam Fairing Bent Angle Captivation :;imul,_tion T..::t(M::'l'q{)l',)
o Problem/Anomaly - TV films indicated the l,,,am1":_irir_:win; c,lptivat,'d
_ by a bent angle remaining as a result of 1o:::;(n" th,, m,-teoroid shi,,Id.
o Action - Perform a test to detern.ine forty rvquir,,d to (-lt:,,rb,:nt tm_:l,'.
o Hesults - Four tests were conducted to simulate the c(_ndition:; not_,d (,n
the TV films. A procedur- was established to apply ustr_,n:lut l_,_-d:;t.(,
,_ remove the angle clear of the beam fairing.
".'{.2.::0 SAS Beam Release - EVA (MSTH u:*())
o Problem/Anomaly - Establish a procedure l',_r _m ,';tr(-'_aut to r,.l,',u:,.
: - the SAS beam fairing during an EVA utilizing ou-bo,Lrd t(_ols.
o Action - Utilize pinch bar and handrail as a pry bar.
o Results - Tests demonstrated capability of using establish,,d i;;'yl,tLr',¢_
re_ease restraining bent angle.
5.'{.2.2] Water Tank Iodine Reading Low (MSTR 021)
o Problem/Anomaly - Possible iodine depletion within the (]WC:water t,mks
due to high internal temperatures.
o Action - Analyze a 6 ppm water/iodine solution a! "{O°F, IO0"F, and l:'(_°l.',
(29"_.23°, 310.9 ° , and 322.0°K) to determine e]evat,,d t(,mperatur,- ,,l'1"v(rts
on the OWS onboard readout.
o Results - Tests indicated on-board iodine Icw, l eva/uation mvthod is not.
reliable at elevated liquid temperatures. There is no crew problem.
The iodine level taken out of the water chi]ler indicated a good s_unple
reading.. _
_.'(.2.22 SAS Beam Fairing R_straint Pry Away Test (MSTI_ 022)
o Problem/Anoma/y -Constraint created by angle holding SA[; bean, fairing
: from being deployed
i 0 Action - Determine methods and force required to pry the restraining angle
5-i_8
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out of the way. Document step-by-step procedure and measure force
, required for each developed technique.
: o Result - Test was successt_ully accomplished cn test specimen.
_.7.2, 23 SALq Beam Fairing Deployment Usin_ Pneumatic _lashcloth Squeezer (M_TR 02h)
o Problem/Anomaly - SIS beam fairing failure to deploy.
o Action - Demonstrate feasibility of deploying SAq beam fairing by means
of pneumatically pressurizing a washcloth squeezer bag installed beneath
the SAB beam fairing.
o Results - Test showed that the actuator damper could be broken free
utilizing this method.
: _.7.2.2_ SAB Deplo_nt Simulation Test Using the Washcloth Sgueezer Bag (_TR 02_.1)
o Problem/Anom_Lly - SAS beam fairing failure to deploy.
o Action - Determine the ballooning effect of the external vacuum on the
: washcloth squeezer bag after it has been prepared for placement under
; the 8AS.
o Besults - Feasibility of this method of deployment was established.
;.7.2.25 In£1atable Heat Shield Test (MSTB 026)
o Problem/Anomaly - Develop design feasibility of a sunshade to protect
the OWS from elevated temperatures.
o Action - Verify design approach of a pneumatically deployed shade by
performing a series of tests.
o Result - Present design concept for the inflatable interior shtel_ cannot
be installed in a 1-G atmosphere, although it is possible that it might
deploy in zero-G environment. Test results ind/cated the shield will
not meet the structural requirements imposed by the environments
: anticipated during an orbital missis.
;.7.2.26 Recommendation for Vehicle Attitude for S_B Wing Deployment (MSTR 028)
o Problem/Anomaly" - SAB beam fairing failure to deploy.
o Action - Verify actuator/damper extension time after a minimum period
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of h hours (l.hh x i0h sec) at -hO°F (233.12°K). Pitch hO-_O ° and
hold for h-i hours (1.62 x i0h see) tully extended after release
in 605 seconds.
o Results - Test was conducted. Actuator damper huld at depressed posi-
tion at -hOOF (233.12°K) for four hours (l.llh x lOb). Actuator damper
was fully extended after release in 605 seconds.
5.7.2.27 Shoulder Deploy SAS with Fireman's Pole ']'ether (MSTR 029)
o Problem/Anomaly - Failure of SAS to fully deploy.
_; o Action - Convuct a series of tests and develop a technique where one
crewman inserts f'ireman's pole tether into the SAS vent and acts as
a support bracket for other crewman to pull tether and break actuator
damper; thereby, releasing the SAS beam fairing.
o Results - Technique did not develop into SL-2 crewmen capability to
deploy SAS beam fairing; however, when the crewman substituted for
_-- the pole and moved from crouched to full standing position, the actu-
ator damper cle,lis was easily fractured. (Note: This method was used
to deploy the OWS wing.)
5.7.2.28 Squeezer Bag Temperature Susceptibility (MSTR 031)
o Problem/Anomaly - SAS beam fairing failure to deploy.
o Action - Conduct test on wash cloth squeezer bag at low temperatures to
see if it was possible to deploy simulated SAS b_am fairing load of
bOO pounds (1779.2 N) and determine what pressu, e was required to
accomplish a successful deployment.
o Results - Test results were satisfactory with an average bag temperature
of -57°F, (P23.68°K) the squeezer bag fully deployed at approximately
6.0 psig (1.427 x 105 N/m2).
5.7.2.29 Water Purification Elevated Temperature (MSTR 032)
o Problem/Anomaly - Possible loss of iodine and starch in the purification
equipment at elevated temperatures. _
o Action - Determine the effect of 200°F (366.hS°K) o_ 30,000 ppm iodine .--
solution and starch in the OWS purification equipment for a period of
24 hours (8.6h x 104 see).
5-150 "| ,
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o Result - _esting indicated that the loss of iodine in the purification
equipment at the temperatures existing in the OWS was not significant.
L
5.7.2.30 Meteoroid Trunnion Pull Test (MSTR 033)
o Problem/Anomaly - Loss of meteoroid shield.
o Action - Conduct a pull test on the trunnion strap taking measurements
at the applied low levels in 250 ib (IIIC.O N) increments, until failure
was achieved.
: o Result - Failure occurcd at 3,350 ibs (1.49 x 104 N), Failure mode was
tear-out of the meteoroid shield skin between the two rows of rivets on
the strap. Rivets on the trunnion strap were still intact. Conclusion
also indicated that the trunnion straps met < __design requirements.
5.7.2.31 SAS Beam Fairing Release Using the Squeezer Bag at Various Pressures
(MSTR 03h)
o Problem/Anomaly - SAS beam fairing failure to deploy.
o Action - Several tests were conducted between 5 psi (3.h47 x i0h N/m 2)
internal bag pressure and 20 psi (1.3788 x 105 N/m2).
o Result - 20 psia pressure (1.3788 x 105 N/m 2) maximum because of beam
fairing structural capability limitations. Energy imparted to the SAS
beam by bag expansion will be dissipated by tether. Two tethers
required: One long (hO'), (12.192 m) one short (I0') (3.0h8 m). Hands-
off approach feasiule.
5.7.2.32 SAS Actuator Damper Cold Deployment Tests and Analysis (MSTR 0_5)
o Problem/Anomaly - SAS beam fairing not deployed, and low temperature
indicated on actuator damper.
o Action - Determine the response of the actuator damper at -50°F (227.57°K)
when held in compressed position and then released.
o Result - Actuator damper held in compressed position at -50°F (227.57°K)
for 2 hours (7.2 x 103 sac), then released. Time for extension 845 seconds.
Same conditions, only for 5 hours (1.8 x 104 sec), time for extension "-
1125 seconds.
_ 5.7.2.33 Abrasion Test of Fluorocarbon Rubber Shoe (MSTR Oh0)
o Problem/Anomaly - Extensive wear on the astronaut shoe at the toe.
5-151
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. o Action - Run an abrasion test using fluorocarbon rubber sheet of
.060 in. (O.152 cm) thickness.
o Result - Tests were run with a STY 056h-030/_ rubber sheet with no loss
t
in thickness after 2,700 cycles. Houston had alrea<v tested Durette
BW-P-586, using a 500 gram weight and a CS-17 wheel. Fabrication
was penetrated in 1,345 cycles.
5.7.2.34 Auxiliary Tunnel Vent Measurement (MSTR 042)
o Problem/Anomaly - Resolve a discrepancy between NSFC measurements on
STA tunn_.lvent in Backup measurement at MDAC-W.
o Action - Make measurements on the vent forward and side seals and :"
compare what the results obtained at MSFC on the STA were.
o Result - Discrepancy probably due to NSFC using test part and PLDAC-W
• --_ using production part to make measurements.
5.7.2.35 Biocido Wipe Iodine/Thermal Temperature Degradation Test (NSTR 043)
o Problem/Anomaly - Possible depletion in biocide wipes on SL-I due to
elevated temperatures.
o Action - Make analysis of three biocide wipes received from _ouston
that were subjected to elevated temperatures for extended lengths of
time.
: o Result - Increase in iodine aepletion rate was not considered to be
/
: very significant for several reasons: i) JSC test temperatures were
higher than the biocide wipe of SL-2 exposure, 2) An acceptable
iodine concentration is 2,500 PlY.
)
5.7.2.36 Quick Disconnect (QD) Sealing Capability in a Vacuum (MSTR 044) _
• o Problem/Anomaly - Question was asked concerning condensate dump system.
Is the pressure cap portion of P/N IB79636-611 an adequate seal in
a vacuum_ _
7,
o Action - Measure leakage of the QD pressure cap.
o Results - Leakage rates considerably less than anticipated, therefore,
_roblem did not exist.
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5.7.2.37 Waste Management Compartment (WMC) Water Dispenser from SL-2 (MSTR 046)
o Problem/Anomaly - Clogging of the SL-2 WMC water dispenser.
o Action - Perform a failure analysis of the WMC water dispenser retunled ,
_ by the crewmen on SL-2.
/
o Resalts - The seal from this water &ispenser proved to be made of
Neoprene which is not compatible for use in the hot iodine water as it
swells and reduces water flow. Material should have been Viton as
, i
: specified on Change Letter "F". The Neoprene seals were removed from
spare valves, and Viton seals were inspected and installed in two
dispensers to be carried up on SL-3.
, J
5.7.2.38 Meteoroid Shield Leading.Edge Ballooning Test (_TR 047)
o Problem/Anomaly - Investigation of the cause of a loss of meteoroid
shield. ,
o Action - Conduct a wind tunnel test as noted on Test ]_ine Item ST-h1.
o Results - A total of 29 runs were completed (2 MAC_Inumbers per run).
Tests show that at 0 shield deflection (i.e., the meteoroid shield in
contact with the tank wall), there is a net neg,ative differentia]
pressure on the shield. At shield deflections in excess of 0.i"
(.25_ cm), positive differential pressure occurs. This positive
differential pressure would tend to lift the shield.
_5.7.2.39 SAS De-Orblt Load Test (MSTR ohg)
o Problem/Anomaly - No de-orbit loads have been derived by MSFC greater
: than previously tested under Line Item ST-hO. i
o Action - Prepare Mini TCD for Test Line Item ST-h3 and conduct a test
with a new de-orbit load, using Test Line Item SA-16 hardware to the
new loads as furnished by MSFC.
o Results - The tests verified that the structural integrity of the SA_ ,.
J
beam fairing and forward fairing could withstand the ultimate de-orbit
loads without structural failure.
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D.7.2.hO Refrigeration System (MSTR 0h8)
o Problem/Anomaly - Sudden chanF,e in ability of OW[; Hefrigeration
System to maintain extreme cold conditions in freezer compart-
ments.
:, o Action - Perform tests on components such as the r_diator bypass
valve and the pressure relief valve, _nu on the system an a
whole, in the space chamber, using all com[_onents includ_n_
_, freezers, and capable of simulating all orbital conditions except
_b
zero-G. Test objectives were to duDlicate &nomaly, to determine
the cause, and to prove out recommended corrective actions.
o Result - The component tests indicated that the radi_tor bypass
val:e could give rise to the anomaly under conditions oF partiucl_Ate
contamination or certain electrical control signals.
In the systems tests, the anomaly could be duplicated by mechanical
manipulation of the bypass valve to simulate the particulate
contamination or the erroneous electrica/ control signals. From
this base, test results verified some of the corrective action
concepts, and provided operational limitation and capabilities
data for the system while in the anomalous condition.
5.7.2.hi SL-2 Returned Biocide Wipes Test (MSTR 050)
o Probl_m/Anomaly - Concern still expressed about the degradation of
the blocide contents to the wipes onboard the OWS.
o Action - Conduct a test and analysis similar to that of MSTR Oh3,
- u_ilizing biocide wipes removed from spacecraft and returned with SL-2.
o Result - Elevated SL-2 temperatures did not result in a detectable
: change in the depletion rate of available iodine in Skylab biocide
wipes. Resupp]y of biocide wipes was not required for SL-3 or SL-h.
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5.7.2.h2 EREP Constraints - Refrigeration System HS-19 1 Testing (MSTR 051)
o Problem/Anomaly - Concern expressed on the impact to the frozen food
temperatures based on spacecraft maneuvers.
o Action - Conduct test obtaining temperature plots of various space-
craft attitudes to gain constraints such that no degradation in
performs_ce of the refrigeration system would occur.
i o Results - There was minimum impact to frozen food temperatures.
Constraints were not expected on EREP maneuvers, assuming no more
than two EREP's per day.
5.7.2.h3 Radiator Byspass Valve Locku_ Test (MSTR 052)
o Problem/Anomaly - Concern over the anomaly occurring in the space-
_, craft with the refrigeration system related to MSTR 048.
o Action - Conduct a test in the OWS Backup vehicle on the radiator
bypass valve to verify that it could be locked in a bypass condition
and allowed full operation.
o Result - It was possible to maintain the valve in a bypass mode,
even though the controller was generating a radiator mode command
5.7.2,hh Supplemental TACS Ball Valve Development Test (MSTR 053)
o Problem/Anomaly - Excessive use of TACS system during SL-2 maneuvers
made it advisable to supplement the existing TACS system with a
manually operated TACS system deployed through the SAL. (Reference
Action Item No. 280.)
o Action - Determine feasibility of using existing designed ball valve
for supplemental TACS system. Conduct a proof, leak, functional, life
cycle and burst test on the ball valve from T_st Line Item HS-26, _
reworked to a -501 valve configuration (stem seal facing pressure)
and reidentify as test hardware for Line Item TC-16.
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: o Result - Hardware withstood all environments necessary to perform
this function of a supplementary TACS system control valve satis-
factorily. Present position is that it probably will not be flown
_ because TACS usage has subsequently decreased.
5.7.2.45 Trash Airlock Leakage Test (MSTR 058)
o Preolem/Anomaly - Leakage noted in trash airlock with the trash
disposal valve assembly in intermediate position.
o Action - Run a test to: (1) measure valve leakage with valve handle
in worstcase position; (2) establish range of valve handle positions
between pressurize and vent where significant leakage (cabin to
vacuum ports) occurs.
_4 o Results - Procedure was established to alleviate further leakage
of trash airlock for crew implementation. Leak rates vs. handle
position were also determined.
;3
5,7.2.46 Refrigeration System Dual Radiator Loop Operation Test (MSTR 060)
o Problem/Anomaly - Warmup of spacecraft Refrigeration Subsystem.i
o Action - Demonstrate thermal performance improvement through dual
radiator loop operation on HS-19, qualification test hardware.
o Results - Refrigeration System "dual loop" HS-19 test results
indicated substantial improvement in system performance can be
anticipated when the radiator bypass valve, bypass poppets, are in
partially open positions with both refrigeration subsystem loops
running. Increased radiator flow was the cause for the improved
performance.
54%
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5.7.2.h7 Cold Coolanol Test (MSTR 06h)
= o Problem/Anomaly - Resolve refrigeration system warm up.
o Action - i) Evaluate the effect of extremely cold coolanol on pressure
drop. While flowing coolanol and at star_ing flow of static conditions.
i 2) investigate effect of increased radiator delta P, due to cold
: coolanol, on relief valve crack and reseat.
o Result - The bypass valve and relief valve operated normally throughout
the test.
5.7.2.h8 OWS Refrigeration Subsystem Leak Analysis Verification (MSTR 068)
e Problem/Anomaly - RSSwarm up anomaly.
o Action - Perform Refrigeration Subsystem HS-19-1 specimen testing to
_ verify,RSS analytical leak detectiou c_pability.
o Result - Review of HS-l_ data provided sufficient information _ch
obviated the requ_ _ent to run the test.
5.7.2.h9 Pump Box Vent Test (MSTR 069)
o Problem/Anomaly - Determine if the RSS pump box can be pressurized
from the OWS.
o Action - Determine if the "_wlss Army" knife could b,,used to cut
1/h" (.635 cm) tube to allow cabin pressure to pressurize the refrigera-
tion pump box.
o Results - in two tosts, both shoved ready penetration of the stainless
steel tubing wall.
5.7.2.50 SL-3 Coolant Trarsfer Hardware Test (MSTR 073)
o Problem/Anomaly - Leakage indicated in the AM thermal conditioning
system.
J
o Action - Use HS-19 hardware to demonstrate how much "well bleed" or
air-free coclanol can be transferred from one RSS ioo_ of the OWS on
SL-3 into the SL-3 portable water tank.
t
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o Results - This method of coolanol transfer entirely feasible,
but only a portion of loop content available in air-free condition.
5.7.2.51 Water Bottle Drying and Residual Determination Test (MSTR OYh)
o Problem/Anomaly - Requirement to establish procedure to dry the water
hoses to levels satisfzctory fo_ coolanol transfer.
o Action - Conduct tests to ,letermine: i) potential Dar_iculate contamina-
tion ]evel in OWS #i hsu-dware; 2) level of drying that can be obtained
using proposed vacuum technique; 3) time to accomplish training and dz-jinC
using .02 psia (137.88 N./m2) as a goal for residual iodine level; 4)
residuals from condensa-_3 fluid; 5) vac'._umlevel vs. time after drying.
o Results - Tests %-ere completed, documented, and considered
oatisfactory to resolve the problem.
5.7.2.52 Coolanol/Silicone Compatibility Test [MSTR 075)
o Problem/Anomaly - Coolanol transfer capability from OWS refrigeration
coolanol loop to portable water bottle in order to service the _'_
th¢',-_l conditioning system.
o Action - Determine the compatibility of coolanol with silicone seals
present in the condensate hose couplings and portable water tank plug
valve.
o Result - Deterioration of silicone seals occurred after 57 hours
exposure to coolano].
5.7.2.53 Valve Life Cycle with _oolant (MSTR 077)
o Pr,blem/Anomaly - Will the valve inletthe life cycle testing with new
seals and tcrque limits within the leakage requirements after life
cycling?
o Action - P, .orm a pressure leakage torque measurement in life cycle
test on the outlet plug valve of the portable water tank. Tests will
be initially GN2 and then coolanol.
3
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o Result - Sea]. life under exposure to coolanol is still considered time
critical. No leakage or apparent we-r tc the valves and packing were
encountered.
5.7.2.54 SL-3 AM Coolanol Servicing Procedure Revisions (MSTR 079)
o Problem/Anomaly - Determine that the RSS pump filter can be removed
and that MCl6OCh union, with 3165-i-0424, can be installed without
: having a clearance notch cut in the support block.
o Action - Conduct tests to see if this fit check is possible with no
interference in the support.
o Result - A required filling was .020" (.0508 cm) at b5° from the fiberglass
support edge for worst case tolerance conditions.
5.7.2.55 Additional Heat Sink for Refrigeration System (MSTR 08h)
o Problem/Anomaly - Refrigeration anomaly was discovered or, the SL-I ,,iEsion.
o Action - Determine the wardroom thermal response to ambient temperature
(70°F) (29h.23°K) water-filled urine bags placed in Compartment No. 2,
which is controlled to :'lightoperational temperatures.
o Result - The use of water-filled urine chiller bags will not significantly
increase refrigeration system troubleshooting time (less than 5 minutes) 4
(300sec).
5.7.2.=" Skylab TACS Valve Thermal Tests (bt$_, 085 B1)
o Problem/Anomaly - It is possible the OWS TACS valves ms_vbe exposed to _,
temperatures approaching 200°F (366.45°K). Previous testing ".:as only ;"
accomplished up to 165°F (3h7.0°K). In order to anticipate possiblu _
degradation under these environments, testing was requested.
o Action - Conduct tests at elevated temperatures to determine external ....
leakage, response tire and internal leakage at various pressures.
o Results - The TACS valves passed all test environments. No problems :,
were encountered.
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5.7.2.57 Urine Separator Suction Line Washer Replacement and Test (:_TR 088)
o Problem/Anoma/y - SL-3 crew reported one v_sher had debonded an I fallen
off separator line.
o Action - Redesign washers and test in life cycle sufficient to provide
confidence that the washe z"will sustain the duration of the mission.
o Results - Test was conducted in Space Systems Laboratory _,d results
were considered satisfactory.
c
5.7.2.58 Vibration Effects of 6_clin_ Radiator Bypass Valve (.'_STR090)
L
o Problem/_noE_ly - Concern expressed that cyclin_ of secondarj loop
bypass valve mighh cause sufficient vibration transfer to the
prima_ loop bypass valve to cause valve poppet movement.
o Action - Conduct a vibration test at levels experienced during,bypass
valve actuation to determine the bevel required to unseat the valve.
o Results - It was concluded the bypass circuit of the unactuated valve
will remain in contact with the seat when the other valve is actuated.
5.7.2.59 Bypass Valve Controller Test (_TR 091)
o Problem/Anomaly - Bypass valve lock-up/unlock capability not good
durinK power on/power off at low temperature levels in the thermal
m
capacitors. This could create a problem in the refrigeration system
performance.
o Action - Perform a limited PAT on the bypass valve controller to
obtain refrigeration system operating data point support of OWS.
o Results - Confirmed reg,lirement to raise thermal capacitor temperature to
32.8°F (273.57°K) or higher to command radiator mode by power off-on cycl
5.7.2.60 Non-ProDulsive Vent S_stgm Tor0ue Test "MSTR 092)
o Problem/Anomaly - Perform fit check of hoses required to connect
the LBNP checkout vacuum "tee" to the urine dump probe fitting on the
! _sak blLlkhead, determine "B" nutw_te Also, torque requirements.
¢
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o Action - Use OWS Backup hardware to perform fit check. Make
laboratory setup to determine torque vs. leakage.
o Results - Fit check test was perfcrmed with satisfaction. Torque
value for LBNP "B" nut was established at 200 +__25in. lbs (2259.6
N-cm).
5.7.2.61 '392 Hose Collapse Test _MSTR 094)
o Problem/Anomaly - Loss of meteoroid shield LBNP vent caused over-
board to be _ropulsive. A new installation utilizing onboardt
hoses will be used to vent the LBNP experiment to waste tank;
! thereby, eliminating propulsive vent condition.
o Action - Run test on Hose, P/N 1B83881 (.41 ID), at approximately
5 psid (3.h, x lO5 N/m2) and demonstrate that no collapsing of
the inner liner occurs.
o Results - The hose was subjected to differential pressures of 5,
lO, and 14.7 psid (3.h47 x lOh, 6.894 x lOh and 1.O13 x lO5 N/m 2)
and no collapsing of the inner liner was detected. A 0.34"
(.864 cm) diameter ball was used to detect if collapsing of the
hose o_.curred. A vacuum pressure of 2mmH mercury was maintained
within the hose for 2-1/2 hours, (9.0 x lO3 secj without detri-
mental effect. Note: 0.344" (.8738 cm) diameter ball is maximum
size that will pass through .350 (.889 cm) ID of hose
5.7.2.62 M092 NPV System Flow Test (MSTR 092 R2)
o }roblem/Anomaly - Loss of meteoroid shield cau: LBNP vent cver-
board to be propulsive. A new installation utilizing onboard
hoses to be developed to vent the LBNP experiment to waste tank;
thereby, eliminating propulsive vent condition.
o Action - Run four flow tests of th.= LBNP non-propulsive vent system.
MSTR 095 RI aathorized removal of iB83881-507 hose from Backup
vehicle for this test. R2 revision initiated to authorize removal ....
of QD's on the system flex hoses, the installation of unions bet-
ween each flex hose, and the repeat of the flow test per MSTR R1
change.
5-16_
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o Results - At the specified flowrate of 0.13 ib/min. (9.83 kgm/sec)
of air, the back pressure at the LBNP interface was 2.70 psia,
(1.86 x i0" N/m_) using unions vs. 3.28 psia (5.261 x i0k N/m 2)
with QD's.
5.7.2.63 Heat Pipe Test (MSTR 098)
o Purpose - Obtain heat transfer coefficient data for 1/2" (1.27 am)
square bar immersed in _-ater to support a potential SL-4 heat pipe
experiment.
o Action - Conduct a test of an instrumented 1/2" (1.2'[ cm) square
i
aluminum bar one-foot (30.48 era)long immersed in water on one
: end (thermo-couples on both ends). Record temperature histories on
, an X-Y plotter.
o Results - The heat transfer coefficients obtained during water
agitation ranged from 160 to 500 BTU/Ft2 - HR °F (907.78 to 283.8
watt/m2/K) with no dependence on Twate r - Tba r. There was no
noticeable difference in heating or cooling.
5.7.2.64 Methods for Compressing Frozen Urine Samples (MSTR 106)
o Problem/Anomaly - Stowing urine in return container presented
problem to crew.
o Action - Fresh urine was frozen in th_ laboratory and installed in
the return container. Protrusi-m above lip was abou5 3/32, of an
inch (.238 cm) above tray lip. Height was reduced by %apping/
pounding with flight type hammer and a blood sample spacer with
varying degrees of force.
o Results - The recommendation was to use loose end of blood spacer
in pounding as a technique to prevent leaks. Do not use flat
I side of spacer or h_mer only.
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SE_?ION 6 - ENGINEERING PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
6.1 PLANNING AND SCheDULING
The mLnagement of technical resources, to plan and control the engin-
eering tasks on the Orbital Workshop Program, was basically oriented
to two major activities :
: o Design and develolment pre-CDR
o Design changes post-CDR
6.1.1 Design and Develo_ent - In the evolution from the Wet Workshop to the :
Dry Workshop, an OWS Development Engineering Work Statement was utiliz-
ed to depict the technical requirements/configuration as ultimately re- !
flected in the CEI Specification, CF2OSOJ!C, dated 26 November 1969.
At that point in time, definition of design was very fluid, many
technical discussions/meetings between MDAC and MSFC resulted in def-
inition and/or re-Seflnition affecting other organizations. This led
to varicl:s organizations working to different requirements and/or con- -,
figurations. In order to provide singular technical work definition,
Engineering Management directed that the baseline work statement could
only be amended by issuance of Development Engineering Plans (DEP) as
shown iu Figure 6.1.1-1.
\
Another form of management directive to control design criteria was
the establishment of OWS Design Memorandums. They depicted design phil-
osophy, design loads and factors, materials selection, etc. These
memoranda were the medium by which the technical coamanity was unified
in the design approach to the OWS.
E_gineering management established the means to monitor all technical
work effort in requiring an Engineering Work Order (EWO) number on
every Job The EMOrequired the signature of the Project Engineer for
approval. Every design Job had a Job Drawing List (JDL) neighed to
the EWO and every released drawing requi_ed the signature of the Pro.
Ject Engineer on the Engineering Order (EO) prior to release. Throl_h
these means the design Job was defined, and statu|ed agaAn|t that
6-1
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MEMORANDUM
Date: Oct o_, L_),,9
A3-250-KKOO-M-Op5
To| All H. B. Development Engineering Orbital Workshop Supervision ,
Froms A.P. O'Neal, A3-250 (Ext. 2_58)
Subject| ORBITAL WORKSHOP CONFIGURATION DEFINITION
Copies to: L. F. Starlof, A3-126; H. E. Bauer, M. C. Button, G. V. Butler,
R. C. Dineen, G. F, Hanson, S. Yarchin, A3-850; File
The purpose of this memorandum is to clarify the authority to which the H. B.
Development Engineering Department is to adhere for the configuration of the
Saturn V Workshop. There has been much confusion as to system description
emanating from many sources; viz, Orbital Workshop Development Engineering
Work Statement, Integrated Work Statement, Contract End Item (CEI) Speci ficatlon,
System Engineering study results, Customer contacts, meetings, rumors, etc.
The H. B. Development Engineering Department shall work to the Orbital Workshop
Development Engineering Work Statement, dated August Ii, 1969, as a baseline
" and the Development Engineering Work Statement shall only be amended by H. B.
Development Engineering Plans (DEP's). These are the sole definition documents
that the design technologies are to follow. Due to the current backlog of
revisions to the Development Engineering Work Statement, DEP Issuance may lag
in an untlmely fashion. To flll that gap, Records of Discussions (ROD's)
resulting in changes to the Development Engineering Work Statement shall be
issued and distributed to the appropriately affected groups. In order to
authenticate these chan_es to the Development Engineering Work Statement, the
ROD's shall carry advance DEP numbers.
Responsibility for the Development Engineering Work Statement and the DEP's
remains in the Project Office. In addition, the Project Office has the
_esponslbility to represent the H. B. Development Engineerln_ Department in
,Ichievingcompatibility among the Development Engineering Work Statement, the
Integrated Work Statement, and the CEL Specification. In achieving this, the
Project Office will need the support of all other en_ineerln_ agencies to bring
to its attention incompatibilities in any of these documents. Detail changes
not affecting the Development Englneerlng Work Statement are not within the
scope of this memorandum.
In summary, the Development Engineering Work Statement, supplemented by DEP's
and ROD's carrying the DEP numbers, is the sole document depicting system changes.
Your compl_ance is required to minimize confusion and to implement our Work Plan.
. '_, ,t.,. .,
A. F'.O'Neal
Ii. B. Development EnglneerlnR Director
S_turn/Apollo & Apollo Applications Programs
AP0 sWBSsmd
{
Figure 6.1.I-i
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definition and against the design completion schedule.
These management techniques provided the program with an effective
communication system so that all of the engineering departments were kept
• "up to date" during the design development phase. This assured all :
personnel working to the same ground rules and the same configuration
of the various OWS subsystems. It also provided visibility of drawing
schedules so corrective action could be implemented as required.
6.1.2 Design Changes - Internal Design F_VI_dS (IDR) and the Preliminary <
Design Review (PDR) led to a baseline configuration, as established
with completion of the Critical Design Review (CDR), consisting of the
basic contrs_t plus approved Engineering Change Proposals (ECP). There-
after, all design changes were reviewed for approval and program impact.
-- Class I chaoges resulted in ECP submittal to the Customer, other changes
that caused significant internal effects were presented to the CCB for
authorization approval. All implementing drawing changes, Engineering
Orders (EO), were submitted to the resident NASA Office for information
and concurrence with Class II classification. Tracing a hardware change
from MDAC initiation to installation illustrates the technical manage- ':
ment system utilized after CDR.
A. Upon discovering a problem, the designer prepared a description
+
and Justification of the proposed change on MDAC Form 850-60,
"Skylab-OWS Change Request" (CR), as shown in Figure 6.1.2-1.
The designer and the Engineering Scheduler planned the design and
_rawing work arriving at a proposed drawing release date.
B. The designer present._d the CR at a daily meeting, chadred by the
Project Engineer and attended by representatives affected in
implementing the change. The CR was completed for submittal to
the Program Manager, Chief E:_ineer, and Operations Manager for
their approval. Those CR's for which approval was not recommended ....•
' _ere also reviewed for their concurrence. The approved CR's "_
constituted a commitment of all departments to the Work Plan andi
Schedule developed during these sessions.
/
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PAGE OF
1 ECP/PCP NO. I DATE:
SKYLAB.OWS
2 ,_OOEL_O. CHANGE REQUEST 3 FECNO.
4 CEI NOMENCLATURE I 5 CONTRACT SPECIFICATION(S) AFFECTEOI
6 TITLE OF CHANGE
7 RECOMMENDED CHANGE PROPOSAL PRIORITY ( ) EMERGENCY ( ) URGENT ( ) ROUTINE ( ) COMPATIBILIT_
-_ 8 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE (ATTACH SKETCH & JDL)
9 JUSTIFICATION
?
10 AFFECTS:
YE', NO YES NO
E LECTRONICS OWS CONTROL DWG 1B77075
LOGISTICS IP&CL
• MECHANICAL/CREW P0327 FORM
PROPULSION AGE CONTROL SIGNIFICANT ITEMS
STRUCTURES STOWAGE, RCN. NCN
; TIME CYCLE SIGNIFICANT ITEMS KSC TEST & CHECKOUT PROCEDURES (TCB)
ENGG CRITICAL COMPONENT LIST IN CEI FIT CHECK MATRIX
" MISSION CRITICAL ITEM ON DWG 1B75304 KSC TCRSC
TEST AND ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT QUAL TEST (IF YES, INDICATE
" INTERFACE CONTROL DWGS (ICD) CTCA NO.... & LINE ITEM NO.
PRODUCTION TEST
11 SERIAL NUMBER EFFECTIVITY AND LOCATION (IDENTIFY GSE TO LOCATIONS)
{
i 12 MOD INSTRUCTION REQD 14 RECOMMENDED CHANGE PERIOD- FTC DESIGNATION ( ) 15 SCHEDULE PARTS
AVAILABLE( ) YES ( ) NO 2A (2A) 4 (4,5) 7 (11)
I 13 RETEST REQUIRED 2B (2B) 5 (6. 7.8) OTHER OVERTIME REQUIRED
i ( ) YES ( ) NO 3(3) 6(9. 10) ENG- OPS-
I 16 ORIGINATOR: CONCURRENCE 18 ACTION/DISPOSITION• COMMENT: APPROVED ( )YES _ )NO
IN SCOPE ( )YES ( )NO
IMPLEMENT BY WHO ( )YES ( )NO
NAME PREP ECPIPCP ( ) YES ( ) NO
OPE RATIONS MANAGE R - OWS COMMENT :
EXT DATE COMMENT:
FIGURE 6.1,2-I
_': L FORMBRANCHCHIEF/DESIGNENG850.60(OCT 72) CItlEFENGINEER- OWS6"4 PROGRAM MANAGER - OWS C)ATE Jl .. ,
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C. As the design progressed,the Engineering Schedulerwas respon-
sible to alert Engineering Management of any Jeopardies to the
Work Plan. Correcting action was then taken. In the event the
Work Plan was about to be vAolated, the CR was revised and re-
submitted for review and approval.
D. Every EO was required to have an identifier noting the approval
of a CR and a verifying signature of the Project Engineer.
E. The drawing number and change letter was posted in the manufactur-
ing area and status reported daily. Engineering representatives
attended these meetings to assure prompt responseswhen technical
activitywas desired. During the period when the OWS No. i was
in final assembly, Engineering Management also attended these
meetings to monitor technical modes of operation and to develop
methods to further foreshorten response times when required to
solve hardware problems. Management was applied in
implementingmethods to reduce time to process paper
accompanyingthe hardware while assuring Judicious adherence to
proper activity and documentation. These activities occurred in
all areas of fabrication,assembly and installation. Some examples
of management "English" are:
i/ The normal system to obtain technical assistance in clarify-
ing or requesting a design change of a released drawing is
for the requestor to prepare a Process Action Request (PAR).
Normally prepared in the manufacturing area, the PAR book is
posted at a specific location. This is visited a few times
a day, or on demand, by a Liaison Engineer, who logs it and
sends it to the appropriatetechnical organizationvia the
Engineering Schedules Group for disposition. The designer
answers the PAR and sends it back to the originator, essen-
tially, via the same route, The lapsed time may be five days
while the hardware is put aside awaiting some resolution.
Zn early 1971 the OWS Program Manager recognizedthat "normal
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activities" could not meet program needs and as a result
identified sixteen "OWS Action Teams." One of these, 'War
Board, Shortage Management, and Tooling" assigned the Chief
Project Engineer as the engineering team member. The team
established their headquarters in the fabrication area at
the Santa Monica plan, available to PAR requestors. The
Engineering representative then handled the PAR "on the spot"
thereby minimizing hardware delay. This was accomplished by
a phone call to the designer to obtain i,amediate attention
and answers, or concurrence, to solve the problem. If a
drawing change was required, the PAR was dispositioned to
• provide the answer and identify the drawing change letter to
be issued. The EO was expedited and hand-carried to the fab-
rication area. This allowed the continuation of fabrication
while the EO was enroute for proper documentation of the fab-
rication and inspection.
In the installation area at Huntington Beach, in late 1971,
the same problem cf normal routing of PAR's was slowing the
: operation. Since it was an installation problem, the part
obviously was past the fabrication process, hence, there was
little or no drawing change activity - which allowed a more
direct solution. Here the engineering representative on the
Action Team, with appropriate coordination with other organ-
izations, directed that the PAR be replaced with the EO.
When the problem was written the resolution was to be pre-
pared by _ngineering on the same piece of paper and, when
possible, within minutes of each other. This was called the
Engineering Change Request (ECR), and was released to the
shop immediately and processed later for finalizing through
normal EO channels.
2/ In the electronic module fabrication area we were faced with
i delays when a problem and its solution, resulting in a draw-
ing change, occurred after the first shift working hour_
_ (nights or week-ends). Although the operations and _echn1_&l
!
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people were present, the personnel who perform the functions
that process EO's from the technology to the shop were not.
This involved Check, Weights, Stress, Schedules, Proje-t,
Release within Engineering, also, Reproduction and Change
Control. Since the personnel who perform these functions
were not present, the fabrication process, with many inte_'im
inspection points, would normally await their presence to
process the EO. The program could ill affort such delays,
however, it was not practical to institute a three sh_ft,
seven day shift of these functions. The Action Team Engin-
eering Representative, by proper coordination with appropriate
organizations, authorized the engineers on the floor to re-
lease the EO's, marking them "SSNA" (Standard System Not
Available). These EO's were processed later through normal
channels to maintain proper documentation.
3/ When Procurement received a request from the supplier for a
change in technical requirements it was via a Supplier Infor-
mation Request (SIR). The normal routing was similar to that
of the PAR noted earlier. With creation of the OWS Action
Team, the Procurement representative would ask the Engineer-
ing representative for "on the spot" answers. This was
accomplished again by a call from the Chief Project Engineer
to the designer for immediate attention and solution. This
was then written on the SIR and, rather than route through
for signatures, the coordinated designers name was noted and
signed by the Action Team Engineering representative. Sim-
ilarly, Material Substitution Forms were processed. Many
days were thus saved.
4/ It was normal procedure upon receiving a non-conforaing ship-
meritin Receiving Inspection to return it to the supplier for
reconciliation. In order to protect the program schedule the
Procurement and Engineering representatives of the Action
Team initiated a twice daily review of the packages t_ be re-
turned to the supplier. A significant magnitude of return
6-7
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shipments were stopped or split to retain the hardware in
plant to allow faster supply to the using department. Some
involved rework, and the supplier was brought to the hard-
ware rather than vise versa. Some were cosmetic rather than
functional non-conformances, wherein, the parts _o',idbe
secepted for use. In those cases when technical requirements
were not met, the requirements were reviewed for practicality
and/or effect. This acti%-Ity saved many delays in supplying
; parts to the using department.
The management system used to evaluate, plan and schedule
design changes proved very effective in absorbi_ the many
design changes so necessary in the development of a complex
space system. It provided the contractor and Customer manage-
ment early _-Isibility of impending program changes which was
the initial key to success_ll change management.
Formation of the "OWS Action Teams" provided technical manage-
ment in the hardware problem area as it occurred and was very
effective in minimizing delays.
6.1.3 Recommendations for Future Programs - The OWS Program was noc necess-
arily unique but changes from the "wet" to "dry" concept created some i
special problem,s of schedule and cost control. It was recognized that
the established and documented operating poli_ies would not likely
provide the quick reactions, rapid com2/unications, and on-the-spot 2
decision-ma/(ing needed. Therefore, new te.'hniques of management were
developed to proceed and additional new inovations were developed plus
some old techniques previously used under similar conditions were
applied. Most of the _echniques described could be used on any program.
It must be _'ealized that such uses would require retraining the people
being assigned, since the high percentage of technical people would not
normally be familiar with these procedures. The recommendation would •-
be tc use these procedures agaln if conditions were similar to those
that existed on OWS.
6-8
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6.2 CONFIGURATION ._L_NT •
The requirement for implementation of Configurat,ion Man_e_nt (CM)
disciplines was included in the initial Workshop contract as part of
the Schedule II work statement. DAC 56689 was designated as the
initial Configuration M_na_ement Plan and was to be the repository
for the contractually imposed CM requirements and procedtu,_sapplic-
abls to the Saturn I (Wet) Workshop. This CM plan was updated as
DAC 56689A to convert from Saturn I (Wet) Workshop to Orbital Workshop
(Dry) requirements per direction o.'?Supplemental Agreement #2 to con-
tract NAS9-6555. The 23 January 1970 issue of DAC 56689A was desig-
nated by NAS9-t_55 Supplemental Agreement 84 as the applicable CM
document for the Orbital Workshop program.
6.2.1 Configuration Identification
6.2.1.1 Specifications - The OWS Contract End Item Suecification (CEIS),
CP2OSOJIC, was designated as the document to contain the OWS design
and performance baselit,e requirements. The CEIS was reviled by MDAC
and NASA approved Specification Change Notices (SCN) when needed to
remain current with the contract design and performance requirements_
The 0WS Ground Support Equil_ent (GSE) requirements were maintained
in DAC 56692A, Ground Support Equipment Model Specification. This
doc,_mentwas also maintained curr,_ntby SCN's processed through MDAC
to NASA for approval. These two documents reflected the total con-
tractual design/performance requirements baseline for the OWS Program _
and were conscientiously maintained curr_t. _or this reason they
were extremely useful throughout the program, including at the board
design engineer level.
to the authority for the chan@e by SCN vs authority logs maintained
in the document and by anotating each changed paragraph with the SCN • .
number. This provided the info_matica needed to allJw enraing engin-
eering document changes to be identified to the applicable change
iden'_ity.
6-9
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6.2.1.2 Interface Control Drawings (ICD) - ICD's were included by refernnce
as requirements in the CEIS, rut were maintained separately on d:-.wing
format. The ICD's were prepared by contractors designated by NA_A,
were coordinatedwith the affected associate contracto;s, were issued
by NASA, and subsequentlywere placed on the appropriate contrs_tor
contracts. The total listing of the applicable ICD's was maintained
in MSFC document CM-O23-OO3-2H, Skylab OWS Interface Control Documen-
tation Contractual Index and Status Report, which was listed in the
CEIS.
There were two levels of iJD's used on the OWS Program. Those which
affected only one NASA cente,, and contractors for which chat one NASA
center was re-_J-ible were called I_vel B ICD's; and thnse ICD's
which affected _or_ than one NASA center or their contractors were
c,]l _vel _ IC'D'_.
MDACwas designated by _LaS#.as the responsible contractor for ICD's
reflecting OWS to Fxperiment interface requirements. This was a size-
able task which resulted in MDACpreparation, coordination and m inten-
ance of 70 ICD's (50 Level A and 20 Level B).
Iv addition to those plepared by MDAC, here were 46 additionaJ appli-
cable ICD's which repre,ent requirerentsupon the OWS design. MDAC's
task related to these ICD', was to review, accept, or propose changes,
and when placed on contract, to control the OWSdesign thereto. This
same task ol" review, acceptance, and control also was required of MDAC
for _he 70 ICD's prepared by MDAC.
Once it was established that an interface existed that would be docu-
mented on an £CD, a specific design technology organizationwas assign-
ed the responsibility.'orthat particular interface. This responsi-
bility, in addition to the design aspect included:
o Est_blishm:ntof a single contact for coord._natiunwith each
affected associp-tecontractor and NA_%,
_-I0
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o The marking of each a_fected design drawing to identif_ that it
could not be changed without prior approval via the ICD change
syste=,
o Establishaent of central records regarding all interface trans-
actions, -,
o Responsibility for initiation of designs to comply with the inter-
face requirements,
o Responsibility for initiation of changes to the ICD to keep it
current or to insure proper functioning of the interfacing hard_
ware
/
o Responsibility for assessment of all changes proposed by NASA or
an associate contractor relative to that interface,
o Responsibility for coordination of that set of interf_e require-
ments with all other MDACagencies affected.
o Responsibility for keeping managenent appraised of the status of
the compatibility of that interface design.
Each I_D change carried the identity of the charge authority on the
Interface Revision Notice _IRN) _hich described the change. This
change authority identity was carried down throL_h the engineering
documents which wer_ subsequently revised to reflect the ICD changes.
6.2.1.3 Design Drawings - The OW_ and G_E design drawings were requires to and
did comply with _ _-D-70_7, Class II, in format and content. Strict
rules governing part numbering were observed and the designs, when
released for manufacturing/test were identified to the approved design
requirenent baseline established by the CEIS and/or the GSE Model
Specification.
The release records were centrally maintained in the engineering rel-
ease group and the release ftAe for each dreMing contal_.d the infor- _
m_tion required to determine the total released engineering require-
monte. Likewise, ,.he release records contained the information
1m
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necessary to be able to determine the total design configuration of
the OWS and of the GSE at any point in time in the program.
6.2.1.4 Design Reviews - Once the design requirement baseline was established,
dewign reviews were planned and performed to assure that the design
baseline was established which conformed with the requirements. There
were reviews conducted internally by MDAC and reviews conducted by
NASA. The latter were required by the CM plan:
o To resolve design baseline requirements,
o For acceptance of design concepts, analysis, and preliminary
design,
o For authorization to proceed with final design,
o For approval of final design baseline.
The NASA reviews were conducted in two phases. The Preliminary Design
Review (PDR) was required prior to proceeding with the final design,
and the Critical Design Review (CDR) was re_aired to obtain NASA
approval of the final design. :
The FDR was initially held in May 1967 and was comp_.eted in a delta
PDR in December 1967; however, both of these reviews related to the
Saturn I Workshop (Wet) configuration. The CDR (OWS dry configuretion)
was held in Sepbember 1970 and thereafter MDAC was authorized to pro-
ceed with completion and closeout of NASA assigned Review Item Discrep-
ancies (RID) and to release the approved baseline design foc production.
Both of these reviews were major milestones in the OWS development
cycle and each system was reviewed in-depth for all affected NASA
centers and associate contractor personnel.
Separate PDR's a_d CDR's were conducted by MDAC of the major subcon-
tractor developed portions of the OWS; ramely, the Solar Arrays and
the Waste Management hardware. NASA participated in these and closely
monitored both the reviews and the RID closeout activities.
6-12
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To assure comp!iance with the baseline requirements, MD_ c_ucted
internal company reviews of each OWS system and subsystem, and redir-
ected the design as needed, prior to presentation to NASA at the CDR.
NASA attena_nce was invited at these sessions to aid in communication
of progress status and system details between the various technical
organizations.
6.2.2 Configuration Control
6.2.2.1 Configuration Control Board (CCB) - The MDAC C_S CCB was chartered as
a senior management committee to direct MDAC response to contract
directives and to implement and ccntrol appropriate action relative to
OWS baseline changes generated within MDAC. The CCB was established
early in the progrem (J, Lly, 1970) at a time, prior to the OWS CDR,
when formal change traffic was Just beginning to become a factor that
required management attention and control.
The CCB was chaired by the OWS Program Msnager and the Directors of
the i_nctional orga_za_ions were members. The board convened reg-
ularly each week on a schedule tailored to the change traffic. The
early sessions were less frequent than later when the ,'hange traffic
increased to a level such th_t_ it was necessary for the CCB to convene
eac_ workday.
The CCB was suppor_ed by an A_ternal MDAC charge analysis board (CAB).
This team, consisting of representatives from each 0WS department,
performed the staff work, for each directed or proposed chan@e, such
as establishing the description, cost, schedule, impact, recommcnded
actions, and associated documentation. The CAB relieved the CCB
members of this preparatory staff effort and provided them with firm,
factual information upon which to base their decisions. This arrange-
ment wxs significantly beneficial i.- that it improved the timeliness
of CCB decisions as well as assuring that they were founded on facts.
The CCB operated to stric* guidelines relative to proposed changeb
i
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and approved only:
A. Necessary changes resulting from:
o A change in NASA requirements
o A design deficiency necessitating a '_lake-it-work"change
B. Cost saving changes resulting in:
o Significantly reduced recurring cost in design, manufactur-
ing, or test, without unacceptab e effect on schedule
C. Desirable changes resulting in:
o Significant increase in reliability, system safety or sch-
edule accomplishment.
The CCB activities provided the top management cont:ol needed in the
OWS activities. The timely decisions of this management team kept the
OWS design change traffic from becoming excessive and costly %o the
point where it would h&ve Jeopardized the aims of the program.
It is important to note _hat the CCB decisions were the responsibil_ty
of the chairman. The members made recommendations and gave advice to
him, but they did not decide the f_nal issues by vote. _s methol
placed t_e final control with the pr_gram manager and the decisions
were thus made with consistency and with full benefit _f his total OWS
experience.
6.2.2.2 Engineering Change Control - The OWS Configuration Management Plan
required any Class I change to be proposed to NASA via an Engineering
Change Proposal (ECP) for approval prior to implementation. A Class I
change was defined as - Any proposed engineering change tc NASA
accepted or unaccepted prime equipment end items (flight hardware and
launch critical GSE) which affected one or more of the following
documents or caused a listed action:
o CEI Specification
1974020219-282
o Interface Control Documents
o KSC portion of Orbital Workshop Test and Checkout Requirements
Specification and Criteria Document (IB83429)
o Orbital Workshop portion of the Saturn Workshop Power Allocation
Document (40M35631)
o OWS portion (I-SL-O08) of the Skylab Stowage List
o OWS Stowage Capability Document (IB85808)
o OWS Alignment Control Drawing (10M03934)
o OWS Operational Nomenclature Document (MDC G0387)
o OWS Snaps#_elcro Restraints Document (MDC G2439)
o Government Furnished Property
o Camera and Photolight Locations Drawing (IB94616)
o Retrofit at KSC
o A change in required requalification testing
o A change of vendors of mission/safety critical components
o A change to contract price or fee, contract guarantee, contract
delivery or test schedules
o A change in electrical interference to comRunications or to
electronic equipment, or a change in electromagnetic radiation
hazards
o A change in materials which come into contact with urine
o Instrumentation Program and Component List (]368467) additions,
deletions or changes to measurement number, name range or channel-
ization therein
All other changes were designated as Class II type_ i.e., those requir-
ed to correct errors or to correct the designs to be able to meet the • . -
baseline requirements without affecting the items listed in the Class I
definition. These did not require formal NASA a_proval, but din re-
quire the NASA Resident Mannger Office concurrence with their
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classification. MDAC submitted copies of all Class II drawing change
Engineering Orders (EO) to the resident NASA office to fulfill this
requirement. There were virtually no mis-classified EO's which MDAC
was required to change to Class I type.
A. ECP Initiation - The requirement that stipulated the need for
approved ECP's prior to implementation of Class I changes was
one of the prime controls imposed on the OWS engineering depart-
ment b-/the CM plan and by the program/engineeringmanagement. _
Consequently, there was a particular emphasis throughout engineer-
ing to assure compliance.
Once a design has been prepared and reviewed/approved/released,
each proposed change to that design was screened by design tech-
nology and engineering project management for proper change class-
ification (I or If) and for need. Once the need for the change
was established, the Class II type change was completed and re-
leased and the Class I type change was held while an ECP was ini-
tiated to gain the approval to implement that change.
The OWS, bei:_ designed to accc_amodatea large quanti_y of para-
llel developing experiment_ and to mate with and operate compat-
ibly with an equally large quantity of parallel developing multi-
disciplined crew support systerls,spawned an exceedingly large
quantity of proposed changes. Class I changes were approved as
part of the 0WS CDR baseline and thereafter an average of 72
Class I changes were processed eac _onth until the initial Sky-
lab launch (811/70 thro'_h 5130/73).
The quantity listed above is only of changes approved by the MDAC
CCB, and indicates the high degree of compliance of MDAC with the _:
CM Clams I change ECP requirements.
The total number of cha_ges processed per month by MDAC was much
higher when Clasc II _.nddisapproved changes are considered.
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h. ECP/PCP Preparation/Processing - Each change, approved by the
MDAC CCB for preparation and processing to NASA utilizing the
long form change format, was required, by the CM plan, to include
the follow_mg specific data and information:
o Description of effect of the change on prime equipment
o Description of effect of the change on non-prime equipment
o Description of effect of the change on other OWS program !
elements such as the test program, GSE, High Fidelity Mockup_
Neutral Buoyancy Hardware, One-G Trainer, Crew Systems Eng-
ineering Laboratory, and Dynamic Test Article :
o Effect on MDAC contractual software
o Effect on designated NASA sol%ware
o Cost of implementation
o Schedule for implementation - including retrofit at KSC
o Contractor recommendations related to approval
To eliminate unneeded effort and to speed the flow of information
and approval, certain types of changes were allowed to be identi-
fied within "family" change numbers. Some of these family series
changes were then allowed to be prepared and processed to NASA
utilizing a special short form format containing only certain
specified data pertinent to that family of changes. The change
families established were :
so.
o ECP WOO3-X 0WS Compatibility change Short Form
o ECP WOO4-X OWS Compatibility change Short Form i
- that affects the stowage .._
system only.
o ECP W@)5-X Document on_7 change to OWS Short Form
CEI8
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o ECP WOO6-X OWS stowage system only Short Form !
change that affects NASA
document I-SL-O08.
o ECP WOOT-X Change proposed to NASA Long Form
that is on 0WS contract.
o ECP W008.X Change to 0WS on-orbit Long Form
Snaps and Restraints
o ECP W009-X Change to 0WS operational Long Form
nomenclature.
o ECP WXY3( Change to OWS prime Long Form
equipment.
o PCP WXXXX Change to 0WS equipment/ Long Form
program that does not
affect prime equipment.
Every effort was made to provide the required data with each ECP
processed to NASA. Many times, however, the required technical
decisions were not available from associate contractc ; (actual
dimensions needed to reflect ICD changes, for example) or from
MDAC design technologies (factual power requirements, for example)
because the design required to obtain these facts may not have
proceeded that far.
To hold ECP's until such data was av%ilable would hav_ caused
significant, undesirable delay in ch_ge approval. £herefore,
as an expedient, many ECP's were processed lacking some of the
desired knowledge. This did necessitate additional change
board activities to proc_-ss the ECP revisions that updated
previous submittals to include the omitted information.
Several methods w__re used to fill the information gap for NASA.
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when this type of ECP was reviewed by their change board :
i/ The MDAC on-site engineering group at MSFC furnished repre-
sentatives to the MSFC CCCB and was able to hand carry data
and information, as it became available after initial ECP
submittal, to cognizant MSFC personnel to supplement the ECP.
J
2/ During the MSFC CCCB meeting, wherein ECP's _ere being dis- !
cussed and dispositioned, an MDAC management support team was
in attendance via telephone conference hookup. This MDAC
team was able to answer CCCB member questions and supply T
latest knowledge on information regarding any area of the
ECP. This included not only information that may have been
omitted completely, but amplification or explanation of in-
formation presented within the ECP.
These support efforts were very effective, particularly during
the pe_- ECP traffic periods as OWS designs were Jelling. :-
C. Drawing Change Control - The configuration of the OWS _pproved at
the CDR consisted of a design which conformed with the 26 November
1970 CEIS requirements as modified by the approved ECF's listed
in Table 6.2.2.2-1. Once this design baseline had been establish-
ed, 0WS engineering imposed a hard and fast rule that restricted
all drawings from being revised unless because of an approved
Class II or Class I change. The 0WS Engineering Integration Office
was the approval agency for Class II cbange_ while the MDAC CCB
gave ECP submittal approval and the NASA CCCB gave implementing
e,pproval for Class I changes.
All drawing changes after _.,eCDR were identified to the approved
ECP causing the change and upon release separate lists, of the
drawings affected by each change, were _,,aintained.
The release records of each drawing contained each approved ECP
number, o0tained from the drawing releasing paper (Engineering
Order - EO) an a real time basis. The release rec_r_u were
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?CDR APPROVEDDESIGN BASELINE
CP2oSoJIC, dated 24 July 1970 as modified by the following listed ECP'S:
W020_ W087RZ W146
wo23R1 W091 W_47
WO2__ W092RI WZ49
wo30 R1 wo93 w168 K1
WO33 R1 WO96 R1 W169
_- WO34 R1 W097 w171
WO35 R1 W099 W172 •
W036 R1 WlO0 W173 1:!2
WO41 R1 WlOl R2 W174
WO43 R1 W105 P& W191 !
WO_8 _I Wli( % r(l W199
WO52 R1 Will R1 W209
".054R1 WlI6 W209Cl i
WO61 Wl19 R1 W2-15 :
wo69_ wz22 w--z8
woTo_ wz27_ w244
wo82_ wz_9 w245 i
W084 R1 Wl_k W303 :
W085R1 W145 _.
)
!,_ TABLE 6.2.2,R-I :
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automated and thus were capable of producing listings of design
drawings affected by any authorized, released ECP. These list-
ings were called Engineering Change Identity Parts Lists (ECIPL).
Prior to the EC!_, printout which occured after drawing release,
an estimated li_t of drawings _o be affected by an approved ECP
was maintained in a sub-routine of the automated release record
system. This sub-routine was called the Job Orawing List system
(JDL). It was used to great advantage by simultaneously provid-
ing drawing change and scheduled release visibility to manufact-
uring departments. The JDL system also maintained in-system loca-
tion of each drawing and change, thus providing the important
relee.se status function that engineering management needed to
monitor design progress.
6.2.3 Configuration Accounting
6.2.3.1 Configuration Accounting Records - MDACmaintained records within the
OWS probram departments as required to maintain complete configuration
v_ _bility and status. Maintained were :
A. Approval records and c_m_ incorporation status information oz'
all configurction specifications/documents and changes thereto
(i.e., Contract End Item Specification, Gzound Support Equipaent
Model Specification, Governnent Furnished Property Requirements,
Quality Program Plan, Reliability Program Plan, Test Plan and
Configuration _',_.a_e_ent Plan). Each document included a change
log which listed the SC,_ nu_er and date, ECP number, contract
authority number and date, document pages affected, and other per-
tinent infomation.
B. Approval records of all deviations and waivers to the approved _
configuration specifications/documents. These records were main- ,..
rained in the engineering contract specification section, i_
i C. Listings _ad release status of all drawings/documents of which
i
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the OWS design baseline was comprised. These records were main-
taine.dwithin the enginee,ing release section (Refer to 6.2.1.?).
D. Listings and approval status o_ all Class I changes (ECP's)to
the design baseline. These records were maintained in an on-line
automated system which included data relating to i_Iti_tion, in-
ternal MDAC approval, submittal to NASA, approval by NASI, approv-
al authorities, and modification kit information.
E. Records of all Class II changes. These records were maintained
in the engineering release section drawing release record files.
Each drawing change was identifiable as to i_s classification as
Class II or to its ECP number if Class I.
F. V-rifi_ation records relating to baseline or Class I change (ECP)
identities. This information was also maintained _n the auto_.ated
system no_ed in D above.
6,2.3.2 ConfigurationAccounting Re_ort Certification - MDAC, in addition to
compilation and maintenance of internal records, reviewed and sugges-
ted changes/correctionsto the following NASA p_epared configuration
management oriented documents:
A. Skylab Configuration Identification Index and Modification Status,
CM-O20-OOI-2H. MDAC reviewed monthly and responded _o NASA with
suggested changes.
B. Skylab OWS Interface Control Documentation Contractual Index and
Status Report, Part I of CM-O23-OO3-2H.
C. Skylab OWS Stowage List Status Report, Part Ii of CM-O2B-O03-2H.
D. Skylab Stowage List, I-SL-O08.
6.2.4 chan_e Traffic - The OWS design baseline underwent many changes from
the time of CDR (Table 6.2.2.2-1) through SL-4 splashdown. There were
several reasons f_r this high rate of change: '-
• o The change from t_',Wet Saturn I Workshop to a Dry Skylab Orbital
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Workshop was a maJo; change.
o The OWS program sustained several "stretchouts" for funding rea-
sons. Tnis gave extra time for many aesirable ;edesigns - from
all agencies.
o The inter-center reviews developed needed changes.
o The OWS design included a huge volume for stowage of mission re-
Sulted items - by an order of magnitude greater than on any pro-
gram before. TEis new design field also br_ht forth many crew/
NASA initiated changes related to on-orbit operation of the many
! experiments.
! o The trainers, mockups, aad neutral buoyancy end dynamics test
articles were utilized effectively and _ontiuuou_i_. A natural
fallout of this effort was change traffic.
Between September Aq69 (CDR) a_4 November 1973, the followir_ quantities
of changes were processed by MD_C on the OWS program:
_e F_A_ ___ _o I_A l_A !_
_P w_3_ o o o lO _,_
ECP wOC_.X 0 0 0 7 156
ECP WOOS.X 0 37 28 24 3
ECPw(_6.x 0 29 2_ 3Ol 140
ECP WOOT-X 0 O 215 299 114
ECP WOOS.X 1 0 0 6
ECP WOO9-X 1 0 1 19 23
ECP WXXX 18 364 412 2J_7 121
, • ..
PCPWD_CX 27 140 127 107 18
SUB-TCTAL 47 570 1027 1020 689
TOTAL CRAW_ES - 3353
6-23
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!_: 6.2.5 Conclusions and Recommendations - The configuration management discip-
}lines used were adequate and fulfilled the desires for the 0WS. A lot
of effort was spent obtaining a mutual understanding of an operable
syst_ _ structured to meet CM requirements with the OWS schedule and
cost control problems. A lot of emphasis and participation was required
of top management for change board and change control activities. _e
disciplines used for OWS are applicable to any future programs.
< However, the implementation methods are not necessarily optimum and
depend on the program schedule conditions.
,2, i
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SECTION 7 - MISSION OPERATIONS SUPPORT
7. i GENERAL
_ Support of the Skylab (SL) mission was provided by many NASA and Skylab
contractor personnel from various locations throughout the couutry.
Md)AC-W provided mission operation s support for the Orbital Workshop
7 (OWS) from its facilities at Huntington Beach, California, and through
its _n-site personnel located at MSFC, Huntsville, Alabama. This sup-
7
port was provided to _FC who supported the JSC flight ccntrol team
from the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC).
MDAC-W monitored all mission activities and provided around-the-clock
_.- support to NASA for the final four months of launch preparations and
for the entire 9-month mission period.
An OWS mission Support team was established at MDAC-W which included
senior systems engineers for-all OWS systems and representatives from
all supporting program organizations. All mission support actions were
assigned to the OWS mission support team which operated out of the OWS
t Mission Support Center at Huntington Beach. Coordi:_tion with MSFC was
_ accomplished through the MDAC-W mission support personnel on-site at
MSFC which operated out of Conference Work Area (CWA) No. 6 in the HOSC.
Whenever an OWS problem was identified or whenever JSC and/or MSFC
generated a mission support action request related to the OWS, MDAC-W
i
would generate an internal action item to respond to the problem or
i_ action request. Responses to these action items received an internal
technical and program review and were forwarded to the _FC Mission
_ Support Groups (MSG's) for their consideration and use when responding
to the JSC flight control team. One thousand twelve (1012) such
actions were processed by MDAC-W during the course of the mission.
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The OWS Backup spacecraft and OWS component and system test setups at
_, Huntington Beach played a prominate role in providing test data in sup-
port of many of the OWS action items. In addition, a significant
i amount of hardware was developed at Huntington Beach during the mission
period for fly-up on SL-3 and -4 and for test or crew training use by
MSFC and JSC.
%
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7.2 MDAC-W SUPPORT AT MSFC
7.2.1 Overview of MDAC-W's Role at MSFC - Z,[DAC-W'srole at _FC was as
follows:
A. Tc provide a team of qualified engineers that could advise their %
• MSFC Mission Support Group (MSG) leaders on technical matters per- :
taining to their responsible Orbital Workshop (OWS) system.
i
<
B. To manage the tec/dnlcal support, insure coordination and integra-
tion across technical interfaces, and timely response to action
v :_
items.
C. To insure that the MDAC-W technical position on OWS action item_
was properly represented to the M_G leaders and OWS Project Office.
D. To provide to MDAC-W, Huntington Beach, real time aata on key-OW$.....
parameters on a frequency sufficient to allow assessment-o_-aystems
status.
/
The orgs_lizational structure and interface relationship are discussed
in Section 7.2.2. Individuals assigned to the team were responsible i
for working shifts as assigned by their MSG leaders. Duties generally
included console monitoring and action item coordination. In some
cases, and particularly during times of heavy action item traffic, the _
ability to properly coordinate technical responses was compromised by
I
i console monitoring duties. Two senior representatives were assigned to
M_DAC-W, Huntsville, to insure technical coordination and continuity of
• responses. Coverage was provided during the manned mission phases ,.
seven days a week to properly represent MDAC-W technical positions. A
'. staff was formed (varying initially from seven to four at the end of
, the mission) to provide around-the-clock coverage in the Hun_sville :_
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Operations Support Center (HOSC) to assist in the specific action
tracking and coordination system. _LII actions assigned to or poten-
tially affecting the OWS were assigned a number for tracking purposes
and responses distributed to affected M_SFC personnel.
7.2.2 MDAC-W/M_FC Missicn Support Interface - The interfaces between MDAC-W
and MSFC can best be viewed on an organization-type chart, considering
J MSFC's overall responsibility during the Skylab mission (see Figure
_ i 7.2-1). MSFC was organized to accomplish two basic functions with
regard to hardware and experiments under their development responsi-
bility; monitor real time systems status and provide solutions to
problems. To accomplish these functions MSFC established several MSG's
/
_. that had technical responsibility for the status monitoring and problem
X , solution° These MSG's were headed by the individuals designated on the ,
: charts. To ensure continuity and timeliness of technical response, ._ !
_ Operations Director (0.D.) position was e-tablished full time at HOSCV-_ i
reporting to a senior 0.D. Staff systems engineers were assigned to i
i
the O.D. to assist in technical integration end coordination across MSG
overlapping responsibilities. The 0WS Project Office had individuals
assigned to support the various MSG's and advise th_ Project Manager of
i
_%he status of 0WS systems and actions required.
The I_AC-W interfaces weze officially from the Huntington Beach Duty
Officer (Program Manager/Chief Engineer level) through the on-site
Hun_sville Senior Representative to the affected MSG's. Thus, all
problem,s or actions affecting the 0WS were responded to through the
I[_ Huntington Beach Mission Support Room (MSR) under approval of the cog-
nizant Duty Officer. Responses were reviewe,_ and coordinated wlth the • _-
MSG's with copies distributed to local _DAC-W MSG personnel and the 0WS
i:
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Figure 7.2-1
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I Project Office representative. Requests for MDAC-W s_gport originated
_ from several sources: MSG's through MDAC-W MSG personnel to Conference
Work Area (CWA) No. 6 (MDAC-W/OWS HOSC Control Room); directly to CWA
No. 6 from MSG's' to CWA No. 6 from OWS Project Office personnel; and
CWA No. 6 initiated through monitoring voice conversation and JSC
: action requests. '
_: All MDAC-W action requests requiring hardware fabrication, utilization
of the Backup OWS or conduct of testing required authority of the OWS
, Project Manager (or his designee). Details of the overall action sys-
tem are discussed in Section 7.2.6, however, for interface dis6ussio,_
<
J purposes there was an official authority interface with the Project
Manager
The MDAC-W senior representatives _o HOSC interfaced with all the
_ personnel or positions identified on the chart with the exception of i
_-_ Flight Operations Management Room (FOMR) (MSFC representatives to JSC _ •
J
: FOM__). The day-to-day interface was basically coordination with the ,
i MSG leaders and the OWS Project Office representative to CWA No. 6.
; Interface with the 0.D.'s or senior O.D.'s was mo_e periodic, depending _ ,
J
i_ on the events and circumstances. The MDAC-W CWA No. 6 Room Captains ,
provided the on-site full time capability for coordinating action ,
requests and responses (with Huntington Beach and MSFC) as well as a !
single point oi contact for MDAC-W personnel location and notification i
of problems. I
7.2.3 Facility Definition - The Skylab mission support facility is located -_:
primarily in the HOSC. The facilities available to MDAC-W were as i
! follows :
A. CWA No. 6 - CWA No. 6 (Figure 7.2-2) was used by MDAC-W to provide _,
,T / "-
1974020219-298

$_i a focal point for dirseminating action requests and a(tion re-
sponses, to provide a work area to work on problems, to maintain i
o
• communications with MDAC-W, Huntington Beach, as well as the on- i
site MDAC-W MSG personnel. The equipment within CWA No. 6 included
desk, work table, filing cabinet, technical library, three phones,
TV monitor, plus hardcopier and communication loops to monitor
Flight Directcr (FLT DIR), Ground Operational Support System (GOSS),
HOSC, FOMR, O.D,, plus several internal lines.
B. Administration Support Center (ASC) - The ASC provided m_gnafax
support, reproduction, limited typing, mail distribution, and an
_ extensive library of documents and photos.
_ C. Operations Support Room (OSR) - The real time data display consoles,
Mission Operations Planning System (MOPS) terminals, data hard-
_ copiers, and strip charts were located within the OSR and were
; manned by MDAC-W personnel as required by their respective mission
support leader.
D. Support Action Center-Orbltal Assembly(SAC-OA) - The SAC-OA was
manned by the Operational Support Manager (0SM) from which
HOSC/FOMR business was conducted. MDAC-W supported the OSM by
participating in status meetings and all technical meetings
affecting the OWS.
Other facility areas included:
A. Building _81 - MDAC-W Office - The MDAC-W office provided all of
the MDAC-W typing aaditlonal magnafax transmission, complet_
i MDAC-W drawing file, reproduction and normal MDAC administrative
_ services.
• 7-8
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LB. Crew Systems Facilities - The MDAC-W Crew Systems support personnel
_ worked out of the Crew Systems War Room. Available to them"were TV
monito1', communication monitors, and phones. Also, the Hi-Fi
Mockap was available next to the War Room for mockup of problem
solutions. The Neutral Bouyancy Facility was used by the Crew
Systems personnel to work crew training procedures using simulated
. zero "G" conditions.
r
; C. Experiment Work Area - TV monitor, voice monitor, and phones were
available within the Experiment Work Area to support problem
coordination.
"_ 7.2.2 MSFC Skylab Data System
7.2.4.1 General - Although many similaritics existed between Apollo and Skylab
data systems, the long duration mission, with the resultant large
quantities of data, r_quired significantly new approaches to data pro-
cessing. The most notable of these was the compression (or compaction)
of data such that only changes in data values were transmitted from the
ground stations to the data network. During final data reduction, the
"missing" static data bits were reinserted for a "continuous" data
_ curve. The downlinked data was recorded at the remote sites in both an
analog and digital format. The analog instrumentation tape recording
f
was utilized as "prime" data on the Apollo Program b_t the Skylab
Program utilized the digital tape recording. These digital recordings
were stripped of all redundant data samples by using an editing tech-
_ nique (zero-order-predictor) at the remote site. These edited data
[All Data Digital Tape (ADDT)] were then transmitted to JSC where they
were available in the Skylab Data Base. The ADDT computer terminal at
i_ JSC inserted tape recorder data, time sequenced the data, removed
{
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:, overlaps from the remote sites, and then transmitted the data to MSFC.
Figure 7.2-3 shows a simplified flow of Skylab data to MSFC with each
of the major elements described in the following sections,
7.2.4.2 Real Time Data - The on-board telemetry and command response data were
: downlinked at the remote sites, processed through the Remo+_ Site
Telemetry Computer (RSTC) and transmitted to JSC via Goddard Space
L
Flight Center (GSFC) and the Apollo Command, Communications, an_
Telemetry System (CCATS). At JSC these data were available in the
Skylab Data Base via the Mission Operations Computer (MOC). These
real time CCATS data were also transmitted to MSFC via a 50 kilo-bit
line where they were received at the HOSC, processed through computers
and Digital-to-TV (D/TV) generators to drive the video matrix for the
television and console displays.
Originally, real time data were to be received and displayed 8 hrs/day
with an option to call u_ additional data within one hour to assist in
_ solving urgent problems. However, because of complex difficulties
encountered in transmitting the ADDT to MSFC and because of the state
of the Skylab follow_ng launch, it became necessary to perform the
mission operation functions utilizing the real time data as a "prime"
data source. Tllis was performed by manning the HOSC in an
"around-the-clock" operation. This mode of operation placed very grea_
demands on the D/TV hardcopy capabilities during the first manned
mission, as well as requiring additional personnel tc man the consoles
|_ continuously. Certain data formats were hardcopied and transmitted by
telephone to Huntington Beach for tracking critical system performance.
_ 7.2.h.3 NO_S - Four MOPS terminals were available in the HOSC, at least one of
j_
_ which was operated around-the-clock. These terminals provided direct
7-i0
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access to the Mission Data Retrieval System (MDRS) Data Base at JSC. i
The data b_@.c iiormally contained the most recent (from about 2 hours
old) 48 hours of data (real time plas recorded) which could be
retrieved in fixed, predetermined plot or tabular formats in selected
: time slices and sample rates. The older data (more than h8 hours) was
stored on magnetic tape and catalogued into a historical data base
: which could be retrieved at a later time. The system (MOPS) proved to
be the prime source of data for contingency analysis until the data
books were awilable since real time dat_ "slices" at time points •
selected by the console monitor over ground stations. MO_S provided
continuous data tabulation within certain limitations.
7.2.h._ Auto S_an - The Auto Scan Program was a software progr_n r "stem of
smaller programs, any one or all of which could be resident in the
computer simultaneously. The Auto Scan main program perfon,_ed a limit
search, discrete event search, detected time of acquisition and loss
of signal, and output three tapes:
A. The Behavior History Tape (BHT) contained the times at which
measurements exceeded and returned to their predetermined limits,
/
. - the ms._.imumdeviation, and total number of points outside the
limits as well as the status and times for discrete event measure-
?
ments. (A minimum of five consecutive dat_ point_' outside the scan
• limits were required for a measurement to be processed onto the BHT
;_ and after eleven deviations were discontinued). A tabular output ;
report (Event Report and Limit Scan Report) was printed for I
' engineering review.
B. The Statistical Data Tape (STDT) contained the actual data that
• required more thorough study as determined by the limit search of
J
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the main program. _"T,iallowea special processin6 to be performed
as determined by the requestor.
C. _e data tabulation keying tape contained the measurement number
and times that these exceeded and returned to their limits as a
criterion to _rovide the start _ud stop times for further non-Auto i
Scan processing. This was used :n conjunction with a compressed i
data tape to produce special plots and/or tabs. i
During the storage period between SL-2 and SL-S, the lisLitsearch
portion of the Ar o Scan Program output was deleted an_ only
_ batches 3 and _ [1200 to 2_00 hours Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)] of
the ADDT data were routinely processed to the data book format.
This time interval covered the waking hours of the crew and any of
the remaining batches were processed on a contingency basis. These
_ changes resulted in a more realistic output schedule such c_at the
d_ta books were available within 12 to 48 hours.
_' 7.2.4.5 User Tapes - Skylab user tapes were provided to each contractor using
compressed data and a special user format. These tapes were used by
the contractors for detailed system evaluation or module performance
analysis for final evaluation reporting.
7.2._.6 Special Data - Telemetry was not the only source of data that was used
to evaluate the OWS. Crew voice transcripts were made from tape
recorded air/ground communicatio,l and from airborne tape playbacks.
These were available on a "quick-look" basis in about 24 hours and on
j
an "edited" basis in 2 to _ weeks. Copies of the crew debriefJngs and
crew logs were also available.
_ Photographs made by the crew were selected for review based on the OWS
7-13
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I: systems photographed. Video transmissions from the crew were recorded
I
> at the Mission Control Center (MCC). An "enhanced master merge" video
tape was prepared and transmitted to MSFC where a kinescope was then
L prepared. Copies of this kinescope were then provided to the contrac-
_- tots. The sound track was deleted from the kinescope pr_or to the SL-3
manned missions due to cost and availability considerations.
The problems encountered early during the launch of Skylab involving
the los_ c_ the Meteoroid Shield (MS) and the secondary problems of
g
overheating resulted in contingency data requirements. Analog tapes
T containing the launch and OWS telemetry links through insertion were
• requested. An analog tape from the Madrid tracking station was also
_ required to investigate an anomaly of the refrigeration system.
Video tapes were requested on two occasions; the rendezvous and
"fly-around" of SL-I/SL-2 and the trash airlock operations conducted
? during Day of Year (DOY) 253. A 16ram movie film to perform an analysis
of crew systems operations was requested.
7.2.5 MDAC-W Support Structure and Manning Schedules - The support structuref
was described in Section 7.2.2 and shown in Figure 7.2-1. The team
?
working out of CWA No. 6 manned 24 hours a day, seven days a week dur-
. ing manned and unmanned phases. Two senior representatives provided
! _-_,':.,_ coverage for seven days a week during manned operations (in HOSC during
major crew activity periods and on-call the other times) and a normal
_ shift, five days a week and on-call on weekends during unmanned opera-
tions. The MSG support team schedule was variable, depending on the ,.
needs of the individual groups, During the manned phase, the Electrical
Power System (EPS), Structural/Mechanical and Crew Systems support
<
personnel covered two shifts a day, seven d_vs a week. The
;/ 7-14
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: Environmensal Control System (ECS), Attitude Pointing and Control
System (APCS), and Instrumentation and Communication (I&C) support
personnel covered three shifts daily while the experiment support
t
individual covered a single shift 5 days a week. During unmanned
?
mission phases, ECS supported two shifts a day, seven d_vs a week, and
." l&C supported one shift a day, seven days a week.
:' Temporary Duty (TDY) support during the mission varied considerably
?
from the SL-1/SL-2 period through the SL-4 mission. This was basically
.c
because of two factors: the launch problem activity and a normal learn-
• ing curve. Subsequent to the initial launch and meteoroid shield
failure, several individuals were in Huntsville on TDY to aid in
developing solutions to the thermal shield and SAS deployments as well
:_ as program management. During the remainder of the mission, TDY was :
generally as shown on Figure 7.2-1 with the exception that two TDY
_ ind/viduals rotated to cover the I&C and EPS console monitoring until
}
the middle of the SL-3 mission. Experience gained in CWA No. 6 opera-
tions allowed release of two electrical engineers with subsequent
discontinuance or the l&C and EPS TDY. In general, it was viewed pre-
ferable to have individuals on a long term field assignment as opposed
to rotating several individuals to fulfill a requirement. This bettor .'
_, maintained continuity of operations.
7.2.6 Action Request Flow - The method used by the OSM to satisfy the actions _
_, requested by the various a_encies was as follows: the Action Request :
_ (AR) form was used to document requests initiated by MSFC; and the
" FOMR,'Mission Action Request (MAR) form was used by FOMR personnel at ,_
JSC. ,
7-15
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1Any agency requesting information, solutions to problems or recommenda-
tions, documented their reKuest on one of the forms and submitted it to
• the OSM at HOSC. After coordination with and approval of the O.D. the
&
_ OSM would then assign the request to the appropriate MSG or groups for
4
!
disposition. On some occasions, the contractors were assigned an
action. However, most contractor support was requested through the
i MSG, either verbally or written. When an action request was assigned
• affecting the OWS, a MDAC-W action number was assigned to the request
which was transmitted to Huntin&_&on Beach by magnafax for disposition.
The response by MDAC-W _;as then submitted to CWA No. 6. The action
response was reviewed by the senior representatives and coordinated with
--- the appropriate MSG. Distribution was also made to various MSG's,
MSFC personnel, the OWS Project Office, and MDAC-W Huntsville,
_ personnel. A log and copy of action requests end responses were kept
on record in the CWA No. 6. This overall system is shown on Figure
7.2-4.
j,
?
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Figure 7.2-4
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7.3 MDAC-W SUPPORT AT HUNTINGTON BEACH
L
i
7.3.1 Overview - Mission support activities at Huntington Beach were concen-
trated in the Mission Support Room (MSR), a part of the four-room
_ complex comprising the Huntington Beach Mission Support Center. The
MSR was the focal point for communications between MDAC-W, Huntington
Beach, and the other Skylab (SL) la,Auch and mission support organiza-
tions. Primary support consisted of providing a minimum manning crew
of technology personnel consistent with the mission phase for real
• time problem/action item solution. The on-duty crew was responsible
_ for keeping abreast of mission activities/anomalies by monitoring crew
and flight director voice loops and through telephone coordination with
Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC), JSC, MDAC-E, etc., and for
>
_; providing a coordinated technical position in support of JSC, HOSC, or
internally generated action items.
The Huntington Beach MSR was activated in January, 1973, to support
mission simulations originating at JSC. Continuous support was
: provided for the duration of individual simulations and key KSC count-
down activities. Around-the-clock support continued through SL-h
splashdown 08 February 197h. MSR manning levels during this period
varied in accordance with the requirements of the different mission
, phases.
7.3.2 Mission Support Team Definition/Organization - The OWS mission support
i,i_ i i
team was formed from Skylab OWS technology engineers and O_:Sprogram
_ support organizations to provide an organization capable of monitoring
the mission activity and solving all OWS anomalies/associated action
items during the Skylab mission. Organization of the team, including !
i_ the person in charge of each functional area, is depicted in Figur6 '
• i
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7.3.2.1. Personz_.l from the various support groups were assigned
to provide real t±me MSR manning. Figure 7.3.2-2 shows
mission support team in relationship to other MDAC-W mission support
organizations.
7.3.3 Summary of Huntington Beach Prelaunch Operations Support
A. Mission Simulation Support - Mission simulations originating at JSC
_ were held during th__period of 17 January 1973 through 05 May 1973.
The Huntington Beach M_R was operated in as close to the antici-
: pated mission mode as possible. Ground Operational Support System
(GOSS) and flight director voice loops were operational at the out-
set of the mission simulation period and the various other items
: of MSR equipment were phased in as they became operational. The
simulations provided an excellent training opportunity to famil-
iarize the mission support team with action item solving and
mission monitoring, and the intent was to utilize as many personnel
as possible. A total of 23 mission simulations, expending
approximately 4500 man-hours, were supported by the Huntington
Beach mission support team. The overall system for solving action
_ items and coordinating with HOSC and JSC was developed and improved
during this period.
i
MDAC-W participation in mission simulations was as follows:
_ o Orbital Operations Simulations - 170 Hours
o Deactivation Simulations - 50 Hours
o Activation Simulations - 25 Hours
o SL-I First Day Simulations - 90 Hours _
0WS action items worked during the simulations were as follows:
T-19 il
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1
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FIGURE 7.3.2-2 _
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'_ OWS SYSTEM NO. OF ACTION ITEMS
-" Instrumentation and Commtmication (I&C) - 12
Electrical Power System - 4
Enviromnental Control System (ECS) - 19
Attitude Pointing and Control System (APCS) - lO
Refrigeration System (RS) - 20
Water System - 9
i
Waste Management System (WMS) - 3 ,_
Mechanical Systems - 9
, Structures - 9 :.
Crew Systems - 3 ..
: Experiments - 12 '
%.
.! TOTAL MISSION SIMULATIOH ACTION ITEMS - ii0 :
B. KSC Prela_nch Support Huntington Beach MSR support of KSC pre-z--
: launch activity consisted of providing appropriate technology
_ personnel in the MSR to support specific key KSC prelaunch tests.
For these tests the voice channels normally us d for capcom and :
'_ flight director were switched at HOSC to the KSC Operational Inter-
com System (OIS) channels running the test. In this manner the MSR
personnel assigned to support the KSC test could monitor and follow
the test as it progressed. Due to the lack of anomalies during the
major prelaunch tests, very few action items were assigned. The
< KSC tests supported were as follows:
J,
" i/ 21-2k March 1973 Flight Readiness Test (F_2) '
2/ 27 March 1973 Systems Integration Test (SIT)
; 3/ 29 March 1973 Launch Vehicle FRT 4
:_ 4/ 27 April 1973 Countdown Demonstration Test (CDDT)
_. 5/ 02 May 1973 CDIE -.o\
6/ lh M_y 1973 Countdown -
_ In addition to the specific test support noted above, MDAC-W pro- i:
'; vided around-the-clock "locator-type" service at Huntington Beach :_
f, ,
in support of all KSC OWS operations. This service was used to aid
1974020219-314
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in the expediting of replacement hardware required at KSC and for
_ establishing teleconference setups between MDAC-W personnel at KSC _
and various Huntingtcn Beach engineers and management personnel to :
: discuss technical problems.
J
: f
)
/
?
i ,
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Y.3.h Identification and Management of OWS Problems/Action Reque:;ts - Figure
Y.3,h-i depicts the overall flow which action items followed from
origin to completion. This section of the report will cover the func-
tions performed and the paperwork utilized within the IIuntington Beach
i I_R to azcomplish the tasks from (A) - (B) on Figure 7.3._-i. Action
item initiation was the responsibility of the MSH Hoom Captain and he
initiated action items based upon the following sources:
'" A. Flight Operations Manager4ent Room (9_JMI()- Mission Action ](equest
._ (Mm_).
B. Hose Support Action Center - Orbital Assembly (SAC-OA) - Actio_
l(equest (AI¢).
C. HOSC Conference Work Area (CWA) No. 6 - Action Request.
D. Other - This category includes NU*AC-W management, MDAC/JSC, HOSC
MSG, MS1{real tims mission monitoring of voice loops.
: Regardless of the source, all MSl_ formal action items were initiated,
_ and the response documented, by the standard OWS MC,lt action item form.
After completion of the action item form copies of the action item
would be distributed and the action item log and status board would be
annotated.
The action item log provided control over action item number issuance
and comprised an index which assisted in retrieving action item infor-
matlon subsequent to closeout. The action item status board was a
management tool providing a qulck-look assessment of current action
: items. Color coding was utilized to provide e,,_hasis and easy recognl-
tlon of proximity to the due time. A responsible engineer was
selected for each action item. The responsible engineer selected,
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_: generally, was the senior system engineer as listed in Figure 7.3.2-1
having cognizance over the component/subsystem involved. Action items
• involving more than one technology were assigned to a senior tech_ical
_ represen+%_ive as prime responsiblity for integrating all inputs into
a single response. Acti_ item responses completed by the responsible
engineer were reviewed and approved by the senior technical represen-
tative, OWS Duty Officer, and Room Captain prior to tz_nsmittal to CWA
_ No. 6. This review cjcle formalized the action item response and
established it as a company position.
Informal responses and telephone conversations not requiring a formal
action _.temwere documented by using a Dire Response Re_nrd (DRR)
form. Completed DRR's were filed with the related action item if one
existed or in the Room Captain's Log "_nderthe dam of year that the
DRR was written.
k
Action items involving testing were handled in such a manner that the_
\
_ test authorization was processed and test results tracked by a separate
system. Two types of tests were utilized in support of MSR action items
(OWS Backup Vehicle and Component Tests). The Mission Support Test
Request (MSTR) was used to authorize, initiate, and document results
of both types of mission support tests.
7.3.5 Summary of Mission Support Action Items
A. A total of 1012 action items were assigned during the entire mission.
As a point of interest, the greatest activity in any one day occurred
DOY !35 in which 22 action items were opened and 20 closed out.
Responses to all action items were magnafaxed to _SFC and distributed
to effected personnel
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iB. Action item distribution by OWS system vs. mission period is pro-
vided in Table 7.3.5-i.
C. Action item distribution by initiating agency vs. mission period,
[i.e., JSC (FOMR-MAR's), MSFC (HOSC-AR's), or MDAC-W] are provided
in Table 7.3.5-2- It should be noted that many of the actior_s
initiated by MDAC-W were a result of informal requests by the MSFC
MSG's.
J
= D. Action item distribution by OWS system vs. type of action item are
provided in Table 7.3.5-3. Many action items involved more than
one type of action. Action items were classified by placing them
;'_ _! in the category where most of the effort was concentrated except
_ that all action items which provided hardware were placed in the
"hardware" category regardless of the amount of effort expended in
the other categories.
E. Action items worked in support of the Skylab mission are typical of
the following examples :
i/ Investigated the meteoroid shield anomaly including an assess-
ment of the effect of high temperatures on OWS equipment and
food, internal insulation, and optimum attitudes for thermal
L snd electrical control. Also, investigated alternate methods
for thermal control such as de_loyable sun shade.
2/ Investigated Solar Array System (SAS) Wing No. i deployment)
: problems including analysis of video tapes to develop procedures
Y and ,_rdware required _o make the SAS operational.
3/ Reviewed operational documentatiun, such as .activation and
deactivation checklists, co.and procedures, and flight mission
7-26 1
1974020219-319
( :
1I
1974020219-321
I
irules, for comp_ibility with the OWS configuration.
4/ Developed procedures fol removing ice formation in Wardroom
window cavity allowing continuation of experiment and astronaut i
observation activities !
• I
5/ Evaluated wearout of the triangle shoes and provided the
necessary hardware for fly-up on SL-3 and SL-h.
6/ Routinely evaluated Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP)
pie charts for compatibility with OWS systems. As a result of
this review, it was determined that the OWS insulation out-
gassing temperature limit of 200°F would be exceeded for
• extended Z-L_ EREP maneuvers. As a result of test data pro-
vided by MDAC-W the outgassing temperature limit was raised to
300°F al!owlng for increased flexibility in EREP planning.
7/ Evaluated the loss of OWS low-level multiplexer "B" and
identified instrumentation which could be utilized in lieu of
the low-level multiplexer "B" data.
8/ Investigated the W_te Management Compartment (WMC) H20 dis-
penser failure, identified the failure mode, and developed and
/
L
shipped spares to KSC for fly-up on the SL-3 command module.
9/ Developed the necessary procedures and hardware required to
i route experiment M092 vent into the waste tank resulting in a
\
non-propulsive vent which decreased Thruster Attitude Control
System (TACS) usage.
,' I0/ Developed RS flushing and dual loop operational procedures in .
an attempt to alleviate the RS radiator bypass valve anomaly.
J
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f.o.o Facility Description/Evaluution
7.3.6.1 Mission Support Center
A. Description - The OWS Mission Support Center consisted of a four
segment interconnected complex plus a separate data room all
1
located on the east end of the third floor of Building lb. Figure
7.3.6-1 is a sketch of the OWS Mission Support Center showing the
! relative position of the varicus areas. .-
J
l/ Mission Support Room (MSR) - The MSR _¢as the focal point of
OWS mission support activities and was the normal duty station 2
during mission support activities for assigned personnel. The
MSR was :rganized as shown in Figure 7.3.6-1. Nineteen direct
support position,s were provided, however, the room accommodated
?
up to 30 persons during high activity periods. Table location
assignments for normal operations were as follows: i
z
!
,i
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!Tables i _d 2: Room Csptain
Miss ion Operations Representative
Senior Technical Representative
J
NASA Representative
Duty Officer
Experiments
Tables 3 and h: Mechanical
Crew Systems
Aero/The rmal
Propuls ion
Tables 5 and 6: Electronics
Structures
Flight Mechanics
Historian
Facilities were available in the MSR for display of significant
data (schematics, detailed flight plans, spacecraft panel lay-
outs, photographs, etc. ) and storage of mission documentation
and essential support data frequently used during mission
operations.
2/ Secretarial and Access Control Area - This area provided all
facilities and supplies for secretarial support and magnafax
transmitting and receiving capability.
Access to the MSR could only be obtained through this area and
was limited to those required for mission support. The Room ._
Captain had complet. _ authority for access control.
3/ Problem Support Room (PSR) - The PSR was used for mission prob-
lem solving activity when group activities would interfere with
7-33
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normal operations of +h_ MSR. The PSR had limited support
facilities ira terms of display space, chalkboards, etc.
4/ Viewing Room- This room was utilized for observation of the
OWS mission support activities without interfering with those _
operations. The room accommodated up to 20 people during _eak
activity periods and was also used us a second Problem Support Room_
5/ Data Room - This room was utilized for storage of mission sup-
port type data (i.e., selected as-run test procedures, design
drawings, real time voice tapes, crew voice transcripts, etc.) ?
A Xerox reproduction machine was located here for support of
0%48 mission support activities.
/
B. Evaluation - The mission support center was adequately sized and
arranged to support mission monitoring and problem solving _:
activities.
7.3.6.2 Communications
A. Description - Communications within the OWS Mission Support Center
complex were as follows :
i/ Telephone - Eighteen telephone instrtunents were installed in
the OWS Mission Support Center with ll different extensions.
The,.e included two Federal Telephone System (FTS) lines and
four MDAC Type 1 (direct dial) lines. _
2/ Magnafax - A magnafax terminal was installed in the secretarial ;_
area which provided 2h hours/da_ sending and receiving caps-
•w_
bility. The magnafax was connected to an FTS telephone line
(additional to the two MSR FTS lines).
?-3_
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3/ Televisic,n - Commercial color TV sets were located in the MSR
and Viewing Room. These sets were utilized to monitor
commercially broadcast Skylab activities.
4/ LaLmch Information Exchange Facility (LIEF) Voice Circuits -
:" Three speakers were installed which were patched into the LIEF
Board at Huntsville. One speaker broadcast the launch director
loop during KSC prelaunch activities and was switched to the ::
{
JSC flight director's loop at launch of SL-I. The second
;" "4
i_ speaker broadcast the KSC OIS during prelaunch activities s
(switchable at HOSC to any of 16 KSC OIS circuits) and was
switched to the JSC GOSS at launch for monitoring of crew voice _
.... conversation with JSC. The third speaker was used when S-IVB
mission support activities required use of the other two lines
during SL-2, -3, and -4 launches.
5/ Data Displays - Two Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) data displays were
installed in the MSR. These displays each had a separate key-
board and provided the capability of displaying data in various
formats from the Data Engineering Tape Library (0WS checkout
data and user mag tapes supplied by MSFC during the missions). _
The two CRT displays were tied to a Timeshare computer so that/
_, both worked independently and simultaneously on different _
tapes. A single hardcopy device was installed in the same area i_
as the displays and was shared between the two displays. This
device provided a hardcopy of the data being displayed on either
CRT. A single intercom in the same area provided two-_'a_v _r
conversations between the MSR and the Data Engineering
Laboratory. _
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6/ Time - Clocks were installed along the north wall as follows:
Ground Elapsed Time (Digital Clock) MSFC/JSC
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) Local Time
KSC Time
7/ A remotely activated "Beeper" _ystem was established whereby
key personnel were contacted when away from their normal
telephones to assist in solving mission proble_zs/action items.
The MSR part of the system consisted of 30 Beeper units each
with a unique 4 digit code number assigned to key individuals
and a special touch pad telephone. The touch pad telephone
_ could access a central computer and input a _ digit code
activating the desired Beeper. In addition, an operator was
: ' on duty 2_ hrs/day at the Beeper facility for voice requests
by regular telephone.
B. Evaluation - Communications were generally adequate and properly /
sized to support mission activities except as noted in the
following:
l/ Due to extremely high activity in the first part of the mission
telephone capacity and arrangement was found to be inadequate,
and the following changes were accomplished: two new extensions
were added to the Problem Support Room (PSR), a single line
speaker phone was added to the Room Captain's position and was
dedicated for use between the MBR and CWA No. 6.
2/ The vast majority of magnafax activity was transmittal of action
item information between the MSR and HOSC CWA No. 6. A great
deal of time was wasted in thls uommunicatlon loop due to the
slowness of magnafax (6 minutes per page) and due to the fact
7-36
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ithat CWA No. 6 did not have a magnafax machine and all trans-
mittals had to go through the HOSC Administrative Support }
Center. The main problems occurred when sending from the
_ Huntington Beach MSR to HOSC since an automatic machine was
.<
used to receive and of_cen large action items would have to be
sent 2 or 3 times Just to get one readable set of pages. A :'
manual magnafax machine in CWA No. 6 would have greatly improved i_
/
this loop.
3/ As the mission progressed beyond the early stages, very little
Skylab TV was broadcast commercially. For the TV to be
effective on future programs a data link would have to be
provided to supply real time TV which is received at JSC.
: 4/ The CRT data displays did not get as much utilization as
1_ expected. One problem with this system w_ that the data
displayed was generally old. A more desirable systelawould
have been a real time data link to HOSC.
i
<
7.3.7 Mission Support Manning Schedules (Manned/Unmanned) - The quantity _d
types of personnel required in the MSR during any particular time period
depended upon the type of mission activity taking place in that time :
_ period. Generally, minimum manning levels were _,dJusted downward as
the mission progressed _.ndaction item activity decreased. The ;
_ following discusses the manning during each mission period. ;
"! _
: A. KSC Prelaunch Operations - The MSR was utilized as a focal point
_ for Huntington Beach support of KSC checkout and prelaunch activi- ,-
ties. The room was manned by a Locator 24 hrs/day during the last
four months prior to launch. 0n-call personnel were available to be
contacted by the Room Captain/Locator to initiate work on the KSC _
i 7-37
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: : problems. The Locator was replaced by a mission support te.%m dur-
specific high activity and launch tests. The team consisted of a
Room Captain and the appropriate technology personnel nece"sary to
support each individual test. During normal KSC operations the MSR
was available for Huntington Beach personnel to monitor KSC tests
on the voice loops.
o
B. SL-1 - This period began at approximately T-k hours and continued
_ to SL-2 launch. Manning for this period was per Table 7.3.7-1.
:_ C. SL-2, SL-3, aid SL-4 Manned Activation/Deactivation - Manning for
[
SL-2, SL-3, ._nd SL-4 activation/deactivation was per Table 7.3.7-2.
• D. Normal Manned Orbital Operations (SL-2, -3, and -h) - This period
: consisted of normal manned operations subsequent to the activation
period and stabilization of OWS systems. Minimum MSR manning dur-
ing these periods was per Table 7.3,7-3.
E. Unmanned Orbital Operatiors - This period started at the end of the
applicable deactivation period and lasted to the start of the next
activation period. Duzing this period the MSR was manned 2_ hrs/day
by a Room Captain. No preplanned design technology manning was
necessary during this period, however, technology representatives
; were required to visit the MSR daily to be abreast of mission
• activity. Personnel necessary to solve specific mission problems
were called in as necessary.
:_ F. Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) Periods , A minimum crew was _
required consisting of the following: Room Captain, Historian,
"_ Propulsion, Electrical, M_.chanical, Aero Thermal, Structures, Crew
-" Systems.
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TABLE 7.3.7-1
SL-I MANNING
POSITION MSR DUTY PERIOD
ROOM CAPTAIN CONTINUOUS
MISSION OPERATIONS C0 -INUOUS
EPS
SENIOR SYSTEM ENGINEER FIRST l0 HOURS
SYSTEM ENGINEER CONTINUOUS
l&C
SENIOR SYSTEM ENGINEER FIPST 1C HOURS
SYSTEM ENGINEER CONTINUOUS
ECS
SENIOR SYSTEM ENGINEER FIRST l0 HOURS
SYSTEMS ENGINEER CONTINUOUS
FLIGHT MECHANICS
CONTROL SYSTEM ENGINEER THROUGH ORBIT STABILIZATION
KINETICS SYSTEM ENGINEER THROUGH ORBIT STABILIZATION
MECHANICAL
SENIOR SYSTEM ENGINEER FIRST l0 HOURS
SYSTEM ENGINELR CONTINUOUS
ORDNANCE ENGINEER THROUGH DEPLOYMENT SEQUENCES
REFRIGERATION
SENIOR SYSTEM ENGINEER FIRST l0 HOURZ
SYSTEM ENGINEER CONTINUOUS
PROPULSION
SENIOR SYSTEM E_:GINEER FIRST I'0HOURS
SYSTEM ENGINEER CONTINUOUS
STRUCTURES
SENIOR SYSTEMS ENGINEER FIRST l0 HOU}m$
SYSTEM ENGINEER CONTINUOUS
SAS DESIGN ENGINEER FIRST l0 HOURS
METEOROID SHIELD ENGINEER FIRST l0 HOURS
HISTORIAN CONTINUOUS
SENIOR TECHNICAL REPP_SENTATIVE CONTINUOUS
OWS DUTY OFFICER CONTINUOUS
SECRETARY 6:00 AM TO 7:00 PM DAILY
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TABLE 7.3.7-2
SL-2, SL-3, SL-h _CglVATION/DEACTIVATION MANNING
POSITION MSR DUTY PERIOD
_OOM CAPTAIN CONTINUOUS
: MISSION OPEBATIOI{S CONTINUOUS
t
; .. ELE CTRICAL CONTINUOUS
kCS CONT.VNUOUS
MECHANICAL/REFRIGERATION CONTINUOUS
CREW S.'STEMS CREW AWAKE PERIOD
EXPERIMENTS CONTINUOUS DURING
EXPERIMENT
{ ACTIVATION/DEACTIVATION
i PROPULSION CONTINUOUS
: STRUCTURES CONTINUOUS
HISTORIAN CONTINUOUS
SENIOR TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE CONTINUOUS
OWS DUTY OFFICER CONTINUOUS
SECRETARY 6:00 AM TO 7:00 PM DAILY
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G. Unplanned Contingency _er:ods - On-call personnel were recalled to
MSR by Beeper system (Reference Section 7.3.6 B.7.) as required to
support contingency.
• i
%
• i
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7.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• 7.h.l General - The overs/] MDAC-W Orbital Workshop (O_'S) mission support
" activity was conducted per the pre-mission plan. The resultant
•_ support was effective in providing NASA the technical information, test
information, and hardware required to support mission operations. All
actions directed to MDAC-W were completed in a timely fashion with
responses directed to the appropriate MSFC technical [Mission Support
Group (M_G)] personnel through the MI)AC-W _SFC on-site personnel.
7.4.2 Prelaunch Support - From mid-January, 1973, to Skylab-i (SL-I) launch,
around-the-clock "locator type" support was provided at Huntington
Beach in support of KSC checkout and launch preparations. While KSC
-_ support requirements were relatively light compared to mission support,
: several hardware support requests were coordinated through the support
room which resulted in expedited handling and shipping of replacement
hardware to KSC. Use of teleconference capability _o allow various
Huntington Beach engineers and management personnel to discuss techni-
c'_l problems with MDAC-KSC personnel during Huntington beach non-working
hours proved fruitful. As we approached launch and time to solve
_ problems became more critical, this service received increased activity.
Prelaunch support is concluded to have been adequate as conducted.
7._.3 .4ission Simulations - Pre-mission participation by MDAC-W in the NASA
mission simulations proved beneficial in the development of in-house
operating systems and procedures and in developing communication
channels with the NASA mission support organizations. It is believed
that additional benefits could have been derived from these mission
J
simulations had (I) NASA real time data processing and data handling
:. been included as a part of the simulations, and (2) MDAC-W been per-
:_ mitred to participate more actively in the simulation debrieflngs.
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}7,h.4 Mission Support Organization and Manning - The OWS mission support team
included members from all program support organizations and was formed
to assure an integrated and total response to all launch and mission
' support demands. This team concept proved effective for dealing with
i , all mission support problems by providing technical support, test sup-
; port and hardware development support. Huntington Beach mission
i support was provided around-the-clock for the entire mission period. :
! ' Manning levels in the _R varied dependent upon mission periods and i
/
_ level of activity. The manning levels were adequate to support the i
NASA requirements in a timely manner. Making "on-call" assignments
and use of radio controlled paging systems proved very effective in
_ contacting personnel during off-duty hours. Integration of key MDAC _ :
f
!_ launch and support personnel into the mission support team proved ;
beneficial to the mission support activity and helped to maintain the
)
capability for a backup launch, should this have been required.
7.4.5 Mission Support Facilities - The facilities at Huntington Beach as
'2 described in Section 7.3 were utilized to their fullest capability and
proved to be a significant factor in the overall capability to provide
effective support Of significant importance were the flight director
and crew real time voice transmission loops which provided the caps-
:, billty to maintain cognizance of mission progress and problems.
The magnafax machine traffic was very heavy and quite often caused delay2 "J
_ of required information due to slowness of _ransmission (_ix minutes .i
per page). Higher speed transmission equipment is strQngly recommended, _
_ The presence cf a magnafax station in Conference Work Area (CWA) No. 6 ' _"
_" at the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) would have proved
: beneficial, especially during high activity perlods when the HOSC _ _
central machine was busy or unattended in the automatic mode causing a :i
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requirement for re-transmls_ion of many pages due to "page-splitting"
or other trans_ission problems.
The lack of real time data at Huntington Beach diluted the capability
" of the technical people to provide thorough and timely response to many
problems. Telephone communication of real time data from MSFC helped
to fill this gap but expediting of hard data (data tapes etc. ) through •
normal system and transportation channels was ineffective in supporting
- real time problems. The delay for this data was normally 7 to i0 d_ys
J
making it useful only for long term mission evaluation. A real time
data source, Mission Operations Planning System (MOPS) terminal or
= equivalent, would have proved beneficial.
7._.6 Action Item Assignment, Tracking, and Response - A total of lO12 a_tion
• items were assigned to the OWS mission support team with responses to
all actions provided to the MSFC in a timely manner as required to
support the on-going mission operations. These actions involved the
following type of activity:
;_ 150 Hardware Delivery Actions
68 Component Test Support Actions
• 27 OWS Backup Test Support Actions
5h Engineering Information Actions
• 88 Crew Procedures Actions
62__5 Engineering Analysis Actions
1012 Total OWS Mission Support Actions '
The MDAC mission support action item system for __ssignment, tracking,
and responding to mission support requirements was basically sound and
remained intact throughout the mission This system provided the - _
necessary integration, tracking, and management surveillance to maxi-
mize timeliness and quality of action item responses. During the early
mission period, the action item traffic was so heavy that both timeliness
7-_5 °
1974020219-338
i_ and quality of some action item responses was less than desired. "
Additional resources and time (neither of which were practical) may
, have alleviated this problem. In many cases a better definition of
the problem would have been beneficial but was difficult to obtain
because of the same heavy workload burden on the NASA personnel at MSFC
and JSC. A more formal NASA (both MSFC and JSC) feedback system to i
document the final disposition of action items [Mission Action i
: Requests (MAa's), Action Requests (AR's), and OWS Action Items (Al's)]
would ha_e proved beneficial. Quite often we would learn of problem
disposition by monitoring crew voice or flight director loops, reading
• _ crew transcripts, or through direct requests through MSFC of JSC
4 mission support group personnel.
Maintaining a good action item index and tracking system was difficult
! during the early mission period as many related actiorswere assignedi
new action item numbers with no reference to previous actions address-
ing similar activity. This was generally corrected by greater use of
action item dash numbers to group related actions.
7.14.7 Hardware and Test Support - The inclusion of manufacturing operations :
and the various MDAC test support organizations as part of the OWS
i
mission support team and the assigrauent and control of hardware and
J
test support activity through the basic mission support action assign-
ment system pro_'-_dvery effective. Hardware and test activities were i
: accomplished in concert with mission support requirements and were
j provided in a timely manner. Delivery and control of MDAC hardware to
MSFC during the early mission period caused some problems. A system
:. for single point (one individual) delivery and control was established
and alleviated many of the problems..i
?
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7.4.8 !_AC-W 0n-Site Support at MSFC - The general approach used by NASA/MSFC
_ and supported by MDAC-W to provide mission support at MSFC was sound
: and worked. Shortly after the initial launch, however, the need for
operational improvements became evident and a series of changes were
" implemented. The most notable of these were: (i) a substantial
increase in level of attention to real time monitoring of systems via
data display consoles in the HOSC and establishment of plans and
criteria for collecting and evaluating data (consoles were monitored
on a 24-hour a day basis rather than the before-launch plan of 8 hours
a day), and (2) a substantial increase in the numbers of personnel and
_ the technical depth of talent required real time in the HOSC,
including the establishment of an Operations Director and Senior
Operations Director to act as both technical and operational management
for all HOSC resources.
The assignment by the _G leaders of some MDAC-W support engineers to
console monitoring positions diverted their attention from technical
coordination of 0WS actions and responses. It is believed that the
on-site MDAC-W support personnel could have provided better support in
the coordination role. To accommodate this would have required
additional personnel for assignment to the console positions,
In the action item system the contractor was excluded from direct action
item response requirements other than as a support role when requested
by the NSG. While MDAC-W chose to respond to all actions affecting the
0WS, this was not true for all contractors. Action item submittal
utilization was thus the perogative of the MSG. It is believed
_- that the prime contractors could h_ve been of greater service if
utilized more directly in the action response syste_ and given
the opportunity to review responses affecting their systems.
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Major technical discus3ions were often carried out on the Operations
;. Director (OD) networks or Flight Operations Managemen" Room (FOMR)
6
: loops without the contractor, and the contractor was not involved
unless they were called into the Support Action Center - Orbital
i Assembly (SAC-OA) room to participate. In addition, the contractors
home facility was rarely tied into a conference loop. This exclusion
occasionally resulted in incomplete information being related on a
-h
4
particular question. It is believed, in the future, that better "_
contractor support can be realized by inclusion in acticn discussed
teleconferences and meetings.
The CWA No. 6 was generally inadequate. _%e size was too small to • '
fully accommodate supporting material, work areas to le_ out drawings i
4
and discuss problems, as well as monitor voice and data loops. Each :
contractor should have a two-room complex with at least three times
: the square footage of area. One room ,'_hould house a library with
pertinent data, handbooks, procedures, etc., to support problem eval- i
uation, while the other room should be utilized strictly for voice i
monitoring and teleconferences. The data room should have microfilm ;i
drawing file and printer along with an Long _istance Xerox (LDX)
" machine. The absence of drawings within HOSC often placed an
: unnecessary burden on personnel to drive the one mile to the MDAC-W ' :
office at MSFC, locate the microfilm and print a drawing. The avail- : _"
able phone lines were often busy and difficult for incoming callers.
" A phone with a rotary of four numbers would have greatly relieved the '_
: congest ion.
The volume of data and magnitude of the dat_ handling and processing
systems for Skylab were probably under estimated. The differences and
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changes from the Apollo systems are much more profound in the areas of
. data reduction and ana].vsis than in the display and monitoring of the
t
real. time data.
_q
Problems were encountered in the processed All Digital Data Tape (ADDT)
data during simulations conducted before liftoff which caused a very
low confidence level in this data system. However, many of these prob-
lem_ were resolved during the mission such that "erroneous data"
became the exception rather than the rule. Using relatively new
"state of tl_e art" techniques like the zero order prediction at the
remote Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) sites added to the
: already complicated, complex system. Although the data compaction that
was actually achieved was not what was expected, the Skylab data system
performance should form a good basis for further investigation an_
studies, The development of the Auto Scan Program to assist the
: systems engineers in spotting and analyzing anomalies were rendered
almos_ useless by the lack of confidence in the ADDT data. Perhaps the
overwheh_ing raaL of processing the Skylab data could have been per-
formed with more confidence if more systems checkout time could have
been allowed or if the burden vere shared with each module contractor.
, i
!
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SECTION 8 - NEW TECHNOLOGY
t
_: The Skylab (SL)-Orbital Workshop (OWS) evolved from the Saturn S-IV/S-IVB, the
io Manned Orbital Laboartory (MOL), and the Gemini and Mercury programs over a time
* span of fifteen years. A considerable amount of new technology has been developed
during this time which is applicable to current and future aerospace programs and
to the commercial sector of the USA economy. These new technologies include patent
disclosures_ hardware with associated test and operational data, and design fabri-
cation, test, checkout and/oz mission support computer programs. These items can
be applied as currently established or can provide a cost effective basis for con-
version to the desired configuration.
: 8.1 AEROSPACE APPLICATIONS
The applicable new technologies will be identified in the following two
sections: Patent Disclosure Listing Lnd Hard%,are and Design Concepts.
8.1.i New Technology Patent Disclosures - MDAC-W, under the provisions of the
New Technology Clause, made i04 New Technology disclosures during the
: years 1969 through 1974. Table 8.1,1-1 is a tabulation of these dis-
closures. All new technology reports received by NASA are reviewed and
:: those having commercial potential are disseminated to all sectors of the
U.S. industry by NASA. As noted in the tabulation, NASA has filed Patent
Applications on some of the items. Six items have been filed for patent
by NASA and 22 items are of notable use. _
8.1.2 Applicable Hardware and Design Approaches - The 0WS design represents a
state-of-the-art which resulted from an evolution of manned spacecraft
technology from the early days of the Mercury and Gemini designs, con-
tinuing through the giant step taken by the Apollo program, then through i
:_ the further improvements necessary to sustain long duration manned space _
missions required by the Skylab program.
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OWS design is composed of several phases of technological development:
A. Existing flight-qualifled hardware subsystems from the Gemini
program.
B. Apollo-era technology uprated in several areas to accommodate
the extended duration cf zero-g flight conditions.
C. New systems developed to accommodate needs not previously ex-
perienced representing current stage-of-the-art.
Several of the technology advancements are, in part, due to the large
= volume within the habitable quarters of the spscecraft. Sufficient
room is available for the design of individual sleeping quarters, a
wardroom for preparing and eating meals, a waste management compartment,
and an entertainment center. All are separate from the area designated
for conductiz,g experiments.
The following OWS systems provide a reservoir of hardware, operational
use data and analysis/design approaches which can provide cost effective
solutions for current and/or future manned/unmanned spacecraft.
Electrical Power System (EPS) - The OWS power source consists of approxi-
! mately 1,200 ft2 (111.5 m2) of solar cells. Mission duration and redundancy
requirements precluded the use of fuel cells, the prime power supply for
Apollo. Under normal operating conditions the workshop arrays supply
power to the Multiple Docking Adapt_r, Airlcck Module, and Orbital Workshor;
the Apollo Telescope Mount arrays supply power for the experiments and
control system located in that mount only. In addition, bidirectional power
transfer capability is provided by means of transfer busses to allow either
: array system to power the entire Skylab cluster.
The OWS Solar Array System (Figure 8.1.2-1) consists of externally mounted
q-
and deployable wing assemblies which unfold after insertion into orbit to
; expose the solar panels to sunlight. The sun side of the solar array is
: covered by 1_7,8_0 solar cells connected in series to satisfy the voltage
requirements, and in parallel to satisfy the current and power requirements.
These cell-groups are combined into mcdules and panels. Modules are
connected electrically in 8 groups and located on the wings in a specified
1974020219-351
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pattern to compensate for the effects of potential shadows and variations
in array temperature. This technique helps maintain a balance in the use
of the power conditioning groups, thus equalizing the life of the numerous
onboard batteries. The average available powel from the array during the
i sunlight portion of the orbit is approximately 10,500 watts while in the
solar inertial mode. However, due to the day/night operation, vehicle
orientation, and system efficiency, the power output capability is
approximately 3,750 watts. The mechanical and electrical buildup of the
: system to maintain redundancy and to minimize the impact of single point
" failures is a unique design feature which was beyond the state-of-the-art
at the time the preliminary designs were initiated.
Refrigeration System - To provide freezers and chillers for food, water,
and urine for the extended stay in orbit, an active refrigeration system
was required (Figure 8.1.2-2). The simpler thermal control system used
in earlier manned spacecraft could not provide the low temperatures desired,
the redundancy or duration required for the Skylab mission. The refrigera-
tion system consists of a circulating single phase liquid coolant (Coolanol),
a large radiator, and a phase changing wax compound heat sink (Undecane)
which acts as a thermal capacitor. The radiator is sized to provide an
energy rejection rate to space equal to the average OWS excess energy load.
The peak energy demands are satisfied by the thermal capacitors which
absorb excess thermal ener_ r during the daytime orbital pass.
Film Vault - The large amount of highly sensitive photographic film required
: for _he Skylab mission resulted in a unique design problem. Return of the
film to the ground was limited to the scheduled deorbiting of the Command
• Module and crew, necessitating a relatively long storage period. The high
:. radiation levels encountered at the Skylab orbital altitude dictated an
extreme sblelding requirement, consisting of a thick-walled aluminum vault
approximately 15 ft3 (.42 m3) in volume (Fig. 8.1.2-_). To protect the
packaged film magazine/cassettes from damage due to moisture, special
desiccant salt packs are stowed in the film vault. These salt packs are
calibrated to maintain a relative humidity of approximately _5 percent
throughout the mission duration. The shielding requirement resulted in a •
vault weighing about 3,000 pounds. This large concentrated weight required
_ 8-11
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significant structural support to accommodate the loads encountered _:
during launch.
Vehicle Attitude Control System - The Skylab represents the largest
_ spacecraft ever placed in Earth orbit, the Orbital Workshop "laboratory" _
alone being about 50 times larger than the Apollo capsule. Relative to _
! past manned spacecraft, the physical size of this vehicle imposed require- _ -t_
ments which _e unique. Accurately controlling and maneuvering this i00-
_ _ ton (90.718 kg) space station, and ma/ntainiz,g a comfortable environment
_: throughout the entire volume presented challenging design considerations.
During the eight-month coast period the Skylab was required to accurately
_ point the telescopes in the Apollo Telescope Mount experiment package to i
desired locations on the solar disc, as well as to p1"ovide three-axis
[_ attitude control and maneuverability. To satisfy these rigid requirements :
_ i a dual control system was designed, consisting of control moment gyros "
f
- for the prime moment source and supplemental reaction control thrusters.
i 'The supplemental system (i.e., the OWS Thruster Attitude Control System)
i consists of a r,on-conteminating, gaseous nitrogen blow-down system which )
provides primary control of the cluster until the control moment gyros are
spun-up (Flgure 8.1.2-k). The nominal pressure in the _ nitrogen spheres ,
at liftoff is 3,100 psi (2.137 x 107 N/m2). This system provides supple-
ments.l control for control moment gyros desaturation, for maneuvers, and
for docking transients. Components of the system were designed for rapid
response (minimum impulse bits) and extremely low leakage by use o_ all
brazed Joints in the high pressure part of the system to provide maximum
orbital capability.
Environmental Control System (ECS) The ECS for the Skylab cluster provides-
atmospheric gas composition, pressure and temperature control, electronics _ _:
i
equipment thermal control, atmosphere contaminant control, and crew compart-
ment radiant thermal environmental control (Figure 8.1.2-5). The atmos-
pheric gas composition for the Skylab has a dual gas system (02/N2). An ,:
enriched oxygen atmosphere is used in the Skylab resulting in a partial pres-
sure of approximately 3.6 psi (28 x 103 N/m2) of oxygen an_ i._ psi :
1974020219-356
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(ii x 103 N/m2) of nitrogen. Atmosphere heating is accomplished
using electric heaters in the Orbital Workshnp. The atmosphere is
cooled by heat exchangers in the Airluck Module.
Odor and trace gas removal is accomplished by a molecular sieve/
/ charcoal cannister system.
The primary vehicle thermal control system relies on the extensive
use of passive thermal control coatings such as gold tape/foil and
various paints and paint patterns. Local thermal control to preclude
condensation is provided by a system of heat pipes. A unique feature
of the Orbital Workshop is a large multilayer insulation blanket on
the forward dome which used a ground purge and environmental system to
maintain the insulation free of moisture until launch.
_ Living Quarters - As opposed to being a basic transportation vehicle,
the Skylab was designed to provide the conveniences of a long duration
habitable spacecraft. It was designed to include a kitchen, three
bedrooms, bathroom, and two levels of laboratory work sp_, . It also
! provides a volume of sufficient size to allow considerable mobility
by the crew, which in itself created unique design problems.
Personal Hygiene - Skylab personal hygiene equipment provides for the
maintenance of skin health, personal cleanliness, grooming, and the
collection and disposal of bo_ _,particulate matter. This eqL,ipment is
unique in that it provides many more items than previous manned spacecraft,
and allows the crew more pri,,acy in a more near Earth-type facility.
The Skylab personal hygiene system (Figure 8.1.2-6) includes common
equipment such as tissues, wipes, towels, washcloths, mirrors and trash
bags; also individual equipment (for each individual astronaut) such as
tooth brushes, combs, shaving eeuipment, etc. Other unique hardware for
crew hygiene include_ a whole-body shower, which uses a vacuum arrangement
to contain the water in a zero-g environment, warm water dispenser, and
J washcloth and towel drying equipment.
8-17
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Water System - Water for the entire eight-month mission is stowed in
tanks aboard the Orbital Workshop prior to liftoff. Approximately 6,000
ibs (2721 kg) of water was available through the water system (Figure
8.1.2-7) for drinking and persons/ hygiene, including allowance for each
crewman to take a weekly warm-water shower.
t
Three independent and isolated water distribution systems were utilized
(potable, personal hygiene, and urine flush). For biomedical purposes,
a highly accurate dispensing system was designed for measurement of the
_ potable water.
Ten identical water tanks with pressurized nitrogen gas expulsion bellows
provides sufficient water pressure throughout the Orbital Workshop.
An iodine monitoring and injection system has been designed tc maintain
_- the proper biocide level throughout the entire mission. To ensure the
health of the crew an iodine level of 2.0 to 6.0 ppm is maintained. This
level ir well above biocide levels found in the average metropolitan water
supply system.
Waste Management System - This system is_mposed of several subsystems
designed to provide for nollection, storage and/or disposal of body waste
and Sebris (Figure 8,i.3-8). The OWS concept utilized the existing
S-IVB oxidizer tank by converting it into a 2800 ft3 (79.27 m 3) vented waste
tank. The tank was separated into compartments for solid, liquid an_ gaseous
wastes with stainless steel screen material capable of filtering to a
particle size of i0 microns absolute. In so doing, the capability was
obtained for hnldlng all sclid waste products on board th&t were generatedc
during the mission; thus assuring the contaminate-free _nvironment required
to accommodate sensitive optical and atmospheric experiments. The
sanitary collec_ion of urine, feces, and vomitus, precluding cross con-
8-21
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tamination between crewmen's specimens, and the preparation for return
of sample_ to Eerth presented uniqz:e design problems. A gas-flow system
used in the waste collector and processor assists in the collection of
urine (Figure 8.1.2-9), which is then subjected to a centrifugal
separation of urine and gas. Urine samples are extracted every 24 hours
and frozen in preparation for subsequent analysis. A "thermal wax"
(Dodecane) is nontained in _he bottom compartment of the urine sample
trays, providing needed temperature control to prevent thawing during
return to Earth in the Command Module. Feces and vomit are dried using
heat and vacuum prior to stowage.
A vacuum cleaner module is provided for collection of loose waste through-
out the Orbital Workshop. A debris bag is used in the normal vacuum
cleaner manner. These bags are subsequently sealed, and are disposed in
the waste (LOX) tank through the Trash Airlock. The waste tank also
serves as a repository for residual urine trash hags, solid wastes (food
cans, wipes, etc.) and liquid wastes (wash water, activation water, etc.).
In addition to the Trash Airlock there is a port through the bulkhead to
accommodate gas dumps (fecal dryer) and a heated probe to serve as a
secondary system for urine disposal.
Data Transmittal for European Spacelab Project - In response to a request
from the NASA data on OWS material and equipment which could be applicable
to the European Spacelab project was transmitted to the NASA/MSFC by
MDAC-W Letters A3-850-AZCS-LW-1201 (September I0, 1973) and
A3-250-AZCS-LW-1216 (September 21, 1973).
8.2 OTHER APPLICATIONS
Areas in the commercial sector of the economy along with the technology
which will have application will be identified in the following material.
: i'. 8..22
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8.2.l Electronic/Electrical - A considerable amount of new electronic/
electrical technology has been developed that has diredt potential
utilization to current 8teas of interest.
Solar Array Systems - With the energy crisis all possible energy
sources have to be explored and the sun is a real candida*e. One
possible use would be the conversion of the sun's energy, through
the use of large solar array farms, into electrical power. The Skylab
solutions in the following technology areas provide the initial step
towards producing a feasible, cost effective earth bound solar con-
version system.
o N-on-P silicon cell construction
o Minimization of shadowing effects through cell interconnection
techniques and diode isolation
o Passzve thermal control
o Super-flex cable construction
o Manufacturing panel repair techniques at the a=sembly level
o Fault isolation capability through development of Dark EI tcsts
o Correlation of solar versus pulsed xenon performance
General Illumination Light - There are many non-aerospace areas that
will benefit from the Skylab technology identified in the following:
o Shatterproof bulb
o Low power consumption (12 watts)
o Fast starting
o Easy removal (one-hand operation in zero-g)
o Vibration/shock protected
o High illumination efficiency (mercury-vapor)
o Long life capability[testedtol0,00Ohrs(3.6 x 108 sec)and2,750 start cycles]
o Operates from 0 to 26 psia(O to 1.792 x 105 N/m2).
o Not affected by 100% oxygen atmosphere or 100% relative humidity
o EMI suppression design
L
These areas include hospital speci_l treatment and surgery facilities,
mines, undersea operations, manufacturing operations that utilize hazardous
gases, etc.
_r
_ 8-2k
1974020219-366
Overall Electrical Hardware Construction - The Skylab techniques
that evolved out of the program can have direct benefit to colercial
interests in the four following areas:
o Flammability and outgassing control
:' Plarma arc coating of electronic modules
Sectionalized cable troughs
Non-flammable wire harness "boots"
o Crew hazard prevention
Touch temperature control on display panels
Hazard bonding
Teflon coating of meter faces and lenses
Exploslcn proof connectors
Guards arom_d switches and circuit breakers
Elimination of sharp edges
o Elimination of electromagnecic interference
Single point grounding systmn
RF filters
Physical separation of system functions (e.g. _ power, signal, etc.)
Shielding
o System reliability
Redundancy
Interchangeability
Lightning protection
Component/wire derating
Transient protection
Specialized thermal screening
8.2.2 Fireproof Materials - MSFC Specification i01 forced an extension of the
"state-of-the-art" in production and fabrication of fire resistant
materials. Many of these ha_e potential application in industrial and
consumer utilization.
Non-Flammable Fiberboard - This material is similar to ordinary corregated
cardboard. It is light and easily fabricated but will not support com-
bustion. Potential applications are:
r 0 Record storage boxes
o Facing materials for rigid foam (flammable and non-flammable) '.'
o Storage boxes for use in hazardou._ environments
o Trash containers for flammable materia, s :
8-25
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Fluorel Moldings and Coatings - Moldings and coatings of non-
flammable fluorel were used extensively on the Skylab program.
Design and fabrication knowledge gained can be utilized in industrial
and consumer applications. Spray coatings of flammable materials
would be a major utilization in such applications as co-_ercial air-
crat% and other transportation modes.
Armalon Fabric Fabrication - The extensive use of non-flamnable
arms/on, a teflon coated fiberglass fabric in the Skylab program
resulted in a wealth of fabrication technology. Utilization of this
technology in industrial and consumer applications could make armalon
a cost effective fabric for applications requiring a non-flammable
material.
8.2.3 Zero Gravity Restraint Equipment - The zero gravity environment of
Skylab is quite similar to the buoyant environment found in the
developing field of underwater technology and habitation. The problem
of restraining a crewman to perform a task in zero gravity is the same
as for a diver performing a task while submerged. In fact, the prime
method of simulating zero gravity, in order to test and develop hardware
for spaceflight, is the use of neutral buoyancy test facilities. The
de.ign technology an<_equipment developed on Skylab can be directly
: utilized in its counterpart underwater programs, which it is anticipated
will grow as undersea mining, oil exploration and farming of the _ea
activities increase.
8.2.b Structural Technology - A considerable amount of expertise in the
structural technology has been developed and is applicable in the
following cow_ercial areas:
o Design and fabrication of large and small pressure vessels of
various shapes and materials for use in industrial application
for gas or liquid storage. Includes insulation systems and testing.
o Development cf counercial type of isogrid structure for use in
industry for trusses, stiffened panels, open torque boxes, shells,
and beams. This structure could be used in ship building, all
types of vehicles, bridges, buildings, and many other applications
: _ for low weight/high strength and reduced assembly time.
" 8-26
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o Handling, transportation, erection, and maintenance equipment
design for systems requiring special care and support. %
o Design and fabrication of environmental storage systems for
industrial use. This could apply for many commercial products
where controlled conditions are required for long time periods.
o Structural system design analysis and synthesis including tradeoffs,
documentation, and recommendations. This would be applicable to
many i,_dustries concerned with pollution, transportation and the energy
crisis.
o Structural static and dynamic engineering and testing of industrial
components, subassemblies, and assemblies. MDAC-W Huntington Beach
structures and space test labs can provide this service to many industries
who normally subcontract for their testing.
o Design, fabrication and test of Skylab type optical window for possible _
industrial use.
4
: 8.2.5 Fire Detection_ Prevention and Suppression - The fire detection and ;
warning technology developed for the Skylab could very well be used
in various industrial, computer and commercial applications. The
general area of fire prevention was treated as a system engineering
problem in the OWS and the same techniques are applicable to many
terrestrial and naval situations. The basic technique is identification
of ignition sources and combustibles by location and concentration
and providing proper shielding for both, the elimination of propagation
paths, and the identification by modeling of catastrophic situations.
The prevention analysis is directly applicable to developing the re-
quired equipment and procedures to suppress a fire. MDC G2190-P,
Criteria and Tolerances for Determining Responses to Orbital Fires,
is an example of this trchnique.
8.2.6 Biocide Wipes - The biocide wipes developed for the Skylab program
have been qualified for a long time storage life and have proven not
to deteriorate at elevated temperatures. The pre-moistened wipes :
8-27
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are sealed in a film package and have 5000 ppm available iodine.
These wipes would be usable in first aid kits and for various
operations where microbacterial contamination needs to be removed.
8.2.7 Thermal Mechanical - With the energy crisis, solar energy and energy
: conservation are two areas of activity where Skylab technology can
be applied. The analysis and design techniques developed for the
Skylab refrigeration system with regard to heat rejection to space
: via a radiator surface can be applied to collecting heat from the
sun in a solar heating system. In addition the insulation design
"_ techniques for the radiator, freezers and plumbing developed on
Skylab could be used to optimize terrestrial heating and/or cooling
systems to minimize the loss or gain of heat in a system, thus conserv-
ing energy.
8.2.8 Potable Water Sterilization - Providing a large quantity of high grade
potable water in pro-sterilized OWS flight tanks for long duration
storage led to the development of a mobile item of ground support
equipment referred to as the DSV-7-312 water sterilization and checkout
kit. This equipment was capable of receiv, ng water from any source
and processing it through organic contamination filtration, deionization
and microscopic filtration and biocide treatment. It also had the
capability of providing steam for self-sterilization as well as steriliz-
ing an external spacecraft system and also contained an autoclave.
A possible non-aerospace application of this development could be a
smaller, compact, portable piece of equipment which could be transported
: by truck, plane, helicopter, boat_ etc., into remote areas or disaster
areas (or battlefields) for any immediate temporary supply of not only
potable water but a source of sterilization for emergency operating rooms.
: 8.2.9 Noise Control - Acoustic insulation techniques applied to noise producing
rotating equipment such as fans, blowers and pumps to minimize noise output
are applicable to industrial and consumer use.
8-28
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8.2.10 Pneumatic Valve Design
: A. Pneumatic Valve Performance Simulation Computer Program - Due to
• specific response and reaction problems encountered in the
development of the series/parallel valve cluster in the Thruster
: Attitude Control System, a computer program was developed to pro-
vide a simulation of all valve functions. This program was
successfully used to isolate respoz,se problems, valve interactions,
and to optimize component development.
The program is readily adaptable to accomplish these items on many
types of pneumatic valves in single, parallel, series and redundant
combinations.
B. Redundant Mechanical (Pneumatic) Actuator - To provide high
reliability actuation of the 0WS waste tank vents, a redundant
pneumatic actuation system was developed. This mechanism would be
applicable to any similar apl,ication where a position one-shot
operation is desired (the mechanism can be manually re-set for
multiple operations).
8.2.11 Product Safety Evaluation - Skylab Documentation Techniques present •
some record formats that can be used for product safety evaluation by
commercial hardware manufacturers. _i
: o Test and Assessment Document - This type document presents a :
; perfect display for compa._ison of hardware design requirements ;
to test environments to actu_l environments. Failure to design
* and/or test for an environment could result in product failure
with resultant user injury.
F
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SECTION 9 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 MISSION PERFORMANCE - This section is a narrative discussion of the
mission performance of each Orbital Workshop (0WS) system with emphasis
on performance that was above and below nominal. Included in this sec-
tion are recommendations for future systems. In general, if more
detail is desired the reader can refer to SECTION 2 - SYSTEM DESIGN AND
PERFORMANCE.
: 9.1.1 Structural System - The basic shell structures [forward skirt, aft
skirt, Habitation Area (HA), and aft interstage] withs _ood critical
launch and ascent loadings without any problems. The failure of the
Meteoroid Shield (MS) and Solar Array System (SAS) Wing No. 2 during
ascent did not affect structural shell performance although their
failures introduced some unexpected load conditions and subsequent
orbital activation problems. The failures did suggest that built-in
restraints be considered for Extravehicular Activity (EVA) to certain
areas on new space vehicle shell design, especially for access to
deployment mechanisms. Planned manual deployment of external mechan-
isms in lieu of automatic deployment may prove to be design and cost
effective for future manned spacecra±_. At least, restraints should
be considered in development of contingency plans.
With no MS, the design limit temperatures for some materials were
exceeded. Although the bonded phenolic discs on the interior insula-
_ tlon had a lesser load carrying capability, adequate margin ex_._ted :
• for orbital conditions. The Lefkoweld adhesive for insulation saw
200°F but no debonding was reported by the crew. This type of bonded
in3tallation should be seriously cQnsidered for future systems which
'_ require internal insulation.
9-1
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The aft structure performed as predicted. The Th_ster Attitude
Control System (TACS) and Refrigeration System (RS) components mounted
thereon functioned properly after experiencing the critical launch
dynamic load environment. The S-II/OWS separatior was nominal.
The HA leak rate was much better then the 5 lbs/day (2.3 kg/day) allo-
cation [approximately 2 lbs/day (.9 kg/day) was experienced for the
_ntirc Saturn Workshop (SWS)] indicating good sealing on all tank
: penetration leak _ources. Seals developed and sealing methods used on
j OWS should be considered on future space v_nicles.
The Wardroom window had an ice spot form on the inner surface of the
outer glazing prior to activation. It was cleared by evacuating the
" cavity between panes by the Skylab-3 (SL-3) crew. The first evacua-
tion through the anti-solar Scientific Airlock (SAL) vaculzm outlet
utilized on-board hardware plus hardware taken up by the SL-3 crew,
and was followed by a backfill with air through _he SAL desiccant
canister. Ice reappeareg and subsequent evacuations left the cavity
locked up with a vacuum without backfilling through the SAL. Ice
continued to form in the window cavity which required periodic evacua-
tions by the crews. Crew comments on the window were good with a
desire for more and larger windows. The window construction _2-pane)
proved structurally sound and it was not contaminated from outgassing
of pa_e seals. Therefore, its use for visual observation and as a
: photographic aid was good. In future spacecraft, winaows should be
established early in the design Rhase so that optimization can occur
between window size and structural support design. The 18-inch
(_5.7 cm) clear pane used was the optimum as a modification to an
existing S-IVB shell. An improved technique should be developed to
__ 9-2
1974020219-373
: control the environment betgee the glass pa:_esto prever_ ice or
fogging.
The entry h_tch was used for 9 EVA's without any functional or leakage
problems. During the pressurization cycles prior to habitation, OWS
i
pressure was bleeding into the Airlock Module (AM). The SL-2 crew
made make-shift flapper valves with mosite and tape on the OWS side of
the hatch check va._ves. Leakage to the AM did not occur again after
initial hatch opening an_ instal!etion of the make-shift valves.
The S_'I's functioned properly with no leakage or malfunctions reported.
The JSC parasol was in the solar SAL through the entire Skylab mission.
/
The airlocks proved to be flexible in usage and as a result suggests
-- that additional airloc_s of larger sizes could create multiple uses.
In addition to experiment use, they might be considered usable for
deployment or for contingency repair and maintenance exterral to _ne
space_ raft.
Performance of internal structures (floors, water bottle and stogage
conts_ner support, fasteners, walls, etc. } could only be measured by
crew comments. Structur:_lly, there were no failures as a result of
the boost phase of flight. Some recommendations _ould be to design
the floor and walls into integral closet/bookcase typ_ struc*ures,
standardize fasteners used by ast_-onauts, increase gr_d size in floor
with larger corner radii for handhold use, and give more consideration :
to contingency repai; of functioning systems.
Dome and forward compartment h_ dholds m_d handrails were used occa-
_ sionally for stability, orieutatio_, and translation when carrying
• equipment. The handhold located near the SAL's were not _sed. The _"
fecal collector handholds were used extensively as _:_re handra±is in _
d
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< in the Waste Management Compartment (W],IC)ceiling e_d at the hand
washer/washcloth squeezer module. No handhold/hanarail problems,
malfunctions or failures were noted. Future programs should incc_ -
porate more hand restrr.ints into equipm_,n* design.
Light duty foot restraints in the War_:oom and WMC provided adequat.e
restraint when used as intended, i.e., with bare, stocking, or soft
slippered feet. The crew rated the Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA)
foot restraint as excellent and ._r.dispensibleduring EVA activities.
The triangle shoes, used ,xtensivei:._, were most useful and versatile
restraints. This was also true for their"use _:ith the water tank foot
platform. C_..-._ cleats in place of the triangles te.n_ed to slip out
cr h in t_e _rid. The triangle shoes _,ere subject to toe abrasion
which was caused by astronaut dra@ging one foot or the other. Tape
was used to reinforce worn areas on SL-2, Wluorel toe caps were flown
up on SL-3, and spar_ uppers were flown up on SL-h. Future missions
_"_uld have well constructed universal foot restraints suitably con-
'ucted for on-orbit use.
The Fireman_s Pole was used to goo_.advantage during activation on
SL-3 told-h with no problems reported. It was removed after activa-
tior. Su_u, a device is recommended for future large volume space
vehicles for transfer of bulky items.
Food t_ble restraints, thigh _i foot, provided effective means for
relcxed restraint. The tris_ng±e cutouts for the triangle shoe were
overz_ze c%using some interface _roblem. Future missions might need
only cne restraint - a larger contact thigh restraint or Just a foot
restraint. &ower ?_g restraints _ 1,Ged at ring lockers to install thei
condensate tank ,_n forward dome, _orked satisfactorily. Portabl_J
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_ handholds and tethers were not used because the open grid provided
•_ _ _an_1 z tether
.....ere.......... and attach po__nt c_ahility. The adjustable
tethers worked relatively well but did no_ provide the stability
afforded by the Fireman's Pole.
9.1.2 Meteoroid Shield (MS) - MS failure occurred at approximately 63 secondsl
a1_er launch, _'ne f_lm vault accelerometer indicated an onset of vi-
bration Just prior to 63 seconds followed by temperature measurement
losses; ordnance breakwire separation, mud SAS Wing No. 2 tiedown
fai2ure. Other than the less of SAS Wing No. 2 electrical power, and
SAL (,._olsa-side) experiment capability, no other functional system
failures were caused by the loss of the MS. No meteoroid hits
_. resulting in HA pressure loss occurred during full mission duration;
however, o.lectrical power monitoring and thermal control was affected
by the MS anomaly. Future spacecraft should attempt to avoid use of
thin shell deployable shields.
9.1.3 Thermal Contzol System (TCS) - All components of the active thermal
control subsystem performed as expected and met the design require-
• ments. The eontr(-I system performed as expected; however, for future
design a tighter ".ontrol baz.d is recommended since the astronauts used
the the mostat to ,anually control the OWS internal temperature. The
radiant heaters were not required to maintain storage temperatures
because the use of the sun shades rather the. the MS passive system_
•"hich was lost, caused the OWS to operate at higher temperature levels.
The duct heaters were not required or usea during habitation for the
same reason that the radiant heaters were not used. The duct fan per-
formance resulted in adequate v_,locity in the crew quarters without
using the portable fans, One portable fan was used periodically in the
experiment compartment to provide additional flow to the :few member
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using the ergometer.
The MS witl: its coatings and paint pattern was an integral part of the
passive thermal control subsystem. Its loss caused HA walls, ambient
food and film temperatures, and all internal environment temperatures
to exceed their maximum temperature limits. Deployment of the JSC
parasol sun shade on Day of Year (DOY) 147 resulted in a marked cool-
ing of the OWS and on DOY 153 the internal environment met the comfort
criterion. The internal environment remained in the comfort box until
DOY 170 near the end of the SL-2 mission. At this time the beta angle
exceeded 60 degreez and the average internal temperature increased and
peaked at 980F (319OK) on DOY 177. The high temperatures during this
period were due to incomplete deployment of the sun shade [approxi-
mately !35 ft2 (12,54 m2) of HA sidewall gold coated surface were
exposed to direct sunlight] and the high beta angle (greater than 70
!egrees for three days). As the beta angle decreased, the temperature
also decreased and stabilized at approximately 80°F (300°K) where it
remain._d until DOY 218. On DOY 218 the MSFC solar sha_e was erected
over the top of the JSC parasol. The additional shading reduced the
temperature to the 720F (295°K) to 75°F (297°K) level for the rema-'nder
of the SL-3 mission.
The forward dome Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI), the internal foam, and
the remaining control coatings (excludifig the lost MS coatings)
functioned within predicted levels. The loss of instrumentation on
low-level multiplexer "B" resulted in a loss of some measurements and
has prevented comparisons at essentially s'milar conditions to deter-
! mille small performance cha_nges. The evaluation to date could only
[ !
: _ detect large changes _d none were identified. For future design, it
f
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is recommended that the thermal control system be independent of
deployable systems or a redundant system capable of operation with any
type of failure be utilized.
' 9.1.4 Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS) - The TACS successfully ful-
tilled all vehicle control demands imposed upon the system throughout
the mission, imTulse consunz@tion significantly exceeded the predic-
tions during the early portion of SL-I/SL-2 and during SL-h. The ex-
cessive usage wa_ attributed to a delay in Apollo Telescope Mount/
Control Moment Gyro (ATM/CMG) switchover due to rate gyro drift early
in the SL-I/SL-2 mission; flight plan changes during the SL-I/SL-2
J
mission due to the loss of the MS [i.e., "unplanned" maneuvers to
attitudes for vehicle thermal conditioning; 6_4_ momentum cages per
formed while maintaining the "unplanned" attitudes ; perturbations asso-
ciated with Standup Extravehicular Activity (SEVA) and EVA activities
to deploy S_q Wing No. 1]; several unsuccessful "hard dockings"
attempts, and failure of CMG No. 1 during SL-h.
No detectable s.vstem leakage was observed i _.a series of mass calcula-
tions during ea_'h of the storage periods. The negligible leak rate of
the TACS has verified the adequacy of bi-metal Joints and "in place"
induction br_._in&'-f_r long term storage systems. The ability of the
TACS valves to remain leak ti_Jlt after extensive orbital usage has
verified the adequacy of the valve design, materialz, and testing
program. _
The unanticipated hi_ propellant consumption during the early part of
the nission caused concern that TACS might be depleted p_ematurely.
Future designs shou_a include the c_pability to interconnect systems
using similar "_orking fluids such as the TACS and the AM N2 supply
which had ample reserve.
9-7
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9.1.5 Solar Array System (SAS) - The OWS EAS design, manufacture, and test
program resulted in a system which equaled or exceeded all performance
specification requirements. Investigation and analysis of the Skylab
: ascent anomaly concluded that the loss of SAS Wing No. 2 and the
: failure to deploy SAS Wing No. i on time was a direct result of the MS
failure. The primary and backup command sequences, ordnance, Exploding|
Bridgewire (EBW) electronics units, and associated instrumentation and
interlock circuits functioned as desxgned. Deployment mechanisms in
; SAS Wing No. 1 deployed the wing sections to the full open positiont
after removal of the MS obstruction. Venting of the fairing during
ascent was as planned.
End of Mission (EOM) requirements for the SAS was 10,h96 watts. SAS
Wing No. 1 met its contribution to the requirement of 5,2h8 watts
minimum average power, and a voltage between 51 volts and 125 volts at
the AM/OWS interface were fulfilled. Minimum average array power
ranged between 6,500 w_tts and 7,050 watts at +lh5°F (335°K), witll the
i
variation being attributed to (I) measurement inaccuracies, (2) changes
in sc ar flux which reached a maximum approximately 197h DOY 005, sud
(3) the absence of any measureable performance degradation. _._roughout
the mi._sion, Sular Array Group (SAG) voltages remained between 51 volts
(during peak power tracking) and 125 volts (at slmrise). SAG voltages
typically ran_ed between 58 volts and 99 volts. Predicted SAS perfor-
nance degradation from all causes was 8.3 percent for the mission
i (flight data indicated no measureable degradation); the major contri-
I butor being thermal cycling effects, followed by charged particle and
J
I ultraviolet radiation. It is concl._ded that the orbital environment
encoluntered by the SAS ws._very nominal, and in particular, the
extremes of thermal environment were less severe than those assumed in
i 9-8
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in preflight analyses and testing.
" Following are recommendations for application of future solar arrays.
Actuator-Dsm_)ers - The actuator-.dsmpers, used to both deploy and
control the rate of deployment of the wings, used an orificed fluid
for damping. The damping characteristics of the fluid were highly
dependent upon the thermal environment of the dampers. It is recom-
mended that a method of temperature control be employed on designs of
this type. In the case of Skylab, the wing deployment damper was
frozen after being in orbit without full deployment long after the
design period. The dsm_er was finally broken loose by the crew EVA
allowing wing deployment. Any design using a damper or similar devlce
should also contain a capability of breaking the damper loose by crew
EVA forces.
Vent Modules - The requirement to maintain a purge atmosphere on the
wings prior to iiftoff was made late in the SAS development program,
As the mating electrical interfaces were already designed and fabri-
,_ cared, a decision was made to design the vent valves to operate
mechanically with no interface between the S48/0WS structure. An
acoustic actuated valve was designed and developed to provide the vent-
ing function. The disadvantages of this type of valve wet _.the lack
of capability to close the valve in the case of premature opening and
_ lack of an automatic :;alkback on valve position. The valve operated
at liftoff and did not prematurely open. It is recommended that the
use of this type of valve be limited because, of i_s innerent
dis advantages.
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Thermal Control Paint -'l'he increased power (aHroxim_t¢_ly [4',1watt:;)
did not justify, the difficulties encountert.d in the. a_,i)l[c:tt[on.
: maintenance, and repair of the Z-93 paint _,se.de_ the. ,'ear oi' the so[;_r
panels. Its use in future applications of this ty_,c iu not rccemm(.ndcd.
Ordnance Release Systems - The completel_ cuntained expandable tube
ordnance system used for release of the beam I'airing _uud peuleh;
provided a reliable, '.'edundant release system. Further use oi" the:;
; type of gas-contained system on future space programs is recom_..cnded
especially where equipment, such as that w_th opt_cally critical surfaces,
cannot tolerate the contamination producted by ordnance systems.
9.1.6 Electrical Power Distribution S[stem (PDS) - The OWS PDS
subsystem has performed as designed and its operation during the
mission has verified the data obtained in checkout/s_ ulysis to be
very close to actual mission conditions. In review of the vaz-ious
subsystem problems and crew comments obtained during the mission,
the following modification/improvements are presented for consideration.
o bystem design should include a cne-for-one ground control
capability for every voltage st.b-bus [enable/disable via Digital
Command System (I)CS)].
o Voltage s_nd current telemetry (TM) parameters shu _id be available
for every sub-bus; high resolution for all TM current/voltage para-
meters (i.e., if range 0-1h0A, provide a low and hig;; range
measurement) is desirable; provide multi-scale meter (range selec-
tion switch) for on-board voltage and current measurements; provide
local power 0N/OFF control at all utility outlets; provide more
utility (LO/HI power) outlets; and provide circuit breakers that ..-[
: are not easily (inadvertently) activated/deactivated (maybe
push-button type),
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9.1.7 Illumination System - The 0WS lighting system met all design require-
men%s. There were no light failures. All general purpose !ignts '.'ere
used in the HIGH mode only. The difference between high and low modes
was slight. Future general 1_6hting fixtures should be limited to a
single light level for simplificr_tion aud cost reduction. Special low
level lights should be installed for emergency, night lights, etc.
Supplemental li@hting was required for close work, i.e., item repair,
shaving, reading, etc. Specific area(s) should be designated as a
repair/maintenaz_ce facility and provided with sufficient illumination _
for close detail work. In areas where reading and/or record keeping
is performed, i.e., Wardroom, Sleep Compartments, and Experiment Area,
_- higher illumination levels (higher intensity and/or additional light-
ing) should be provided.
\.
9.1.8 Communication and Data Acquisition Systems (DAS) - All audio equipment
of the OWS communication system performed with no failures except for
the Speaker Intercom Assembly (SIA) located at Panel 5h0 which sus-
f
tained a broken Intercom/Transmit (ICOM/XMIT) switch; the SIA unit was
replaced. Based on crew debriefing reports, the OWS communication
system provided adequate volume level and quality during mission
operations, However, some audio feedback problems were encountered.
The problem manifested itself as a nuisance to the crew and it is
attributed primarily to the interaction between SIA's, as well a_ the
total gain characteristics of the cluster audio systez.A. Audio system
redesign and/or r_loca.tion of SIA's should be considered 5£ this or a
similar system were to be used in the future. Both channels of the 0WS
communication system provided adequate intercommunication for activi-
, ties within the OWS a.-well as uplink and downlink communication.
%
1974020219-382
_ The overall performance of the OWS DAS throughout the Skylab mi_sion
was very good. Despite the failure encountered by the low-level "B"
multiplexer data, optimization of reliability through distributicn of
a system measurement to separate multiplexers avoided the total loss
of data from any one particular system.
The following recommendations would improve the DAS: The OWS DAS
instrumentation panels located in the OWS forward skirt area should be
provided with temperature measurements which measure the panel thermal
environment to facilitate malfunction analyses. The actual measured
temperature environment would provide a fundamental assessment of the
actual thermal environments of the system's major components. The OWS
_. instrumentation and heater power buses should be instrumented for cur-
rent monitoring. Many of the system analyses performed during the
mission required such measurements. Load current changes are very
significant analytical data in evaluating system performance or
anomalies. Future space missions similar to Ski__b should incorpor%te
a data management system so that measurements required only for boost,
deployment and initial activation (i.e. , EBW, positions, events, etc.)
would be deactivated after their usefulness. On-board data compression
would be another method of implementing better data management. These
approaches would reduce the quan'_ity of data_ ___eed up the data pro-
cessing, enable better quality control of the data and allow fcr the
data to be disseminated in a more timely manner. The OWS DAS could
increase its data acquisition versatility, especially within the OWS
HA, by having remote interface panels with patching-type connections
or connectors for accessing the unused multiplexer channels. The use-k'
fulness of this concept was made obvious by the addition of new
%
f
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equipment, work-arounds, and anomalies which made it necessary to
_ccommods, te additional data during the Skylab missions,
The OWS television (TV) system accommodations consisting of the TV
i
Input Stations (TVIS), and its associated wire Aarnesses, performed
very well in support of the Skylab TV system in transmitting video
information during the manned Skylab mission as well as during the
: ground checkout activities. Future design of TV system accommodations
should ta_e into consideration provisions to permit the astronauts to
control the operations of the video tape recorder from the TVIS or the
TV camera. In other words, the astronauts should be provided with
remote control capability within the 0WS. During the Skylab missions
the astronauts were required to activate the Video Tape Recorder (VTR)
in the Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA) and it was a major inconvenience
when TV activities were being performed within the OWS.
9.1.9 Caution and Warning (C&W) System - The OWS C&W system design and
installation satisfactorily supported the SL mission without failure.
All design goals of the subsystem have been met. False alarms which
occurred during the mission were attributed to other sources. The OWS
repeater panel and SIA portion of the C&W system gave the crew the
desired mobility while providing the necessary monitoring function.
H_gh temperatures early in the mission caused only temporary undesired
t
operation from one fire s _sor. Crew comments durin= debriefings
indicated satisfaction with the system and infllght tests proved to be
satisfactory. There are no recommendations or suggestions made to "-
alter the C&W system.
_ 9.1.10 Experiment Ac-,ommodations System - This _$stem perfol_ed to design
requi.'ements except for the following anomalies:
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0WS experiment accommodations anomalies which occurred on SL-2 are as
follows: The crewmen were unable to obtain the proper calibration
adjustment of -0.9K factor for the M487 Sound Level Meter. -0.TK
factor was obtained. The readings on the instrument is +2 db so the
0.2 db correction was not considered to present a problem The backup
SAL tripod, which was bolted to the adapter plate, was dcilled in a
mirror image with the holes misaligned about two inches. The crewmen
had to rotate the SAL tripod legs and had to realign the adapter under
the photometer canister to accomplish the tripod installation. .The
tripod did perform its intended fUnction although two of the t_ipod
legs were bolted to open grid floor, instead of using the fixed
nut-plate locations. During the SL-3 mission, the backup tripod was
transferred to the solar SAL wher_ all the legs were successfully
bolted into the fixed nu_-plates c._the floor.
The crewmen stated that the SAL pressurization and repressurization
times for experiment hardware installed in the SAL were greater than
s..ticipated. The actual pzessurization and depre_surization times
were fie to eight minutes vs. two minutes anticipate_. MDAC analysis
verified that the lcnger times were realistic and the flight plans were
revised to allow more crew time for these operations.
The M092 vent was propulsive with the meteoroid shield gone and this
venti:_g resulted in edditional spacecraft attitude correction. A
decision was made _o correct thi_ problem. The problem was alleviated
by the SL-4 crew by rerouting the vent to the waste tank through the
I common bulkhcad using a penetration previously used by a urine dump
_ probe. No additional experiment accommodation anomalies were reporte_
during th_ SL-4 mission.
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The OWS film vault was successful in providing temperature, humidity,
and radiation protection to the over 600 lbs (272 kg) of film used for
the Skylab experiments. Future programs which require protection of
hardware from humidity and rad-'ation could successfully use the same
approach of potassium-thiocynate salt pads and aluminum walls. The use
i
of standard commercial fasteners such as a "dialatch" should be scruti-
nized carefully and tested thoroughly before use.
: MDAC was successful in adapting a previously designed Apollo SAL to
{ meet all the objectives of the Skylab Program. The SAL repressuri-
zation system performed its function of preventing condensation from
t
forming on experiment hardware. In regards to things to be done
differently in future missions, the Skylab crew has recommended that
two SAL's are not sufficient and consideration should be g_ven to
, having more on any future spacecraft.
9.1.11 Yabitability Support Systems _HSS's)
i_ 9.1.11.1 Waste Management - All waste management systems performed succ_ r_fully
in flight. The flight crew comment_ during and after the mission were
complimentary. There were no damaged fecal bags and only minor urine
?
spills. Samples of dried feces and frozen urine were returned for
post flight analysis. Urine collection was s_mple and easy. Daily
sampling and o_g changeout proved to be an acceptable task in flight.
The only significant anomaly was the low volume returned in the urine
sample bags, Procedure revisions were used by the SL-3 crew which
increased the volume slightly. Fecal collection was very successful.
It was the one area of waste management which could not be adequately
: tested in I-G or in th_ simulated zero-G of the KS 135. For future
spacefli._ht a higher airflow and a softer seat for a better seal wo-!d
9-15
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provide better results. Fecal processing gave the crew no problems.
During SL-2 mission, the p_ _cessing was accomplished successfullj with-
out power. The vacuum cleaner worked well but was not used to pica up
wet debris. Again, the flight crew stated that increased airflow would
be required on future spacecraft. The trash airlock performed
successfully; however, in two cases it was difficult to eject the trash.
The case of major concern was during deactivation of SL-2 when the crew
attempted to dispose of the Molecular (MOL) sieve canister and two
pairs of suit golves in the same bag. For a while, the trash airlock
was stuck, however, they were able to free the unit with additional
force.
9.1.11.2 Water System - The water system performance during the entire mission
was highly successful. The water properties and iodine level at the
dispensers were maintained within specification. Temperatures and
quantities of heated and chilled water were also satisfactory. There
were reports of ai._ in the-water at the stsmt of two missions. In
SL-3 the problem :_aswith the food packages. In SL-$, after switching
tanks, the crew repot-ted that there was no longer gas in the water.
After noticing a decrease in flo_ from the WMC dispenser, the crew;
replaced the assembly and reported flow to be normal. Evidence of
contamination on the replaced unit was reported and the unit was
returned for failure analysis. The ground failure analysis disclosed
that the contamination was a result of an improper seal being
installed. New seals of the p_oper material were installed on a spare
dispenser launched on SL-3. Near the end of SL-3 the washcloth
squeezer seal was replaced to eliminate leakage. The seal was foun_
to be folded back in at least one area, ef_lowing water leaka&e past
_ the piston. The squeezer was beginning to get di:'ficult to operate
@
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because of "grit, grime, dirt, or soap" on the moveable parts. A
procedure was supplied for cleanup and lubrication during SL-h. Also,
!
three additional seals were sent up as sp_res. Th_ Ferforn,ance of the
washcloth squeezer was reasnnably successful, however, there is room
for improvement. A future scheme should allow wringin_ of a washcloth L
is much the same was as in 1-G. A high flow air supply and liquid air
separator might be the best approach. On future spacecraft the drink
: dispensers could be simplified to s_ on-off valve design if med_ cal
experiments are not involved. The crew reported some difficul%_ hold-
ing the fooa packages on the reconstitution dispenser. Futur,_ food _
.
packages should include an improvea n_] ding area.
_, As a result of qual testing, it was determined that with tim_ the
ioaine in the water system wo_Id attack the wate_ ne_ter elem_.nt
resulting ultimately in failure cf the heating _.iement_ The a_d
Wardroom _ater heaters from OWS-2 were flown as spares on OWS-1 and
: althou6h some degradation _as notea during the l_tter part of _L-4,
the spare heaters were never required. The water n_aters for OWS-2
were red_signed to eliminate iodine errcsion by furnace brazing th_
hee _ing element between two _ ainless steal tubes end then welding
the element unit, Any future _pplication should consider the OWS-2
redesigned water hea_er.
9.1.11.3 Personal Hygiene System - The general purpose tissues and utility
wipes were adequate. The second mission crew reported u_ng rags (old
shirt_ and shorts) fo Jleaning instead of a general purpose tissue.
On future flights, a clcth should be consid_r_.d for wiping up spi_l_
and cleaning tasks. ,:
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IThe biocide wipes left an iodine coloration on a wiped area that comes i
off easily. The second mission crew reported that their hand became
-. yellowed during deactivation biocide cleaning but that it faded away 1
several days later. The iodine solution used in the biocide wipes is
_: an acceptable biocide.
Hygiene kits were satisfactory. However, the crew requested
personalized kits. Mirrors were positioned well for the activities
requiring their uses. The polished stainless steel mirror surface was
!|
' adequate. The soap was used with no apparent medical problems. The
L metal disc in the soap held the soap bar to the magnetic post in the
water module sufficiently for zero-G application. Because of bacteria
growth reported on terrestrial samples, investigations should be made
into this possible problem before Neutrogena soap is used for future
space flights.
9.1.11.h Body Cleansing - The washcloths and towels were very adequate. There
were 89 extra towels launched on the SL-3 flight and 30 extra towels on
the SL-_ flight. Towel allocations for future missions should consider
this. The drying station provided a convenient and effective means of
drying the towels and washcloths. The restraint approach should be
standard equipment on future missions for towel and washcloth drying
as well as general fabric restraint. The washcloth squeezer and water
dispenser provided a satisfactory method for partial body cleaning and
housekeeping. An enclosed water module for more convenient handwashing
on future missions was desirable.
9.1.11.5 Food Management System - Although the primary elements of the food
management system performed satisfactorily, minor operations became
j of irritation to the crew. The food table when not used for801.Lt'CeS
i =
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/food service, was th_ center of mission operations activity. Because
of this potential usage, similar to the traditional kitchen table,
future designs should be based on total needs and not limited to those
solely associated with food management. Since the operation of food
storage and preparation facilities is so subjective, a high degree of
flexibility should be a design requirement. It should be possible for
each crew to rearrange the pantry to suit their own needs and desires.
As a result it is recommended that a realistic evaluation through
repeated usage of prototype hardware and operational procedures in a
high fidelity interior mochup be accomplished.
9.1.11.6 Sleep Support System- The sleep restraints provided an excellent means
for providing restraint during sleep. The crews had no difficulty in
obtaining comfortable, restful sleep. The adjustable features of the
restraint accommodated most of the individual preferences of the var-
c
ious crewmen. On future missions an additional adjustable blanket for !
more thermal control should be provided. Also, additional adjustable _
straps and/or adjustable blanket would add variation of restraint and
minimize dead space inside the restraint for thermal control. The
light baffles were effective in blocking light from entering the sleep
compartments. The fabric airflow louvres had a tendency to collapse
and restrict airflow. The light baffles are probably unique to the
OWS configuration. Future mission sleep compartments should have _:
inherent capability to provide a dark environment. The privacy cur-
tains and privacy partitions performed satisfactorily. They provided
visual privacy and light control. Sound control was not a requirement .._
but future missions should provide for reasonable sound isolation. ,_
• /
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9.1.11.7 Refrigeration System (RS) - The RS operated satisfactorily and main-
tained the food, water, and urine within required temperature limits
except for an anomaly which occurred on DOY 173. Lower than specified
freezer temperatures occurred during SL-3 storage and a high tempera-
ture excursion (approximately 13 hours) occurred during SL-h mission.
Assessment of the flight data indicates no apparent performance degra-
dation or malfunction in any of the refrigeration components other
than the occurrence of the anomaly attributed to the radiator bypass
valve on DOY 173. There was no detectable coolant leakage from either
the primary or secondary loop. On D0Y 173 a continuing increase
occurred in the food freezer and radiator inlet temperatures. Assess-
ment of the data indicated that a split flow condition existed between
the radiator and radiator bypass branches. Probable cause was deter-
mined to be a malfunctioned radiator bypass valve in which both
radiator and bypass poppets were in a flow position. "Cycling" of the
valve was performed which resulted in an increase of performance
apparently due to a partial closing of the bypass poppet. The RS
continued to operate satisfactorily in this mode. The system perfor-
mance from the standpoint of temperature control was equivalent to the
nominal performance observed prior to the anomaly.
Data obtained during the SL-3 storage period indicated that the wall
temperature of the coldest freezer compartment decreased to the speci-
fication limit of -20°F (2h4°K) by DOY 270, and by DOY 277 decreased
to its lowest value of-23.60F (2h2.5OK). Thereafter, until SL-h ,
activation (DOY 320), the freezer wall temperature oscillated between " "_
-20°F (244°K) and -23.6°F (242.5°K). This freezer performauce resulted
from the following: (I) opening of the radiator bypass valve circuit
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breaker by the SL-3 crew which prevented the valve from switching from
the radiator position, and (2) disabling the OWS ventilation fans dur-
ing SL-3 deactivation. Consequently, the freezer temperatures varied
as a function of the OWS internal temperature which, during the SL-3
: storage period, decreased to approximately 63°F (290°K). No food was
stored in this freezer, however, it was reserved after SL-2 for
stowage of filled and frozen urine trays. Following SL-4 activation,
the coldest freezer temperature returned within the specification
limits due to an increase in OWS internal temperatures. On DOY 018/019
the warmest freezer warmed to +l°F (2560K) which exceeded the specifi-
cation limit for 13 hours. No food, however, is known to have been
stored in this freezer at that time and other freezers were within
- temperature speci fications.
Evaluation of the flight performance of the refrigeration system
resulted in the following reccmmendations: (1) a 15-micron filter
should be added upstream of the radiator bypass valve (RBV), (2) the
existing radiator bypass branch orifice should be reduced in size to
increase the radiator flow in the event of a split flow condition,
caused by either a relief valve open malfunction or a RBV poppet
position anomaly, (3) the lO0-micron filter should be removed from the
downstream flow side of the thermal capacitor. This filter is a
potential source of pressure increase due to ice plugging the filter
element as the water in the coolant freezes out. The filter is not
required in the system since its original purpose was to protect the
radiator control valve which was deleted, (_) the negligible leakage
detected during the mission has verified the adequacy of "in place"
induction brazing for consideration' of long term storage system, and
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(5) since essentially only one pump of the eight on-board (_ in each
loop)was required during the mission, future systems design need not
be as conservative if pump performance can be predicted with confidence
or an operating life test can be performed prior to design.
J
9.1.11.8 Atmosphere System - The pneumatic vent valves in the atmosphere system
: fulfilled all ground and orbital design requirements. The only
anomalies in the solenoid vent system performance were slow venting on
DOY I_5 due to a clogged filter and failure of Valves I and B to give
a closed indication on DOY 146 probably caused by particulate contami-
nation. The'use of an inlet screen with a finer mesh (finer than lO0
microns) allowing more flow area might have prevented both problems.
The overall low cabin atmosphere leakage rate verified the manufactur-
ing and testing techniques used to assure OWS HA pressure integrity.
9.1.11.9 Vacuum Systems - All vacuum systems performed us expected and without
significant anomalies, except that the waste tank pressure reached the
triple point pressure of water during some large quantity dumps
apparently due to a higher than expected rate of sublimation of the
ice formed during the dumps (no adverse effects have been observed
because of this high pressure), and the WMC water dump probe orifice
became blocked during SL-3. The dump probe was replaced with an
on-board spare and no additional problems were experienced with this
system. Subsequent investigation indicated that the problem was
temporary blockage with ice _d the probe could be kept on-baord as
a spare. The liquid urine dump system was used on SL-4 only and per-
formed satisfactorily except for a brief teL'@orary blockage on DOY 005
j of S_-_.
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9.1.12 Pressure Garment Conditioning System - Suite drying was accomplished
satisfactorily. The suits were always dried adequately and there was
no evidence of bacterial growth or odor. The desiccants were dried
in the waste processor. The noise level during the extended operation
of the blower was not objectionable. There were no changes in
procedures or hardware recommended by the flight crew. During the
SL-2 mission, the suit drier power module was reported too hot to
touch. The unit was being operated with the ring compartment door
closed per procedure. Crews were instructed to leave the door open
for additional cooling and no further problems were reported.
9.1.13 Stowage System - In general, the stowage compartments performed their
intended functions very well. They were versatile and provided ease
of access. The ability to complete the stowage of the ring containers
(and the ambient food containers) outside the vehicle prior to launch
minimized the impact of stowage operations on vehicle time. This
feature shouldbe strongly considered for future vehicles. The
restraint straps in the compartments, even though adequate, should be
more flexible, stronger, and easier to adjust. This will require
development of new materials that will meet flammability requirements.
The armalon/sponge bags and the non-flammable fiberboard proved very
effective as a packing material and vibration dampening device. These
had the added advantage of being lighter than other materials available
that would have satisfied the flammability requirements.
All dispensers performed satisfactorily. The towel dispenser did not
require the versatility it had. The trash containers performed very
well. The concept of standard compartments with standard door attach-
ments lent itself to inter-changing trash containers as desired. The
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bag/door interface provided easy replacement of trash bags.
The food box concept was satisfactory. No problems were encountered in
relocating the boxes on-orbit. Placing round cans in rectangular
boxes was an inefficient use of space. The food freezers and food
chiller performed as designed. They maintained the food at the
required temperatures. Chillers and freezers on future vehicles should
J
• have a general restraint capability to provide the flexibility to i
handle preflight and flight requirement changes.
The film vault performed satisfactorily and met all requirements The
large amount of unplanned equipment stowed in the vault drawers
suggests a system or universal restraints should have been incorporated.
The bungees appeared to be the best concept for on-orbit temporary
restraints. A better attaching method could have been developed. Per-
manent attachment or snap attachment would have been desirable but
would have added weight to the vehicle. The snaps and velcro performed
satisfactorily. A higher shear strength and longer life velcro would
have performed better but none was available that would meet the
flammability requirements, i
The tool and repair kits performed satisfactorily. The utilization of
standard tools proved to be effective and should be continued on future
vehicles. O,l future vehicles a basic comprehensive tool kit should be
established early in the design phase. Specific tools would have to
be added where the design dictated but the change in the basic kit
would be minimized.
The computer program was an excellent vehicle for tr_cking the various
stowage items, restraint hardware, and required drawings. No previous
"! 1
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program of this magnitude and numbers of stowage items exists from
which a comparison can be made between manual and computerized manage-
ment of numerous stowage aspects, but manual preparation would have
produced a much hi@her magnitude of errors. Future programs should
J
find advantages in this type of approach to stowage control.
9.1.14 Markin_ System - Since no comments from the flight crews were received
regarding the methods chosen for the markings or the adequacy of same,
it is assumed that no significant problems were encountered. However,
as a result of the experience gained during the silkscreening of the
various OWS panels, certain recommendations can be made for future
application. The panels silkscreened with uniglaze ink were not able
to withstand normal wear. For future applications, it is strongly
recommended that an ink more suitable for silkscreening, e.g. _AC
STM 0248 catalyzed silkscreen ink, be used. This ink has proved to be
easily applied using normal practices and stands up very well to
nor_al we_.
!_ The metal-foil labels proved to be an excellent method of identifying
; stowage content and for procedural ?.abels. For future applications it
is recommended that the .008 inch (.203 mm) thickness be used for all
labels applied to a flat surface. In general, the application of
labels on a curved surface is not recommended. However, if this
i cannot be avoided, the .003 inch (.076 mm) thickness should be
specified. +
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9.2 PROGRAM PLANNING
9.2.1 Organization - The OWS Engineering organization was separate from but
an extension of the Saturn/Apollo matrix organization; however, this
matrix management technique was utilized in a way which was tailored
to the special needs of the program. It was, for example, recognized
early in the program that there would be a need to place special
emphasis c_ the "system" aspect of the design, since the 0WS was only
one component of the total Skylab Cl_ster, and contained many inter-
related, internal systems. Systems that were to provide for and to
• support crew habitation on-orbit, to accommodate laanch provisions
and on-orbit operation of Associate Contractor designed/Government
Furnished Experiments, and to provide monitoring and control capability
to assure proper functioning of all systems in orbit. The organization
recognized the "one-of-a-kind" (one launch spacecraft) and the need
to make the transition from concept to design, to fabrication, to
qualification, to spacecraft system tests, to launch site testing and
launch with firm continuity. This caused the identification of key
technical people to become involved through the transitions and these
i
_ people were identified to the NASA as focal points for working group
meetings and exchange of technical questions and directions.
To assure proper emphasis on this system aspect, three methods were
employed:
o The System Engineering Organization was strengthened and chartered .-
to work closely with NASA and the MDAC-E Airlock engineering depart-
ment to concentrate _ _he systems engineering aspects of the desiln.
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o Special system managers were assigned to focus particular emphasis
on major system hardware which was being designed and supplied by
subcontractors or associat-, contractors; to wit: Habitability
Support System, Solar Array System and Government Furnished
Equipment.
o Subsystem engineers were assigned to assure that the s_stem design
aspects were properly studied and accounted for in each 0WS design;
to wit: Crew Support, Electrical, Environmental Control, Experi-
ments, Ground Support Equil3nent, Instrumentation & Con_nunication,
\
Ordnance, Pneumatics, Refrigeration, Solar Array, Stowage, Struc-
tures, Waste Management, and Water. To maintain the continuity
from design through launch, the subsystem engineers, which also
included the special system managers, were identified as the key
technical people to follov the respective systems and actively
participate through all its phases. Where appropriate, these key
people were identified to go to the field site, engage in the final
test and launch, and then go tc mission support sites.
These usi_,nents carried vith them an across the departaent respon-
sibility for design and aission performance.
To further reduce communication paths the OWS engineering organization
vas brought together u a centralized unit, physically located in one
large vorking area. Within the sme area vere key representatives and
working personnel from all program elements such aa Manufacturing,
Tooling, Procurement, Planning and Quality. This technique provided
early inputs to engineering to ef£ect simplification and reduced cost.
It also provided rapid response from engineering on probleae encountered
by other prograa eleRente, an_ eliminated false starts.
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i 9.2.2 Establishing Requirements - The 0WS design evolved from the S-IVB
t
t
! stage of the Saturn/Apollo vehicle. It was first envisioned as a
i regular propulsion stage with additional "SCARS" (OWS equipment attach
i
} fittings) added within the hydrogen tank portion. '_h.L SCARS were to
allow utilization of the stage in orbit, after the _uel ,,adbeen ex-
pended, as a habitable workshop. During this perio_, the design was
known as a "Wet Workshop" design since it was to have been launched
with fuel - or "Wet". The design progressed fran "Wet" to '_ry". The
Dry Workshop, being the final design wherein the OWS no longer per-
_'ormed as a propulsion stage during launch, end consequently was
launched without fuel or "Dry" with all provisions built in for on-
i orbit use as a Workshop. During this period of 0WS evolution,
englneerlng management _rovided a close relationship between MDAC end
NASA "_echnical people to establish end develop the design requirements
for the program.
This close vorking relationship had been established end promulgated
during the S-IV/S-IVB design period s_d was particularly effective in
previously good c_unication paths between government and contractor
perscr, nel.
Another planned technique employed by NASA and fully suppJrted by
,_ en_Lneerins mauagement, to assure developmnt end wide dissemination
of technical requirements with a linimum of communication barriers,
was the establishment and conduct of frequent, regular sessions of
requirement/design vor_ing troups. These working groups included the
fl//h_ crews and their representatives to assure that their flight
experience prodded the necessary influence where appropriate.
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The design requirements, once established were formally maintained in
the Contract End Item Specification and attendent documents (Systems
Engineering Requirements Document, Development Engineering Plans,
Engineering Work 0triers, Design Requirements Document, etc.).
A major requirement determination effort was accomplished on the
Skylab program in the area of interface requirements. NASA and
contractors alike recngnized the need for interface requirements
development, since Skyle.b brought together literally hundreds of neviy
designed and developed items of hardware. Interface Control Drawings
(ICD) prepared by assigned contractors and formally controlled and
issued by NASA _eceme the prime means for ccs_unic_tion of design
requirements betveen the many associate contractors supporting the
OWS. Each prime contractor in the Skylab program actively supported
_he ICD approach to requirements definition. It had been anticipated
that many significant fit and .'unction problems would develop during
[
_, OW5 final assembly and test but the ICD program proved to be a prime
technical management tool.
9.2.3 Controlling tn Requirements - It is mandatory to establish a good set
of requirements, and equally mandatory that the designs produced are
controlled in a v_7 that assures their conformance to the requirements
once established.
The OW8 enEineering management reoogni_ed ,_arly in the progrLm this
need for control to requirements, and several aane_ement methods were
employed to focus attention on this control aspect: "_
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A. The system managers and su'osystem engineers were established in
; the organization, as previously outlined in 9.2,1, and were
chartered to assure compliance to the design requirements. Each
.: system/subsystem engineer conducted frequent reviews of the
design against the requirements, and through the assigned team
members, accomplished the technical coordination with NASA and
Associate Contractors to effecz complete compliance to require-
_en+:,. This was a very effective team approach that focuses the
engineering effort where and when needed to control designs to
the requirements.
B. An interface management office was established A,d a working team
J
assembled, comprised of representatives fr_n each design techno-
logy, to define and control the 0WS designs in the interface areas.
This team made direct contact _Ith NASA and Associate Contractor
 representativesand made certain that each interface requirement
was known and followed. Design drawings were identified to the
ICD'e and formal ECP oubmittal and approval was required in order
to chang_ a desisn of the interface identified as affected by the
)
! chanse. The result of this efTort was very effective control of
interface demi6na to the a_proved ICM r_quirements.
C. Desisn revievn - internal and external - _ere a prime method :
employed to lls_t"e total compliance to recognired OW_ requirements. )
i
The SWS Onisn Engineer office conduete_ extensive interna_ reviev_ _,
I
of each mymten to asce_teAn z"quirement compliance and assure capa-
bility .'or total mission performance.
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4The OWS Jcixt NASA reviews were comprehensive and searching - and
J
more frequent - as launch time approached. OWS engineering man-
agement committed fully to support of these affairs and every
facet of the design including test data was made avsilable to the
NASA teams conducting these reviews. The major reviews conducted
are shown in Table 9.2.3-1.
D. Special types of reviews end groups which NASA managed, relating
to the total Skylab Cluster, were also actively supported by OWS
engineering management. These (see Table 9.2.3-2) were a vital
_ part of the overall NASA plan to develop, disseminate and control
• Cluster requirement_ across the program. OWS engineering pro-
: vided data and representatives to these sessions regularly; and
followed them up by responding to assigned action items.
These sessions were invaluable to OWS designers since they pro-
vided a way to gain insight into the workings of the other Cluster
hardware and to the compatibility of the flight crew with the
hardware design.
9.2._ Improvements for Future Programs - The management methods stated in
9.2,1 thrcush 9.2.3 were a major contributor to the 0WS success in
meeting its design and performance objectives. Following ere some
suggested improvements which should be considered for new programs:
_ A. Increased utilization of the subsystem management conce_t should
be made throughcut the total program management structure. This
_ is equally applicable to Contractor and NASA organizations.
_ Assigned subsystem engineers should clearly be made responsible
2
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• Table 9.2.3-1 "
_' OWS REVIEWS !
REVIEW .... DATE
[
_' OWS Preliminary Design Review (PDR) May 1967
_' OWS Delta PDR December 1967
OWS Preliminary Dry Requirements July 1969
Review (PRR)
Habitation Support Systems Preliminary August 1969
• Design Review
J OWS Critical Design Revia-_ (CDR) September 1970
OWS Solar Array System CDR January 1971
OWS Subsystem Reviews March 1971 thru June 1972\
OWS Systems/Operations Compatibility June 1972
Review
: OWS Design Certification Review (DCR) October 1972
OWS Hardware Integrity Review (DCR) March 1973
OWS Flight Readiness Review (FRR) April 1973
1974020219-403
Table 9.2.3-2
Cluster Reviews
:_ REVIEWS
Cluster Requirements Reviews
Progressive Crew Station Reviews
"; Experiment Integration Reviews
._: Crew Equipment Fit Checks
i_ Customer Acceptance Readiness Reviews
! Monthly Management Reviews
: WORKING GROUPS
EVA Operations Planning Group
) Change Integration Working Group
_' Stowage Working Group
Contamination Control Working Group
Microbial Working Group
" Transfer (on-orbit) Working Group
Checkout Working Group
Electrical Working Group
Mechanical Working Group
Instrumentation and Communication Working Group
_' ICD Working Group
Mission Evaluation Working Group
Maintenance (in-flight) Working Group
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only for the technical aspects of analysis, design, fabrication,
test and assembly and they should remain free of administrative
activities. The types of people assigned to these roles are key
engineers and are often also given administrative responsibilities.
This should be avoided.
B. More emphasis and effort should be expended to assure the e_rliest
possible definition of design requirements for each subsystem of
the flight items.
C. Once defined, each design technology should maintain an engineer-
ing document which is the repository for each set of system/
subsystem requirements.
D. Design reviews should be planned and scheduled for each system in
a way that will assure an orderly progression and with no schedule
conflict with another system review. Review participation should
be defined and considered mandatory, to assure maximum communica-
tion of system knowledge and plans for meeting the requirements.
E. Analytical and design engineers should be encouraged to become
significantly more involved with the hardware. This could be
aceamplished by more review of basic raw and final data, obser-
vance of test runs and initial production operations, and by
participation in first article and delivery acceptance inspection.
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_ F. The NASA intercenter working group panels should be structured
cc_patible with the program systems and should convene frequently.
, Contractor assigned representatives should be obligated to p_esent
: frequence concise reviews of the design features of their related
product, and should be afforded member sta enable them to
present problems deemed appropriate.
: G. GFE should be subject to the same requirements for design, review, :
and documentation as are imposed on the contractor in whose pro-
duct it is used. The drawings and design information regarding
the GFE should be made available to the using contractor and his
agreement should be required in any decisions regarding flight
worthiness of the GFE.
v
J
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9.3 TESTING
9.3.1 o Deyelopment and Qualification - The Orbital Workshop, a follow-on
development of the S-IVB Program, was designed to use common,
qualified hardware to the extent possible. Components unique
_: to the OWS program were designed with the intent to minimize
required testing. Methods such as factored safety margins and
system redundance to reduce criticality were used. Wherever
possible, analysis or similarity to previously qualified hardware
was used as the verification method.
f
! Initially, because the OWS was approached as a low-cost ("bare
9
bones") program, the test program and its associated documentation
4
were developed on a minimal basis. This concept left much to
be desired in developing the required confidence by MDAC Management
and the Customer that all design and mission operation requirements
were being satisfied. At this point, it was mutually agreed that
J
a Test and Assessment Document (TAD) be employed to provide
traceability of requirements through necessary verification.
The "Off the shelf" concept while eliminating a complete redesign,
development and retest of much hardware, did not reduce the
requirements to verify and validate the qualification of all
Flight Critical hardware. In attempting to utilize both new and
previously qualified hardware in the OWS Program, the contractor
found that three (3) major categories vere required to define
J
the hardWLre test history; i.e., hardvare qualified by test_
analy|is, similarity and/or any combination thereof. To certify
1974020219-407
the hardware was aualified by the above methods, the contractor
required evidence of the previous test records, current and/or
previous analysis data, similarity rationale and/or combinations
of all.
In addition to the above items, data to satisfy program requirements,
the desirability of a single reference document to record, validate
and control this multitude of data points lead the contractor to the
develol3nentof a Test and Assessment Document (TAD). The TAD evolved
around these major data points.
The initial work was begun on the TAD early in 1970, by defining hardware
lists, establishing ground rules and area of responsibility. This
; effort was coordinated with Customer representatives in working group
: meetings. By early summer of 1970, the basic ground work was finalized
to initiate the TAD "First Draft.' DRL MSFC 171A, Line Item G09,
released I0 August 1972, identified minimum TAD data and established
a release date which had been agreed upon during the Customer/Contractor
working meeting 3 through 7 August 1970.
During the "First OWS Mechanical Assessment Review Meeting" (eleven
Mechanical and 6 Electrical meetings were subsequently held), it was
agreed that all Mission Safety Critical Items (MSCI) would, as a minimum,
be include_ in the TAD. The Customer further stipulated additional
: hardware items, collectively designated as "Engineering Critical
Items" would also be added to the TAD list when identified. It was
also agreed two (2) separate TAD Volumes would be issued and maintained.
Volume I would contain the Mechanical items and Volume II the Elec_rical "_
"t
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items. Engineering critical item inclusion in the TAD presented
the contractcr a substantial schedule problem, in that the TAD hardware
list was in a continual state of expansion. This was born out in
growth of the original 188 items of the first TAD issue compared with
the 291 items of the final issue.
During the durati_l of the OWSProgram, three (3) complete revisions
of the TAD (Volumes I and II) were issued. The first issue was
made in February 1971, being preceded by a Preliminary Volume I,
dated September 19_0. First submittal of Volume II was dated
6 April 1971. The final revised issue of Volumes I and II was made
on 1 May 1973. This final issue incorpor-.ted the contractual data
requirements for OWSas well as 0WS Backup baseline requirements.
The TAD was expanded well beyond the original intent of a component
test valid_tion document by becoming a master test index during
CDR's, Vehicle checkout and CDDT. It served well as an indispensable
Engineering tool throughout the Program. It was considered by most
as the controlling document for other contractural _unctio_,g such as
the Certificate of Component Acceptsnce (CCA), as well as significantly
influencing the entire OW8 test program.
To facilitate a reasonable degree of visibility of test statue betveen
TAD items and the multitude of testa performed, • FORTRAN computer
Test Matrix was developed. This Btrix provided first an alph_,useric
tabulation of all TAD items and • @orresp_ding list of test line items
associated with the quallficstlon/de_elopmsnt testing of the item.
Both the item and the test line item were suffixed to indicate testin_
status, i.e., c_lete or lncaaplet4.
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A second tabulation "matrix of OWS-I components tested under test llne
! items," listed al__l test line items. Beneath each specific line item
the part number and noasenclature of each TAD item tested were listed.
As the development and qua_ification testing progressed. Certificates
of Component Acceptance were prepared for all critical items listed
in the TAD. At this time, acceptance test procedures were developed
to assure the flight hardware was built to the proper quality and
desiKn standards. Virtually all hardware assembled into the 0WS was
subjected to a Production Acceptance Test (PAT) prior to installation.
systems received an additional PAT after installation--for example,
atter brazing pneumatics systems.
9.3.2 o S_acecral_t Systems Testing - Spacecraft systems testing was initially
• approached as a low cost, low profile program with the same type of
management and controls utilized to checkout $IVB stages. Very early
in the checkout, the Contractor and the Customer decided the established
practices were not 8uffic_-er.t. A more comprehensive manaKement and
• controls system was established because of the many interfaces between
the NASA cent, era, experiment developers, and participation of crewmen
in the tests. The expanded system proved to be quite satisfactory.
Checkout was a finite plan. Changes were carefully controlled and
aut ho r i zed.
The checkout was completed within the required schedule, thousands
of elapsed hours of aanutacturin_ work were accomplished in parallel
and the flight integrity of the spacecraft va8 verified.
Division of work, applicable contractor policies and procedures,
vorkln 6 e_reeaent8 established by the Customer and Contractor, etc,,
were specified in the gI)C G2h27, _untington Beach Vehicle Checkout
Laboratory Operations Plan, dated July 1971.
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tProcedures utilized during checkout were prepared in accordance with ,.
requirements of 1B83_29, Test and Checkout Requirements, Specifications
. and Criteria Drawing. Special constraints and remarks were noted, f
The TCRSC changes were very carefully controlled and required the
NASA approval. It proved to be a very valuable document not only
; for specifying the requirements but also the mechanism to verify all
requirements were met.
: Spacecraft checkout objective was to verify ope_.ational capability
r
by exercising each spacecraft element in such a manner as to assure
operation within allowable test specifications and criteria as a
component, subsystem and all systems operating together.
Checkout was accomplished subsystem by subsystem to ascertain 1) all
components were properly installed and anctioned properly throughout
normal sequence of operation, 2) appropriate system leakage require-
ments were met, and S) each connnand response was within test speci-
fication and criteria established for each system/subsystem.
An All Systems Test vas accomplished subsequent to completing subsystem
testing. The AST stJnu_ated a compressed 0WS-1 Mission, including
Prelaunch, Boost, Preacttvation, Activation, Orbital Operations and
Deactivation. It was a functional test with all OWS systems active
in _he required boost or orbital flight configurations, _thin the
constraints of ground testing. The _ _as the final demonstration
at HB of OWS flight readiness.
The OWSwas tested for lack of electromagnetic interactions, safety ....
margin of induced RF interference, and experinent/OWS radiation
susceptibility. Acoustl@_ noise neasurements were also included
as part of the AST.
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Spacecraft checkout at Huntington Beach contributed greatly toward
successl_tl integrity verification of the spacecraft and launch prep-
aratton acttwlty of the 8k_lab.
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9.3.3 Conclusions and Hecommendations
i 9.3.3.1 Component and Subsystem - The emphasis on qualification testing was to
develop a "low cost" /"bare bones" program. Criteria were: reduce test-
ing, reduce formality of testing, and reduce formal documentation
requirements. There was a continuing increase in demand for technical
Justification to substantiate the need for a test and more technical
?
analysis was required to support rationale for qualification without
testing. Assembly or system level tests were performed in lieu of some
component level testing. This action created at least _wo problems:
(i) more components had to be gathered to complete the higher level
assembly/system tests and, therefore, test delays were evident_ (2) tests
f
were entered at a recognized higher risk because of the lack of component
level test. This caused further delays in the test program.
The emphasis of reduced formal ocumentation was recognized as a mis-
Judgment. The background, rationale, and Judgments made by the designers
was not readily available to the technical and program management people
who had the responsibility to assess the validity of the program to
make the spacecraft read_ o fly. This problem was eventually corrected
by the development of the Test Assessment Document (TAD) _ discusse_ i
!
in paragraph 9.3.1.
In conclusion, the test approach taken did make the spacecraft ready to
_ fly. In-flight performance did show that in three significant cases,
more testin6 should have been done. Those three were (i) meteoroid
shield which was lost during boost, (2) the refrigeration system radiator
by-pass valves that failed. While they did not cause a loss o1' the
syste_ anxiety was created, (3) late ground test results predicted that
the WArdroom and waste _nagement heaters would fail. At the last minute
O-ho
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spare heaters were launched. Inflight data indicated a change in per-
formance of the heaters, however, both did supply needed hot water
through the entire mission.
Recommendations to consider for improvements in the quali__cation
approach are (i) a systematic approach should be developed to assess each
subsystem until all elements of the spacecraft have been analyzed and
documented to show the rationale to verify ready for flight by use of
tests, analysis, and similarity, (2) during the assessment phase the
components having a relative high risk of failing tests and causing
redesign should be identified as candidates for individual component
level testing as early as possible. This could help prevent test
stoppages and/or delays.
9.3.3_2 Post Manufacturing Checkout - The spacecraft checkout was performed in
detail to meet the Test and Checkout Requirements Specifications and
Criteria (TCE_C). The _AC-W proposed concept of formalizing the TCRSC
for _FC concurrence and preparing Test Outline Drawings (TOD's) for
early review and com_nent _ _FC, _C, JSC, and in-house cheokout
related organizations proved beneficial to establishing a solid founda-
tion for detailed procedure preparation. Adequate attention had been
paid to the technical content of the tests. All procedures were worked
through the procedure workins group review team and finalized prior to
testtn E. Therefore, there were no significant technical probiema.
The sisnif_cant checkout problem was _he misJudpent of the timin_ and
ma4[nitude of actual flight crew participation. The premise on which
the start of checkout was prepared for and started, was - the spacecraft
would be functional_y checked first and then the flight crew would do
the thinp they planned separately. After the ma_or part of the checkout
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procedures had been prepared, it was decided that the flight crew would
participate in subsystem checkout. They stipulated what tests the$
desire_ to participate in and what parts of the test. In addltio_, it
then bec_=e a requiremen_ to reformat the procedure into a crew
operating format. The format was to be as near identical to the
inflight procedure as possible. This then increased tn, crews familiar-
ity with systems and hardware functions and also allowed them to functio_
as near as possible to the anticipated flip,hiprocedure. After thi_
initial changeover the crew participation became routine and helpful.
The other significant problem was in attempting to get all the equip-
ment aboard for the Crew C2F2 (Crew Compar+-'¢nt Fit and _mction). This
spacecraft had significantly more equipment aboard than any previous
A
spacecraft. There were hundreds of storage items, many of which were
still undergoing modification, and there were many pieces of experiment
equipment not readily available. The ultimate solution was performance
of the C2_2 in increments with that not performed being deferred to the
launch site.
The following recommendations should be considered on future programs
of a similar nature. The checkout plan should clearly recognize the
degree of flight crew participation desired so that checkout procedures
are form&ted properly and consistently and are as near identical _o
inflijh% procedures as possible.
|
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9.4 PRELAUNCH AND MISSION SUPPORT - The Orbital Workshop (OWS) prelaunch
and mission support provided b2"MDAC-W was effective _n providing the
technical analysis, ground testing, and support hardware necessary to
support the NASA in the successful conclusion of the Skylab mission.
The organization of an MDAC-W OWS Prelaunch and Mission Support Team
including representatives from all program support organizations was
! effective in providing an integrated and total response to all launch
_ and mission support demands. The use of program and engineering
personnel with in-depth experience in the design, development and
_, prelaunch verification of OWS systems proved invaluable in the rapiu
assessment and complete response to mission support requests. The
incl,,sion of manufacttuing operations and the various MDAC-W test sup-
port organizations as part of the OWS mission support team and the
5
: assignment and control of hardware and test support activity through
t._obasic mission support action assignment system proved very effec-
tive. Hardware and test activities were accomplished in concert with
mission support requirements and were provided in a timely manner.
! OWS mission support requests were formally documented by an MDAC-W
action request and assigne_ to the appropriate mission support team
representative for response. Responses received a technical and pro-
gram review to verify their completeness and acc,,racy prior to
transmittal to MHFC. During the Skylab (SL) mission one thousand
twelve (1012) action requests were p.,'ocessedby MDAC-W. The system
; developed for action item assignment, tracking, review, and response
was effective in providing accurate and timely support.
The OWS mission support facilities at Huntington Beach proved to be
satisfactory in providing the communication channels and wor_ areas
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necessary for mission monitoring and action response coordination. Of
particular benefit were the NASA provided mission voice networks for
real time monitoring of the air-to-ground crew conversations and the i
JSC flight directors communication loop. Real time data availability
at Huntington Beach was limited to what could be received via telephone
from MSFC. This resulted in a constraint to understanding and provid-
ing fast response for some of the more complex technical proble_. _
Another significant constraint was the inability to transmit written
material in a timely manner. There was a large volume of written
material requirin6 transmission between MSFC and Huntington Beach. The
magnafax transmission equipment provided was too slow (6 minutes per
page) and very often caused delay of required information.
The following recommendations should be considered for future programs:
provide a data terminal at each support location which would allow
receipt of real time or near real time flight telemetry data for sup-
port of problem resolution, and provide a capability for timely
transmlssion [e.g., Long Distance Xeroxgraphy (LDX)] of written
material between all mission support locations.
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10.2 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING STUDY REPORTS
REPORT NUMBER DATE ISSUED TITLE
I
! MDC G0031-P 1-15-70 SATURN V WORKSHOP WATER SYSTEM
I SUMMARY: Trade Study directed toward establishing the configuration of
the water system for the "Dry" Orbital Workshop. Study is
divided into three basic sections: Water Distribution System;
Water Storage Container; Water Storage Container Installation
MDC G0033-P 2-17-70 ORBITAL WORKSHOP PRESSURIZATION AND VENT
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
SUMMARY: Study documents the selection of a system for _essurization
and venting of the 0WS tanks during launch and orbital coast.
MDC G00_I-P 2-2-70 INTELSAT IV ANTENNA INSTALLATION FEASIBILITY
STUDY
SUMMARY: Study initiated to establish the feasibility of installing both
the refrigeration subsystem radiator and the intelsat antenna
in the aft interstage area of the Saturn Workshop. Study was
terminated by NASA prior to completion.
MDC G0047-P 3-17-70 0WS PASSIVE THERMAL CONTROL STUDY
SU_4ARY: An evaluation of the thermal control requirements for the 0WS
made to define potential passive system changes to meet CEI
Specification habitation temperature criteria. Primary emphasis
was on external tank and meteoroid shield "optical" coatings.
MDC G0052-P 2-16-70 SOLAR ARRAY SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION
SU_Y: Document smnmarizes the results of a Preliminary Design Study
on the Workshop Solar Array System.
MDC G0053-P 1-15-70 SCIENTIFIC AIRLOCK (SAL) INSTALLATION STUDY i
i SD_Y: Study reviews the SAL design and documents the structural and i
and mechanical modifications required to meet OWS requirements, i
J
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lREPORT NUMBER DATE ISSUED TITLE
MDG G0055-P 1-29-70 WINDOW INSTALLATION IN OWS WARDROOM
SU_Y: Study compares window designs already made and in some cases
flown on existing Apollo craft. Window location information
is derived for optimum viewing. Several alternate designs are
presented along with a discussion of their relative merits to
aid in eventual selection.
MDC G0056-P 1-21-70 A GASEOUS OXYGEN RECHARGE SYST_ TO SUPPORT SVWS
EXPERIMENTS MS09/T020 _,
SUMMARY: Study provides definition of a Gaseous Oxygen recharge system
for use in conjunction with experiments M509 and T020
•
q
MDC G0058-P 12-29-69 AM/0WS TRANSIENT GENERATION AND SUSCEPTIBILITY
LEVEL DISPARITY
SU_Y: Study documents the impact of increasing susceptibility levels
to +__0volts•
MDC G0059-P 3-31-70 OWS ORBITAL STORAGE TRADE STUDY
SUMMARY: Study to determine if the OWS internal hardware could be stored
in orbit between habitation periods at near vacuum conditions
and remain functional for subsequent use. Electrical and
Habitability Support System equipment, sealing devices, and
experiments were considered•
MDC GOO60-P 1-29-70 ORBITAL WORKSHOP PERSONAL WASH SYSTEM
SU_RY: Trade study to evaluate wash systems for the personal hygiene
of the OWS crew. Failure to find a satisfactory filter for the
baseline system air-water separator required a stud_ of alternate !
approaches to crew hygiene and wash water collection methods. C
MDC GOO61-P 1-29-70 THRUSTER ATTITUDE CONTROL SYST_4 (TACS) -
SUMMARY: Trade Study compares the use of the Saturn Control Relay Package
(CRP), P/N IB57731, to a d_.sign concr.pt which uses relay modules
containing the general purpose i0 Amp rel_ys, P/N 1366900, used ...
on the Mainline Saturn Program.
'4
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rREPORT I_JMBER DATE ISSUED TITLE
MDC G0062--P 1-16-70 URINE POOLING STUDY, TECHNICAL (REVISED 5 FEB. 70)
SUmmARY: Trade Stu_M to analyze a 24-hour pooled urine sample technique
with optional processing of:
(a) 100% dried
(b) 120 ML sample dried !
(c) 120 ML frozen sample
Study takes these options and compares them to the Baseline
System to develop the measure of advantages in volume, electrical
energy and return weights.
MDC G006_-P 2-18-70 ORBITAL WORKSHOP POSIGRADE AV SYSTem4 STUDY TO
ELIMINATE SHROUD RECONTACT POSSIBILITY
SU_Y: Trade Study of Propulsive Venting Systems to determine the most
promising design approach for imparting a posigrade AV to the i
0WS. A delta velocity of four feet per second was used to avoid
recontacting the p_yload shroud.
MDC G0065P 1-22-70 2ACS MISSION IMPULSE INCREASE USING ELECTRICAL
HEATERS
_Y: Study on a means of maximizing Thruster Attitude Control System
(TACS) impulse by utilizing active thermal control.
MDC GO067-P 1-29-70 FILM VAULT STUDIES
SU_Y: Study of design approaches to the storing of film.
MDC G0068-P 1-29-70 OWS EXPENDABLES
SU_Y: Study to identify required quantities of expendables for the
dry version of the 0WS and document the ground rules and , !
rationale used in their determination.
MDC GO069-P 2-19-70 LIGHT BAFFLING STUDY
_Y:_ Stu_ to determine the optimum method or methods of providing ii
a means for light baffling in the sleep compartment and
wardroom. Total darkness was chosen as a design goal.
i0-_ ,
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REPORT NUMBER DATE ISSUED TITLE
MDC G0070-P 2-11-70 TRADEOFF STUDY GAS SUPPLIES FOR WATER SYST_
PRESSURIZATION & METABOLIC ANALYZER FOR
SATURN WORKSHOP #i
SU_Y: Study to evaluate alternate methods and configurations for
supplying gas for pressurizing the water system that supplies '.
the OWS with water for metabolic and hygienic needs, and
secondly, to evaluate alternate methods of connecting the
gas supply lines into the Airlock Module Supply System. _
MDC G0071-P 2-10-70 IMPACT ASSOCIATED WITH REVISED ACOUSTIC, SHOCK, _
AND VIBRATION CRITERIA FOR THE SATURN V
ORBITAL WORKSHOP
SU_Y: Study documents the effect of the increased environments,
resulting from the conversion to a "dry" Workshop, on the OWS
Test Program. Design procedures which minimize the impact of
the increased environments are recommended.
MDC G0074-P 2-24-70 URINE FREEZING STUDY
SU_Y: Study to determine the optimum method to implement a urine
sampling and freezing system. Consideration was given to the
following :
(a) Total mass determination
(b) Alternative methods and procedures for obtaining
measured samples
_ (c) Methods of freezing and storing samples
(d) Methods of packaging samples for return
(e) Available space in CSM for sample return
MDC G0075-P 3-13-70 TPASH AND DISPOSAL STUDY
SU_Y: Trash Disposal System Stuay used to develop a current "trash
model" procedure for trash disposal and determine the size of
the screen in the LOX tank.
MDC GOO76-P 4-3-70 ISOLATION OF GAS SUPPLY FOR SWS THRUSTER ATTITUDE
(Revised CONTROL SYSTem4 TRADE STUb _REVlSED 30 JUNE '71)
6-30-70)
SUMMARY: Study _ddresses TACS Gas Supply Isolation of the systems presented,
selects the optimum with respect to performaree, hardware develop-
ment, reliability, development and qualification testing, cost
and _chedule. The primary objective was to complete the 236 day
mission or, in the event of a leak, complete as much of the
mission as possible.
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! .REPORT I_MBER DATE ISSUED TITLE +_
MDC G0077-P 3-25-70 PRELIMINARY DESIGN/TRADE STUDY FOR CONTINGENCY i
ACCESS TO SATURN WORKSHOP ON LAUNCH PAD
SU_Y: Preliminary design/trade study which led to development of a
design concept for adapting the catwalk end to the stage side.
MDC O0078-P 3-31-70 USE OF APOLLO SCIENTIFIC AIRLOCK ORBITAL WORKSHOP
SU_Y: Study to identify changes to the SAL to assure that the Experiment/
SAL interface is operationally compatible. Study established
structural and dimensional limitations to be included on experi-
ment ICD 's.
MDC G0079-P 5-_-70 STUDY TO DETERMINE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM REQUIRID_NTS
FOR A 50° INCLINATION ORBIT VOL. I TECHNICAL REPORT
_Y: Stu_7 determines the impact of a change in mission inclination
angle from 35° to 50° and recommends system changes to the OWS
to satisfy crew comfort criteria.
z
MDC G0080-P 5-_-70 STUDY TO DETERMINE T_RMAL CONTROL SYST_ REQUIR_NTS
FOR A 50° INCLINATION ORBIT VOL. II APPENDICES
SU_Y: Study presents supplemental data used to assemble the results
contained in MDC G0079-P.
MDC O0081-P h-14-70 DELETION OF THE S-IVB ULLAGE ROCKETS
SU_Y: Stu_ identifies advantages end disadvantages associated with
the deletion of the S-IVB ullage rockets. A summary of all
potential problem areas and their final assessment is presented.
MDC G0088-PA 12-18-70 EFFECT OF EARTH RESOURCES AND RENDEZVOUS
MANEUVERS ON THE ORBITAL WORKSHOP
SU_Y: Study assessed the compatibility of components with the
X-IOP/Z-LV attitude required for rendezvous and defined the OWS +
subsystem performance and limitations during the revised earth
resources X-IOP/Z-LV maneuvers. +
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pREPORT NUMBER DATE ISSUED TITLE
MDC GOO89-P 6-19-70 380,000 LB. SEC. THRUSTER ATTITUDE CONTROL SYST_
SUMMARY: Study presents a design for a 380,000 pound-second cold Gas
Attitude Control System for the Saturn V Workshop. The selected
; impulse was based on a back-up capability requirement for a
control moment gyro failure. Also, this impulse level is
believed to represent the practical upper limit of a cold gas
system for workshop applications.
MDC Goog0-P 7-13-70 SOLAR ARRAY SYSTEM (SAS) DEPLOYMENT CONSTRAINT STUDY
SU_Y: Investigation of all factors influencing the time when the SAS
could be deployed. Study recommended a sequence of events for
the identified influencing factors including actual SAS deploy- _
ment and detailed the constraints dictating this sequence. !
MDC G0092-P 7-27-70 LOOSE ITemS AND DEBRIS DETECTION AND R_OVAL FROM
(Revised ORBITAL WORKSHOP
9-9-70)
SU_Y: An analysis of the impact of tumbling or rolling the OWS to
dislodge, detect, and recover loose articles for contamination
control.
_C G0093-P 9-8-70 METHODS TO REDUCE POSSIBILITY OF RF_IGERANT j
LEAKAGE IN THE OW"
SIR_MARY: Tra_e-off Study to evaluate means of reducing or eliminating a
possible fire hazard resulting from leakage of OWS refrigerant.
MDC GO083-P 4-27-70 ORBITAL WORKSHOP VENTILATION AND COOLING
(Revised DURING GROUND OPERATIONS
9-28-70)
SUMMARY: A study to (i) determine the optimum method of ground conditioning.
Assuming OWS internal temperature requirements are 40°F to 80°F
and that ground conditioning should maint _tn this temperature
level for the 20 da_s preceding launch, (2) define +he aft inter-
stage prelaunch temperature purge requirements, and (3) identify
the nominal purge g_ temperature and the required tolerance
band.
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REPORT PJMBER DATE ISSUED TITLE i
MDC GOOS_-P 7-27-70 ORBITAL WORKSHOP LEAK DETECTION AND REPAIR
SUMMARY: Study defines requirements for a hand held portable leak
detector. Established C&W displays, meteoroid penetration
probability, and evaluated present availability of leak
' detection device.
MDC G0085-P 5-25-70 LIGHTNING PROTECTION - OWS
SU_Y: Study to investigate possible effects of lightning on the OWS
hardware. Applicable review of the Apollo 12 incident were
utilized to explain where similarity exists between the S-IVB
stage and the OWS. Capability of the OWS to withstand any
induced transient voltage or current was evaluated, i
MDC G0086-P 6-10-70 NITROGEN GAS SUPPLY FOR WATER SYSTEM
PRESSURIZATION FOR 0RBIT__L WORKBHOP
SUMMARY: Study identified the optimum method of supplying N2 gas as
pressurant to the OWS water bottles.
MDC G0087-P 7-27-70 ORBITAL _DRKSHOP COMPLIANCE EVALUATION TO THE MANNED
(Revised SPACECRAFT CENTER STAND_YRDS & CRITERIA DOCUMENT
3-15-71) MSCM 8080
SU_Y: Review of '_4anned Spacecraft Criteria & Standards" (MSCM 8080),
dated January 8, 1969, and determination of 0WS compliance or
noncompliance for each requirement.
MDC GOO9_-P 8-3-70 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ORBITAL WORKSHOP
(0WS) REFRIGERATION SUBSYST_
SUMMARY: Study the refrigeration logic unit to determine if the logic is
too complex. Study documents investigation and updates, evaluates,
and clarifies the design requirements.
MDC G0095-P 8-20-70 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM STUDY
_Y: Trade study aimed at selecting sensor coverage - double or voting,
and definition of the sensor quantities. Study defines coverage
area and logic.
1974020219-425
i REPORT _TMBER DATE ISSUED TIT__.__
I MDC GO096-P 8-12-70 ORBITAL WORKSHOP STOWAGE DESIGN REVIEW JUNE 26, 1970
SI_@4ARY: Documents stowage PDR conducted on June 26, 1970.
MDC GO098-P 8-2_-70 RESIDUAL WATER EXTRACTION FROM THE ORBITAL WORKSHOP
WATER TANKS
SU_Y: Trade Study to determine the optimum method of extracting and
using residual (unused) water fr_n each water tank. :
MDC GO099-P 9-8-70 SKYLAB A OPERATIONAL ACOUSTIC NOISE STUDY
SU_Y: Trade Study to determine if special methods of controlling
(limiting) on-orbit noise level and acoustic characteristics
in the OWS to attain the limits specified in the CEI, were
required. Recommended methods were to be compatible with
interior decor, flammability requirements, thermal heat balance,
etc. Minimum change to the equipment sources generating noise
was deslrpble.
MDC GOI00-P 8-28-70 ORBITAL WORKSHOP WASTE/TRASH DISPOSAL
GENERAL REQUIR_ENTS
SUMMARY: Tabulation and incorporation of Cluster Trash into a trash
model.
_DC GOIOI-P 9-ih-70 METHODS OF CLUSTER ODOR CONTROL WHICH CAN BE
INCORPORATED INTO THE OWS
SU_Y: Definitio. and evaluation of methods of Cluster Odor Control
which can be incorporated within the OWB.
_C GOI02-P 1-28-71 CREW TASKS EVALUATION "POTABLE" WATER SYSTD4
IMPROVEMENT
SUMMARY: Review existing OWS water system design an$ identify changes
which would simplify crew tasks _nd procedures. Identif_
potential design i_rovements and make recommendation relative
to their incorporation.
N_C OO103-P 10-9-70 STAINLESS STEEL/OXYGEN COMPATIBILITY "
StRMARY: Study established design practices for oxygen-stainless steel
systems. Assembled currently available data on metal combus-
tion properties with o_gen. (Considered system pressures,
temperature melting points, and any other pertinent data). !
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REPORT R_BER DATE ISSUED TITLE
MDC G010_-P ii-13-70 MICROBIOLOGICAL CONTROL/OWS ATMOSPHERE CONTROL
! SYSTemS
SU_Y_Y: Review of NASA request for microbiological control of Atmosphere
_ I Control System. Study analyzed problem and OWS system capa-
bilities and provided conclusions and recommendations.
i MDC G01OS-P 9-29-70 ORBITAL WORKSHOP (OWS) PRODUCTION ACCEPTANCE
i TESTING (PAT) WITH INDUCED ENVIROh_LENTS
SUMMARY: Study to determine OWSproduction acceptance environmental
testing requirements.
MDC G0106-P 10-16-70 FILM VAULT HUMIDITY CONTROL
SD_Y: Study examined candidate methods and recommended means of
maintaining film vault humidity at _5 +_15%.
_C G0107-P 11-3-70 PRELIMINARY DESIGN CONCEPTS OF WASTE MANAG_4ENT
COMPARTMENT ATMOSPHERIC FILTRATION
StaY: Study develops several preliminary design concepts for catching
hair, fingernails, dandruff, whiskers, etc. in the waste manage-
sent compartment. Consider as a high priority, placing adequate
filtration in the _C ventilation fan fur this purpose.
i _C G0108-P 10-26-70 SIMULATED OWS FORWARD DOME FOR VIBROACOUSTIC PAYLOAD
, TEST (PHASE II)
SUMMARY: Determine the most feasible and economical means of providing an
OWSForward Dane Assembly including the OWS hatch to meet the
technical requirements of the vihro-acoustic pe_71oad test program
(Phase II).
_C G0109-P 11-9-70 RETRO-ROCKET PL_._ IMPINGINE_T ON SOLAR ARRAY SYST_
SUMMARY: Stu_ examines candidate methods and recownde means of preventing
retro-rocket plume impingement upon and through the solar arre_
fairing use,mbly purge vent valves which might cause damage or
degradation of their on-orbit performance.
I0-i0
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REPORT _%_MBER DATE ISSUED TITLE
MDC G0110-P 1-11-71 METHODS OF PRESERVING SURFACE OPTICAL PROPERTIES
OF S-13G COATING ON ORBITAL WOFXSHOP
SU_RY: Determine the likelihood of hav_ng to clean the low solar
absorbence coating on the OWS (S-13G) to remove excessive dirt
and bring the thermal characteristics back to an acceptable
level.
Determine if it is more efficient to inspect and subsequently
clean the coating if required or install a protective cover
that would be removed Just prior to launch.
Considerations should include but not be limited to the following:
o Length of time the OWS _rlll be on the pad
o Accessibility of coated areas
o Total ar-.a coated with S-13G
o Complexity of a cover designed to withstand wind, rain, etc.
o Past experience with mainline vehicles
o Duration of tasks as opposed to available time
S_arize the preceding and recommend a course of action.
MDC G0111-P 11-19-70 ORBITAL WORKBHOP SUIT CONDITIONING STATION -
ALTERNATE BLOWER AND CONCEPT STUDY
SUMMARY: Study evaluated blowers other than the high cost waste manage-
ment unit and investigated an alternate concept of utilizing
the environmental control system as a source of blown air for
the pressure suit conditioning station.
_C GOII2-P 12-28-70 CLUSTER WEIGHT/MASS REDUCTION BY WATER R_OVAL
_Y: Determination of the optimum water bottles to be removed (and/or
launched empty) to avoid mass saturation of the Sk_lab control
moment _ros during X-LV gravity gradient.
_C GOII_-P 2-_-71 ORBITAL WDRKSHOP CONDENSATION CONTROL STUDY
8tRMARY: Perform conceptual design and prepare gross impact for systems to
backup/enhance or repla_-e the existing heat pipe system.
NDC GOIIS-P 2-I-71 TRASH AIRLOCK CONTINGENCY/M_LFUWCT_...ONSTUDY _.
St_MARY: Conduct a stu_ to evaluate contingency actions in t_e event of
a failure of the truh dispoaa_ airlock. Evaluate test progrm.
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REPORT NUMBER DATE ISSUED TITLE
_C G0116-P 02-05-'/1 EVA_LUATION OF M_'I_OROID RF"qRT KIT
SUMMARY: Review existing meteoroid penetration repair techniques and
comment on their adequacj. Recommend new techniques where
appropriate. Evaluate the list of maintenance and operational
tools/materials cont ".nedin L,csign Requirements Drawing
1B80699. Identify a.ditional tools required.
MDC G0117-P 03-01-71 EVALUATION OF M_THODS OF PREVEI:TING ICINJ OF THE
WASTE TANK NPV SYSTEM
SUMMARY: Conduct further studies to substantiate t,e decision that
control venting of t,e LOX tank will not be implemented. Pre-
sent to MSFC the substantiating analysis to assure that no
problems will be encountered by using the LOX tan_. for w_te
disposal will not occur.
MDC GoIIS-P 02-19-71 TRANSFER AND DISPOSAL OF SERVICE MODULE £UEL CELL
GENERATED WATER
SUMMARY: Determine methods of draining CSM fuel cell water into an OWS
water tank. Consider hardline and drag through hose concepts.
MDC GOII9-_ 02-25-71 0N-ORBIT tRANSFER STOWAGE STUDY
SUMMARY: Perform the stowage studies reque3ted by SED-208-OT-O020h.
MDC G2161-P 03-01-71 SATURN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING TRADEOFF STUDY REPORT
IN-FLIGHT SERVICING OF EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
UMBILICAI_
Sb%_4ARY: Perform a trade study relative to in-flight servicing of th_
dry AM EVA um_ilicals. Prepar, data relative to the dusign and
operational characteristics of the water system. Data will be
used _n an MDAC-East presentation to NASA.
MDC G2162-P 0h-26-71 PKELIMINARY TEST PLAN ORBITAL WORKSHOP CONTINGENCY
TRASH PROCESSING VERIFICATION TESTS
SUMMARY: Study and present a preliminary clesign relative to contingency
trash disposal via ejection through the Scientific Airlock (SAL).
I
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REPORT NUMBER DATE ISSU_'D TITLE
MDC G2163-P 06-09-71 PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OF ORBITAL
:, WORKSHOP WEIGHT CHANGES ON ATTITUDE CONTROL MARGINS
SUMYu_RY: Develop graphical aids which can be used to determine the effect
of a weight change upon attitude control margin.
¢
: G2164-P 07-02-71 FIXED METEOROID SHIELD STUDY
SUMMARY: Generate the appropriate data and Lrepare viewgraphs ollthe
feasibility/meri'cs of a fixed meteoroid shield,
_C G2165-P 07-26-71 PRELIMINARY DESIGN OF THE NITROGEN PURGE SYSTEM FOR
,_ _IE ORBITAL WORKSHOP SOLAR ARRAY SYSTEM
SUM_L_Y: Determine methods of maintaining suitable environmental conditions
for the solar cells in the beam/fairing during operations at the
following locations :
1. Within the VA_.
2. During rollout.
3. On the launch pad prior to L0X chilldown in the S-II stage.
4. During cryogenic chilidown and until liftoff.
MDC G2166-P 07-23271 ORBITAL WORKSHOP METEOROID SHIELD RELEASE SYSTEM
DESIGN ALTERNATES
SUM_K_RY: Evaluate alternate methods of meteoroid shield deployment.
MDC G2167-P 07-28-71 EFFECT UPON OWS SYSTEMS OF ACCOMMODATING EARTH RE-
SOURCES EXPERIMENT PASSES AT ANYTIME
SL,m_Y: Assess or define the OWS subsystem performance and limitations
during the revised earth resources X-IOP/Z-LV maneuvers.
MDC G2168-P 09-16-71 EVALUATION OF CONTAMINATION GENERATED BY WASTE DIS-
POSAL THROUGH THE WASTE TANK NPV DUCTS
SUMMARY: Conduct a survey to establish perfolunance of all materials dumped
into and vented out of the waste tank. The survey is to be
summarized in two for_:
1. A viewgraph presentation.
2. A Systems Engineering Study Report.
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REPORT NUMBER DATE ISSUED TITLE
MDC G2169-P lO-11-71 EF}_CTS OF CMG DESATURATION MANEUVERS AND Z-LV MJ_N-
EUVERS UPON WORKSHOP SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE
SUMMARY: Determine the effect of CMG desaturation maneuvers durizlg Z-LV on
the refrigeration subsystem. Determine necessary desaturation
maneuver constraints and/or system performance deviations re-
quired to acco_modate specified maneuvers.
MDC G2170-P 09-30-71 AN EVALUATION OF MEANS TO CONTROL OWS SAS GI_OUND
(Preliminary) PURGE, ASCENT VENTING, AND RETRO ROCKET PLUME
CONTAMINATION
SUI_WA/_Y: Update preliminary study on SAS vent valve and plume impingement
protection.L
MDC G2171-P 10-05-71 ORBITAL WOILKSHOP METEOROID SHIELD P_EUMATIC SEPARA-
TION SYSTEM
SUMM__RY: Evaluate alternate methods of meteoroid shield deployment.
MDC G2172-P 11-12-71 RATIONALE FOR THE SELECTION OF THE URINE SAMPLE
RETURN TRAY CONFIGURATION
SUMMARY: Document the trade-offs and selected design that led to the
chamfered tank urine sample tray and separate dodecane tanks.
MDC G2173-P 11-11-71 ELIMINATION OF EXTERNAL OPTICAL CONTAMINATION FROM
AM AND OWS FREE WATER DUMPS
SU_Y: Conduct a study to identify methods to eliminate free water dumps
from the waste management compartment and wardroom lines into
the OWS waste tank.
MDC G217h-P 11-30-72 OWS HABITABLE COMP_.RTMENT MAXIMUM PARTIAL PRESSURE
OF OXYGEN
SUMMARY: Determine the maximtml partial pressure of oxygen that may be
encountered in the OWS habitable compartment.
MDC G2175-P 01-07-72 GROUND COOLING AND PURGE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OWS
HABITATION AREA
SUMMARY: Re-evaluate the adequacy of the present purge system for the OWS
habitation area. Compare the present method with alternate
methods.
i0-i|_
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REPORT Ni_4BER DATE ISSUED TITLE
MDC G2176-P 12-22-71 ORBITAL WORKSHOP ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS STUDY
(INTERIM REPORT)
SUMMARY: Determine the effects of short term worst case attitudes and
i" associated attitude constraints.
]
J
_iDC G2177-P 01-25-72 STUD_ OF CONTRAINTS ON MANEUVERING OF EVA CREWMEN
AND A CSM TO AVOID SHADOWING DAMAGE TO THE OWS SAS
SUMMARY: Determine all constraints r_quired to be imposed on planned mis-
sions to prevent unnecessary damage to the OWS SAS that could
occur as a result of array shadowing. Primary items to be
studied are (1) shadowing from CSM fly-around of the OWS and
(2) shadowing from EVA crewmen.
MDC G2178-P 01-27-72 PLUME SHIELD DELETION STUDY
SUMMARY: Determine the effect on the performance of the refrigeration
subsystem due to removal of the plume shield.
i
MDC G2180-P 0h-20-72 REFRIGERATION SUBSYSTEM LEAK ISOLATION REPAIR
SUMMARY: Determine techniques of isolating and repairing leaks in the re-
frigeration subsystem coolanol lines prior to launch.
MDC G2181-P 05-01-72 REDUNDANT RELEASE ACTUATOR FOR RADIATOR SHIELD
JETTISONING
u
_ S[_4MARY: Examine the existing single failure point in the radiator shield
Jettison mechanism and determine methods of providing redundancy.
MDC G278h 11-10-70 OWS REFRIGERATION SUBSYSTEM ALTERNATE COOLANT STUDY
SUMMARY: Determine necessary equipment changes and desirability of
utilizing a fluid other than coolanol.
MDC G281h 01-31-72 COOLANOL ASSURANCE PLAN
SUMMARY: Define the overall approach used by MDAC-W to insure the leak
tight integrity and safety of coolanol-15 related systems in the
OWS.
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10.3 TEST PLAN DAC-56697A, DEVELOPMENT T_g_
TEST LINE TITLE REPORT NUMBER
ITEM CREW ACCOMMODATIONS RELATED/VENDOR REPORT DATE
CA-I Floor Panel A3-860-KBBB-TM-II5 1 January 1968
<
CA-2 Floor & Wall (h.2 Grid) A3-860-KBBB-TM-123 14 February 1968
CA-3 Wall & Floor Grid Splice A3-860-KBBB-TM-124 27 December 1967
, CA-h Thermal Curtain & Ceiling MP 51591, MP 51692, 4 August 1970
MP _1691
i MP 51593, MP 51600
MP 51690, MP 51694
{
CA-5 Green Alodine Coating DAC-62115 (PHASE i 4 August 1970
ANDII)
CA-6 Coating A2 Foil MD-19 DAC-62116 March 1968
: CA-7 Colored Anodic Films MP 51, 386 lh February 1969
!
_ CA-8 Insulated Plug Assembly A3-250-KBBB-TM-131 27 August 1968
CA-9 Portable Foot Restraints TM-DSV-ACCB-190 May 1970
CA-IO Portable Hand Hold TM-DSV-ACCB-188 April 1970
t
CA-11 Tether Attach Pin TM-DSV-ACCB-184 April 1970
• CA-13 Exp Tube/CDF & EBW CDF TM-DSV-hB-MECH-R-6573 A i0 November 1969
i CA-14 Exp Tube TM-OWS-MECH-R-666h 13 February 1970
' CA-18 Viewing Window & Instl _C G3365 May 1972
MDC G3865 October 1972
CA-21 Foam Insulation A3-250-ABAS-TM-138 15 January 1971
\
: CA-23 OWS Acoustic Evaluation A3-253-ABDh-TM-00h 17 June 1971
CA-27 View Window Int Shield MDC G3372 May 1972
CA-28 Expand Tube & Strap Assy MDC G4022 January 1973
Jet Research 1617 & 1618
CA-32 Meteoroid Shield Post MDC G3373 July 1972
_ Instrumentation
CA-3h Met. Shield Deply Latch MDC G337h May 1972
, i0-16
1974020219-433
•EXPERIMENT ACCOMMODATIONS
[
CX-I Scientific Airlock MDC G4115 March 1973
TM-DSV-7-SSL-R6952 A
CX-5 PGA Air Flow Mod System MDC G4178 April 1973
TM-DSV7-F&M-R7049
CX-7 Film Vault Humidity TM-DSVT-SSL-R6904 24 August 1971
CX-8 Film Vault Mat TM-DSV7-SSL-R6930 A 7 February 1972
Compatibility
CX-9 SAL/Experiments Desiccant MDC G4179 April 1973
Unit TM-DSV7-F&M-R7050 !
CX-ll Film Vault Mat Compat TM-DSV7-SSL-R7051 18 July 1972
DATA ACQUISITION
DA-I Mult Sign Cond-Gen MDAC-ED REPORT 25 July 1969
2175-02
2175-02 ADDENDUM lO October 1969
i, REV. A
DA-3 Fwd Sign Cond Panel TM-DSV-7-EE-R6763 i0 September 1971
B (Phase 1 and 2)
TM-DSV-7-EE-R6763 i0 November 1971
SUPPLEMENT 1 (3)
TM-DSV7-EE-R6763 4 February 1972
SUPPLEMENT 2 (4) •
DA-4 Fuse, Cart, Slk Mini TM-DSV7-EE-R6658 December 1969
DA-5 Data Acquisition Comp TM-DSV7-EE-R6775 B 15 April 1971
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
EC-h LH2 Tank Seal Device MP 50, 885 3 April 1968
EC-5 Thermal Shield Ext A3-290-ABFS-TM-137 March 1970
EC-6 Tank Radiant Heater TM-DSV7-EE-R6786 24 February 1972
EC-7 Duct Heater Assembly TM-DSV7-PROP-R6601 12 November 1969
TM-DSVT-EE-R6601-1 A h May 1972 _
EC-8 Fan Cluster Test TM-DSV7-ENV-R6705 , 2 August 1970
TM-DSV7-ENV-R6705-1 23 December 1970
TM-DSV7-MECH-R6705-2 17 June 1970
i0-17
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EC-9 Air Distrib Ceiling TM-250-ACMO-69-TM-189 December 1969
: EC-10 Rm Fan Filter Test TM-DSV7-F&M-R6753 20 July 1971
EC-II Thermal Control Assembly TM-DSV7-EE-67hO 30 March 1971
_ EC-26 Ground Thermal Cond Syst A3-250-ACMI-TM-207 lh August 1972
AIRESEARCH
71-77hi, REV 2
: EC-30 Fan, Portable TM-DSV7-F&M-R6911 21 July 1972
EC-33 Fan Cluster Assembly TM-DSV7-F&M-R7022 19 September 1972 i
EC-3h Room Fan Filter MDC Gh177 April 1973
TM-DSV7-F&M-R6899
EC-h2 Portable Fan - Vibration TM-DSV7-F&M-R703h lh July 1972
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
ES-I LH2 Wicking & Ign DSV-hB-PROP-R6088 30 October 1967
ES-2 Cryo Mat Eval DSV-hB-EE-R6!3h 15 December 1967 _ !
< DsV-hB-EE-R613h, ii April 1969
Supplement-i
TM-SIW-ENV-R613h-I ii July 1969
ES-3 Zero G Corm TM-SlW-EE-R65h8 A 23 September 1970
TM-SIW-ENV-R65hS-I 16 September 1969 !
TM-SIW-SSL-R65h8-2 29 August 1969 !
TM-DSV7-EE-R6906 15 September 1971
ES-5 Forward Dome Test MDC G2071 March 1971
ES-6 Cont & Displ Panel TM-DSV7-EE-R6696 B 22 April 1971
TM-DSV7-ENV-R6696-1 A 2h July 1970
: HABITABILITY SUPPORT
HS-1 Crew Restraints TM-DSV7-SSL-R6901 23 August 1971
HS-3 Zero G Fecal Collector TM-192, Vol I & II 2h July 1970
HS-h Waste Col & Process A3-250-ACM2-TM-198 19 April 1972
AE-250-ACM2-TM-201 September 1972
A3-250-ACM2-TM-202 September 1972 _
Fairchild MSI15T0123
Fairchild _I15T0122
HS-5 Urine Process & Stor TM-DSV-ACM2-191 May 1970
I0-18
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HS-8 Water Storage Assembly MDC G4175 April 1973
TM-DSV7-F&M-R7057,
Vol. I and II
f
._ HS-IO Food Reconst Disp Unit TM-DSV-F&M-R6915 14 April i_72
HS-II Drink Water Dispenser TM-DSV-F&M-R6938 17 April 1972
( HS-12 Water Heater MDC G3945 November 1972
Hamilton Standard
SVHSER 5728, Vol. I
and Supplement I,
Vol. II and Vol. III
HS-Ih Microbiological Eqp MDC Oh156 April 1973
TM-DSV7-F&M-R7058
: HS-16 Per Hyg Water Disp TM-DSV7-F&M-R6760 15 October 1970
HS-2h Trash Disp Airlock MDC G3364 March 1973 ,_
HS-25 Vac Outlet Valves TM-SIW-SSL-R6358 14 March 1969
TM-SIW-SSL-R6358-1 ii April 1969
; TM-DSV7-SSL-R6358-2 7 January i_69
TM-DSV7-SSL-R6358-3 30 April 1970
HS-31 Radiator & Plume Shield TM-DSVT-F&M-R7060 Ii October 1972
HS-32 Water Storage Cont Bel MDC G3611 19 October 1972
HS-33 Cleansing Solution Test TM-OWS-SSL-R6703 8 May 1970
: HS-34 Waste Management Odor Cont A3-250-ACM2-TM-203 October 1972
Fairchild MSII5T0086,
Barneby Cheney
2341-_ and NASA Ltr.
PM-SL-256-72H
HS-39 UCMSS - Prelim Spec TM-OWS-ACM2-193 20 November 1970
Tests FH/RAD MSl15TO029
HS-46 Heater Controller TM-DSV7-EE-R6875 6 July 1971
TM-DSV7-EE-R6875 A 18 August 1971
HS-h8 Wash Cloth Squeezer Assy TM-DSV7-SSL-RT062 31 August 1972
HS-51 UCMSS - Two-Bag Urine TM-OWS-ACM2-196 7 July 1971
FH/RAD MSII5TO056
HS-55 Urine Centr Sep Assy A3-250-ACM2-TM-20h September 1972
Hamilton Standard
! SVHSER 5965, Vol. I, II,
III_ Book 1 and 2
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HS-56 Urine Sep Flush Disp Assy TM-DSV7-F&M-6989 A 23 June 1972
HS-59 Water Deionization Assy MDC G4181 April 1973
: TM-DSV7-F&M-R7063 (S)
HS-60 Centr Sep (Plexiglass) A3-250 ACM2-TM206 September 1973
Hamilton Standard •
.: SVHSER 5909 '°
HS-61 Two Bag Urine Tracer A3-250-ACM2-TM-205 19 September 1972
Verification Fairchild MSII5TO092
HS-62 Centr Sep Collect MDC Gh132 March 1973
Subsystem TM-DSV7-SSL-R7064
t HS-64 Urine Freezer/Tray Frost TM-DSVT-SSL-R6888 13 July 1971
HS-66 Pr Rel Valve, RTC Sterer DTR-29450-5 A 6 October 1971
HS-67 Trash Bags MDC G4094 February 1973
TM-DSV7-SSL-R7066 A
HS-69 Sleep Restraint Assy Deleted by C.O. 745
HS-73 Waste Tank Screen TM-DSVT-SSL-RT040 21 September 1972 :
• HS-75 Pressure Gage, Trash MDC G3377 April 1973
Disposal Airlock
HS-77 Radiator & Plume Shield MDC G4234 A September 1973
TM--DSV7-F&M-7068 A
HS-78 Potable Water Chiller MDC G4087 March 1973
AiResearch 72-8439,
Rev. 1
HS-80 Condensate Dump Syst MDC G4203 April 1973 .
TM-DSV7-SSL-R7069
HS-81 Waste Tank - Screen Baffle TM-DSV7-SSL-R7039 13 April 1972
HS-89 Urine Subsystem - MDC G4198 April 1973 6
Redesigned TM-DSV7-SSL-RTI46
and Supplement I i
HS-92 Htr Probe Back-up MDC G4205 April 1973 i
TM-DSV7-SSL-R7167 i._
r: 10-20 i '
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SOLAR ARRAY SYSTEM
SA-2 One Third Wing Assy _C Gh078 February 1973
TRW SAS.6-_I89, SAS.
6-3189-1, SAS. 3189-2,
SAS. 6-3189-3, SAS.
6-2088 A
5_C G3958, February 1973
VOLS. I & KK
TRW SAS. 6-28h6
VOLS. I, II, &III
SA-13 Solar Cell Panel TRW SAS. h-3082 13 Jaly 1971
Apprendices: 2h September 1970,
A-8222.8-1875,
SAS.6-1590
B-8222.8-1876,
SAS.6-1591
C-8222.8-1881,
SAS.6-1595
D-EOS 3127-TVTR
SA-Ih Wing Release Mech Tube TM-DSVT-F&M-R6835 1 September 1971
SA-15 Wing Rel Mech Exp Tube _C GhOh9 September 1972
TRW-SAS.6-2983 A
_DC G3958, Vols. I & II September 1972
TRW SAS.6-281_6
Vols. I, II & Ill
SA-16 Hinge Assembly Beam 5_C Gh050 Ceptember 1972
TRW-SAS.6-3188
SA-17 SAS Beam Rel, Exp Tube TM-DSV7-F&M-R689h 9 September 1971
SA-18 Actuator/Damper A3-250-ACAB-TM-7 8 November 1971
TRW-SAS.6-26h3
SA-20 Act/Damper W/Brkn Spring _C Gh000 January 1973
TRW-SAS.6-3285
TRW-SAS.6-2367,
8221.18-22, Add R612
SA-21 Mag Rel Vent Module TM-DSV7-ENV-RTOhl 30 June 1972
SA-22 SAS Vent Module b_C GhCh6 January 1973
TRW-SAS.6-3193,
SAS.6-3193-I, SAS.6-
3193-2
I0-21
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THRUSTER ATTITUDE CONTROL
TC-I Thruster Module Assy TM-DSVT-F&M-R6868, November 1972
Vols. I, II & III
TC-IO Bi-Metal Joint TACS Syst MDC G2113 September 1971
TC-I_ TACS Valve Collar & Seal MDC 4207 April 1973
Evaluation Valcor MR27700-
: 3671-368-1 & -2
TC-14 TACS Pressure S_,itch MDC G4209 April i.°_3
TM-DSV7-F&M-R7150
TC-lb BALL VALVE TM-DSVT-P/M-R7219 21 Dec 1973
L
10-22
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i0.4 TEST PLAN DAC-56697A, QUALIFICATION TESTS
TEST LINE TITLE REPORT NUMBER
ITEM CREW ACCO_4ODATIONS RELATED/VENDOR REPORT DATE
CA-12 Meteoroid Shield Rel Syst TM-DSV7-F&M-R6890 A Ii August 1972
CA-15 Exp Tube TM-DSV7-F&M-R6870 A 28 June 1972
TM-DSV7-SSL-R6874 A 28 June 1972
CA-16 Spare EvD Stow Container MDC G4112, Vols I, March 1973
II, & III
TM-DSVT-ENV-RT048 A
CA-19 Viewing Window & Instal MDC G3761 July 1972
Actron DSV7-DI-029
CA-30 Expand Tube/Strap Syst TM-DSV7-F&M-R7042 A 28 July 1972
CA-31 Expand Tube/Strap Full TM-DSV7-F&M-R7043 22 June 1972
Scale
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
CS-3 Struct Mtd Cons Comp MDC G3998 November 1972
TM-DSVT-EE-7028
DATA ACQUISITION
DA-8 Absolute Press Transducer MDC G7045 February 1973
Statham h308 &
h308B
DA-9 Diff Press Transducer MDC Gh002 March 1973
Celesco Industries
QTR.630937, &
Add. 1 Rev. A
Dynacciences Corp.
QTR.630937, Rev. A
DA-IO Data Acq Modules MDC Gh005 December 1972
TM-DSVT-EE-RT052
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_VIRONMENTAL CONTROL
EC-2 OWS Access Match MDC 3363 May 1972
EC-3 Bellows Seal Airlock MDC 3363 May 1972
EC-4 LH2 Tank Seal Device TM-DSV7-F&M-R6823 ii June 1971
MP-50, 885
EC-12 Thermal Control Assembly TM-DSVT-EE-R6968 2 October 1972
EC-13 Solenoid Vent Valve TM-DSV7-F&M-R6932 17 February 1972
EC-15 Fuel Tank Vent Duct Assy TM-DSV7-F&M-R6855 ii June 1971
Ext.
EC-22 Hab Area Vent & Relief TM-DSV7-F&M-R6878 18 February 1972
Latching Vent & Relief
Valve
EC-27 Ground Thermal Cond Syst TM-DSV7-F&M-R7035 A 25 September 1972
EC-32 Short Duct Waste Tank NPV TM-DSVT-F&M-R6973 B 20 October 1972
System
EC-36 Fan, Cluster Vib MDC G4101 March 1973
TM-DSV7-ENV-R6889 A
EC-37 Fan, WMC Vibration TM-DSV7-L_V-R6885 25 July 1971
%
EC-38 Hab Area Vent Flex Line TM-DSV7-F&M-R6998 A 27 October 1972 i
EC-39 Check Valve, Access Hatch MDC G3375 June 1972
EC-40 Pipe Assy - Ware Tank TM-DSVT-F&M-R6999 3 April 1972 iPress
EC-hl Heat Pipe Installation TM-DSVT-ENV-R7037 3 April 1972
EC-h4 Hatch Rod End Bearing MDC G3376 May 1972
Vib Test
EC-M6 Entry Hatch - Repeat Cycle MDC G3379 October 1972
ELECI'RICAI,SYSTEM
ES-h Zero G Conn _4-DSV7-EE-R6970 A 23 August 1972 i
ES-7 Cont & Displ Panel MDC 0h023 February 1973
TM-DSVT-EE-R6931
ES-II OWS R,-layModules TM-DSV7-EE-R6943 ii April 1972
lO-_h
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ES-13 30Amp G.P. Relay TM-DSVT-EE-R6877 ii November 1971
ES-Ih WMC C & D Panel TM-DSVT-EE-R6939 28 April 1972
ES-15 Module, Isol. Diode TM-DSVT-EE-RT053 A 28 September 1972
ES-16 Series Beg Module TM-DSVT-EE-RTOSh 9 August 1972
HABITABILITY SUPPORT
HS-2 Waste M6mt Subsystem MDC G4176, Vols I, 9 April 1972
: II, III, IV & V
, TM-DSVT-SSL-RT055-1, -2,
-3, -4, -5 Rev A, -6
: &-7
HS-7 Water Subsystem MDC Ghl9h, Vols I, March 1973
TM-DSV-SSL-RT056-4
MDC-GhI9h Vols II, April 1973
III, IV, VI & VII
; TM-DSVT-SSL-R7056-2, -3,
-5, -6, -7, 8 & 9
MDC Ghl9h Vol VIII October 1973
TM-DSVT-SSL-R7056-10
_DC Ghl9 h A Vol V October 1973
TM-DSVT-SSL-RT056-1 A
MS-17 Per Hygiene Subsystem TM-DSVT-SSL-R6993 i0 March 1973
HS-19 Refrig Subsystem MDC GhI80 Vols I, April 1973
II, III, IV & V
TM-DSVT-SSL-R69hO,
-5, -7 a -8
TH-DSVT-F&M-R69hO-2 ._. -6
TM-DSVT-SSL-R6940-1 9 December 1971
TM-DSVT-SSL-R6940-3 2h March 1972
TM-DSVT-F&M-R69hO -h 9 AuEust 1972
TM-DSVT-F&M-R7060 i0 November 197"
HS-26 Vacuum Outlet System .MDC GMII7 February 1973
_4-DSVT-S$L-R7059B
H8-27 Apollo Blower " TM-DSVT-EE-R6690 A I0 March 1971
HS-28 Apollo System A3-250-ACM2-TM-195 22 January 1971
H8-35 Pump Logic Control TM-DSVT-EE-R6967 28 June 1972 ""
H8-36 Radiator Bypass Valve MIX: GhOOb February 1973
Control ler TM-DSV'f-EE-R7027 "
HS-41 Urine Freezer TM-DSVT-SSL-RT038 2 May 1972
10-_"5
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!| Ha-h2 Urine Sample Return Stor l_C G3973 March 1973
Container TM-DSV7-SSL-RT061 A
TM-DSV7-ENV-R7061 &
Supplement 1
i HS-65 1/2 Inch Vacuum TM-DSVT-SSL-R7065 22 May 1972
HS-Th Bioclde Wipes MDC Gh233 April 1973
TM-DSV7-SSL-RT067
! HS-76 Bypass Control blonitor TM-DSV7-EE-R?073 A 9 November 1972
_ HS-85 Urine Freezer (U_.ne and MDC GhlSO April 1973
Blood) TM-DSVT-SSL-ETII0 '
HS-86 Urine/Blood Sample Return MDC Gh152 April 1973
StoraEe Container TM-DSVT-SSL-RTIII
i HS-87 Heater Probe/Am Cond Dum= MDC G4204 April 1973
System TM-DSV7-SSL-R7144 (S)
HS-88 Coolant Pump Inverter MDC Gh193 April lO73
TM-DSV7-EE-RTIh5
HS-90 Urine Subsystem - _DC Gh199 April 1973
Pedesigned TM-DSV7-SSL-?71h7 (S)
HS-91 Urine Ba_ Assy MDC Gh196 April 1973
Hamilton Standard
SVHSER 60h8
HS-9h Water Heater TM-DSVT-P/M-R7228
TM-OWS-ENV-R7210
ILL_41NATION SYSTEM
IS-i General Illumination Light TM-DSV7-EE-R692_ 26 blay 1972
IS-7 General Illumination Light _C Gh155 March 1973
TM-DSV7-_V-RTI07
sou sYszm
SA-I Solar Cell Panel _)C G3958, Vols I & II Feb,. _ry 1973
TRW-SAS.6-28_6
Vols I, II, III ' ""
MDC G_039, Vols I, II, February 1973 ,
III & IV
TaW SAS. h-3130 A, i
Vola I, II &III
SAS.627O7(71-822_.5-_2); i
6-3023; SAS.6-3225 J
10-26
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L; SA-3 SAS lacrUnit &Conn MDC G3999 December 1972
TM-DSV7-EE-R6951
< SA-4 Solar Array System _,_CG432, Vols I, II, January 1973
IIi & IV
TRW SAS. 6-3179, -i,
-2, & -3
; SA-5 CDF Manif Instal TM-DSV7-F&M-R6788 A 19 February 1971
i SA-19 Actuator/Damper _DC GhO47, Vols ! January 1973
: & II
_ TRW SAS.6-3192, -I
-2, -3 & -h
SA-23 SAS Vent Module MDC G3950 November 1972
TRW SAS.6-319h, -i & -2
SA-26 Cinch Bar/Seal MDC G3932 November 1972
TRW SAS.6-3191, -i & -2
THRUSTER ATTITUDE CONTROL
TC-2 Thruster Module Assy _OC G4206, Vols I, April 1973
II, III& IV
TM-DSV7-F&M-R7072
TC-8 TACS Timer Module TM-DSVT-EE-R6946 19 April 1972
TC-9 TACS Pressure Sphere MDC G2119 May 1972
TC-II TACS Timer Delay Module TM-DSVT-EE-R6971 26 July 1972
TC-13 TACS Temp Probe & Press MDC Gh208 April 1973
Switch TM-DSV7-F&M-RTIh9
10-27
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10.5 TEST PLAN DAC-56697A, SPECIAL TESTS
* REPORT NOT TRANSMITTED TO CUSTOMER
TEST LINE TITLE REPORT NUMBER i
• ITEM CREW ACCOMMODATIONS RELATED/VENDOR REPORT DATE i
*ST-]. Neutral Buoyancy Tests Test performed by MSFC .... _
*ST-2 Zero G Test Program Test performed by MSFC .... 1
: ST-7 SAS Cell Sunlight Martin Marietta 13 April 1972 !
_ _ Test MCR-71-320, Vols I & II i
_ ST-8 SAS Panel Sunlight Test Martin Marietta 13 April 1972 I
MCR-71-320, Vols III,
IV&V 1
-1
*ST-9 SAS Module Shadow Test TRW-SAS.4-3117, November 1971 !
Vol II & Append. A i
SAS. 4.3132 April 1972
i
ST-II M-487 Stowage Container I._CGh089 9 February 1973
TM-DSVT-ENV-R-7033 A
ST-12 Flowmeter Transducer MDC 4192 April 1973
Quantum Dyn 482-
ii and 1482-12
ST-13 Pneumatic Separator Syst )._CG2171-P 5 October 1972
Meteoroid Shield TM-0WS-F&M-R6926
ST-lh Meteoroid Shield Depl STA MDC G3369 August 1972
ST-15 Vent Mod Test @ KSC MDC G3378 January 1973
A3-250-ACAB-TM-208
TRW SAS.6-3190
ST-16 Spring Loaded Mech MDC G3993 February 1973
TRW SAS.6-3195
TM-DSV7-ENV-RT071 A
*ST-17 Coolanol 15/Water Oral MDC G4227 April 1973
Sensitivity TM-DSVT-SSL-R7029 '
10-28
ST-18 SAS Solar Cell MDC G4039 February 1973
TRW-SAS.4-3130 A
Vols I, II & III
SAS.6-2707
(71-8224.5-24)
SAS.6-3023
SAS.6-3225
ST-19 RSS Component Evaluation MDC G4135 16 March 1973
ST-20 M-487 Stowage Container TM-DSV7-ENV-R7046 12 June 1972
-, (Modified)
*ST-23 Film Equipment, GFE MDC G4090 February 1973
TM-DSV7-ENV-RT098
*ST-24 Expandable Tube/SAS Strap MDC G4091 February 1973
Jet Research, Report 3
ST-27 Stowed Items Life Test MDC G4223 6 April 1973
ST-2_ Butterfly Hinge, Met Shield MDC G3605 September 1972
ST-29 SAS Solar C_lls TRW SAS.4-3187 June 1972
ST-31 Urine Subsystem - Redesign MDC G4161 April 1973
TM-A3 250-ACM2-TM-209
: ST-34 Mosite & Polyfoa_. Odor MDC G4159 28 February 1973
Generation TM-DSV7-SSL-RTIh8
ST-B5 Trash Lock Funct. MDC G4228 April 1973
Compatiuility TM-DSVT-SSL-R7168
ST-38 Met. Shield-Debonded MDC G3616 March 1973
B/F Finge
ST-B9 TACS Temp. Probe - Leak _,_CGhI20 March 1973
Test MP 52, 244
*ST-h0 SAS Fairing Test-Deorbit Structures TM 171 24 April 1973
Loads
*ST-41 Meteoroid Shield Leading A3-250-AAAO-AT-73-43 13 July 1973
Edge Ballooning Test
ST-43 SAS Fairing Test-Deorbit AB-250-ABFS-M-7315 12 July 1973
Loads ....
10-29
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10.6 MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS
DOCUMENT DATE OF ISSUE TITLE
_ DAC-56695B March, 1970 Man/System Integration Plan
MDC G0384B September, 1972 Contamination Control Plan
MDC G3069 November, 1972 OWS Checkout Report
DAC-56759 December, 1969 Safety System Program Plan
DAC 56698A January, 1971 Production Plan
MDC G2423A November, 1971 OWS Backup Implementation Plan
N/A November, 1972 Microbial Test Sample Report
MDC G3077 24 May 1972 OWS C2F2 Stowage Configuration
MDC G3820 12 August 1972 OWS Delta C2F2 Stowage
Configuration
N/A September, 1972 SAS-SA23 Vent Door Module Flow
Test
DAC-56620C May, 1971 Acoustic Shock and Vibration
Test Criteria
SA-003-001-2H MSFC Document Skylab System Safety Check,
SA-003-002-2H Input
10-30
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APPROVAL
MSFC SKYLAB ORBITAL WORKSHOP
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT
Orbital Workshop Project
The information in this report has been reviewed for security
classification. Review of any information concerning Department
of Defense or Atomic Energy Commission programs has been made
by the MSFC Security Classification Officer. This report, in its
_ entirety, has been determined to be unclassified.
This document has also been reviewed and approved for
technical accuracy.
William K. Simmons, Jr.
Manager, Orbital Workshop Project
Rein Ise
Manager, Skylab Program
i
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